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 ABSTRACT 
The ‘technology’ of risk structures social relationships within and outside of 
organisations, even though risk tends to be perceived externally as objective, neutral 
and apolitical. In adopting a poststructuralist perspective, this research investigates 
the impact of ‘calculating’ risk and how cultural, economic, social, psychological 
and political aspects influence the concept of risk and risk management practices. 
Hence, it provides a contextualized understanding of how risk and risk management 
are constructed intra-organisationally. 
This is a study of risk based on immersion. After six months of critical ethnographic 
fieldwork in a Brazilian development bank, called BrazBank, and applying the 
Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe as well as the Logic of Critical Explanation 
of Glynos and Howarth, this research contextualises and challenges the universal 
logic of the discourse of ‘risk’, from a regulatory point of view.  
This research links macro- and micro-discourses of risk to reveal its ‘hidden power’ 
and to provide a glimpse into the fundamental contingencies in this discourse of 
control. It considers that the potential multiple interpretations of risk allows the 
construction of a hegemonic discourse, with boundaries that constitute and subvert 
certain claims in a rhetorical historic (re-)articulation of power. By doing so, it 
exposes how a technology that was supposed to simplify and enable, creates 
miscommunication in an organisation.  
‘Risk’ became a battleground as controlling the understanding of risk, meant control 
of the organisation. Therefore, reflecting shifts in the international macro-context of 
risk regulation, the power of risk shifted between departments and their managers 
over political mandates and empowered and constructed experts and non-experts. 
This research illustrates different articulations of risk in the BrazBank context, how 
different individuals and groups developed competing interpellations of risk and, by 
examining the role of ideology, how and why certain conceptions of risk 
management practice were conserved, even as an illusion or secret, to maintain 
hierarchical positions and power imbalances.   
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– CHAPTER ONE – 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF RISK 
 
1.1. Risk Constructions in the Western World 
The attempt to have some control over an unpredictable future has a long history in 
human culture, reaching back to the days of priests and oracles who predicted the 
harvest or the outcome of war. In the wake of the Enlightenment and the advent of 
reason and scientism, power was no longer seen to be in the hands of the gods or 
occult forces; humankind took control of its own destiny (Bernstein, 1996). This 
important cultural shift has led to the idealisation of decision-making based on 
evidence, where data has become a compelling force and statistical calculations have 
assumed paramount importance. 
In our contemporary world, those who work predicting the future are still highly 
regarded, but they now take a different form. The most common projections are 
based on statistics and revolve around ‘risks’, and those who claim the ability to 
forecast them are considered as experts of this ‘science’. These experts have the 
power to influence countries, corporations and individuals. They can establish a 
direction of travel and influence strategy. In this way, the domain of risk continues to 
endow power and status – as it did in the era of oracles and priests.  
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It has become a truism in business that the Chinese ideogram for ‘risk’ means both 
‘threat’ and ‘opportunity’, and this gives clues to the reasons behind the hegemonic 
status risk has assumed in the modern world. This dual conceptualisation, with 
disparate elements, provides power to this concept which can be used to construct 
different pictures of the future. Throughout human history, the idea of risk was 
presented as the unknown: the elements beyond our view and delimited by our 
imagination. The idea that the world would come to an end – as well as the 
numerous maps that represented this flat earth and its beasts – was common a few 
hundred years ago. Additionally, the assumption was that by avoiding sin and hence 
the punishment for committing sin, a person could remove suffering from their life 
or avoid hell, while also achieving greatness and success in their lifetime. Nowadays, 
the future is still an unknown, as are the possible scenarios that it could present. This 
is likewise related to possible benefits and hazards that could be presented. For that 
reason, we keep creating methods to deal with this uncertainty, which is commonly 
constructed with interests hidden in principles.  
The domain of the future, through the concept of risk, is broad. Spiegelhalter et al. 
(2011) have highlighted how people, who may or may not be numerate, are 
constantly misled by statistical information. For instance, politicians are able to 
present a vision that will benefit certain voters, knowing that the realisation of that 
vision will be problematic or even unlikely. Another example comes from the 
assurances that precede major sporting events, like the World Cup or the Olympic 
Games. Those events are presented as likely to boost economies and increase the 
incomes of host countries; however, this is not always the case (Jennings, 2007; 
Shaw, 2008). The causes of diseases and possible treatments for them are another 
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example of futures constructed according to a purpose. To take a specific example, 
the results of cardiac surgery in the USA are published according to the relevant 
mortality rates, while in the UK they are published according to survival rates; these 
different approaches are related to the private and public health policies, 
respectively, adopted by each country (Spiegelhalter et al., 2011). 
All of these uncertain events use the metaphor of risk to portray controllable 
scenarios. Even the weather forecasts on the news are presented in a way that makes 
us feel certain that tomorrow it will rain, although these predictions might sometimes 
have only small margins of accuracy (Gigerenzer et al., 2005). Therefore, 
considering that the weather forecast system is the result of centuries of development 
and research but still gives predictions that are not complete or fully accurate, how 
can we believe in calculations involving more complex contexts such as markets and 
organisations?  
My thesis is a theoretical, paradigmatic, practical, methodological and personal 
reflection of inquiries that I have been undertaking during my time as a researcher 
and practitioner in the field of risk management. I have always been intrigued about 
the way we consider, portray and seek to the control the future – particularly claims 
of reliable controllability of a framed future. In this chapter, I introduce the thesis, 
beginning with a short summary of how risk is constructed and moving on to outline 
my research goals and objectives. I present a brief introduction to the field, present 
my research questions and outline the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
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1.2. The Importance of Risk Constructions 
Firstly, it is important to understand the relevance of risk. Risk is a key element in 
modern society, legitimising decisions and decision-makers (Bauman, 2007; Miller 
and Power, 2013). We cannot change the past, but we are constantly trying to control 
the future. In this attempt, risk provides support through calculative practices, which 
will show the path followed and the elements included in decision-making processes. 
Although many decisions involve pondering some risks, the construction of risk 
seems to be quite different from one event or individual to another (Slovic, 2000; 
Adams, 1995). For that reason, the comprehension of the construction of risk, and 
what is included and excluded in each construction, is a fundamental matter.  
We often think of ‘risk’ in our daily lives. People think about risk when they make 
plans about their future and even before crossing a road. This is all done without 
reference to statistics, indicating that we have a well-developed sense of everyday 
risk. Nevertheless, the definitions of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ in finance and 
accounting establish risk as a calculation process, different from the common-sense 
notion and ignoring subjectivity and human influences such as gut feeling, or 
instinct, as well as the importance of political interests in the construction of risk. 
Consequently, in accounting and finance, decision-makers purport to use a definition 
of ‘risk’ which holds that it is a pure and objective concept.  
Different individuals, nonetheless, will view risk differently according to their life 
experience, culture, appetite for risk and other aspects like age, education level, 
average income et cetera (Adams, 1995). Most of the time, this is done without 
reference to numbers, and people trust their instincts and experiences to determine 
what is good or bad, or right or wrong, and make decisions about what to do or when 
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to act. In accounting and finance, however, there are more restrictions around 
classifying something as a risk. Following the proposition of Knight (1921), risk is 
measurable, and if we are dealing with events or elements of decisions that are not 
measurable, then they must be categorised as uncertainties. However, for me, this 
dichotomy is problematic.  
As a researcher and practitioner in this field, I observed that the idea of risk was 
more flexible than its descriptions in guidelines and norms usually propose (BIS, 
1988; 2003; 2013). Indeed, considering changes in this concept throughout its 
history, the idea of risk has been shifted from a highly quantitative conceptualisation 
to a more qualitative one. Therefore, acknowledging changes in guidelines as well as 
in daily risk management practices within organisations, I embarked on an 
investigation of the reasons behind risk constructions.  
Contrary to guidelines and regulatory statements about risk, this thesis embraces the 
complexity and dynamics of risk construction reflecting on its object-subject 
interface. There is no risk ‘out there’, waiting to be discovered. Hence, even if risk is 
an important technique to deal with future outcomes and scenarios, nothing and 
everything can be considered as a risk before its materialization in dangers, crises or 
accidents (Power, 2004; 2009; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). For that reason, more 
important than search for ‘what risk is’, is to understand how things become risks, as 
this is a driver for many other decisions within our modern Western society.  
During my studies, I perceived that this duality between risk and uncertainty was 
more than just a technical device used to operationalise decision-making processes. 
This dichotomy was also an instrument applied to legitimate decisions and decision-
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makers and that shifts the focus of problems according to interests, which were not 
commonly explicit. For instance, during the subprime crisis, the construction of risk 
shifted the focus from the capitalist attempts to maximise profit and accumulate 
wealth to technical and regulatory issues, such as governance structures, which could 
be ‘fixed’ in order to re-establish the trust and security in financial and stock markets 
(Glynos et al., 2015). Another example was the current scandal in the largest oil 
company in Brazil, Petrobras, involving politicians and CEOs of large multinational 
corporations in vast corruption conspiracies that have threatened the economic 
stability of Brazil’s economy itself. Nonetheless, the media and government framed 
as and reduced this problem to corporate governance issues, and then, proposed 
changes bounded by technical solutions. There are many contemporary examples – 
the possibility that the UK will leave the EU, the war against terrorism, the benefits 
of the Olympic games, policies on immigration, or even epidemics, like Ebola or 
Zika, all involved constructions of risk. In each of those cases, threats and 
opportunities are deliberately constructed, even as principles, in order to support 
hidden interests, power imbalances or powerful positions. For that reason, here, risk 
is portrayed as a social and political tool in the construction or creation of enemies 
and allies. 
 
1.3. Research Goals and Objectives 
The goal of this thesis is to develop a better informed discursive understanding of the 
construction of risk in accounting and finance by focusing on subjectivity, rather 
than on the simplistic rational calculation of risks. Therefore, it differs from the most 
examples of research in accounting and finance and regulatory frameworks, that 
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define ‘risk’ as a quantifiable and objective concept, as opposed to ‘uncertainty’, as a 
concept that is deeply uncertain, subjective, qualitative and unquantifiable (see 
Chapter 3). Stirling (2010: 1031) states that ‘an overly narrow [quantitative] focus on 
risk is an inadequate response to incomplete knowledge’. So, here, the construction 
of risk is considered as ‘contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and 
out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and 
transmitted within an essentially social context’ (Crotty, 2003: 42). 
This research assumes that the narrow view of risk, and hence, risk management, has 
political rationales for conveying the idea of control and objectivity (see Chapter 3). 
As a result, the focus of this thesis is on the ‘technology’ of risk, as a concept that 
structures social relationships within and outside of organisations. Each definition of 
risk includes, but also excludes, elements that will then interfere in the identification 
and, hence, assessment of risk (see Chapter 4.3). 
In practice, the flexibility and fluidity of risk, as a concept, are intriguing, and ‘risk’, 
as a signifier, has been used differently according to diverse interests and purposes. 
My previous professional experience, as an intern, a consultant, risk manager, and 
then, member of an Executive Board, provided me with a broad understanding in 
relation to risk in Brazilian financial and non-financial institutions since 2006. 
During this period, I realised how people interacted with management tools, gaps 
between how they worked theoretically and in practice as well as discourses 
developed internally and externally, within departments and hierarchies and in 
different contexts. I observed that there was a ‘hidden power’ in this construction of 
risk (Hines, 1988) and political interests took advantage of the definitions of the 
boundaries of risk and risk management. While I was an intern, this understanding 
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was not clear, but as I moved upwards in and interacted with organisational 
hierarchies, it became increasingly clear. These experiences drove my interest in 
understanding the gap between theories and practices of risk management. Under 
demands from new international guidelines, which were requesting a focus on ‘risk 
culture’ and ‘risk appetite’ (IRM, 2011, 2012), I understood that in order to 
understand this current proposition of risk construction, first, I must understand each 
reality as multi-faceted (Hines, 1988).  
There is a long-standing dispute concerning the objective and subjective nature of 
risk (Bernstein, 1996). Accordingly this study examines the ‘discursive’ construction 
of the notion of risk by interrogating how organisational ‘actors’ construct the 
concept of risk to suit a particular purpose, comprehending and criticising political 
imbalances that privilege some aspects of risk while ignoring others that do not fit 
with the hegemony of modern financial risk and neo-liberal rationality. This is done, 
by posing and answering the following questions: what is ‘risk’ according to 
different organisational actors?; and how is the concept of risk mobilised to 
legitimate actors’ political interests? Accordingly, with this background, this study 
shifts to the organisational environment to comprehend how these different views of 
‘risk’ impact upon, are received by, and are spread within the organisational context.  
The principal research questions are: 
RQ1. How is the concept of risk constructed to meet the demands of certain 
powerful organisational actors (including internal and external stakeholders 
such as employees, experts, governments, and other corporations)? 
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RQ2. What is the importance of subjectivity in the construction of risk, and the 
practical implementation and development of risk management?  
RQ3. How do individual conceptions about ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ 
influence the implementation of a risk management framework and 
conceptions of ‘risk appetite’ and ‘risk culture’ at the organisational level? 
 
1.4. Approaching the Constructions of Risk 
To gain a deep understanding of the social and cultural processes involved in the 
creation of risk as a concept requires an appropriate methodology, and I have chosen 
a critical ethnographic approach that has allowed me to undertake an in-depth 
examination of the workings and politics of decision-making within a Brazilian 
development bank. My analysis focuses on the role of the construction of the idea of 
risk and its calculation, and investigates how cultural, economic, social, 
psychological, and political aspects influence the concept of risk and risk 
management. This perspective, thus, provides the understanding of risk at different 
hierarchal levels and within and between different departments in internal decisions 
about internal control and audit processes and external decisions relating to credits 
grants, microcredit loans and project financing.  
Previous studies have highlighted that the dynamics of risk management depend on 
the specific industry and individual characteristics of companies (Arena et al., 2010; 
Woods, 2011; Mikes, 2011). In particular, I questioned whether the concept of risk 
employed allows for the distinction of accounting and finance ‘risk’ specialists to 
appear as experts, and consequently the construction of risk as a way of maintaining 
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the power imbalance and the illusion of control over financial cycles. Based on the 
idea that risk calculations are ipso-facto (after the ‘real’ decision has already been 
made), thus, my research states that the construction of ‘risk’ and risk management 
empower, rather than inform, decision-makers. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
research, there is arbitrariness within the rules that suggest that risk is a quantifiable 
concept, and there is arbitrariness in how a bank or other financial or non-financial 
institution decides to follow and implement those rules. Consequently, there is no 
absolute or true ‘risk’.  
Based on the arguments developed by Carter (2008) for accounting concepts such as 
cost, this research assumes that risk is ‘constructed technically, methodologically and 
politically’, so as to meet certain desired results (see Chapter 4). I then argue that 
risk is essentially a qualitative, subjective, social concept. Individuals and 
organisations construct the idea of risk to suit their own particular ‘political’ 
purposes. Building on this foundation, I analyse the formation of social and political 
identities characterised by antagonism and uncertainty at multiplelevels, including 
the discursive enunciation of views and perspectives of the ‘actors’ interested in risk 
management (Carter, 2008: 156). Furthermore, the thesis argues that political 
interests tend to be revealed in risk decisions and that internal politics obscure 
specific risks so as to maintain the ‘sensation’ of safety and objectiveness, and 
moreover, to maintain control (Beck, 1992; Power, 2009; Carter, 2008; Mikes, 
2009).  
In the banking sector, ‘prudence regulations’ using risk management as an 
instrument for their operationalization were disseminated among many countries by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in coalition with the Bank 
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for International Settlements (BIS) (see Chapter 2). Even in non-financial 
organisations, risk managements tools, frameworks and guidelines were adopted as 
‘best practices’, and, as an example, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission’s (COSO) guidelines were disseminated and employed 
all over the world (Power, 2009). Therefore, this research aims to explore the 
difficulties imposed by a regulatory monolithic positivist view of risk, how such a 
view affects the development of a culture of risk, and its role in determining the 
organisational risk appetite in contrast to individual appetites.  
This discussion is important in answering contradictory outcomes from mainstream 
and critical research on risk, which has not considered the importance of pondering 
human constructions of risk, and in turn, the relevance of their comprehension and 
perception within risk management practices. Thus, this study examines how risk is 
constructed at the social, political, and cultural levels, and examines the influence of 
this Western concept in a developing country. Exposing the multiple politically 
inclined layers of risk construction, this research constitutes the first significant 
study in the field of accounting and financial risk management to adopt a post-
structuralist paradigm and therefore is expected to make a significant contribution to 
knowledge. Equally, its empirical focus on Brazil is interesting, as previous studies 
in ‘risk’ have tended to treat it as a ‘Northern’ and universal concept.  
This research contributes to the study of risk from more critical paradigms in 
accounting and finance, and investigates it from sociological, political, and historical 
perspectives (Miller, 2001; Carter, 2008), based on linguistic, social, political, and 
psychoanalytical analysis. Consequently, it challenges the neo-classical economic 
and positivist perspective that permeates research in accounting and finance and 
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recognises broader sociological and political factors. This research enables the study 
of specific risk management practices, which would respond to the need for more 
organisational studies on this topic (Gephart et al., 2009; Power, 2009). Further, it 
caters to the need for more holistic approaches in the analysis of practices of risk 
management that pay more attention to a wide range of cultural paradigms 
(Lounsbury, 2008), enabling a greater understanding of the role and limitations of 
management accounting and the implications of broader conceptions of risk for the 
management of organisations (Collier and Berry, 2002). Therefore, in exploring the 
discursive nature (constructed) of the concept of risk, my research begins to fill in 
the gaps identified. 
Furthermore, this discussion contributes to our current understanding of risk, in the 
wake of the ongoing global financial crisis. My research concentrates on the 
influence of subjectivity on corporate risk management and the failures of 
quantitative models of risk management. It is also practically oriented, which 
supports organisations in the implementation of risk management by highlighting the 
importance of subjectivity, culture and complexity in this process. Much research 
argues that the implementation of risk management is complex and struggle (Mikes, 
2009; Arena et al., 2010; Woods, 2011). My study, then, suggests that these 
complexities cannot be resolved through traditional positivist research, for it 
abstracts the subject, holding a subject-object duality, generalises and is superficial 
to organisational reality (Crotty, 1998; Chua, 1986). Furthermore, there are few 
critical contributions exploring how risk management works in practice, and even 
fewer, addressing how the organisation develops its own conception of risk and how 
it contributes to a style of risk management (Gephart et al., 2009; Power, 2009).  
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My thesis, hence, examines different hierarchical levels, departments and individuals 
working within the framework of risk, demonstrating that the concept of risk has 
different meanings and purposes, even within a single organisation. Post-
structuralism argues for an ontological and multi-faceted conceptualisation of reality, 
and advocates the importance of listening to different voices and recognising power 
relationships and imbalance. Post-structuralism focuses on how subjects mobilise 
objects and meanings, and considers the historical context related to power, politics 
and conflict (see Chapter 4). From this perspective, it is possible to understand more 
adequately that social artefacts, like risk, are not neutral and are political. This 
insight lend weight to my analysis of the importance of concepts such as ‘risk 
appetite’ and ‘risk culture’, proposing a deep understanding of the social process of 
defining risk, the complexities of the social and political processes that underlie that 
definition, and the sophistication required in the implementation of risk management 
in Brazilian development banks. 
‘Risk management’ has become a prime reference (nodal point) for corporate 
governance in firms. However, this research is not merely focused on technical 
artefacts and frameworks of risk management, but on the way that subjects (actors) 
interact with them, and thus, construct the idea of ‘risk’ and risk management in this 
particular organisational context. As a result, my research gives ‘readings’ and 
‘interpretations’ and invites readers to choose which discursive construction that they 
are more persuaded by. 
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1.5. Structuring an Argument about Risk Constructions 
This thesis comprises of nine chapters. Firstly, I introduce the regulation of risk 
management in the Brazilian financial system, pondering where it has come from 
and its impacts (Chapter 2). It also critically illustrates the articulation of risk in 
accounting (Chapter 3), whilst opening a space for Discourse Theory (DT) critiques 
about mainstream claims (Chapter 4). Then, after an explanation of the 
methodological approach of this thesis (Chapter 5), the second part of this thesis 
focuses on the empirical outcomes from my fieldwork (Chapter 6, 7 and 8). These 
elements are described in more details below. 
As already discussed, I have chosen for my setting a Brazilian development bank. In 
order to situate my research findings I use the following chapter to introduce the 
macro-context of my fieldwork in the Brazilian banking sector. The chapter 
highlights the importance of these financial institutions to the progress of developing 
countries like Brazil, exploring the structure of this financial system and focusing on 
the roles of development banks in this context. Further, it examines the emergence of 
risk and the influence of structural adjustment programmes from international 
financial agencies, such as the IMF and World Bank, and international conventions, 
such as the sound practices from the Basel Accord, to Brazilian regulatory 
statements. Finally, the chapter explores problems related to (supposedly neutral) 
imported solutions, demonstrating the inadequacies of risk management 
requirements to BDBs.  
The third chapter presents a critique of the imposition of accounting technologies of 
governance that are sustained by positivist claims, which reinforce the neutrality and 
objectivity in accounting numerical figures. Thus, the chapter is a reflection on the 
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impact of the mainstream accounting research in the conceptualisation and 
management of risk practices. Here, the multiple layers of accounting and risk are 
exposed in order to emphasise the influence of subjects. Both accounting and risk are 
defined trough the inclusion and exclusion of elements that are used to support 
powerful actors’ interests. Consequently, any representation of risk, or accounting, 
would reflect implicit choices made about what it might be useful to communicate, 
or not, to empower some groups. Therefore, this is always a discourse about power 
and persuasion, nonetheless, one that is concealed by positivist claims used to 
segregate the subject from the object of risk management decisions. 
Any researcher enters the research space with a set of theoretical and methodological 
tools and my theoretical approach to research is outlined in Chapter 4. Here, first, I 
present a reflection about the harms caused by the imposition of risk regulation as a 
necessary tool for Brazilian progress (Chapter 2), through the lenses of post-colonial 
theory and Spivak’s concept of subaltern and epistemic violence. Subsequently, I 
explore the relevance of the post-structuralist discourse theory (DT) of Laclau and 
Mouffe (1990; 2001; 2014) to investigate risk management practices. DT 
understands the ‘politics’ of inclusion (limited definitions of risk and the hegemonic 
impacts of this) and exclusion (excluding alternative paradigmatic and disciplinary 
conceptions of risk) used to create and support power imbalances. I mobilise DT to 
contextualise how the main elements of DT can be useful for understanding risk. 
Hence, I consider that the potential multiple interpretations of risk allow the 
construction of a hegemonic discourse with boundaries, which constitutes and 
subverts certain claims in a rhetorical historic (re-)articulation of power. 
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The more detailed nuts-and-bolts of my research project are discussed in Chapter 5, 
where I focus on my role as a researcher, addressing questions about ‘what’, ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ a critical ethnographic approach was chosen to collect my empirical 
material as well as justifying the Logic of Critical Explanation (LOCE) used for my 
empirical analysis. The LOCE is a method for applying DT, considering the current 
rules and regulation of risk management practices (social logic), contestations 
around the emergence, implementation and re-articulation of risk rules throughout 
the organisational history (political logic), and how subjects are ‘gripped’ by 
fantasies – ideological presuppositions and pathologies – that sustain their identity 
(fantasmatic logic). Therefore, this chapter provides the foundations to my empirics.  
After that, I present my results in three chapters that explore in turn the social, 
political, and fantasmatic logics of risk management in the development bank. In my 
first empirical chapter (Chapter 6), covering the Social Logic of Risk, I explore the 
different articulations of risk in the BrazBank context and compare external 
disclosures and internal practices of risk, as well as how different individuals and 
groups developed competing interpellations of risk. In short, the construction of risk 
in the BrazBank was contradictory, as the discourse of risk was constructed with 
signifiers of ‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’, despite incorporating subjectivity and 
judgment in its conception and practice.  
In the following empirical chapter (Chapter 7), examining the Political Logic of 
Risk, and how discourses of risk shifted over time, I explain how the discourse of 
risk empowers and constructs the identity of “experts” and “non-experts” in relation 
to risk as well as ‘secrets’ used to maintain hierarchical positions and power 
imbalances. This chronological genealogy of risk analyses historical constructions of 
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risk, and how the power shifts of risk discourses have also represented power shifts 
between departments and their managers over different political mandates in the 
BrazBank. This has also reflected shifts in the international macro-context of risk 
management discourse. The construction of risk has empowered and disempowered 
terrains for certain actors and departments to claim power and visibility inside the 
Bank. Throughout its history, in effect, ‘risk’ became a battleground in the BrazBank 
as controlling the understanding of risk, in effect, meant control of the organisation.  
Chapter 8, examining the role of ideology, exposes how and why certain conceptions 
of risk management practice are maintained. In sum, this chapter demonstrates that 
‘risk’ operates as an ideological cover for Brazilian agents and the Bank’s actors as 
the international conception of ‘risk’ is presented as the ‘solution’. This proposition 
of ‘the right path to follow’ coming from outside implied conceptualizations of 
weakness against international knowledge, suggesting that BrazBank actors were not 
strong enough to contest inadequacies in risk regulatory statements. This idea was 
supported by desire for an objective measurable future and attempts to legitimate 
experts’ actions by propositions of ‘doing the best’ or ‘adding value’, even if these 
constructions were problematic.  
In Chapter 9, I present the conclusions I have drawn as a result of this in-depth study. 
To summarise, this research advocates that the technology of risk is employed to 
assign, and to avoid blame, in a technology of miscommunication through claims of 
expertise. The inclusion and exclusion of groups and the polarity between ‘experts’ 
and ‘non-experts’ reflect and perpetuate an international discourse of domination 
(from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Big 4 consultancy firm, to 
the Brazilian Central Bank, and then, Brazilian development banks). Consequently, 
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for the BrazBank and Brazil, failures of risk are not ‘micro-failures’, but 
international ‘failures’ of ‘best practice’ conceptualisations, which allow certain 
actors to avoid blame for failures. Thus, as a study of politics, this is a study of 
control; however, multiple actors and interests claim power, influence and control 
through the interpellation of risk.  
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– CHAPTER TWO – 
 
THE BRAZILIAN CONTEXT AND RISK REGULATION 
 
2.1. Introduction 
My research is situated in the context of the Brazilian finance sector, so I begin by 
providing a sketch of recent Brazilian economic history considering its aspiration for 
and struggles with ‘order and progress’ and then provide a more detailed account of 
the role of development and then development banks in the country. Situated as part 
of the neoliberal ideology of progress and development, I explore how the 
hegemonic discourse of risk was contested and established in this space, considering 
structural and regulatory changes in the Brazilian financial sector. In embracing the 
influence of ‘risk’ as an advanced capitalist discourse, I examine the regulation of 
Brazilian financial institutions and provide a critique of ‘best practice’, ‘efficiency’, 
‘progress’ and ‘development’ which were embedded in the process of risk 
management implementation. Consequently, this chapter examines the following 
questions: What is the genealogy of risk in Brazil and in Brazilian Development 
Banks? What is the impact of the imposition of risk in Brazil and in Brazilian 
Development Banks? 
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In short, development is crucial for Brazil, as an emerging economy. Nonetheless, 
the imposition of the concept of ‘risk’ in Brazil represented a choice made and 
privileged the idea of risk over that of uncertainty. In development banks, this was a 
logic imposed by the requirements of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank, and supranational bodies like the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). Risk management was initially proposed for regulating the financial sector, in 
general, but it had pervasive effects particularly on Brazilian Development Banks 
(BDBs). In sum, the logic of risk dominated the logic of development, privileging an 
idea of progress focused on the economic logic of risk over the social logic of 
development. This chapter sheds light on this political process embracing the 
organising questions: what was the role of this particular concept of risk in these 
regulations? How have the concepts of risk and risk management practices supported 
fantasies of ‘progress’? And, why have they been constructed? Furthermore, this 
chapter offers the basis for a more coherent exploration of political processes that 
will later be revealed by my fieldwork, by scrutinising international power 
imbalances between entities and macro-actors that played a role in the construction 
of risk. Finally, this chapter shows how the logic of risk was constructed as the right 
path to follow, as ‘the’ solution to the problems of the Brazilian financial system and 
the economic situation, representing the only way towards progress, and the 
problems caused by this framing.  
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2.2. Brief Contextualisation of Brazil 
Brazil has stamped on its flag an aspiration for ‘order and progress’, but throughout 
its history, this aspiration has undergone many vicissitudes. Formerly a colony of 
Portugal and with a history marked by slavery, natural resource exploitation and 
military dictatorship, Brazil has emerged as one of the BRICS
1
 and the largest 
economy of Latin America and the southern hemisphere (IMF, 2015). However, 
progress in Brazil is far from uniform. High indices of social inequality and a large 
proportion of the population in deep poverty (PNUD, 2014) are contrasting 
indicators in a country that is the seventh largest economy in the world, causing 
continuing concern, and leading to growing dissatisfaction.  
After decades of hyperinflation, a strict programme of monetary stabilisation carried 
out via the Real Plan in 1994 supported economic development in Brazil. A 
stabilised economic situation at the expense of high social costs was the legacy of 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s period of government between 1995 and 
2002. After that, President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva worked to reduce social 
problems during his period of government. Between 2003 and 2011, he rolled out a 
state welfare reform with the ‘Bolsa Familia’ programme providing a minimum 
income for 14 million families with children. This and other government 
                                                 
 
 
1 The term BRICS here is not accepted uncritically, but considered as a relevant symbolic construction which has 
attracted investors to these countries while ignoring their different aetiologies and conflicts of interest in some 
sort of common vision of growth (Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003; Armijo, 2007; Fourcade, 2013; Sotero, 
2013). In this sense, it is used solely to reinforce the importance of Brazil in the world economy. 
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programmes achieved a poverty reduction of 28 per cent in a decade at a cost of only 
0.5 per cent of GDP (Economist, 2015). This proved to be a clever double-edged 
initiative that also boosted domestic consumption by enlarging the spending power 
of the lower-middle class and thus increasing aggregate demand.  
Lula also promoted the increasing freedom of the federal police to investigate 
corruption schemes. However, this led to an increasing focus, for instance, on 
investments in the World Cup and Olympic Games
2
. In 2012, Brazilians started 
questioning how their country, which had no money to help the poor, could afford to 
invest in massive stadiums
3
, leading to the request for a ‘FIFA standard’ in 
everything, particularly public transport, education, and health services. In 2013, a 
wave of protests that had been building for decades spilled out onto the streets, 
exposing the contradictions between the country’s social and economic 
achievements, which downgraded previously optimistic forecasts for Brazilian 
economy (Economist, 2009; 2013).  
                                                 
 
 
2 The demonstrations that took place in Brazil, in 2012, before the World Cup are considered the first mark of 
contradictions presented in the routes chosen by the Workers’ Party government to carry out Brazil’s progress 
project. Recently, more corruption scandals were uncovered by the federal police, like the one involving the 
state-owned oil company (Petrobras), construction corporations and political parties, which ended up 
undermining the pillars of the left wing project and providing power to right wing political parties (Saad-Filho & 
Boito, 2015). 
3 These are not the only causes of Brazil’s current situation; only the most current elements embraced in the 
news and by the population. Thus, this comment reflects the priorities for Brazilian population and is not focused 
on traditional neoliberal economic perspectives about growth and progress (c.f. Singer, 2013; Saad-Filho, 2013).  
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In the spotlight, Brazil showed the world that it had overcome its period of 
hyperinflation, but that the country was still struggling to contain internal conflicts. 
The persistent recurrence of signals about the impact of the financial crisis and the 
cooling of Brazil’s economic growth, combined with a fall in exports as its trading 
partners struggled with crises of their own, led to a loss of market confidence. This 
economic vulnerability was later exacerbated by rising inflation, and the revelation 
of widespread corruption schemes in different government spheres and activities, 
particularly, after the elections in 2014. In conclusion, it leaves the queries: What is 
the right path to follow? Where is the solution to Brazilian recurrent problems? 
Considering its extraordinarily rich lands and a wealth of resources, Brazil has the 
potential to become self-reliant, were it not for its hesitation about the ‘right path to 
follow’. From such a view, a country that has followed the neoliberal reforms, 
especially during the 1970s, is now trying to find its own way to a more prosperous 
future. However, this is not something new, as Brazil has always struggled with 
constraints imposed by its history and its place in a global, interconnected market 
system. As an impact of its colonial history, Brazil has long been dominated by its 
historical commitment to supporting the Portuguese economy. Moreover, the IMF 
debts incurred during the period of Brazil’s industrialisation have cast a long 
shadow. The constant questions about ‘how to develop?’ expresses an uncertainty 
about the country’s ability to forge its own path since constraints are unpredictable 
but potentially powerful. As a result, Brazil’s development path has been 
characterised by an imitative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) following 
the logics of culture, practices, and structures imported from developed countries, 
especially the USA and European countries. 
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In this globalised capitalist version of the economy, therefore, the moderators are not 
the nation-states and their governments, but international actors, and mostly private 
ones (Friedman, 2000; Milanovic, 2003; Weiss, Seyle and Coolidge, 2013). 
Supranational bodies like the IMF propose universal agendas of development, for 
instance, through financial liberalisation and prudential regulation in developing 
countries, although the real intent lying behind this policy platform is difficult to 
grasp, and requires more research. Conversely, different countries suffer from 
various constraints and have different priorities. For that reason, Rodrik (2010) 
argues that development processes require a selective and contextualised choice of 
reforms, focused on prioritising and sequencing these reforms. It is hard to 
encourage education when parents do not know if their children will become adults 
or if they will die in a civil war or as a result of contagious diseases and epidemics. 
The neoliberal propositions have primarily focus on complementary reforms to 
support the free movement of capital, nonetheless, they carry with them an inherent 
bias towards universal solutions and ‘best practices’ (Rodrik, 2008), as if social 
welfare was an inevitable consequence of economic growth.  
The implementation of prudential regulation and then risk management practices in 
Brazil could be perceived as just one more example of these ‘solutions’ coming from 
outside. Brazil followed the latest global market fashion wave arriving in the wake of 
the discourse of the need for transparency, accountability, and governance in a 
globalised world. By contrast, the perspective I take in this research is to suggest that 
we do not know ex ante what works and what does not. Hence, these global solutions 
coming from outside must be scrutinised. The relevance of context-specific 
problems, in which supposed principles hide interests, needs to be revealed. Thus, 
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the intention of the approach adopted here is not on to focus on what policies should 
be, but rather, to reveal their actual impact and hidden original intents.  
In this context, to understand markets and economies properly, we must 
acknowledge that they are embedded in a broad range of institutional relations 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Rodrik (2004) suggests that people tend to think of the market as disembodied from 
politics, and this is a core tenet of the universalising neoliberal ideology. However, 
there are no self-created, self-regulated, self-stabilised and self-legitimated markets. 
There is also a necessity to contextualise regulatory statements by taking into 
account social, economic, cultural, and political structures (Hopwood, 1983) as well 
as the accounting technologies, tools and measures used to support actors in this 
market (Hopper and Armstrong, 1999). Thus, we must have contextualised 
explanations to understand the proposition of risk in Brazil, generally, and in 
Development Banks, specifically.  
The following sections explore the emergence of risk as a transitional logic for 
neoliberal propositions of development and progress that have ignored the specific 
priorities of Brazil. They outline the struggles to achieve the desired progress, and 
the specificities of the Brazilian financial system, focusing mainly on the role of 
development banks and the clash between BDBs’ roles and prudential regulations in 
this context. Nevertheless, the elements exposed here represent only a snapshot of a 
much broader structured programme of ‘globalisation’ and consider only the 
contradictions implied in the emergence of risk regulatory statements in the Brazilian 
context.  
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2.2.1.  The Problematic Conceptualisation of ‘Order and Progress’4 
Progress could be conceived as the process that leads countries toward a state of 
perfection that has its highest point in Western civilisation. However, Adorno 
(1969/1998) rejects this totalising concept of progress, characterising it as a 
‘progressive domination’. Within the emergence of Western rationalism, Adorno and 
Horkheimer (1973/1997) outline this trend toward ‘progressive domination’ by the 
scientific project, which reduces the qualitatively different to a quantitative identity 
that has its rationale in the precept, ‘science is measurement’, and then proposes the 
control of nature. Adorno and Horkheimer state that the instrumental manipulation of 
nature leads to the exploitation of man, reification of human relations, and hence, 
that technical signs of progress would result in a loss, decline, and deterioration of 
humans. Given that, Adorno (1998) considered that this idea of a universal scientific 
approach towards progress alienated the human component of culture among men. 
                                                 
 
 
4 The motto Order and Progress in the flag of Brazil is inspired by Auguste Comte's (1830) positivist motto: 
‘Love as principle, order as basis, and progress as goal’. Given this positivist perspective, Comte’s rationale 
introduces the importance of scientific doctrines and the valorisation of methods. Equally, progress became 
almost an axiom in social science literature after the revolution provoked in 1859 by Darwin and his book ‘Origin 
of Species’. These positivist claims based on a scientific idea of progress were also embedded in regulations of 
risk management and the construction of risk in accounting. Thus, the impacts of this paradigmatic construction 
on risk management discourse are further scrutinised in Chapter 3. 
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In economic terms, however, Douthwaite (1992) asserts that progress is traditionally 
related to an evolutionary process of lifting people out of poverty and enabling them 
to have better living standards. Moreover, the field of scientific rationality and 
technicality considered the basis, which would lead men to freedom and well-being. 
Dupas (2006) conversely reminds us that progress represents a dominant discourse 
of global elites that involves exclusion, wealth concentration, underdevelopment, 
severe environmental damage, and assaulting and restricting of human rights. For 
that reason, it is important to understand who is privileged by progress as, according 
to Habermas (1970), in industrially developed capitalist societies, domination tended 
to lose its characteristic of exploitation and repression to cover itself with the cloak 
of rationality. 
Neoclassical economics emphasises the direct correlation between economic growth 
and welfare and equality. In the 1980s, neoliberal ideas sustained by the process of 
globalisation portrayed the State as the main villain of development, blamed for 
inefficiency and bureaucracy (Chang, 2003; Pollitt, 2003; Hupe and Hill, 2007). This 
dogma emphasized that an open market and privatisation will lead to economic 
stabilisation and all the benefits that supposedly follow it. This doctrine resurrects 
the concept of progress associated with global market freedom and a positive view of 
the logic of capital. However, political parties might conceive these welfare 
expectations in different ways, proclaiming that they look after the entire population, 
even if the most visible beneficiary of development processes has been corporate and 
individual elites (Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik, 2004). 
Therefore, to understand the historical and spatial patterns of growth and 
development, it is necessary to understand the role and functioning of ‘deep’ 
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determinants of development, as institutional or political factors shape determinants 
of growth like primitive accumulation, technology adoption, and policy choices.  
Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews (2013) criticised the problem with universalism 
and the idea that ‘one size fits all’ by arguing that development is a process whereby 
countries find and fit solutions that work to solve problems in their contexts. They 
advocate caution about imported solutions, because, although they can work well in 
tackling problems that have a universal technical solution, they undoubtedly fail in 
understanding complex problems in which politics is involved, capacity constraints 
are severe, and even the nature of the problem is unclear. To this extent, Pritchett, 
Woolcock, and Andrews recognise that many organisations have the tendency to 
adopt best practices in order to legitimate their practices, but advocate that 
isomorphic practices are just an illusion of development, as they focus on short-term 
programmatic efforts to build administrative capability, even if these practices do not 
offer better functionality (Pritchett et al., 2013). The problem, therefore, it that 
solutions from outside might also come with unintended consequences, as the real 
intents of these packaged logics usually contained interests hidden in principles. For 
that reason, it would be worthwhile to examine the emergence of prudential 
regulation that reached Brazil and created space for risk regulatory statements, 
searching for hidden interests and where they came from.  
First, it is important to uncover briefly the origins of the regulation introduced in 
Brazil. The idea of prudential regulation emerged after the banking crisis occurred 
during the NYSE Crash in 1929. These regulatory announcements prohibited the 
establishment of universal banks and promoted the formation of a safety net, 
assuring the deposits made in banks, and preventing threats to the stability of the 
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financial system (Flannery, 1998; Goodhart, 2005). During this period, the market 
perceived that the loss of confidence caused by the public feeling of vulnerability 
could have more devastating effects than crises themselves. This period highlighted 
the need for new regulations of the banking system and encouraged the creation of 
federal agencies in the US. In return for the creation of a guarantor government 
agency, like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), the USA Senate introduced a requirement for 
commercial banks to form a regulatory capital
5
. These capital reserves had to consist 
of funds from the institution’s owners to make them co-responsible in case of bank 
failure. 
In general, financial systems remained healthy and without major disturbances until 
the 1970s, when they were hit again by successive economic shocks. The most 
notable events of this period, then, were the acceleration of inflation in the USA; the 
collapse of the fixed exchange rate system of Bretton Woods, between 1971 and 
1973; oil crises in 1973 and 1979; and the adoption of contractionary monetary 
policies by the most industrialised countries (Mendonça et al., 2011). Moreover, 
greater freedom of capital, in an increasingly globalised world, allowed the 
emergence of financial innovations and banks began to securitise their loans as a 




 The definition of regulatory capital, as outlined in the Basel Accord (1988) and clarified in the Basel Accord 
(1998), is the amount of capital that financial institutions are required to hold, as a percentage of risk-weighted 
assets, to operate. This capital reserve ensures that these institutions do not take on excess leverage and become 
insolvent. 
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way to reduce the risk exposure of their portfolios (BIS, 1999; 2001). Nonetheless, 
these financial innovations also impacted on accountability and transparency of 
institutions, as well as on the reliability and faithfulness of information disclosed.  
Different countries adopted different strategies to deal with the demands and 
opportunities arising from the financial sector during this period. The British 
banking system, for instance, adopted more flexibility in its supervisory rules, which 
allowed financial system innovations to be practised, since they were not prohibited 
by law. In the USA system, financial innovations were required to obtain prior 
approval of the regulator to be practised in the financial market. As a result, towards 
the end of the 1980s, USA commercial banks began to lose market share to 
investment banks and foreign banks operating with companies in the country but 
without being reached by the liabilities of prudential regulation. 
From these conflicts of interest, there began a process of ‘deregulation’ in the USA 
banking system. The possibility of operating with a number of demand deposits 
under the guaranteed protection of a government agency against loss of depositors, 
nevertheless, encouraged banks to assume greater risks. Consequently, the 
publication of the Basel Accord in 1988 represented the first attempt at a global level 
to implement supervision and control in the banking industry. The principles 
contained therein aimed to establish security and stability in the world financial 
system by requiring a minimum regulatory capital. The assumption is that these 
capital asset reserves would bear any losses that imply loss to depositors and reduce 
the leverage of banks and, ultimately, the risk of insolvency that could culminate in 
systemic risks (BIS, 1988; Goodhart, 2005).  
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In the first Basel Accord, credit risks were considered the central theme and main 
risk to which financial institutions were exposed. In principle, the minimum capital 
asset requirement to manage these risks was set at 8 per cent of the capital of the 
financial institution (BIS, 1988) and, according to Power (2007), this level of capital 
asset reserves gave USA banks a clear advantage over European ones. At this stage, 
market risks were referred for later discussions and operational risks had not been 
recognised, but were considered implicitly covered by the minimum capital asset 
requirement. Nonetheless, this regulation has passed through many modifications in 
order to adapt itself to new demands. Technological advances and the globalisation 
of financial systems prompted the modernisation of banking operations, which led 
BIS to launch in 2001 a proposal that became known as ‘Basel II’. After that, the 
subprime crisis and loss of confidence in the markets led to a comprehensive set of 
reform measures in at the ‘Basel III’ in 2013. Those were the major contingencies, 
but many others contingencies have shaped Basel publications about standards, 
guidelines, sound practices and implementation issues. 
Originally issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
prudential regulations were used by countries as a benchmark for assessing the 
quality of their supervisory systems or for identifying future work to achieve a 
baseline level of sound supervisory practices. Besides, the IMF and the World Bank 
also use the BIS’s Core Principles to assess the effectiveness of countries’ banking 
supervisory systems and practices. These three agents share information and 
collaborate closely in their monitoring of the implementation of prudential standards 
(BIS, 2012). In this sense, the IMF and the World Bank provide regular reports with 
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lessons drawn from assessment experiences that constitute a useful source of 
information which has been used as an input to improve BIS’s Principles.  
The IMF and the World Bank have embraced a discourse of “good governance” and 
set principles to guide member countries in their objectives towards globalisation 
(Woods, 2000). Nonetheless, Milanovic (2003) shows that the current view of 
globalisation as an automatic and benign force is flawed, as this rhetoric might focus 
on only one, positive, side of globalisation whilst neglecting the malignant one. 
Although the doctrine of economic neutrality constitutes the main ideology of the 
IMF and the World Bank interventions, Swedberg (1986: 377) suggests that the real 
function of this claim of neutrality is to ‘provide an ideological smokescreen for the 
powerful Western nations to intervene in favour of free trade capitalism in the 
domestic affairs of third world countries’. In this regard, although most research 
finds that banking regulation and supervision has an effect on the risks of high-risk 
banks, Klomp and De Haan (2012) demonstrated that these measures do not have a 
significant effect on low-risk banks, such as Brazilian development banks (BDBs).  
The rhetoric of globalisation’s long-term benefits covers up unsuitable pieces of 
evidence to carry on this project of domination, pushing the idea of ‘globalisation’ 
forwards, whilst ignoring its limitations. This rhetoric outlines that developing 
countries must be the only ones blamed for the incorrect implementation and 
application of these developed solutions in their context (Stiglitz, 1993). For that 
reason, I consider it crucial to understand better the role of BDBs and the pressures 
of financial liberalisation in Brazil, as it is important to contextualise the reasons 
behind this attempt towards an elusive ideology of globalisation and progress. 
Therefore, the next section describes the configuration of the Brazilian Financial 
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System (BFS) and how international prudential regulations, and subsequent, risk 
management regulatory statements were disseminated and adversely affected BDBs. 
 
2.3. The Brazilian Financial System (BFS) 
Banks have the power to influence market expansion and the ability of individuals to 
improve their living standards (Bain and Howells, 2008: 242). However, none of the 
neoclassical theoretical work on the subject seems as yet to have reached a 
conclusion on the causal relationship between financial development and economic 
growth (Carvalho, 2005). Cameron (1967: 318) for that reason advocates that ‘no 
single model of a banking system is appropriate for all economies’. Therefore, the 
Brazilian financial system presents peculiarities, a particular history, and structural 
and monetary characteristics, such as the dominance of public banks and a long 
period of restrictions on financial market internationalisation through the setting of 
restrictions on the entry of foreign banks (Sobreira and Paula, 2010; Bain and 
Howells, 2008: 30; Brasil, 1988). This context must be understood before I present 
the findings of my own research.  
Gonçalves and Madi (2013) have emphasized the role and importance of Federal 
public banks in credit expansion in Brazil. They considered particular government 
incentives to domestic development and the consequences of the liberalisation 
process, which implied the adoption of international regulations and the use of new 
techniques of risk management. Nonetheless, Madi and Gonçalves (2014) also 
highlight the prejudices of this liberalisation and wave of privatisations in Brazil. 
Between 1994 and 2002, this movement increased the market-share and total assets 
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and deposits concentration in the hands of large private national and foreign banks. 
Finally, this led to the automation and outsourcing of the Brazilian banking system, 
resulting in the cutting of jobs and the proliferation of ATMs and banking 
correspondents.  
Historically, the Brazilian government has used public banks as instruments to 
promote economic activity. Since 1952, national and regional development banks 
have supported state projects and infrastructural investments, and they were the 
primary source of long-term credit for industrial expansion. During the 1960s and 
1970s, for instance, there was an increase in the number of development banks and 
the majority of Brazilian states had their public banks recognising the importance of 
those banks for regional development (Costa Neto, 2004; Salviano Jr., 2004). Public 
banks have pleased a significant role in Brazilian history, with half of the assets of 
banks being publicly owned in 1996, whilst at present that share remains at 30 per 
cent even after privatisations between 1997 and 2002 (BCB, 2006b)
6
. Although the 
contestable significance of these banks, in the subprime financial crisis, they played 
an important counter-cyclical role that reduced the impact of the crisis on the 
Brazilian economy (Ocampo and Griffith-Jones, 2008; Barbosa, 2010). Supported by 
a reduction in the level of the compulsory capital asset reserve by the BCB, they 
                                                 
 
 
6 This data considered the market-share by shareholders control (in percentage of total assets) (BCB, 2006b).  
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expanded credit operations and purchased the credit portfolios of smaller or weaker 
banks that had been impacted negatively by the crisis (Sobreira and Paula, 2010: 
227). As a result, these financial strategies helped Brazil to pass through the global 
financial crisis relatively painlessly (CEPAL, 2009).  
Since the implementation of the Real Plan, the BFS is comparatively stable, and it is 
performing well after decades of hyperinflation (Sobreira and Paula, 2010). In the 
1980s and early 1990s, inflation exceeded 80 per cent per month in Brazil, and 
merchants needed to change the price of products every day, whilst goods quickly 
disappeared from the shelves, as the population hoarded food for fear of successive 
price increases. The Economic Research Institute Foundation in Brazil (FIPE) 
showed that between 1980 and 1989, the average inflation in the country was 233.5 
per cent per year and between 1990 and 1999, it reached 499.2 per cent. The causes 
of hyperinflation related to the increase in public spending and foreign debt, 
exacerbated by the global crisis derived from higher oil prices and the slowdown in 
the growth rate of the economy. Brazil had approximately 15 years of hyperinflation 
and the indexation of wages and prices. As a result, Brazilians had to get used to five 
different currency plans in a decade. In early 1994, however, the Real Plan was 
launched based on the balance of government accounts, spending reductions, tax 
increases, and privatisations. The government also promoted the de-indexation of the 
economy and greater openness to imports, controlled the volume of money in 
circulation to avoid pressure on prices, raised interest rates, and increased the reserve 
requirements for banks. Thus, in 1999, these government interventions amounted to 
a regime of inflation targeting for each year reduced market expectations related to 
the stability of Brazilian economy (Giambiagi et al., 2006) 
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The Brazilian financial market has nonetheless been characterised by restrictions on 
credit supply and high interest rates. Considering the logic of liberalisation, this low 
volume and expensive credit supply were attributed to the concentration of state-
owned banks, which reduce competition, as the Brazilian Constitution legally 
forbade the entry of foreign banks until the second half of the 1990s (BRASIL, 1988, 
Art. 192). Based on the neoliberal ideology, however, this Brazilian monetary 
approach was considered as discouraging for entrepreneurship and foreign 
investments. Under arguments that the economy must be opened up to the global 
financial markets, after 1995, the government began to use loopholes in the 
legislation (BRASIL, 1988, Title X, Section 52) and recognised the entrance of 
foreign banks as ‘the interest of the Brazilian government’. Overall, the rhetoric used 
maintained that this would purportedly increase the competition and reduce banking 
net interest margins in Brazil (Oreiro et al., 2009: 217).  
Throughout its history, the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) relied on neoliberal 
assumptions to restructure its banking sector, using predominantly privatisation and 
liberalisation strategies to conduct this process between 1990 and 2002. In the mid-
1990s, problems of solvency in a context marked by liberalising policies drove the 
BCB to issue the Stimulus Programme to Reduce Public Sector in the Financial 
System (PROES, in Portuguese). In this period, there was a reduction in the number 
of Brazilian public banks, due to reductions in government support and conditions of 
efficiency and productivity imposed upon public financial institutions, such that 
most of them subsequently became extinct, or were privatised or transformed. 
Foreign banks took advantage of Brazil’s scenario to purchase Brazilian public 
banks, enhancing their market shares. However, contrary to the theory of market 
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liberalisation, they increased their profitability and accumulated higher net-interest 
margins. As a result, these reforms reduced domestic banks’ profit, even causing 
losses in some cases, without pursuing the promised benefits (Sobreira and Paula, 
2010: 216). Thus, even though Martinez-Diaz (2005: 34) suggests that liberalisation, 
in this case, proceeded to ‘raise the prices for privatised state banks and lower the 
costs to the central bank for recapitalisation’, the Brazilian banking system went 
through a downsizing after these policies (Araujo and Cintra, 2011).  
In summary, the features of the free-market toolkit that the IMF and World Bank 
imposed on Brazil included privatisation programmes conditioned by a broad set of 
macroeconomic, structural and regulatory reforms. These reforms were illustrated by 
banking currency stability through Real Plan, adherence to the Basel Accord, 
integration with the international banking system, and increasing presence of foreign 
banks (Araujo and Cintra, 2011). The central feature underpinning the restructuring 
rationale for these banking regulations is summarised by the Basel Accord and more 
than one hundred countries signalled their intention to implement Basel Guidelines 
and Standards, following the recommendation of ‘international experts’ (Ward, 
2002). Accordingly, in Brazil, they were incorporated into resolutions of the 
National Monetary Council’s (CMN), the Brazilian SEC. However, in Brazil, as a 
developing country, the regulation established higher minimum capital asset 
requirements of 11 per cent (CMN, 1997), although in the G-10 countries this 
requirement is set at 8 per cent. Throughout their history, though, Brazilian banks 
had always operated with higher capital asset reserves than those required by the 
Basel rules, and the one adopted by G-10 countries (BCB, 2009). Therefore, to 
provide a better understanding of the effects of the proposition of prudential 
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regulation in BFS, the impacts of these regulations for BDBs are particularly further 
explored in the next section.  
 
2.4. Development Banks  
The history of development banks is relatively recent, and their importance is not 
completely understood, as they represent an idiosyncrasy of developing countries. 
Cavalcante (2004) points out that there is little material available on the role played 
by these institutions in economic development, and the literature about regional and 
national development banks is even scarcer. The major research focus in this area is 
on the operation of supranational organisations, like the World Bank and IMF. 
Furthermore, there is no universal concept to address this issue, as some authors 
have reported cases of development banks using terms like ‘national development 
bank’, ‘development bank’, ‘state-owned Banks’, ‘development financial 
institutions’ and so on. Additionally, different settings can be found around the 
world, with financial systems formed by various combinations of national, public 
and regional development banks. For that reason, it is worth exploring further the 
characteristics of these banks in Latin America and Brazil.  
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Representing hybrid financial institutions
7
, the form and functionality of 
development banks reflect conditions of national economic development as well as 
the socio-economic profile of the countries where they operate (Diamond, 1957). 
This characteristic creates many controversies about these institutions. Supporters 
see development banks as an important tool to solve market failure that would lead 
to suboptimal productive investment (Bruck, 1998; Yeyati, Micco and Panizza, 
2004). However, development banks also face critiques from orthodox economists, 
as those banks are more exposed to political and government priorities and 
interference, which would focus on ‘targeting credits’, concerning not only 
economic, but social benefits (Öztürk, Gultekin-Karakas and Hisarciklilar, 2010; 
Torres Filho, 2009). Thus, while some authors view development banks as an 
important tool to alleviate capital constraints in scarce credit markets and unlock 
productive investments, others see those banks as conduits of cheap loans to 
politically-connected firms that could obtain capital elsewhere (Lazzarini et al., 
2011). 
In Latin America, the use of public financial institutions for economic development 
came to the fore during the middle of the twentieth century, between 1930 and 1980. 
According to Alcas (2005), the 1929 crisis led governments in Latin America to take 
                                                 
 
 
7 Diamond (1957) highlighted that development banks are not easily distinguished, as it is not possible to identify 
a single model or typical form of operation. 
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an active role in the promotion and financing of production. This view was taken 
forward after World War II, and in the 1950s, when it became part of a neoliberal 
development strategy to stimulate the industrialisation of peripheral economies 
(Araujo et al., 2011).  
The advantage of development banks is that they can set an interest rate to meet 
borrowers’ needs rather than just following a market rate. Private and multinational 
banks would not commonly provide funding to social projects that have small 
financial returns of investments. Therefore, Development Financial Institutions 
(DFIs) have played a crucial role in structural changes in the productive sector, 
particularly in countries that have only recently industrialised (e.g. Levy-Yeyati et 
al., 2004; Öztürk et al., 2010). They finance infrastructure and agriculture sectors, 
serving as an instrument of economic intervention for national states in their 
strategies during the so-called developmental period (Araujo et al., 2011). During the 
international crisis of the early 1980s, conversely, many Latin American economies 
went into a deep structural crisis, and there was a redefinition of the role of DFIs in 
their financial systems. As a result, many of them were privatised or closed, as a 
requirement of IMF structural adjustment programmes (Calvante, 2004).  
This restructuring project concerned mainly the operations of DFIs. Therefore, 
several DFIs continued to exist in spite of major restructuring that weakened their 
role and reduced government support (Araujo et al., 2011). Development banks 
usually operate as financial institutions, providing loans directly to the productive 
sector, while other organisations operate working as financial intermediaries. Among 
structural changes undergone in Latin America during the 1990s, then, there was a 
shifting in DFIs operations, which were moved to financial intermediaries. 
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According to the Asociación Latinoamericana de Instituciones Financieras para el 
Desarrollo (ALIDE) (2010: 25), the rationale behind these changes is that decreases 
in operating costs would enable greater capillarity and economies of scale for these 
institutions. However, working as financial intermediaries, these institutions could 
not focus on the final cost for borrowers. Consequently, many criticisms of this 
format emerged, as this characteristic would prejudice the final cost of social 
projects, even if the rationale were that those changes would reduce the risk of DFIs’ 
financial operations.  
The use of financial intermediaries, furthermore, can promote the exclusion of 
smaller institutions and the current economic emphasis on development banks has 
been widely criticised since those institutions must primarily have a social goal. 
FDIs should not only provide cheaper credit, but they must propose further benefits 
offered by their technical assistance to borrowers, which enables organisations to 
manage their activities better. Recently, nonetheless, evidence from the Colombian 
Fondo del Sector Financing Agropecuario (FINAGRO) suggests that only 0.5 per 
cent of FDIs’ loan portfolios are still designed for these purposes, whilst most of 
them are primarily economically driven.  
Part of this problem referred to the assumption of a direct correlation between 
economic and social benefits. This assumption, as Souza (2004: 142) ratified, states 
that ‘the [economic] viability of the business is a sine qua non condition for the 
occurrence of [social] effective benefits. [Thus] Projects that fail not only could 
represent a capital loss for the lender, but also do not generate social benefits’. In 
fact, this argument seems to be restrictive, since although financial viability is a 
necessary condition for the promotion of social benefits, it is not a sufficient 
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condition for these benefits. For that reason, for instance, traditional economic 
theories fail to prove, explain or predict the success of initiatives such as the 
microcredit programmes for the poorest in India, which were subsequently 
propagated all over the world (Yunus, 2007).  
In sum, DFIs continue to play a significant role in Latin America, but their 
configuration differs between countries. In the majority of these countries, 
development banks are directly subject to the requirements and constraints of 
international bodies, such as the World Bank and IMF. As funding providers, these 
international agencies influence in changes in the constitution and operation of these 
banks, imposing restrictions, recommendations, and prerequisites to financing and 
loans throughout development banks’ history. However, in Brazil, the majority of 
these institutions are still operating formally as financial institutions and with capital 
coming from public revenue. Therefore, it is important to consider the specificities of 
development banks in the Brazilian context and the impact that risk regulations have 
for their operations as well.  
 
2.4.1. Development Banks in Brazil  
According to the Brazilian Federal Constitution (1988, Art. 192), ‘the [Brazilian] 
financial system is structured to promote a balanced development of the country and 
serve the interests of the community in all its parts’. However, Brazilian credit 
funding is still limited, small-scale and expensive in terms of the interest rate (Sister, 
2010). Therefore, development banks are financial institutions controlled by the state 
governments aiming to provide timely and adequate resources to supply financially 
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medium and long-term government programmes and projects that seek to promote 
economic and social development of the respective State.  
Brazil has 100% of its territory covered by development bank’s financial assistance. 
In total, currently, there are 22 development banks in operation in Brazil. They are 
divided in one national, one regional and 20 state development banks, as shown in 
Figure 1. Therefore, Brazilian states can have its area financially covered by one, 
two or even three development banks. It is worth mention that the North East region 
suffers with severe droughts and it is one of the poorest regions in Brazil, which 
explains the multiple sources of financial assistance in that area.  
 
Figure 1 – Geographic concentration of Brazilian development banks 
Administrative reforms carried out over the last 70 years tried to reduce the political 
influence of Brazilian public institutions. Active in several states during the 1960s 
and 1970s, most state development banks had their loan portfolios weakened during 
the 1980s crisis, due to Brazil’s poor economic performance, when various 
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institutions concentrated their credits in transactions directed to finance their state 
governments (Cavalcante, 2004). This concentration was considered a prejudicial 
profile, as charity cannot be done with someone else’s money (Franco, 1999). 
Through the 1990s, then, the figure of State intervention was exorcised, and this 
opened space for a series of reforms focused on strengthening market liberalisation 
(Campante, 2003). Thus, in this period, state and development banks almost 
disappeared in Brazil.  
The policy adopted by the Federal Government promoted the implementation of a 
structural adjustment programme that sought to facilitate the redesign of the financial 
system and aimed to stimulate the replacement of development banks by funding 
agencies. The goal of this model deployed in Brazil was to decentralise public 
administration with the motto of ‘less bureaucracy’ and ‘more transparency’, whilst 
this logic was supported by the idea of ‘good governance’ and critiques related to the 
‘inefficiency’ in State operations and demands to reduce government intervention 
(Baer and Nazmi, 2000; Cavalcante, 2004). Similarly, trying to maintain the benefits, 
but reduce the duties of the Brazilian government, in 2001, the CMN Act nº 2.139-
66 created the concept of the financial fomenting agency
8
 (FFA).  
                                                 
 
 
8 These institutions are named ‘Agências de fomento’ in Portuguese. However, they seem to be an idiosyncrasy 
of the BFS, as I did not find any similar institution in financial systems of other countries. Thus, the renaming of 
these banks is considered here as a rhetorical strategy used to shift the role of the State in BDBs. 
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Initially, FFAs were conceived as nonbank financial institutions regulated by the 
Central Bank of Brazil. These organisations were intended to replace the 
development banks, seeking to reduce state participation in the financial system 
(CMN, 2001), part of IMF and World Bank requirements, supported by the sound 
practices from the Basel Accord. FFAs were obligated to meet liquidity and leverage 
requirements much more rigid than the regulation applicable to their predecessors, 
and also prevented from taking deposits. Consequently, FFAs could only operate 
with their own funds or transfers originating from constitutional funds, federal, state 
and municipal budgets, national and international financial institutions and 
organisations and development. Each state allocated a different amount of resources 
as the capital of their FFA. Their functions, nevertheless, were kept focused on 
supply credit to fixed assets and working capital associated with State projects; 
promoting guarantees according to ruling regulations; managing development 
funding; and offering consultancies and financial agent services. However, they are 
explicitly forbidden to access financial assistance, rediscount funds, and BCB’s 
reserve account; raise money from the public, including external resources; and hire 
interbank deposits (CMN, 2001). The impact of these changes, however, is not 
completely understood in the current literature and detailed data about those 
institutions is restricted (see Cavalcante, 2004).  
The importance of development banks is still contested in research and practice, as I 
will explain in the following section. Moreover, considering Brazil’s peculiarities 
and its context, this study adopts a particular view of the segregation between 
Development Banks and Funding Agencies categories. This research takes both 
groups as one, following reports from Brazilian Association of Development Finance 
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Institutions (ABDE), and considers that Brazil has 20 development banks. Although 
it considers the particular aspects of these organisations, it also recognises that this 
segregation between development banks and financial foment agencies was used to 
reduce the interference of the State in the economy, following the request of 
minimum State intervention and market-driven management. For that reason, their 
segregation is clearly related to political and market international orientations. Even 
though, there are still arguments in favour of and against BDBs’ operations, then, the 
next section discusses three BDBs’ conceptualised roles, pondering the economic, 
social and the Keynesian view of them.  
 
2.4.2. Contradictions about the Role of Development Banks 
The debate about the role and purpose of development banks revolves around the 
dichotomy between the roles of the state and market, which have marked the 
discussion on economic development since Adam Smith. Cavalcante (2004) 
confirms this, noting the absence of a theoretical body and that different perspectives 
are adopted to address issues related to development banks. He then states that this 
tension invariably refers to divergences between these two roles reserved for the 
state and the market. For that reason, the following sections analyse three 
perspectives concerning the importance of development banks in Brazil 
development.  
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The Liberal Economic View of BDBs 
First, according to liberal economic theories development banks must be avoided. 
Liberal economic theories start from the assumptions that investors are rational, 
information is symmetric, and transaction costs are equal to zero (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1979; Fama, 1980). Briefly, this approach conceives that the financial 
market operates as a broker and efficiently transfers funds from surplus units to 
deficit units
9
. The central assumption of this theory is that free markets promote 
more efficient resources allocation, and thus, interest rates must be flexible. This 
conceptualisation constituted the theoretical basis for the liberalisation of financial 
markets (Shaw, 1973; McKinnon, 1973).  
This perspective, moreover, considers that economies with artificially low interest 
rates would not develop, as agents have no incentive to save, and government 
interference would result in inflation and investments in capital-intensive projects, or 
less profitable projects, which would reduce the real interest rate, reinforcing this 
deteriorating process. Therefore, it is recommended to limit state intervention in 
financial markets to avoid distortions. Consequently, development banks are 
considered part of the cause of ‘financial repression’. 
                                                 
 
 
9 Represented by agents who consume more than they save or invest more saving - and, therefore, require loan 
funds. 
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This market-driven theory, however, has caused many problems, especially when 
applied to development banks and public institutions, which have explicit social 
aims in their operation and constitution. In practice, there are several imperfections 
in this concept, as models based on this simplified theory cannot properly represent a 
broader range of agents and decisions in reality (Davidson, 1982-3; Minsky and 
Kaufman, 2008; Crocco, Cavalcante and Barra, 2005). As Chang (2000: 7) argues, it 
is important to reject the myth of neoclassical economists that intervention can be 
drawn according to “scientific” rules. Furthermore, many authors have exposed the 
fallacies of the corollary of efficiency and rational operation of the market in the 
financial system and the necessity for State intervention (see Andrade and Deos, 
2009; Yeyati, Micco and Panizza, 2007; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 
2002). Nonetheless, there is also the idea of a temporary role for these development 
banks, as proposed in the next section. 
 
The ‘Invisible-Hand’ in an International Political Approach 
According to a Keynesian perspective, the role of a development bank is temporary. 
Keynes (1936) reverses the causality from savings to investment, arguing that 
investments are dependent on entrepreneurs’ decisions based on the expected return 
on capital assets and their financing. Investments have a multiplier effect that would 
generate income that is in part allocated to savings and investments. However, the 
loans in the banking system are inappropriate to the structure of long-term 
investments, as revolving funds constitute a liability for entrepreneurs in the short-
term. Consequently, entrepreneurs need to lengthen the structure of their liabilities in 
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a process that Keynes (1937) called ‘funding’, which can be provided via the capital 
market or credit.  
The problem then is that, in developing economies, there are underdeveloped capital 
markets, and it is common to use development banks. These entities operate with 
directed credit and interest rates lower than those of the market, allowing the 
expansion of investments. From this perspective, public and development banks play 
a crucial role in financing and coordinating investment projects, reducing their risks 
(UNCTAD, 2008: 92). However, they are conceived as temporary instruments for 
market development. Therefore, when markets start to become more developed and 
stronger, public banks lose most of their importance, as they have a lower level of 
efficiency. According to this perspective, then, privatisation would rectify this last 
issue, and that was the rhetoric applied during the period of privatisations in Brazil 
(e.g. Baer and Nazmi, 2000; Nakane, and Weintraub, 2005). 
Nowadays, there are still public banks supporting robust economies, like Germany, 
without evidence of adverse effects for the efficiency of their operations (Altunbas, 
Evans and Molyneux, 2001). Belluzzo (2009) then suggests that the Keynesian 
consumption function lost its original simplicity, in recent world economy cycles 
(between 1983 and 2008). The growth of household consumption, mostly in 
developing countries, ‘disconnected’ the evolution of income, particularly wages and 
employment, and became increasingly dependent on the wealth effect and the 
expansion of debt. The assumptions that foreign private banks would increase 
efficiency and decrease net interest margins were not confirmed in Brazil 
(Afanasieff, 2002; Vasconcelos and Fucidji, 2003). Therefore, it seems that foreign 
banks just followed the market flow in this country and accumulated larger net-
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interest margins and then profits (Vasconcelos and Fucidji, 2003). For that reason, as 
an alternative to this accumulative wealth arrangement, there are propositions of 
BDBs performing a major social development role.  
 
Acknowledging Market failures and the BDB’s Social Approach 
One problem with the application of the previous perspective to developing 
economies is that their financial markets are underdeveloped. In these countries, 
capital markets are incipient, and stock markets are often non-existent (Stiglitz, 
1993). In practice, private banks tend to favour short-term loans, unconcerned with 
projects that have a high social return, but low economic returns and high risk. This 
situation justifies government intervention and public banks that play a crucial role 
stimulating regional development, supplying credit to sectors where private banks 
are not interested. This challenges neoliberal economic assumptions and exposes 
hidden interests in market liberalisation, Stiglitz (1993) argues that development 
banks would successfully tackle these problems.  
In Brazil, Jayme Jr. and Crocco (2010: 17) reinforced the relevance of government-
owned banks for long-term investments in segments and regions where private banks 
do not meet. Therefore, these banks have privileged access to exclusive long-term 
and low-cost resources, from tax or quasi-tax public funds sources related to 
compulsory labour or social contributions, to the Guarantee Fund for Time of 
Service (FGTS, in Portuguese) (Jayme Jr. and Crocco, 2010: 17). Hence, arguing in 
favour of public financial institutions, they assert that these banks:  
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 increase the credit supply on more favourable terms, in a country like Brazil 
marked by expensive credit and credit supply difficulties in various 
segments; 
 expand the capacity to meet financial beneficiaries demands in public 
programs that include receive and have regular access to financial resources;  
 exercise a counter-cyclical role and policy support in times of economic 
instability. 
As a result, those public financial institutions stimulate economic and social 
development and improve the conduct of economic policies. Nonetheless, one of the 
main critiques of this operation of public financial institutions has been directed at 
their lower efficiency in comparison to the ones in the private sector (Baer and 
Nazmi, 2000). Thus, the main arguments against this efficiency consider potential 
costs from this fragile operation structure to controllers and society (Jayme Jr. and 
Crocco, 2010: 17).  
This research aims to unpack the social role of BDBs and show how the neoliberal 
logic of risk has shifted the external and internal discourse about their aims. In short, 
this movement has privileged the liberal economic or Keynesian view, which 
proposes that BDBs should have, respectively, no or temporary roles in developing 
countries. However, this rhetoric overshadows the social benefits coming from 
BDBs, which have been undermined by the political interference in this context. 
Therefore, considering that a development bank has different characteristics from a 
private banks, and that its primary aim is not profit, but social welfare, this research 
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focuses on how decision-making processes, related to risk, measure and view social 
benefits in practice.  
 
2.5. Risk Management and Brazilian Development Banks  
The examination of risk management in the context of Brazilian Development Banks 
raises many questions about which elements are relevant to this investigation. The 
previous section outlined Brazilian aspirations for and struggles with order and 
progress
10
, considering the specificities of Brazil and BDBs’ operations to encourage 
this. Here, the regulatory statements of risk management increase complexity in this 
context. Therefore, I believe that would be helpful to clarify the following questions: 
What is a risk in this context? What were the conditions under which the 
sedimentation of risk management practices was made possible? Where do risk 
management regulatory practices come from? What were the political contestations 
that preceded their sedimentation? How was the maintenance of risk management 
regulation possible as a hegemonic concept in this space?  
These preliminary questions relate to the emergence, contestation and sedimentation 
of risk management regimes in the Brazilian financial sector; and how they were 
                                                 
 
 
10 Indeed, in this chapter, the discussion focuses mostly on progress and not on order. The next chapter, therefore, 
will demonstrate how accounting structured this regulatory discourse materialising order in this context. 
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conceived (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Thus, this section then explores how 
international regulatory policies applying universal neoliberal solutions in different 
contexts acquired different instrumentalist forms, which make possible the 
redescription and theorisation between the macro- and micro-context of BDBs. The 
following section scrutinises how risk was institutionalised as a mechanism to 
provide progress, reducing failures and improving the lack of controls that might 
have generated corruption or bureaucracy, so bringing ‘better’ and more efficient 
systems that follow new public management’s prerogatives.  
 
2.5.1. The Emergence and Sedimentation of Regulatory Statements of Risk 
Management in Brazil 
The practical effects of the Basel Accord have only been minimally explored, even 
though this norm has passed through many revisions under arguments of 
improvements in its sophistication and adequacy following more recent 
requirements. However, the regulation concerning risk management was not neutral 
from the beginning. Originally, these parameters were created to preserve USA 
banks’ market and provide a balance between them and German and Japanese 
financial institutions, and this has generated debate around risk measures and 
standards particularly in Europe (Underhill, 1991; Leyshon, 1994; Power, 2007). For 
that reason, though the BIS and COSO frameworks are widely used worldwide, the 
Basel Accord was not fully adopted until the last 2007-2009 financial crisis (Sobreira 
and Paula, 2010b). Furthermore, risk regulatory statements and requirements are still 
diverse around the world (Kajuter et al., 2008).  
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In Brazil, the requirements of Basel I (BCBS, 1988) began to be introduced in 1994 
by BCB Resolution nº 2.099/1994, which established the minimum capital and net 
equity to be observed by financial institutions, including development banks. This 
norm also stipulated that these institutions have a duty to ‘keep the value of adjusted 
net equity compatible with the degree of risk in their asset structure’, among other 
provisions (see BCB, 1994, Annex IV, art.1). Nevertheless, the implementation of 
Basel’s requirements in the BFS was problematic, as could be perceived from the 
many alterations regularly made during its implementation (Carvalho and Santos, 
2008).  
The imposition of the Basel Accord was harsher in developing countries. In addition, 
for instance, although BCB’s Resolution nº 2.099/1994 had established 8 per cent as 
the minimum capital adequacy, this percentage was increased to 11 per cent after 
BCB Circular 2.784/1997, following new recommendations from the Basel 
Committee (BIS, 1988). The arguably higher risk to which banking systems in 
developing countries were subject supported this percentage increment, considering 
that possible economic shocks would have greater intensity in these regions (BIS, 
2003; Sobreira, 2009). A missing feature in this rhetoric was that there were hidden 
interests underlying these principles, which coincidently favour USA banks (Power, 
2009). Nonetheless, this is barely mentioned as the standard rhetoric reinforces the 
neutrality, rationality, and objectivity of these measures used in these interventions.  
The procedures suggested by the New Basel Accord were formally adhered to in the 
BCB Resolution nº 12.746 in 2004 (BCB, 2004), but the practical application of the 
new agreement has been modified many times. The BCB’s Communications 
illustrate that the implementation schedule were continuously extended from 2008 to 
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2012 (CMN, nº 16.137/2007; BIS, 2001), and now from 2013 to 2018 too (Basel III, 
2013). During this period, therefore, many new regulatory statements emerged and 
calculating procedures for minimum capital allocations passed through numerous 
alterations (BCB, 2004; 2007a; 2007c). In 1998, for instance, BCB Resolution nº 
2543 stated the concept of Adjusted Net Equity (ANE), which was renamed and 
reframed as Referential Equity (RE1), in December 2000 with the Resolution nº 
2802, to fit in the framework of analysis for financial institution following Basel 
rules (Sobreira, 2009). Nevertheless, in 2001, after the publication of BCB 
Resolution 2.837, the composition of Referential Equity (RE2) was again modified. 
Consequently, it seems that although the Basel Accords have shifted from Basel I to 
Basel II, and then to Basel III, however, the promised panacea is still far from be 
achieved. 
These changes and new requirements, nevertheless, directly affected the capital 
structure of Brazilian banks, which has passed through modifications due to the 
stipulation of an equity restructuring to meet the demands of these new standards 
(Torres Filho, 2009; Sobreira and Paula, 2010). For instance, after a ‘Global 
Consolidated Inspection’ (GCI), made in 1997, the necessity was observed of all 
federal financial institutions being subjected to a ‘Program for Strengthening Federal 
Financial Institutions’ (PROEF, in Portuguese) that, concisely, consisted of: 
 transferring the risk of bad debts and doubtful receivables to the National 
Treasury and to a freshly created Asset Management Company, named 
Emgea;  
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 exchanging illiquid assets and liquid assets for low paid interest at market 
rate; and 
 increasing the capital of these institutions. 
Brazilian regulatory statements about risk management follow almost the same 
framework as international requirements. Indeed, the adherence to risk management 
practices in Brazilian banks was one of the requirements of international investors 
who have disseminated ideas of ‘governance’, ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ in 
private banks, culminating in their reaching public financial institutions (Sola and 
Whitehead, 2006; Brasil, 2001). Nevertheless, according to Jayme Jr and Crocco 
(2010), the capital of BDBs is funded by public money. Therefore, there were 
incongruences in the acceptance of the same requirements made of multinational and 
large banks by supranational institutions such as the World Bank or International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in this context. 
After the collapse of Enron and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) in 2002, changes were not only related to financial risks, as many regulations 
around the world were promulgated to reinforce the importance of transparency and 
governance, as well as the duty of directors in managing operational risks. This latter 
element of risk was promptly incorporated into new requirements from BCB to 
BDBs. Initially, the focus was on credit, and then, market risks. After that, attending 
BCB’s Act nº 12.746/2004, BDBs were required to implement operational risk 
management practices and disclose them in annual reports. This regulatory statement 
then was again modified in 2006 by BCB Act nº 3.380, requiring not only that 
BDBs’ manage and disclose operational risks, but also that they mandatorily create a 
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department for risk management, which would ensure the independence of risk 
practices inside financial institutions. 
In the particular case of Brazil, the same regulation as for multinational private banks 
has been applied to BDBs, and, undoubtedly, this has caused problems related to the 
structure and financial power of these latter institutions (Prado and Monteiro Filha, 
2005; Sobreira and Martins, 2011). On the one hand, some governance norms and 
authors argued that the complexity and problems associated with this establishment 
of a risk management structure was repaid by the benefits provided and could be 
adapted according to the level of accuracy desired in measuring risk impacts in each 
organisation (IRM, 2002; Collier et al., 2007). On the other hand, the particularities 
related to organisations’ size and resources capacity are problems that cannot be 
ignored or blocked with a universalising ‘one-size-fits-all’ rhetoric permeating this 
discourse about risk management implementation (Klomp and De Haan, 2012).  
Part of the mismatch in the application of the Basel Accord can be explained by the 
purpose of this standard and BDBs themselves. The objective of the original Basel 
Accord, in 1988, was to equalise the conditions of competition in the banking system 
internationally; therefore it contemplated only internationally active banks. 
Additionally, the Basel II’s agreements shifted the focus of a regulation focused on 
liquidity to one concentrated in the solvency of financial institutions, besides a 
primary objective of creating mechanisms to avoid systemic crises in the banking 
sector. Nonetheless, contextualising these norms, we must consider that development 
banks are not related to the emergence of systemic crises (Sobreira, 2009; Sobreira 
and Zendron, 2011; Prado and Monteiro Filha, 2005; Castro, 2009). Their role is 
quite the reverse; BDBs played important countercyclical roles in the last 2008 crisis 
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(Jayme Jr and Crocco, 2010). This being so, what is the reason for the adherence to 
these norms in this context? 
Ward (2002) maintains that central banks in developing countries did not have a 
choice even if there were problems in international regulatory standards. First, 
because the World Bank (2001) declared that ‘the international community is likely 
to expect all banks to adopt and implement the Basel Committee’s 
recommendations’. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) also conceived that the 
standards would represent non-tariff trade barriers for protectionist reasons. Finally, 
the market pushed governments to comply with these standard practices to reduce 
funding costs. In sum, there are powerful reasons to show compliance with the BIS 
framework. Therefore, even if there are suspicious about its real working the extent 
of any sanction for non-compliance remains unclear. Hellmann, Murdock and 
Stiglitz (2000) argued that the failure of globalisation to deliver its potential gains to 
low-income countries is “almost a predictable outcome”. In the case of the BIS 
standards, Ward (2002: 36) suggests that:  
The capital framework is still, essentially, designed by the G-10 countries for a subset of 
banks in those countries. The developing world has no representation on the Basel 
Committee. If the Accord is indeed an obligation or anything like it, there is a governance 
gap. The international regulatory framework is more nearly a colonial regime than official 
rhetoric admits. 
A common explanation for adherence to these standards in Latin America is usually 
the origin of development banks’ capital, generally coming from IMF and World 
Bank funding. However, this is not applicable to the case of BDBs, as their capital 
structure is mainly funding by public money coming from federal financing, hence, 
from tax and quasi-tax operations. As Carvalho (2005: 18) explains, Brazil has 
widely adopted and applied the Basel Accord principles and sound practices due to 
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IMF and the World Bank requirements requested for assistance. Nonetheless, what 
was the impact of this adherence on BDBs?  
Sobreira (2009) argues that Basel’s agreements had perverse effects, especially on 
development banks, as they do not operate with the economy’s payment system, and 
were affected asymmetrically by these regulatory requirements. The effects of Basel 
on the BDBs is explored by Sobreira and Martins (2011), also analyse the case of 
two BDBs and stress the variability of these impacts, as while the BNDES exercised 
their functions with some small limitations, the BNB was heavily damaged in the 
exercise of its social functions. This shows that the application of Basel’s rules in 
these institutions is at least not appropriate
11
. Thus, as pointed out by Prado and 
Monteiro Filha (2005: 1), Basel’s ‘rules are in many cases inadequate for [a 
development bank to fulfil] its statutory functions effectively’. Accordingly, Sobreira 
(2009) advocates that regulators must be critical and recognise that risk management 
models compatible with the peculiarities of development banks should guide the 
actions of these institutions, particularly when operating in developing countries, as 
these new standards can have a direct impact on BDBs’ missions. 
All these gaps seems to be ignored in the Brazilian context and inside BDBs, which 
keep proudly disclosing ‘best practices’ and attempts to achieve the ‘state of the art’ 
                                                 
 
 
11 Certainly, this does not mean that these banks should not deal appropriately with the risks to which they are 
exposed, but maybe that the Basel was not the right approach. 
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in risk management practices, so, this research raises the question: ‘why?’. Part of 
the answers for this question will come from the next Chapter 3 and 4, which, 
respectively, embrace the construction of risk in accounting and the political side of 
this hegemonic construction. Briefly, according to Berry (2008), there are many 
different interests related to the implementation of risk management practices and it 
seems to be not as technical, objective, and neutral as standards are supposed and 
argued to be. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter provided an understanding of the international and national macro-
context of my research, exploring the structure of the Brazilian financial system and 
focusing on the role of Development Banks in Brazil. I considered the Brazilian 
banking experience of risk and relevant institutional and historical developments that 
contributed to the establishment of risk management’s hegemony. I also examined 
the influence of international financial agencies, for instance, the World Bank and 
IMF, and international conventions about risk, specifically, the BIS standards. This 
chapter then exposed conflicts and contradictions that expose the multilayers of 
‘naturalised’ international regulatory approaches to risk management, commonly 
perceived as neutral, objective and apolitical.  
I have scrutinised the emergence, lack of contestation, and sedimentation of risk 
regulation in Brazil, considering the particularities of the Brazilian financial system 
and its historical development as well as the configuration of its financial institutions 
and the importance of public banks to the development of Brazil. Finally, I 
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demonstrated that, in the particular case of BDBs, the logic of risk clashed with the 
logic of development. Thus, challenging the universality claimed in the regulation of 
risk and supported by the construction of the logic of ‘risk’ centred on ‘best 
practice’, I examined the impact of risk as a coloniser (Beck, 2002: 40).  
In this chapter, risk is considered as a discourse from outside. Focusing on the 
politics of risk management’s emergence and the logics of development/progress as 
an imported neoliberal hegemonic discourse, the idea of risk is part of a neoliberal 
logic of transition. The application of risk regulations in Brazil adopted the 
international models and sound practices of BIS, ignoring the Brazilian context and 
the nature of BDBs, for instance, as a counter-cyclical institution. This regulation, 
however, did not recognise the necessities of Brazil or its development banks, and 
Basel standards were a taken for granted adoption of international ‘solutions’ 
proposed from outside. 
Risk as an capitalist discourse contradicts the balance between social and economic 
growth primarily intended by BDBs and seemed to be the only way to develop 
Brazil’s economy and financial system. This particular conceptualisation of risk has 
also been interesting to preserve the interest of interested parties, such as foreign 
banks and multinational corporations, implicitly supported by the IMF and World 
Bank requirements. Imposed by external financial agents, risk management 
regulations could have had benefits in the short-term. I consider, however, that risk 
represented an attempt to maintain an illusion of progress while overshadowing what 
should have been the real focus of these BDBs: the enhancement of social well-
being. The proposition of risk as a transitional advanced capitalist accounting 
technique distorted the social aim of BDBs, imposing a neoliberal economic logic of 
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risk assessments underlining funding calculations in social projects. These imported 
risk regulations caused potential harm to BDB’s operations throughout an ideal of 
international homogenised, and in turn, harmonised processes. As a result, this study 
sheds light on the constant discussions about implementation of imported policies or 
regulations from ‘developed’ to ‘developing’ countries, criticising a totalising vision 
of this type of practice.  
It is also crucial to problematise the necessity of a modern financial risk hegemony 
discourse in BDBs as well as how the influence of the people was ignored in the 
rhetoric of risk sedimentation. It is important to comprehend the social, cultural, and 
political elements involved in the construction of risk and risk management in each 
context. In practice, risk seems to be used to perpetuate the idea that ‘we are in 
control’, but nowadays the greatest challenge is to know who comprise this ‘we’, 
what composes this object of ‘risk’, which aspects are under this claimed control, 
and if there is even a ‘real’ control that could be kept by this construction of ‘risk 
management’. Therefore, while exploring the contradictions and multiple actors 
involved in risk management implementation at BDBs, this chapter also provides an 
opportunity to understand the construction of ‘risk’ as a hegemonic accounting 
technique of governance in the next chapter. Furthermore, it provides the basis for 
understanding of risk and especially the discursive constituent elements of risk 
management, which forms the focus of discussion in Chapter 4.  
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– CHAPTER THREE – 
 
IN COMMUNICATING RISK, WE CREATE ‘RISK’ 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Having exposed the arbitrariness of risk management regulation for BDBs, in 
Chapter 2, Chapter 3 focuses on why risk became a technology of governance and 
what are the conditions for and implications of employing ‘risk’. Risk is 
hegemonically presented as a solution for the indeterminacy of an uncertain future 
(Reddy, 1996) and risk management practices promise a measurable future through 
‘objective’, and hence, ‘neutral’ calculative practices implied in the decision-making 
process (Ewald, 1991; Castel, 1991). Nonetheless, this chapter scrutinises the 
construction of the elements of risk. Accepting that risk is part of and involved in the 
discourse of accounting, accounting literatures are good location to situate this 
discussion of risk management practices from a regulatory and banking perspective. 
In doing this, I examine the epistemological and ontological boundaries that 
highlight that risk is a technocratic process in mainstream accounting literature, 
simultaneously downplaying the social, political, cultural and methodological 
impacts. By doing so, I embrace a critical accounting research perspective, which 
challenges the conventionally taken-for-granted accounting information (Chua, 
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1986). Accordingly, then, risk must be understood as an arbitrary social and political 
accounting technology that considers elitist viewpoints and reifies their particular 
way of doing things. Therefore, this chapter answers the following questions: How 
does risk operate as a technology of governance? How does risk operate at technical, 
methodological, social, cultural and political levels? 
The following sections illustrate that risk, similar to accounting, is a technique of 
governance. Therefore, risk conveys images of the future as calculable; risk 
constructs knowledgeable and manageable futures. This is in itself a political act, as 
by reducing and constraining the future to calculative practices, the discourse of risk 
creates power imbalances, by determining what is included and excluded, what is 
measurable and thus controllable. The representation of risk as a technocratic 
technology in accounting reflects the arbitrariness of accounting and risk and that 
these viewpoints serve the particular interests, which consequently renders risk 
contestable and contingent. ‘Accounting has been created and developed to 
accomplish various desired objectives and, therefore, it is not based on fundamental 
laws or absolute precepts’ (Catlett, 1960: 44); I explore whether we might apply a 
similar approach to risk. 
Shifts in regulatory frameworks demonstrate that hegemonic definitions about ‘risk’ 
denote flexible categories which are expandable or constrainable according to social 
and political interaction. Hence, objectivity, measurability, calculation, and 
rationality are characteristics that condition risk to a particular paradigm. The 
mainstream accounting perspective of positivism, with its scientific foundations, 
focuses on explaining objects independent from subjects, as they ‘are’ (Chua, 1986). 
The positivist paradigm understands risk as an external object, which is discoverable 
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and measurable. These characteristics, subsequently, enable actors to allocate 
resources ‘efficiently’ as long as they can explain, predict and control correlations in 
the social world (Chua, 1986). 
This viewpoint, nonetheless, is epistemologically bounded. Similar to accounting 
artefacts, categorisations and classifications of risk suggested by international 
regulators to understand future outcomes constitute reductionist and limited views of 
the social world. Thus, from a transdisciplinary perspective, risk is understandable in 
a broader social context and by its interconnectedness. The consequence of this 
representation of risk invites an ontological and ontic focus on risk constructions, 
concerning how different interpretations of risk are negotiated and accommodated. 
From such a perspective, risk is qualitative and subjective, with a personal and 
decision-making process, and an interaction with social, political, cultural, economic 
and other foundations. Here, I illustrate the influence of social, political and 
methodological elements that influence the construction of risk and the creation of 
both subjects and objects within this discourse. 
 
3.2. The Imposition of Accounting Technologies of Governance 
First, my focus is on understanding the impacts of the domination of this logic of 
risk over the logic of development in Brazil and in BDBs. To do this, it is necessary 
to question which characteristics make the diffusion of the regulation based on 
calculative practices possible. In this regard, Cooper and Hopper (1987: 410) provide 
provocative ‘insights into the reasons for the increasing pervasiveness of, and 
acquiescence to, financial calculations in modern society’. They shed light on the 
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role of accounting in shaping the form of the ‘global function of capital’, since 
accounting works by ‘identifying the nature of problems and offering solutions to 
them’ (Cooper and Hopper, 1987: 408). Cooper (1980: 164) states that:  
Neo-liberal economics is the basis of accounting and assumptions of capitalism 
overwhelm current accounting […] The institutions of capitalism define the 
boundaries of our theories and the task of accountants is delineated by these 
boundaries. 
The discourse of accounting re-conceived the role of the State and accounting 
practices themselves (Lehman and Tinker, 1987). Miller and Power (2013: 558) 
conceive accounting as ‘the most powerful system of representation for social and 
economic life today in many national settings’. Accounting tools were, for instance, 
indispensable to make possible the control of production and labour force, as well as 
countries, from a distance (Robson, 1992; Quattrone and Hopper, 2005). 
Furthermore, accounting supports the belief that the current institutional arrangement 
is all that is possible (Cooper, 1980: 165). Miller and Power (2013: 569) emphasise 
that ‘the ability of an organisation to manage uncertainty was presented as a function 
of its ability to handle information, with accounting being central to this equation’. 
However, Cooper (1980: 164) suggests that ‘rather than providing a valid economic 
rationale for action, accounting information is used as a means to support those 
groups who are currently powerful in society’. 
Regulators and supranational bodies represent powerful institutions that serve 
various interests, imposing particular values and related concerns, for instance, 
through accounting technologies of governance (Foucault, 1977; Hines, 1991; Uddin 
and Hopper, 2003; Neu et al., 2006). Different organisational groups also would 
follow their interests using a variety of strategies to pursue their aims against the 
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rigidity and resistance of institutions (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004; 
Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Miller and Power (2013: 559) argue that ‘while 
management and regulators may be concerned with issues of efficiency or value for 
money, it is accounting practices that enable such ideas to be operationalised and 
made real’. Therefore, social and political interests are taken into account in the 
implementation of accounting frameworks. 
A wide range of studies portrays accounting as a technology of government and 
governance, embracing this conception of ‘government rationality’ as 
‘governmentality’ (see, for example, Rose and Miller, 1992; Miller, 2001; Dean, 
2009; Lobel, 2004; Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007). Dean (2009: 18) suggests that 
the governmentality of accounting embraces practices ‘undertaken by a multiplicity 
of authorities and agencies and employing a variety of techniques and forms of 
knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, 
interests and beliefs of various actors’. According to Lobel (2004: 362), governance 
facilitates creative, flexible, and efficient ‘best-practice’ solutions that leave ‘the 
greatest possible amount of control in the hands of those closest to the problems’. 
Gouldson and Bebbington (2007: 12) state that ‘governmentality seeks to uncover 
and examine the often invisible rationality that is behind an assemblage of actions 
and mechanisms that are in place to govern certain actions’. As a result, accounting 
calculative practices should be analysed as ‘technologies of government’ (Rose and 
Miller, 1992: 183), mechanisms through which programmes of government are 
articulated and made operable (Miller, 2001: 379). I argue that this applies equally to 
risk. 
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Significant accounting research focuses on the impact of this logic of governance. 
The impact stretches to shaping daily life. Miller and O’Leary (1987), for instance, 
demonstrate how this logic of governance, using accounting instruments, creates a 
logic of efficiency and inefficiency measured by standard costing and budgeting, and 
how this supports corporate hierarchies in the factory. This idea of accounting as an 
instrument of control and knowledge enabled the financialisation of the social world. 
Power (1997), for example, also illustrates how auditing operationalised neoliberal 
programmes through ideas of accountability and control that shaped individual and 
organisational actions. Accounting places a price tag on society: life is measured 
through insurance, health-care treatments subjected to cost-benefit analysis, 
organisational and individual performance evaluated using balanced scorecards 
(Edwald, 1991; Miller and Kurunmäki, 2007; Wolcher, 2007; Busco and Quatronne, 
2015). The broader impact of neoliberal policies is identifiable throughout society 
and include such examples as the monetisation of success (wealth), a focus on 
measurable intelligence such IQ and other testing of students, learning by grades, 
university’s performance by ranking, and employment rates. This measurement 
fetish extended to subjectivities, such as perceptions and feelings of quality, 
motivation and happiness, summarised by surveys in simple metrics and even in a 
single number. In general, the dogma emphasises that the right amount of data could 
solve everything. In this reductionist view of the world, thus, the privileging of the 
economic led to the obscuring and neglect of social influences and reified particular 
political positions. 
Risk, similarly, is a technology of governance and control, disseminated by risk 
management guidelines and regulatory requirements. In a similar manner to 
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accounting, risk (as a reductionist practice) is a powerful concept in representing 
spheres of social and economic life. Emphasising that risk management would add 
value and reduce failures, propositions of risk serve varied purposes and interests, 
making control possible through its calculations. Risk exercises its power on 
different levels, influencing both nations firms and individuals. Therefore, the next 
section turns to focus on the impacts of risk, as a technology of governance.  
 
3.2.1. The Impact of Risk as a Technology of Governance 
Compliance with standardised regulatory statements about corporate governance 
models, which refers to extensive international and national regulatory requirements, 
increasingly dominates the design of risk management systems (Miller et al., 2008: 
944). Power (2007: 1) affirms that different countries and public organisations have 
been transformed to varying degrees by discourses about risk and approaches to 
managing risk. Additionally, Harris (2014: 164) illustrates the pitfalls of regulations 
that conceptualise risk management from a quasi-scientific or closed rational system 
point of view following assumptions from economics and finance. In this sense, 
Harris demonstrates the importance of understanding individual, social and 
organisational contexts of decision-making and the necessity ‘to adopt an open-
mindedness to draw upon a wide range of theoretical approaches to move this 
essentially inter-disciplinary subject forward’ (Harris, 2014: 174). According to 
Lazzarato (2009: 124), then:  
Theories of risk that have flourished with the rise of neoliberalism submerge the 
concept […] in the motor of shareholding capitalism, under a vocabulary that 
obscures the political struggle and the stakes played out around “risk”.  
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This intentional silence over the politics of the discourse of risk nonetheless 
empowered a rhetorical extension of risk and enabled its expansion and penetration 
into many domains, becoming ‘the risk of everything’ (Power, 2004). Thus, there is 
a multitude of influences to the current dissemination of risk management practices 
around the world. Many regulatory frameworks, such as the Cadbury Report (1992), 
the Turnbull Report (1999), COSO (2003) and ISO 31000 (2009), portray risk 
management as an essential component of corporate governance. Moreover, 
industrial and banking guidelines have portrayed risk as an essential component of 
good management and governance. In accordance with this perspective, Hayne and 
Free (2014: 310) state that while consultants help to spread risk, other actors, such as 
accountants, auditors, academics, researchers and consultants perform multiple roles 
within risk and support both the development and preservation of the current concept 
of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). Consequently, risk management practices 
are in use in many organisations, not only in the banking sector.  
Bhimani (2009: 2) argues that ‘enterprises seek not only to adopt risk controls but 
also to make the deployment of such controls transparent and visible to engender 
greater organisational legitimacy. This reinforces the rhetorical power of risk. Soin 
and Collier (2013) assert that the increased corporate governance focus reflects a 
trend towards a universal regulatory practice using risk-based approaches that tighten 
internal control after crises. These techniques govern modern life with contestable 
statistics about almost everything, which are rapidly creating their own field of 
research, such as the focus on ‘Big Data’. Miller and Rose (1990) additionally 
suggest how risk technologies may appear humble and mundane mechanisms, like 
techniques of notation, systems of training, professional specialists and vocabularies. 
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However, as Bhimani (2009: 3) illustrates, this characterisation of risk as technical, 
analytical and calculable is partial, as risk also constructs a space for managerial 
control and a focus on transparency, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency.  
In a society grown increasingly fearful (Bauman, 2013), risk converts the future and 
danger into the calculative and rational that is controllable and manageable through 
record-keeping, surveillance and regulation (Castel, 1991; Bauman, 2007; Power, 
2007). This dominant logic has expanded to colonise an uncertain social world, 
based on financial instruments – such as loans, bonds, hire purchases and mortgages 
– which requires adherence to hidden rules and probability calculations, as well as 
providing records and report to external authorities (Power, 2004; 2009). Lastly, the 
distinction between risk and uncertainty shapes operational strategies for the 
management and regulation of risk in organisations and governments. The rhetoric of 
risk management is the enhancement of corporate and financial transparency, 
accountability and compliance with current regulatory mechanisms (Power, 2009; 
Miller, Kurunmäki, and O’Leary, 2008; Woods, 2011). Recent studies, nonetheless, 
explore the emergence of contradictions from this ‘dominant’ perspective and expose 
contestations around the risk model (see Fischer and Ferlie, 2013; Brivot, Himick 
and Martinez, 2016; Hardy and Maguire, 2016).  
As a technology of governance, risk is employable to control and measure 
organisational performance and well-being. Jordan et al. (2016) stress how risk 
matrices operate interdiscursively, and go beyond the precise measurement of risk 
related data. They argue that the power of these instruments derived precisely from 
their symbolic representation that simplifies complex realities as ‘manageable’. Risk 
controls tomorrow. Thus, in spite of technical ‘imprecision’ or misrepresentation 
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concerning risk, these tools continue to be attractive to different sectors. In this 
sense, risk matrices are preserved because they become an easily recognisable icon 
with the potential to create connections between specialised and everyday discourses 
and then expand its meaning, engaging users and producing a false sense of security 
(Jordan, Mitterhofer and Jørgensen, 2016). This proposition relies on the idea that 
accounting faithfully represents reality, with further support from accounting 
qualities such as reliability, neutrality and verifiability. The next section, 
nonetheless, presents insights that illustrate the construction of risk on a myth of 
objectivity and the impact of a ‘faux’ independence between objects and subjects in 
risk.  
  
3.3.The Myth of Objectivity in Accounting 
Even with the ‘more sustained and penetrating contestation’ after the subprime 
crises, banks escaped radical shifts in their operations using a ‘densely overlapping 
and mutually supportive network of elites connecting the “unholy trinity” of finance, 
politics and the media’ in uncritical celebrations of their global competitiveness 
(Glynos, Klimecki and Willmott, 2015: 1). I argue that the traditional characteristics 
of accounting are part of this problem, as the mainstream enunciation of risk in 
accounting and finance supports a universal epistemology of risk management 
practices that excludes any role that subjects play in constructing risk. The positivist 
paradigmatic perspective portrays accounting as universal, objective, neutral and 
impartial (Morgan, 1988). Consequently:  
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In making visible and calculable the objects and activities that are at the heart of 
management, accounting creates a facticity that appears objective and 
unchallengeable, beyond the fray of politics and mere opinion (Miller and 
Power, 2013: 559).  
The neoclassical, neoliberal conceptualisation of accounting perpetuates a 
mystification of efficiency and control, obscuring oppositions to the social 
desirability of the capitalist model of society (Cooper, 1980: 164). This viewpoint 
sustains claims to the rationality, and objectivity of calculative practice. However, 
Morgan (1988: 480) is critical of this, arguing:  
Accountants try to represent organisations and their activities in terms of 
numbers. This representation is metaphorical. Moreover, like all use of 
metaphor, it gives but a partial and incomplete representation of the reality to 
which the numbers relate. The numerical view [. . .] ignores those aspects of 
organisational reality that are not quantifiable in this way. 
The positivist paradigmatic perspective in accounting operationalises a realist 
ontology to focus on objects ‘as they are’ and argues that the reality is ‘real’ objects 
independent of subjects. For positivists, facts exist independent of subjects as an 
‘objective reality’, so researchers are experts explaining and predicting the world 
through ‘value-free research’, by providing technical answers to pre-conceived 
questions (Chua, 1986). The focus is on scientific, mathematical method, such as the 
hypothetico-deductive model and regression analysis.  
Accounting, however, is a social artefact. The role of accounting emerges within 
social relationships that shape and are shaped by accounting practices (Chapman, 
Cooper and Miller, 2009). In constructing human actions as accountable, accounting 
plays a role in constraining the responsibility of individuals, through mechanisms 
such as flexible remuneration, awards and punishments (Burchell et al., 1980). For 
that reason, accounting must be understood in relation to its roles within society and 
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organisations (Hopwood, 1983). Miller (2001) shows that calculative practices in 
accounting, like budgets and accounting reports, are instruments for controlling 
organisational culture, norms and beliefs. Consequently, the focus on accounting 
techniques in isolation from their social routines provides an abstract, irrelevant view 
of these practices (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). 
Subjects actively construct the meaning of objects. Therefore, the separation of 
objects from subjects is unsuitable, as accounting is dependent on human actors. 
Chua (1986: 620) asserts that ‘social reality is, thus, both subjectively created and 
objectively real’. Carter (2008: 90), accordingly, illustrates how decisions involving 
costs are exposed to ‘subjective choices between methods and within methods’. 
Thus, although accounting portrays itself, and its methods, as neutral and 
transparent, ‘the deep irony is that the tools that are used are themselves not 
necessarily open and transparent’ (Broadbent, 2002: 445). Although quantitative or 
measurable processes are beneficial in certain instances, the positivist 
conceptualisation of accounting depends on the (unlikely) analytical ability to 
establish conclusive objective and quantifiable correlations with deep structures. 
Consequently, positivist claims are imposed and arbitrary in practice. In discourses 
about risk, nevertheless, this myth of objectivity continues to be perpetuated.  
 
3.3.1. The Myth of Objectivity in Risk Management 
Developments in statistics and probability theory facilitated the construction of 
discourses regarding risk. At this point, humans believed that they had control over 
their future, and it was not a caprice of the Gods (Bernstein, 1996). Knight (1921) 
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introduced the distinction between risk and uncertainty, which revolutionised the 
treatment of the concept of risk. As Reddy (1996) states, the history of economics, 
management and accounting, in this respect reveal the triumph of the notion of ‘risk’ 
(as a vision of the future subjected to analysis based on probability and statistics), 
over ‘uncertainty’ (as a vision of a radically indeterminate future). Knight (1921) 
argued that the segregation between the concepts affirmed that risk corresponds to 
quantified uncertainties, and consequently, that risks were measureable to an 
acceptable level of confidence, while uncertainty, by its idiosyncratic characteristics, 
could not. This conception of ‘risk’ became a particular ‘technological rationality’ 
(Ewald, 1991). 
The importance of risk grew in parallel with the development of regulatory 
frameworks for corporate governance and in response to a series of scandals and 
company failures, once considered robust (Collier and Aguei-Ampomah, 2005; 
Power, 2007). Imposing more restricted interpretations of risk in daily management, 
regulatory statements and accounting reify the measurability of risk in capital 
allocation and in the measurement and disclosure of credit, market and operational 
risks in annual financial reports. These requirements reify a financial definition of 
risk, often linked to financial returns on investments or the probability of default 
(Jorion, 2001; Damodaran, 2007). The Federation of European Risk Management 
Associations (FERMA, 2003: 3) and the Institute of Risk Management of London 
(IRM, 2002) suggest that risk ‘can be defined as the combination of the probability 
of an event and its consequences’. Consequently, traditional accounting research on 
risk management typically focuses on the development of models as an attempt to 
predict trends using financial variables which are translated into the probability of an 
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event occurring to quantify its impact based on historical data and classical statistics 
(Fabriani, 2004; Beasley, Clune and Hermanson, 2005; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). 
In this respect, Morgan (1988) asserts that the use of uni-dimensional information 
tends to lead to uni-dimensional decisions. 
Within this myth of a measurable risk, individual attitudes and behaviours are also 
subject to calculation. Harris (2014: 170) argues that the ‘marketisation’ and 
‘scientification’ of risk created ‘illusions of controls’. In this sense, research using 
cognitive and prospect theories pursue the ambitious aim of predicting human 
choices in conditions of uncertainty. Using the concepts of heuristics and cognitive 
bias that are generated by shortcuts taken during decision-making processes, 
researchers in this field propose fragmented models, which could determine the most 
likely response of a decision-maker (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974; 1981; Kahneman, 2011). Following this positivist approach, 
human aspects related to risk perception and the culture of and for risk are associated 
with probabilistic, statistical aspects measured through proposed scenarios and 
questionnaires using Likert scales. For me, a major problem of these modelling 
perspectives is their descriptive nature, which abstracts situations to capture attitudes 
toward choices made under conditions of uncertainty. However, laboratory or 
experimental environments simplify decision-making processes and usually isolate 
only one effect at a time, which, in general, is not currently affecting the 
respondents’ in real life (Visschers et al., 2009). Bauman (2011) argues that this 
epistemological structure disregards the complexity of real life. Stirling (2010: 
1029), furthers this sentiment, by suggesting that this is ‘an overly narrow focus on 
risk is an inadequate response to incomplete knowledge’.  
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The concept of risk reifies ‘objectivity’ over ‘subjectivity’ and ‘neutrality’ over 
human judgment. The discourse of risk as ‘controllable’ and ‘measurable’ focuses on 
constructing increasingly complete risk models through including new quantifiable 
‘variables’. Harris (1999: 347) argues that managers ‘often make subjective 
judgements about the riskiness of prospective projects, but there are rarely formalises 
into their strategic decision-making processes’. For that reason, ‘little attention is 
paid to this qualitative side of investment appraisal in the corporate finance 
literature’, which disregards that ‘decisions may be being made early on in the 
appraisal process’, even ‘before the cash flow analysis and simulations have been 
completed’ (Harris, 1999: 351). In this sense, there is arbitrariness within the 
construction of risk as a quantifiable concept, and there is arbitrariness in how banks 
or financial institutions implement risk. Therefore, there is no absolute, true ‘risk’. 
Woods (2011), for instance, researched public and private companies in different 
contexts to identify the core drivers of effective ERM. Woods (2011) identified 
diverse risk management styles influenced by business complexity, external 
regulation and what the organisation considered ‘key risks’. Interestingly, within the 
same sector, there were differences within these factors due to cultural and social 
elements and managers’ preferences within the institution (Mikes, 2011). In a similar 
way, Arena et al. (2010) argue that the dynamics of risk management depend on the 
specific industry and the individual company. 
Positivist research about risk, nevertheless, does not examine the reasons for the 
adoption of such risk models in organisations, and traditional approaches emphasise 
calculation (i.e. probability, sensitivity, coverage, insurance, and discount rates), 
which reifies that risk is assessable, measurable and manageable with assurance 
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through a quantitative approach. However, many risks are subjective, judgmental 
and qualitative (Adams, 1995). Researchers argue that risk is ‘socially constructed’ 
and responses to risk should reflect this (Collier et al., 2007; Adams, 2009; Lupton, 
1999). Power (2009) argues that this is a problem in the philosophical perspectives 
applied to risk management research, which generates an ‘intellectual failure’
12
. That 
is the reason why Kadvany (1996) labels such attempts to quantify scientific 
uncertainty as ‘taming chance’. In sum, this myth of objectivity represents risks as 
apolitical; however, this claim is in itself political. The positivist paradigm shows a 
reductionist view of the socio-political complexity and dynamicity of the elements 
intertwined in decisions involving risks and uncertainties. This view affects decision-
making processes and representations of the world. For that reason, the next section 
unpacks the impacts of unilateral decisions involving accounting and then risk.  
 
3.4.The Impact Of Unilateral Decisions In Accounting  
After each crisis, the confidence in accounting models and then in the objectivity of 
risk is shaken by the limits evidenced within this discourse (Craig and Amernic, 
2004; Carter, 2008). Although research following positivism has made a salutary 
                                                 
 
 
12 Power (2009) suggests that one of the causes of risk management flaw during the last financial crisis derived 
from an ‘intellectual failure’ in risk conceptualisation and hence, studies. Thus, rather than the vague current 
demands for improved ‘risk culture’ and governance in financial institutions, it would be useful to focus on ‘risk’ 
as a process for representing and intervening in social practices. 
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contribution, such analysis is one-dimensional and superficial, adopting arbitrary 
assumptions that are inconsistent with individual and organisational specificities. 
Morgan (1988) stated that any representation of accounting is always partial, because 
the separation of accounting from society and context is only theoretical. This is in 
line with arguments claiming that accounting is socially and politically constructed, 
and accountants and accounting actively construct reality (Morgan, 1988: 482-483; 
Hines, 1988: 257; Carter, 2008: 100). Critical paradigmatic positions in accounting, 
thus, challenge the dominant view that accounting is ‘an objective, value-free, 
technical enterprise, representing reality “as is”’(Morgan, 1988: 477):  
Accountants often see themselves as engaged in an objective, value-free, 
technical enterprise, representing reality ‘as is’. However, in fact, they are 
subjective “constructors of reality”: presenting and describing the situations in 
limited and one-sided ways. They are not just technicians practising a technical 
craft. They are part of a much broader process of reality construction, producing 
partial and rather one-sided views of reality, exactly as an artist is obliged to 
create a partial view of the reality he or she wishes to represent. 
Miller and Kurunmäki (2007), accordingly, highlight the danger of regulation using 
accounting numbers, exemplifying this by the case of the National Health Service 
(NHS) using the concept of Reference Costing and ‘Payment by Results’ in the UK. 
These authors illustrate how regulatory statements were sustained by a persuasive 
argument for sharing information, cost comparisons, and efficiency. Potential 
conflicts among regulators and related forms of expertise create incentives for 
hospitals to alter the volume and mix of activities and even to cut costs in certain 
treatments or in entire departments within individual hospitals. Within the 
triumvirate of cost, patient’s choice may end up taking second place to financial 
assessments of the ‘profitability’ or cost-benefits of particular service lines or 
treatments.  
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Scapens (1985: 22), for that reason, argues that the more economically sound, the 
greater the subjectivity, and states that there are different costs for different purposes. 
Skærbæk and Tryggestad (2010), analysing the strategy development in a company, 
showed how, depending on the type of calculative tools mobilised, different realities 
could be created. As they exposed, one set of accounting devices could be mobilised 
to make a given perspective ‘real’, whereas another set of accounting devices could 
be mobilised later to show a very different point of view. In sum, there are many 
power imbalances and politics going on inside the particular representations of 
accounting numbers and these are rarely clear to outsiders.  
The problem with accounting techniques, such as cost, or ‘risk’, is that their 
information is partial, incomplete, situation-specific, organisation-specific, biased, 
subjective, political, and constructed (Carter, 2008: 91). Carter argues further that the 
objectivity proposed by the positivist paradigm is based on exclusions, presuming 
that accounting is universal and ‘a concrete concept discovered independently of 
human interaction’. He also points out that, determinations of accounting techniques 
is done by arbitrary selections characterised by information asymmetry and divergent 
interests in a search for the ‘absolute true presentation’. In conclusion, Carter (2008: 
111) states that regulatory regimes commonly assume a simplistic monolithic 
positivistic notion of accounting techniques and fail to deal with the complexity of 
issues like ‘arbitrariness, choice, contestability, social and institutional 
constructionism, politics and subjectivity’.  
In sum, the unilaterality within these decisions works to include elements that might 
be useful to support vested interests and exclude others, which might be prejudicial. 
This discursive strategy clothed in a technocratic rhetoric neglects the substantial 
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influences of some subjects, whilst empowering others as experts. Accounting 
silences voices, but also gives more space to those who can legitimate their claims. 
Therefore, it created space for the neoliberal rhetoric of progress and supported IMF 
and World Bank interventions. As an objective instrument to manage the future, risk 
metrics could also sustain what would be right and wrong; furthermore, it could 
legitimate those claims through supposed neutral evidence. The difference, though, 
is that accounting is an attempt to tell a story about what has happened and risk is an 
attempt to construct a story about what will happen. The following section exposes 
the impact of applying this rhetoric to risk management practices.  
 
3.4.1. The Impact of Unilateral Decisions in Risk Management 
Accounting literature has addressed ‘risk’ in a fragmented perspective (Collier et al., 
2007). Guidelines have proposed a way to manage risk impregnated with 
‘mechanicism’, designed on the basis of frameworks and recipes that obscure the 
multiple interferences presented, for example, in subjects’ understandings and 
perceptions that are entangled with risk’s definitions and risk management practices. 
Consequently, the meaning of risk is not a static and objective phenomenon, but is 
constructed, negotiated and renegotiated as part of the network and social interaction 
necessary to meaning formation (Chua, 1986).  
The positivist paradigm, thus, presents several limitations for this study of risk 
management. Firstly, definitions of risk and risk management found in regulatory 
statements are arbitrary, especially in the financial sector, presenting these concepts 
as an absolute and objective truth, thus, incurred many errors caused by the 
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conditionality of risk signifiers and the risk management process (Spiegelhalter and 
Riesch, 2011; Stirling, 2010). This is even more problematic, since the assumption 
that risk is an objective object gives managers a false sense of security and rejects 
risks that might be specific to an organisation and its context (Ewald, 1991; Stahl et 
al., 2003; Power, 2007). Organisational actors would present different risk appetites 
and risk perceptions in the decision-making process, as well as emotional and 
political interests that can be influenced by culture and contextual aspects (Gutnik et 
al., 2006). Therefore, the weights given to different risks, at particular times, and in 
particular organisations, could not be considered as homogeneous or universal.  
According to Ewald (1991: 198), risk ‘did not fall from mathematical skies to 
incarnate themselves in institutions’, so we must consider the interconnectedness, 
multiplicity, and diversity of risk practices. After the subprime crisis, risk 
management practices were blamed as the primary cause of these financial issues 
that rocked the global economy. Kaplan et al. (2009) argued that it was time to 
review what went wrong and to propose new solutions. In their discussion about 
which were the new paths to follow, they further explored and analysed the inherent 
assumptions made in risk management frameworks and models. Nonetheless, they 
also failed to recognise that these choices implicit in any disseminated model or 
framework function as boundaries to these discourses and practices.  
In relation to this, for instance, Stulz (2009) and Taleb et al. (2009) showed the 
impact of this exaggerated confidence in risk instruments. The ignorance about the 
limitations of risk management tools or ordinary flaws in managers’ ability are 
aspects that might generate errors presented in the more traditional models of risk 
management. Accounting textbooks and mainstream research keep discussing risk in 
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terms of decision trees, probability distributions, cost-volume-profit, discounted cash 
flow, etc. while in finance this is typically concerned with portfolios, valuation 
models, capital goods and hedging techniques to reduce the risks of currency and 
interest rate exposure. However, the results of these models are inconsistent, 
especially when they would be most necessary, such as in times of crisis, because to 
a great extent in these critical periods the economic ‘reality’ just does not follow 
historical trends. In conclusion, a revision of these practices is needed.  
According to Collier et al. (2007), there are at least three limitations in these 
restricted mainstream perspectives. First, they state that quantitative measures of risk 
were recognised as questionable since 1930 (see Mcgoun, 1995); risks have been 
typically viewed as negative, despite the current proposition of risk as akin to 
opportunities; and following positivist claims there was a reduction of the attention 
offered to the importance of human action. The limitations of this myth of objectivity 
and the implications of one-sided views of risk are notorious. As a technology of 
miscommunication, risk instruments allow the prioritisation of processes and 
activities that might mislead individuals and organisations. Commonly driven by 
economic metrics, risk analysis concentrates the business focus on profitability 
rather than human interaction, perception, and judgement, which are a consequence 
of broader social and political interactions. This creates the dangerous illusion that 
experts can have all risks under control. However, accidents naturally occur no 
matter how sophisticated risk methods are, so the reasons for supporting to the risk 
management perspective must be further scrutinised. The next section then provides 
a paradigmatic reflection about how accounting is a construction made both by what 
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is included and what is excluded. Hence, in communicating accounting, we create a 
‘reality’.  
 
3.5. In Communicating Accounting, We Create a ‘Reality’ 
Initially, it is important to understand how a field of research is formed according to 
paradigmatic positions that set boundaries to the nature of reality and what and how 
human beings can know about it (Huff, 2009: 108). From this point of view, within a 
positivist perspective, risk is an object to be discovered, so measured. Nevertheless, 
according to Carter (2008), in accounting, the numbers are only the final product. 
Accounting practices are about the particular relationships forged between 
understandings and traditions of social groups and their aspirations and pressing 
problems (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007). Thus, from a social constructionism 
perspective, subjects construct the meanings of objects, so ‘meaning’ is both 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’, being constantly constructed, negotiated and 
renegotiated as part of networks and social interactions (Chua, 1986). 
Miller and Napier (1993: 632) assert the inappropriateness of talking about the 
‘essence’ of accounting because there is no ‘invariant object’ to which the name 
‘accounting’ can be attached. New techniques are invented, or transferred from one 
domain to another, and new meanings and significances are attributed to existing 
methods. Miller and Napier, hence, draw attention to the different meanings that 
have been attached to accounting practices at various moments in time, so rather than 
take contemporary accounting practices and their meanings as historical constants, 
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they emphasise the re-directions, transformations, and reversals that time establishes 
in genealogical terms.  
Accounting from this perspective is considered a discourse. The discursive nature of 
accountancy provides a distinctive idiom in which those who participate in it can 
define their actions, a particular way of setting out the possibilities and the 
limitations of certain practices (Miller and Napier, 1993). Overall, the territory of 
accounting is permeable, and there have been redefinitions of its boundaries and 
changes in its content (Miller and Napier, 1993).  
In fact, Morgan (1988) not only shed light to this discursive territory of accounting 
as permeable by other disciplines and perspectives, but also explained how different 
metaphors of accounting shape its domain. Morgan illustrated how ‘accountants’ 
numerical form of representation provides a very “thin” and limited characterisation’ 
of the object, subject, context, and practices under scrutiny, and that any other 
description of accounting under a single lens would have similar problems (see 
Morgan, 1988: 481). Accountants enmeshed in a process of reality construction 
articulate complex realities in partial ways, which help them to sustain realities as 
perceived. Accordingly, Morrow and Brown (1994: 79) state that ‘there is no single 
correct method. There are distinguishable methodological strategies appropriate to 
particular questions and subject matters, depending on the nature of the object of 
inquiry’. Accountants will always seek to illuminate some objects and obscure others 
(Dean, 2009: 41). Thus, Morgan states that accountants must be skilled enough to 
grasp and communicate adequately their essential limitations (Morgan, 1988: 484), 
as accounting constructions are significant in shaping the preferences of varied 
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actors for whom they provide “information” (March, 1987). Even though, he admits 
that this sincerity is not commonly evident, for many reasons. 
Hines (1988) demonstrated that in constructing reality, accountants create reality. 
Therefore, while determining what is included or excluded, accountants also set 
boundaries that constraint what might be considered as legitimate aspects to ponder 
in decisions, influencing how people see the world. This provides a hidden power for 
accountants (Hines, 1988). The discursive nature of accounting is not separate from 
the world of ‘practice’ but is constitutive of it (Garfinkel, 1967). Miller and Napier 
(1993: 644) then add that contemporary accountancy is nothing more than an 
assemblage of disparate components that has been put together in a piecemeal 
fashion. Given that, Walker (2004) affirms that no single paradigm would explain all 
aspects of accounting’s actual development and practices. Arguing about the 
necessity to view accounting as a ‘multi-paradigm science’, Chua (1986) considers 
that different or alternative world-views could potentially enrich and extend our 
understanding of accounting in practice. Thus, she asserts that if someone only takes 
into account one kind of accounting information, that person would have a unilateral, 
uni-representational, representation of accounting, which would drive him or her to 
biased decisions. Consequently, an important aspect of risk is its communication, 
and how actors and institutions use the discourse of risk as a rhetorical instrument.  
 
3.5.1. In Communicating Risk, We Create Risk 
Risk management practices as well as risk definition can be examined considering 
the potential to establish what is included and excluded from this discourse as a 
103 | P a g e  
 
precursor to government intervention (Russell and Thomson, 2009: 231). Embracing 
the genealogy of risk management practices, from this point of view, since the Basel 
Accord in 1988 until now, there have been constant changes in the definition and 
design of what is accepted as ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’. According to Collier et 
al. (2007), there was a natural progression in this process: associated with 
compliance and prevention; to minimise the risks of uncertainty regarding operating 
performance, and to improve opportunity chances that must be used to maintain and 
increase shareholder’s value. Recently, approaches to risk management have 
undergone a change from the initial design, characterised by isolated categories 
segregated in silos, such as market, credit and operational risks, to another one 
related to strategic risks which claims a more integrated and holistic perspective on 
risk management practices, called Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). In summary, 
those dislocations renamed the acceptable practices and categories of risk 
management, representing a redefinition of risk from one entirely restricted to 
quantitative approaches to one allowing more subjective moderations. 
Each conceptualisation of risk throughout its history can be considered a ‘hegemonic 
discourse’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) or a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1979) that 
determines the rules, and then, what is allowed or prohibited within risk management 
designs. However, this is not a static process, and risk practices move forward theory 
and regulation according to new realms, new definitions, and new purposes of risk 
management (Mikes, 2011: 243). In the face of contingencies, the traditional 
construction of risk shows the limitations of a restricted focus on financial aspects. 
Having been challenged, risk has been shifted to embrace operational risks, 
expanded to new territories like strategic risks, a proposed focus on culture and 
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appetite, and then, the idea of a holistic risk management perspective using ERM. 
The evolutionary process of risk, hence, was not merely a technical development, but 
also a deliberate political endeavour.  
Considering the logic of expansion and conquest, thus, if all these last claims had 
been made during the emergence of risk management practices, probably the 
resistance and contestation around those practices would have been enormous, 
ultimately causing their collapse. On the other hand, this strategy of first setting 
‘concrete’ foundations using already legitimate scientific discourse and accounting 
elements, such as ‘objectivity’, ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’, provided to risk a 
much safer shield to maintain and enlarge its boundaries and influence. Although 
some people might consider these shifts as inconsistencies or failures to define what 
risk is and what risk is not, according to Mikes (2012: 19):  
Perhaps the apparent weakness of risk management’s guidelines has helped it 
survive the recent stream of risk debacles and control failures. The vagueness 
and plasticity have created a curiously malleable idea of risk management, 
sufficiently broad to encompass other ideas such as "internal control", yet 
focused enough to become part of even wider concepts such as "governance".  
Power (2004) illustrated how risk management continues to evolve through cycles of 
innovation in measurement, crisis, and revision, pushing its metrics into areas that 
were previously the domain of uncertainty. Additionally, Mousavi and Gigerenzer 
(2014: 1672) observed that most theories used to deal with risk are based in an 
uncertain world, rhetorically tamed to work in this ideal organised world. The 
current financial instruments, like derivatives, on the other hand, are becoming more 
and more complex, involving agreements that could not be easily reduced to 
numbers. Therefore, dealing with uncertainty that is not compatible with risk 
calculations is, at least, incompatible with the chaotic movements of the modern 
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financial era. Though many crises have exposed risk management limitations, these 
metrics are still in use and, within new or reformed appearances, they keep gaining 
legitimacy as ‘remedies’ (Mikes, 2011: 228). Consequently, the ability of risk 
practitioners to influence organisational activities depends not only on the accuracy 
of their models, but also on their capability to make even controversial counting 
systems seem natural and indispensable in the monitoring and controlling of 
organisations (Busco et al., 2006; Millo and MacKenzie, 2009). In this extent, the 
repetition and dissemination of this rhetoric of neutrality and objectivity must have 
created a space to legitimate discourses of risk, whilst reinforcing their own value 
within self-referential practices. 
 
3.6. Accounting as a Self-Referential Calculative Practice  
Given the partiality present in each representation of accounting and risk, there is 
always undecidability in the search for their final meaning, which might characterise 
these attempts as necessary, but contingent (Derrida, 2002; Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001). According to Ahrens and Chapman (2007) ‘accounting cannot be understood 
simply with reference to its supposed functional properties because it is implicated in 
the shaping of its own context’. Accounting calculative practices alter the capacities 
of agents, organisations, and the connections between them (Miller, 2001: 379–380). 
Nascimento (2011) further illustrates how an accounting technology initially 
presented as an innovation, turned out to be a totalising control mechanism that 
reinforced itself through shared ideologies. Technologies of control, like accounting, 
therefore, can have diverse organisational effects depending on the particular ways in 
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which they become part of organisational practices (Schatzki, 2005). For that reason, 
Ahrens and Mollona (2007: 306) stated that accounting practices must be 
comprehended as collective and self-referential actions. 
Accounting tools provide a space for actors to make and legitimate their decisions. 
As an extension from the accounting myth of objectivity, self-referential calculative 
practices are set up with an apparent holistic view of the world that claims to 
embrace the most important elements for its representation. However, considering 
the problems with unilateral decisions, this totalising rhetoric actually provides an 
‘ideological cover’ so that accounting metrics are never questioned (Carter, 2008). 
For instance, health care decisions governed by cost-benefits analysis sustain an 
economic value of life. Insurance works with a similar viewpoint, considering that 
monetary compensation could replace bodily amputations, mutilations, or even 
death. Certainly, no monetary reparation would solve emotional sorrow and 
mourning, but these metrics allow companies to exploit labour, devastate 
ecosystems, and harm communities whilst incurring relatively small expense. In 
sum, the self-referential nature of accounting measures reifies a particular Western 
model that entitles someone to make decisions as objective and neutral. 
Nevertheless, this exclusionary practice does not invite the influenced parties to be 
part of the decision, but reduces and avoids rather than celebrating the diversity in 
human preferences and interactions (Wolcher, 2007).  
Accounting works to silence interested parties from showing the social and cultural 
benefits of decisions in a broader context (Wolcher, 2007). Morgan (1988) highlights 
how organisations could be re-framed in reference to an accounting technology, 
citing the case of a hospital where a particular definition of cost had interfered in a 
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whole corporate culture, from patient health to economic measures of client 
satisfaction and nurses’ and doctors’ efficiency. Similarly, Laughlin (1987) 
examined the role of accounting as a language, considering how it shifted the 
balance from technical to social solutions to problems, and then, privileged the 
power of technical systems (including accounting systems) over the social world (the 
meaning and values of people). Consequently, as Carter (2008) stated in relation to 
cost, accounting must be studied taking into account its social, political, and 
methodological aspects. From this point of view, accounting could not be understood 
by its constant search for universal truths, but by a constant process of shaping 
formation (Macintosh and Shearer, 2000a: 612).  
Accounting designs are to be the logical consequence of a developmental process 
where interests motivate the discourse of the parties involved. They vary with 
specific historic and institutional conditions and reflecting conflicts between 
different groups in society (Cooper and Hopper, 1987: 411). In this context, Knight 
and Collinson (1987) stated that the construction of workers’ interests is to a large 
extent the product of managerial strategies of discipline and control, reproduced in a 
cycle that both creates and confirms itself. Lehman and Tinker (1987) reinforced this 
view of accounting as “infused with interests” and MacKenzie (2009) illustrates that 
the production of accounting signs, like price, is inherently embedded in the 
production of validity, since in order to maintain the legitimacy of their prices, actors 
must show them as factual descriptions. However, prices are rarely challenged, nor 
are accounting metrics. 
In adopting a post-structuralist perspective, Macintosh and Shearer (2000b) 
investigated the ontological status of information in accounting reports and argued 
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that ‘accounting today no longer refers to any objective reality but instead circulates 
in a “hyperreality” of self-referential models’. Actors keep using accounting tools, 
not just due to their accuracy, but because they are useful for social interaction, and 
to structure things, like imposing constrains and enforcing contracts (Macintosh and 
Shearer, 2000b). Consequently, there is arbitrariness in the proposition of accounting 
signs, and the usefulness of accounting models is correlated with the purposes and 
interests of powerful actors who can use those tools to achieve their aims (Macintosh 
and Shearer, 2000b). Likewise, the following sections portray risk as an arbitrary 
self-referential calculative practice, as its metrics are barely challenged, except in 
moments of crisis.  
 
3.6.1. Risk a Self-Referential Calculative Practice 
As a technology of governance, risk calculations impact upon individuals’ 
behaviours representing a tool of control, which creates evidence of appropriate and 
inappropriate, allowed and prohibited attitudes, constructed to reify risk’s own 
claims. As a technique of governance, risk’s power resides exactly in its referencing 
to itself, which reifies itself (Wolcher, 2007). Likewise, Millo and MacKenzie (2009: 
639) assert that risk ‘became useful in its own right’, so it was used, for example, by 
the SEC to legitimate its regulatory decisions. Assumptions, and thus, choices to 
represent risk also denote arbitrariness and power imbalances within these 
constructions. 
Spiegelhalter et al. (2011) argue that risk communication has the power to alter 
audience’s feelings, change their behaviour, or encourage them to weigh the possible 
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benefits or harms of different actions (Lipkus, 2007). Risk permits manipulation, as 
the effectiveness of communication depends on the relative numeracy of an audience 
and the structure used (Spiegelhalter et al., 2011). Lipkus (2007) argues that 
probabilities can be described fluidly with words and using language that appeals to 
people’s intuition and emotions. As examples of this manipulation by 
communication, Spiegelhalter et al. (2011) cite the following:  
 A recent poster campaign in the London Underground proclaimed that “99% 
of young people do not commit crimes” to create a deliberate positive focus 
on 99% of youth being law-abiding rather than the criminal 1%.  
 Positive framing is also used for product promotion, when food is advertised 
“95% fat free”, it shifts the perception to belief that the food is healthy.  
 The outcomes of cardiac surgery, in the United States are published as 
mortality rates, whereas the United Kingdom publishes survival rates, which 
is related to the private and public health policies, respectively, of these 
countries. 
Considering these examples, “risk” inherently includes the concept of control (Beck, 
1992: 40), so the search for the ontological presumptions of accounting and risk 
might be a fruitful challenge in the search for contributions to the current scenario of 
risk management research. In this extent, Mikes (2011) contributes to this discussion 
by considering the diversity and individualisation of heterogeneous risk management 
practices and suggesting that risk might be addressed in the plural. Hutter and Power 
(2005: 9) also considered the interconnectedness of representations of risk, its 
management, and the organisations that exercise these practices, so they assumed 
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that this represents a cycle, where each element is co-produced. In contrast to the 
universal proposition of a model to manage risk culture, Ahrens and Mollona (2007: 
309) argue that ‘culture is practical and ideational at the same time because 
meanings do not exist independent of practices’.  
In relation to risk construction, there are still challenges of communication and 
representation, and debates demonstrating that risk can be used to accomplish 
different objectives, so, it might accommodate different interests. The power 
obtained through risk is commonly under-investigated in institutional and 
governmentality theoretical perspectives. Power (2007) shows, for instance, how the 
subsuming of ‘calculation’ into ‘management’ was an important artefact enabling 
risk to be ‘internalised’ and regarded as a manageable factor, rather than merely a 
measurable, quantifiable and calculable entity. However, there is a lack of evidence 
to support empirically the theoretical paths of risk construction.  
The study of risk constructions might shed light on particular individual and 
organisational representations of risk. O’Malley (2001: 91), in this regard, challenges 
the assertions of a single genealogy of risk and concludes that is important to 
understand the possibilities that were not taken up, the voices that were silenced, the 
questions and conceptions of risk that were actively or passively forgotten, as this 
could help to destabilise the inevitability of the present. He affirms that ignoring all 
the complexity and dynamics involved in this chaotic process will just lead to future 
failures and crises and criticises the errors of current model that only maintain the 
status quo. In view of this, Young (2001: 620-621) proposes a thought-provoking 
reading concerning risk:  
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Rather than approaching risk as an enemy that must be controlled and mastered, 
what new thoughts and activities would be enabled if we considered risk as a 
teacher? Such a metaphor would allow us to entertain the possibility that risk is 
“good” and would divert our attention away from mastery towards learning. 
[…] Rather than searching for tools and techniques to control risk, we might 
question the advisability of our practices that appear connected to risk or that are 
said to contain risk. Thinking of new metaphors is a difficult work and risk as 
chaos or risk as teacher may not prove fruitful ways of conceptualising risk 
upon further reflection. However, they do illustrate how different metaphors 
may redirect our thoughts. 
Accordingly, Millo and MacKenzie (2009: 638) affirm that ‘the remarkable success 
of today’s financial risk management methods should be attributed primarily to their 
communicative and organisational usefulness and less to the accuracy of the results 
they produced’. Throughout its rhetoric, risk ‘became part of central market practices 
and gained reputation among the different organisational market participants’ (Millo 
and MacKenzie, 2009: 638). Hence, Millo and MacKenzie (2009: 651) advocates 
that the ‘technical’ usefulness of the risk models is derived from the fact that others 
also use them, so:  
‘technological’ actors do not merely help human market participants to perform, 
but by providing a stream of methodologically valid information (although not 
always realistically valid, as the findings show) they perform an irreplaceable 
and irreducible part in the constitution of markets.  
In this context, it is noteworthy that political groups would have more power and 
their interest would lie in inefficient regulation, where inefficiency is measured by 
the degree of information asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political 
principal (Laffont and Jean Tirole, 1991). The legitimacy of risk measurements is not 
immediately self-evident, but it is frequently constructed, fostered, and reinforced 
among actors (Mikes, 2011). Therefore, Mikes shows that the idea of economic 
capital numbers reflecting the true risk profiles of business units may have been a 
myth, but this did not make it any less powerful. She also illustrates how conceptions 
of ‘best practices’ and compliance have actively encouraged the expansion of risk 
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quantification into new realms of uncertainty. Moreover, she shows how ‘the 
ideological rhetoric of “independent and scientific” risk control protected [risk 
experts’] autonomy and helped them deflect criticism and displace blame in the face 
of apparent risk-management failures’. In sum, Mikes (2011: 243) highlighted the 
capacity of risk to overcome crises of representation and reinvent itself once again. 
Thus, risk must be understood as qualitative and subjective, based on personal and 
internal processes of decision-making, which reflects its social foundations and 
actors’ own interests and positions.  
All that risk does is name a space; however, in filling this gap, regulators and 
regulations also construct social meanings, objects and subjects. In short, risk created 
its own domain, but it created this domain in coalition with actors who perceive 
risk’s claims as an important rhetoric feature for their own position and identity 
inside markets and organisations. Therefore, the next section discusses the 
professionalisation of accounting and the creation of risk experts.  
 
3.7. The Professionalisation of Accounting 
Business is a distinct sphere of action dependent on new types of professional 
expertise and, above all, on establishing accounting apparatus. For that reason, 
Parker (2002: 184) affirms that today’s discourse of management can be understood 
as a ‘generalized technology of control’ and indeed as a ‘hegemonic model of 
organisation’. The genealogies of calculation, thus, are concerned with the ways in 
which particular calculative technologies, deployed in enterprises over a long period, 
came to be linked together at a particular moment in time into a functioning network 
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of routinely applicable expertise (Miller and Napier, 1993: 639). Consequently, here, 
I depict institutions and then the institutionalisation of accounting techniques as 
‘arenas where different strands of knowledge are continually converted into practices 
which are then tested, challenged, and frequently revised’ (Millo and MacKenzie, 
2009: 638-639).  
In line with the controversies about accounting representation presented above, 
Wolcher (2007: 35) illustrated how proposed accounting solutions could also be part 
of the problem, arguing that ‘there is nothing more dangerous to any robust 
conception of popular democracy than the belief that the determination of “what the 
people want” is safe in the hands of experts’. In the same line, Power (1992) 
highlighted how aspirations of ‘efficiency’ and ‘scientific’ methods for US 
accounting, like statistical sampling, actually helped to strengthen the status of 
auditors as ‘expert’, so that accounting inscriptions also regularly contain knowledge 
claims (Latour, 1987). Accounting artefacts can be employed by actors when 
attempting to construct a particular frame in their efforts to enrol other actors into 
accepting the frame (Vinnari and Skærbæk, 2014: 495). For that reason, Miller and 
Power (2013: 558) conceive that accounting performs decisive roles in:  
the recursive construction of the calculable space […] link up distinct actors 
aspiration and arenas […] evaluating the performance of individuals and 
organisations, and also in determining failings and failures […] subjects 
individuals to control or regulation by another, while entailing the presumption 
of an individual free to choose. 
Considering accounting standards and conceptual frameworks, Hines (1991) argues 
that they are important elements in the claims of professionals and experts. 
Nonetheless, she highlights controversies around functionalist perspectives about 
regulations that do not fulfil their functional objective, suggesting that they are not 
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just functional or technical projects, but play an important role in the social 
construction of reality. The ontological assumption underpinning regulatory 
frameworks is that they will provide faithful representations of reality, which is 
objective, intersubjective, and independent of subjects. Thus, analogies are often set 
highlighting similarities between business enterprises and hard sciences. However, a 
good entrepreneur must know that is more important to interpret the surroundings 
than just read ceteris paribus assumptions, as even scientists have their own 
contradictions and disagreements. The world is interconnected and analogies are 
commonly inappropriate reductionist views of reality. 
Claims to expertise, however, occur both internally and externally in organisational 
sites. Regulators claim their expertise by the rhetoric of space-knowledge or 
discipline-knowledge, for instance, portraying themselves as in the possession of 
national or international ‘best practices’ or even the most current and updated 
version of accounting tools (Hines, 1991; Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007; Vinnari 
and Skærbæk, 2014). Large professional service firms would replicate those 
statements, reinforcing their knowledge and experience based on the rhetoric of 
diffusors and implementers of international bodies’ requirements (Greenwood and 
Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby, Cooper and Greenwood, 2007). Internal actors, who 
perceive those claims as self-beneficial, might also strengthen this rhetoric 
proclaiming that they are the legitimated replicators of both international 
professional bodies and those who were trained by worldwide-acknowledged large 
accounting service firms. In sum, Vinnari and Skærbæk (2014: 495) confirms that 
the purification occurs when different experts endorse the relevance of particular 
framings and Miller and Power (2013: 559), complementarily, assert:  
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the power of accounting is a joint function of a technology that seems to reveal 
and represent economic reality on the one hand, and a body of organised experts 
who prescribe and diffuse norms of best practice on the other. 
Regulation is not a neutral game (Derrida, 2002). Therefore, Slinko et al. (2005) 
studying the regulatory capture affect found that politically powerful firms perform 
better on average; a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms 
that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically 
connected firms; capture adversely affects small-business growth and the tax 
capacity of the state. On a world level, Messner (2014) further shows that this so 
called ‘international fetishism’, which becomes an indicator of quality and visibility 
and is driven by the rhetoric of ‘best practices’, could be dangerous. Thus, Messner 
draws attention to the importance of diversity and that we live in a non-homogenous 
world. Hence, as Clarke (1980: 268) states:  
[Even] if cost accounting sets out, determined to discover what the cost of 
everything […] the information that is desired for every possible purpose, it will 
necessarily fail, because there is no such figure. If it finds a figure which is right 
for some purposes it must necessarily be wrong for others. 
Hines (1991: 328) argues that ‘a fundamental form of social power accrues to those 
who are able to trade on the objectivity assumption’ that ‘serves to construct a 
perceived legitimacy for the profession’s power and autonomy’. According to Miller 
and Power (2013: 557), ‘accounting representations and metrics are simultaneously 
powerful interventions which shape people, practices, and organisations’ […] a 
mechanism by which the economization of organisational life becomes elaborated 
and institutionalized’. Therefore, in the hands of powerful actors or institutions, they 
can be used in numerous ways to manipulate and drive decisions to one particular 
aim. In addition:  
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Professional firms are increasingly important in professionalization and 
regulatory processes […] these are important sites where accounting practices 
are themselves standardised and regulater, where accounting rules and standards 
are translated into practice, where professional identities are mediated, formed 
and transformed, and where important conceptions of personal, professional and 
corporate governance and management are transmitted (Cooper and Robson, 
2006: 1) 
The progressive movements of Basel, for example, have focused on the systematicity 
of risk, couched in systematic, scientific, quantitative, calculable terms. 
Consequently, internal to the logic of risk is that we cannot admit its subjectivity, so 
the systematicity of risk supports the manageable, calculable and controllable nature 
of risk assessments (Kadvany, 1996). Although there is a crucial human component 
to risk management, this element has been under-examined in risk research. For that 
reason, it is important to understand the logics used by experts to conquer, maintain 
and expand their domains. Here, in particular, I examine the discursive strategies of 
risk experts.  
 
3.7.1. The Power of Risk Experts  
Scientific knowledge was a valuable resource mobilised by actors in policy 
formulation and an instrument for the legitimation of risk experts (Jerónimo, 2006, 
Reddy, 1996). Thus, as a technique of governance, risk reconfigures roles and 
identities (Burchell, 1993) and sustains a normative control apparatus within 
corporations, producing a world which is amenable to control by managers and 
technologies of management (Parker, 2002). For this reason, risk management 
guidelines and reports act as framing devices (Callon, 1998). Harris (2007) 
acknowledges the existence of a range of manager’s perceptions of risks and 
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uncertainties involved in making acquisitions and that might be taken into account to 
build expertise in this area. In this extent, she argues that the idea of 
‘professionalism’ might be used to label and segregate a positive pole of 
‘professional’ from a negative pole of ‘unprofessional’ individuals, even if actors 
hold different views about the set of skills and behaviours that a professional should 
have in relation to risk management. Likewise, Millo and MacKenzie (2009: 639) 
state:  
An actor’s point of view is the initial coordination according to which risks are 
defined and risk assessments are made. Therefore, the way an organisational 
actor depicts its risks is contingent upon how that actor perceives itself, its goals 
and its relationships with other actors. [… ] Over time, an influential risk 
management system will bring about institutionalised patterns of risk 
embodiment. 
The power of experts works in cascade. For instance, Vinnari and Skærbæk (2014: 
495), citing how internal organisational actors worked in promoting and imposing 
the implementation of the COSO framework on others, confirmed that internal risk 
experts justify its superiority by appealing to the fact that it was based on the work of 
a committee comprising risk management experts. Consequently, there are many 
interests intertwined in the determination of a particular construction of risk, which 
further would influence on expert’s organisational position. As a result, more 
importantly than just understanding what risk is, it might be fruitful to identify how 
risk became and is becoming, and finally, have a glimpse of the reasons for each 
construction in each moment in time (the political logic, in Chapter 8, illuminates 
this process).  
Powerful actors are working in both national and international spaces, internally and 
externally to organisations, within and across disciplines, in discourses of risk that 
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could be shifted, but will always reinforce risk and the superior position and power 
of risk experts. Ericson (1994) explained how the claims of security are created by 
experts through enhancing the feeling of insecurity, which fosters the need for and 
indispensability of experts’ knowledge. Nonetheless, Ericson states that experts must 
also be aware to not push this rhetoric too much, as security also depends upon a 
balance of trust and acceptable risk. However, as Spitzer (1987: 50) has written, ‘the 
more we divide the world into those who are able to enhance our security and those 
who threaten it, the less we are able to provide it for ourselves’. Therefore, ‘each 
successive step in the endless problem-solving, while experienced as another 
extension of freedom, further strengthens the network of dependency’ (Bauman, 
2013). 
More recently, this idea of expertise developed by scientific claims has been 
challenged by studies adopting a more sociological approach. For instance, lately, 
internal auditors started to portray themselves as experts in risk management (e.g. 
Vinnari and Skærbæk, 2014; Power, 2007; Spira and Page, 2003). So, considering 
auditors’ positions, Fanning and Piercey (2014) showed the importance of 
developing a positive interpersonal relationship and their findings characterise 
auditing as a rhetorical practice, considering how auditors could persuade managers 
about their importance in corporate governance issues. Similarly, in relation to risk 
experts, Mikes (2014) shows the importance of building informal networks and how 
chief risk officers (CRO) could facilitate the creation and internalisation of particular 
“risk talk”, legitimating cross‐functional language within the business. However, 
Mikes also reinforces that this role involves a significant degree of humility on the 
part of CROs, who must manifest their limited formal authority and meagre 
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resources. Accordingly, Hall, Mikes and Millo (2015) examined how risk experts 
establish and maintain interpersonal connections with decision makers and 
highlighted the central role of ‘toolmaking’ in explaining how functional experts 
may compete for the attention of decision makers in the intra-organisational 
marketplace for managerially relevant information.  
In sum, the construction of risk experts must involve not only their sovereignty over 
the technique, but also social and political skills, which would support them, while 
constructing alliances and this new space for expertise. For that reason, Damodaran 
(2007) states, the emphasis on subjective uncertainties segregated from the objective 
ones described by Knight was misplaced and, although a measurable risk is covered 
more easily, for example, in an insurance policy, indeed, concerns exist with any 
uncertainty, measurable or not. Moreover, this perception is ratified by the increased 
volume of research that seeks to better understand the influence of ‘non-quantifiable 
risks’, or uncertainties, in other areas (Spiegelhalter and Riesch, 2011, Stirling, 
2010). Although mainstream concepts of accounting and risk presented themselves 
as immune to broader social influences and segregated in a particular worldview, this 
is not feasible. Consequently, the next section ponders the influence of broader 
contexts and discussions in other disciplines, uncovering the multilayers of those 
signified.  
 
3.8. The Multiple Layers of Accounting 
According to Miller, Kurunmäki and O’Leary (2008: 963), we need to know more 
about industry and firm-specific practices that facilitate information and 
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communication flows across the boundaries of the organisation and its groups of 
experts or professionals. We need to know more about the diverse, and often 
localised, metrics and languages that facilitate interactions that do not respect 
organisational boundaries, whether in the private or not-for-profit sector. We need to 
know more about the locales, institutions, and conduits through which such metrics 
circulate, and in which they are embedded. Moreover, we need to pay attention to the 
multiple and diverse constituents of such practices, which often do not fit the neat 
categories according to which we typically organise the world. Considering this 
point, Reddy and Chappe (2012) state that recent social theory dealing with 
modernity has focused on the increase of new forms of risk as a social challenge.  
The focus of current managerial propositions on culture and appetite in risk 
discourses might not be considered from a single viewpoint. Angouri and Glynos 
(2009), for instance, characterise ‘culture’ as a floating signifier, because its 
meanings and significance emerge only in and through the process of articulation, 
namely, the way it is partially fixed by connecting it to available discursive resources 
and the problems animating a particular context. However, Willmott (1993: 517) 
also shows that:  
The marketing of corporate culture has been a ‘success story’. […] interrelated, 
some attention is also given to how ‘corporate culturism’ is supported and 
frustrated by the material and ideological contexts of its articulation. […] in the 
name of expanded practical autonomy, it aspires to extend management control 
by colonizing the affective domain. 
Considering the boundaries set in accounting and risk discourse, Burrell (1987: 100) 
suggests that ‘in order to free others, we must first free ourselves - perhaps even 
from our own discipline’. Tinker et al. (1982) regard accounting as an ideology. 
From this point of view, for example, auditing is as much an idea as it is a concrete 
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practice, and it is this ideational character, which has allowed it to be so readily 
diffused across a wide variety of domains (Power, 1997). More than that, auditing 
can be used as a very convincing argument about a company’s financial health, 
environment, society, processes efficiency etc. Nonetheless, other accounting 
techniques are implicated in this processes of self-legitimation and support of 
experts.  
Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988) illustrate how accounting constructs social and 
cultural positions using the rhetoric of, for example, budgeting. Those practices are 
legitimated by internal actors’ self-interests as well as external systematic 
abstractions that work by ‘masking an underlying socio-political reality’ (Covaleski 
and Dirsmith, 1991: 136). Hopwood (1984: 175) has emphasised that accounting is 
‘implicated in institutional frameworks, language, and patterns of power and 
influence’. Therefore, claims of compliance do not represent the mere acceptance of 
norms, but the perpetuation of social structures and power imbalances, whilst 
‘[obscuring] the transfer of power between societal actors’ within organisations 
(Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988: 135). The label of progress, as a result, has 
‘consciously and actively preserved the basic social, political, and economic 
relations essential to capitalist society’ (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991: 142). Thus, 
‘although this language is cloaked in the appearance of objectivity and neutrality, it 
is ultimately directed toward establishing and maintaining hierarchies of authority 
and status’ (Covaleski and Dirsmith (1991: 139). Consequently, it is important to 
uncover those social and political elements also in risk constructions.  
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3.8.1. The Multiple Layers of Risk Construction 
There are many paradigmatic influences for the current definition of risk in finance 
and accounting and this affects positions brought to research, as well as the practice 
of risk management. The positions presented in previous sections lead to the extreme 
and polarised understanding of risk. At one extreme, risk appears in consequence of 
natural laws, completely independent of the observer, who can only try to 
comprehend these rules. Models and regulations of risk management do not cover it 
as a constructed decision-making process and studies in this field attempt to 
demonstrate factors that could affect the success or failure in the implementation of 
these models (Arena et al., 2010; Collier et al., 2007; Gephart et al., 2009). At the 
other extreme, lies risk as a concept dependent on the observer’s interpretation as a 
consequence of socially constructed reality, where the contingent nature of risk-
modelling needs to be explicitly acknowledged in advice given by policy-makers as 
well as those unconditional expressions of uncertainty which remain an aspiration 
(Spiegelhalter and Riesch, 2011).  
Each organisation, nevertheless, develops its model guided not only by regulatory 
constraints. They usually consider the pressures of their environment, referring to the 
image they want to convey to their stakeholders (e.g. banks, customers, shareholders, 
government, society etc.) (Collier et al., 2007; Souza, 2011). Therefore, decisions 
concerning risk, broadly speaking, seem to be much more grounded in political and 
individual aspects than only in generalised discussions about this concept and 
models. Lupton (1999) states that risk has become a pervasive political and cultural 
concept that influences the very character of contemporary social life in Western 
society and a central aspect of human subjectivity in risk control, which in turn 
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implies that risk must necessarily be associated with notions of choice, responsibility 
and blame. As a result, a common analytical conclusion is reached: risk is a very 
influential, pervasive, and politicised issue in the modern era. 
The growing relative importance of manufactured risks (which are the product of 
human activity), compared to external or natural risks, is well described in the work 
of sociologists like Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990). In addition, the emergence of 
new forms of manufactured risk (e.g. environmental and financial risks) is a direct 
consequence of rising levels of complexity and interconnectedness in industrial 
societies, reflected in the organisation of production, the nature of technologies 
employed, etc. Thus, an interdisciplinary interface attenuates risk’s boundaries, and 
exposes the need to develop a more ontological and ontic focus on risk management 
practices, comprising that:  
‘Risk’ is extremely contextual and fluent, what is or what is not considered a 
‘risk’ depends to a large extent on other things. […] ‘Risk’ is not an intrinsic 
property of things. It is a relational term that emerges out of contexts depending 
on shared conventionally established meanings, that is to say, ‘culture’ 
(Boholm, 2003: 175).  
The territory of risk management and accounting is permeable by other disciplines, 
perspectives, and different metaphors. Considering this aspect, Young argues that:  
[Metaphors] focus our attention upon particular aspects of a thing that we might 
otherwise overlook and, in doing so, they also deflect our attention from other 
aspects. In directing and deflecting our attention, metaphors help us to construct 
our perceptions of reality in particular ways, guide our actions, and are used to 
frame issues as problems and to assess the feasibility and appropriateness of 
various possibilities as solutions. […] Metaphors have contributed to the 
thinkability of risk management and to considerations of risk as an opponent 
that must and should be confronted and managed (Young, 2001: 619). 
Therefore, in this thesis, I consider the propositions of risk culture and risk appetite 
from a perspective that reinforces how the concept of risk has emerged, and then, 
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was contested until its sedimentation. Risk seems to be a very strong argument to 
maintain control (Power, 2007). However, the multilayers of this broad concept can 
be forged according to intentions of each organisation and individual. For instance, 
Woods, Dowd and Humphrey (2008) stated how multiple possible methodologies 
are used to measure the Value-at-Risk, and how this influences the representation 
and numeric variation of this ratio. For that reason, there are technical, social, 
methodological and political elements of risk construction that must be further 
scrutinised in my fieldwork.  
 
3.9. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the mainstream financial articulation of risk and risk management 
was challenged on the ground of its perceived arbitrariness, and for aiming to keep 
the idea of risk as neutral, objective, controllable, and measurable, whilst 
downplaying the subjectivity implicit in each of these constructions. Considering the 
discussion in Chapter 2, it is reasonable to argue that the discourse of risk 
management was also used to empower international actors, who are not native to 
Brazil, nor to BDBs. This discourse allowed claims of expertise and the right to set 
the ‘correct’ path to follow through constructions of ‘risk’ following a universal 
regulatory neoliberal conceptualisation of progress and ‘best practices’. However, 
the multiple potential interpretations attached to ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ from 
different paradigmatic perspectives opened up a space for enquiry about the ‘real’ 
existence of a true and absolute ‘risk’, as social constructions would continuously 
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include and exclude elements of this concept in a discursive attempt to set 
boundaries of closed interpretation.  
Risk as an accounting technology of governance determines what is knowledgeable, 
and then, governable, according to specific power imbalances. Therefore, from a 
mono-paradigmatic perspective, risk might be understood as an ordinary accounting 
technology, which could be counted, calculated, measured, and then, managed. Even 
so, considering a broader conceptualisation of risk and the interconnectedness, 
dynamic and complexity of risk management practices with social and organisational 
contexts, as well as many other disciplines and paradigmatic perspectives, risk must 
be understood also as a social, political, and methodological instrument. From this 
perspective, then, discourses that claim risk neutrality, impartiality, rationality and 
objectivity are at best, “intellectual failures” as Power (2009) stated. At worst, this 
rhetoric is used just to reinforce the political power imbalances that risk discourse 
constructs using unilateral views of organisations and society.  
Accordingly, the multiple layers of risk illustrate that this is a powerful concept, 
which can be shaped to fit different discourses for different purposes, allowing 
particular control and interventions in diverse sites. As an accounting technology of 
governance, risk sustains a particular view and reading of realities, supporting 
regulators and other actors who perceive risk statements as crucial rhetorical 
artefacts for their own purposes. For that reason, a myth of objectivity has been 
created around risk, which legitimated actors’ actions and allowed them to blame 
and avoid blame (Spira and Page, 2003) in an illusory detachment of subjects from 
this object. Such rhetoric, nonetheless, could cause miscommunications and biased 
decisions, influenced by the unilaterality of modelling. Therefore, it is important to 
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search for alternative views of risk that might illustrate broader landscapes to work 
in an ambience of uncertainty, and then, to challenge the traditional taken-for-
granted images of risk. 
I argue here that power is endogenous to society and assert that an apolitical 
perspective of risk cannot be achieved. There will always be self-referential 
constructions of risk, used by actors according to their own purposes. Accounting 
technologies, like risk, would follow certain paths and rules necessary to their own 
perpetuation and dissemination, even if these paths cannot be predicted ex ante. 
Nonetheless, there are paradigmatic, theoretical, and methodological perspectives 
that might improve explanations and investigations of risk management practices and 
constructions. It is important to shed light on the reasons for changes and temporary 
instabilities within risk discourse as well as the obscure international interests in the 
dissemination of this latest example of an accounting technology of governance. 
Thus, the following chapter illustrates how the post-structuralist Discourse Theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe would enhance the understanding of multiple layers of risk 
constructions.  
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– CHAPTER FOUR – 
 
RISK AS A DISCURSIVE PRACTICE 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I explain how the Discourse Theory (DT) of Laclau (1990; 2004; 
2014) and Laclau and Mouffe (2001) facilitates understanding of the construction of 
risk in the BDB’s site. DT has been recently widely used in accounting (Gallhofer et 
al., 2015; Frezatti et al., 2014; Nascimento, 2011; Spence and Carter, 2011; Spence, 
2007; Mouck, 1995; Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991), and management (Willmot, 2005; 
Glynos et al., 2012; 2015), so building on this tradition I have mobilised this theory 
and contextualised it in this research, exposing its usefulness in probing risk 
management practices. Hence, here, I consider the theory to be a toolbox and explore 
elements of DT relevant to this thesis, explaining how they are connected to different 
conceptions of risk in literature as well as perspectives imposed from risk 
management regulations or guidelines (see more, respectively, in Chapters 2 and 3). 
Therefore, this chapter answers that following question: How does DT help us to 
understand risk as a technical, methodological, social, and political practice? 
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DT uncovers alternatives, and then, power imbalances and politics implicit in 
decisions, such as how a regulation must be applied. Moreover, it considers 
influences and interests from macro- and micro-actors as essential elements to 
understand concerns around the application of norms and rules, for instance, choices 
made by regulators as well as consultants and managers during the implementation 
of risk management practices in the micro-context of BDBs. DT also provides a 
theoretical background that explains the reasons behind arbitrary, hegemonic, and 
universal discourses of risk and why they have changed over time and in different 
contexts (Woods, 2011; Mikes, 2011). From this perspective, this chapter exposes 
how the construction of risk opens up a space for multiple interpretations of risk’s 
meaning, revealing gaps in risk-related regulatory statements and conflicts regarding 
the objectivity and subjectivity around the interpretation of risk management 
frameworks. In order to shed light on those political discursive strategies, I provide 
more details about the analytical tools and theoretical elements of DT, which will be 
applied to explain and examine the situation encountered in the empirical site of this 
thesis (Chapters 6, 7, and 8). However, initially, this chapter characterises the 
imposition of prudence regulation on BDBs as an imperialist epistemic violence. 
 
4.2. The Imperialist Epistemic Violence within Risk Discourse 
Given the above problematisation of risk discourse, this section addresses how and 
why the implementation of risk techniques has pervaded so many disciplines and 
spaces, becoming the hegemonic discourse in finance and accounting, generally, and 
more specifically in Brazil and BDBs. To explain this, I argue that the current 
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authority of risk could be explained in terms of power imbalances and hidden 
politics, concerning primarily how the discourse of risk allowed an imperialistic 
ideological domination.  
Campbell (2011) argues that after the colonial period, people and nations are not 
dominated solely by physical and armed forces, but that the current era demonstrates 
domination by more ideological means. Such ideologies were created according to a 
hierarchical conception of segregation between North and South, Third World and 
First World, as well as developed and developing countries (Campbell, 2011). The 
oppressor usually keeps the superior role of a teacher, who knows, or who knows 
more, distancing itself from the inferior ‘other’ culture. This is a claim of power that 
allows oppressors to set the right path to follow and enables them to tell the 
oppressed – characterised as the powerless and ignorant ‘other’ - what to do. 
Nevertheless, this domination rhetoric is not explicitly expressed within the formal 
discourse that commonly asserts its promise of a universal external ‘solution’ to 
problems, even if this solution does not necessarily represent the will of the native 
people (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004). 
The discourse of globalisation is an example of this process, as characterised by 
dependency and mimesis, it leads to the reification of a global hierarchy silencing 
local subaltern voices (Spivak, 1988). Foucault (1977) conceives this as a process 
that produces observed, segregated, normalised, and controlled docile bodies. Hence, 
knowledge is not value-free but used to exercise power and authority (Foucault, 
1979). In post-colonial theory, Spivak (1988: 281) describes this as ‘epistemological 
violence’, which uses language and law to marginalise specific groups. Elements of 
‘otherness’ reinforce concepts of majority and minority, exaggerate the differences, 
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and minimise similarities amongst people. Writing from a position of privilege, the 
coloniser distorts and stereotypes the ‘other’ groups and culture, obstructing and 
undermining non-Western understandings as a way of subjugating the colonial 
subject. However, the biggest problem is that subalterns usually do not recognise 
their position of oppressed. For that reason, Spivak (1988) provocatively asks, ‘Can 
the Subaltern Speak?’. Because, as Freire (1990) observes, self-depreciation is a 
common characteristic in this domination and the oppressed can feel attraction 
towards the oppressor to the point that the oppressed aspires to share the oppressors’ 
way of life. Bhabha (1994) confirms the existence of this imitation as a desire of the 
colonised to emulate the coloniser. Consequently, there is a strong ideological 
component in this domination. 
This domination, achieved through ideologies, characterises systems of 
representation, which mask the true social relations, constructing imaginary ones 
between individuals and groups, but also between them and the social formation 
(Althusser, 1971). The neoliberal ideologies, for instance, provided an ‘ideological 
cover’ (Carter, 2008) to institutions like the IMF and World Bank, through 
supposedly ‘best practices’ (Stiglitz, 2003). Thus, considering the contradictions and 
hidden interests underlining these ideologies, these universal and ahistorical 
constructions of ‘solutions’ from outside represented an ‘epistemological violence’ 
permeated by conceptions of power and domination (Spivak, 1988). The function of 
ideology, then, is to make the world in which the subject lives appear obvious and 
natural, even though this apparent objectivity and normality is an effect of the 
subject ‘misrecognising’ its real historical situation (Howarth, 2000: 93; Althusser, 
1971). Thus, ‘ideology’, ‘acts’ and ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ 
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subjects among individuals or ‘transforms’ them into subjects by the process of 
interpellation (Althusser, 1971). It distorts the real intent of social relations 
(Jørgensen and Phillips, 2004), containing or suppressing the political dimension of 
practice (Glynos and Howarth, 2007).  
Ideologies help to perpetuate asymmetrical power relationships within society, which 
are essential in maintaining domination (Thompson, 1984). Post-colonial theory, for 
that reason, aims to unlock taken-for-granted assumptions remaining from 
colonialism in order to understand the current forms of imperialism. Post-colonial 
studies emphasise the importance of past cultural, economic, political, or military 
domination, and its consequences in the actual configuration of groups and countries 
(Neu et al., 2002; Campbell, 2011). For instance, the idea that the solution will come 
from outside implicitly carries the ideology that natives do not have power or 
knowledge to propose solid solutions, or even change their own contexts 
satisfactorily. This rhetoric is also inhabited by the possible deprivation 
consequences of moving against hegemonic propositions and conceptions from the 
‘emperor’ country. Thus, post-colonial studies contest and disrupt the universal 
optimistic assumptions related to concepts like ‘development’, ‘harmonisation’, 
globalisation’, ‘progress’, ‘civilisation’, and the dominant discourses of Europe or 
the USA, as well as their chronological view of history and the current economic 
situation, as an apolitical reality (Ridpley et al., 2002: 10). 
As a result, historical evidence about the taken-for-granted appropriateness of risk 
management regulatory requirements in Brazil must be subject to reinterpretation or 
reinvestigation according to this perspective. The discourse of ‘objectivity’ and 
‘neutrality’ in risk management practices and regulation, therefore, must be 
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unpacked as a process rather than a given. Critically, this is an attempt to reveal 
privileged and marginalised groups (McCarthy and Thomas, 2005). Risk has created 
an unusual and harmful change in the context of BDBs. Supported by international 
regulatory requirements for the banking sector, the BCB, following international 
requirements from Basel, included risk management in the formal structure of the 
Brazilian banking system. This regulation would supposedly guarantee the operation 
of the major multinational banks in the country, promote cheaper credit supply and 
provide the opportunity for large national banks to raise funds at a lower cost of 
capital. They could then offer lower interest rates to support industrial expansion, 
arguably benefiting the system as a whole. However, in the case of the BDBs, these 
regulatory changes caused various problems, firstly, when trying to adapt their 
limited structure and then secondly, when restructuring their capital composition (see 
more in Chapter 2.5.1). Nevertheless, these inadequacies were barely contested. 
Abdul-Rahaman et al. (2013) demonstrated how efforts to legitimise financial 
practices in a public water institution in Ghana neglected vital issues for 
socioeconomic development. In this sense, the dominant World Bank perspective, 
centred on profit maximisation, was inadequate because it measured everything 
except what makes human life worthwhile. For that reason, Abdul-Rahaman et al. 
argued that the concept of development must be understood beyond economic 
reductionism and reflect a ‘people-centred’ approach in order to embrace the 
complexity of human necessities. Nonetheless, they acknowledge that an 
organisation might ‘(re)-design its accounting system to conform with (or meet) the 
(new) requirements emanating from the justifying rationales’ of supranational 
bodies.  
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Distorted representations and the usage of the Western devices create a discourse 
that silenced the subaltern post-colonial subject (Spivak 1988). Accordingly, Graham 
and Neu (2003: 467) state that while ‘accounting amplifies certain voices on the 
global stage. It does not amplify others, yet these others deserve to be heard’. In 
another study, Neu et al. (2006) demonstrated how accounting technologies of 
governance embedded within lending agreements shaped, constrained and mediated 
action, diffusing financial technologies that reaffirm the expertise and continuing 
influence of the IMF and World Bank. The interventions from these supranational 
bodies have occurred via structural adjustment programmes and lending conditions 
throughout the developing world (Neu et al., 2002). Thus, reinforcing a universal 
path towards progress, accounting makes certain problems visible, and then, suggests 
and operationalises solutions, which result in creation and maintenance of 
asymmetries and imbalances across international borders (Graham and Neu, 2003). 
Consequently, globalisation is considered merely a renewed form of imperialism and 
the adoption of particular policies is mainly coercive (cf. Neu et al., 2002), even 
though these techniques change the day-to-day practices, vocabularies, and priorities 
of distant fields.  
Similarly, risk represents a shift in the political economy of science towards a 
neoliberal regime of governance. Profound changes in the global political economy 
and the rise to dominance of a neoliberal global regulatory architecture with an 
economic focus, combined with the penetration of neoliberal logics into governance 
across the world profoundly shaped organisational contexts and the role of experts. 
Kipping and Clark (2012) suggest that today the BRICS countries represent a market 
that is growing fast for consultancy groups and there is an excessive expenditure of 
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third world countries on management consultancy. Therefore, internationally 
recognised and trained experts rhetorically filled the ‘risk’ space by claiming what 
was right and wrong, and what might be included and excluded in risk analysis. The 
influence of neoliberal economic ideologies in developing countries, consequently, 
can be seen in the insertion of imperialistic accounting ‘technologies’ (Neu et al., 
2002), such as the mechanisms of governance proposed by risk management. Brown 
(2014) elaborates on those ideas arguing that risk is one of the claims in the 
globalisation wave of neo-liberal discourse as:  
Risks can form the basis of effective governance by existing authorities in line 
with general consensus (authority + consensus = legitimate risk), notions of risk 
can be harnessed by existing authorities to foster consensus 
(authority + risk = legitimate consensus), invoking notions of risk in line with 
popular consensus can bolster authority (consensus + risk = legitimate 
authority), but ‘risks’ with neither consensus nor links to authority fail to 
become legitimate (Brown, 2014: 392). 
The discourse of risk and its rhetorical elements of ‘integration’, ‘harmonisation’, 
and ‘globalisation’ empowers industrialised nations, enabling them to push 
regulatory, economic, and accounting technologies upon developing countries. Risk 
as a discourse from outside is an endeavour towards power and domination that aims 
to colonise (Beck, 1992). Nonetheless, the harm caused by risk management 
standards is faceless. The attempt to trace responsible actors that must be blamed is 
puzzling, given the complexity and dynamics of these processes inside institutions. 
Besides, the violence caused by this accounting technology cannot be easily 
recognised at the individual level as violence generated by a direct force, but at the 
collective level it is recognised by the harm caused to social groups, manifested as 
exploitation and repression (e.g. Uddin and Hooper, 2001; Neu, 2000).  
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In the case of the problems of the Brazilian financial system, the damage was caused 
by deprivation. Risk was not merely ‘a solution’, but ‘the solution’ (Pritchett and 
Woolcock, 2004). Risk management was considered as the only way to manage and 
improve the Brazilian financial system. In view of that, risk was not merely 
suggested but imposed by the possible adverse trade consequences and funding 
constraints from the IMF and World Bank. However, the proposition of risk 
management as a regulatory requirement ignored the specificities and real needs of 
the Brazilian context. Hence, this was a violence, regardless of its purported 
intentions. Thus, the central question is, has it brought the kind of progress that the 
majority of Brazilians would value? 
In a history marked by enormous debt to the IMF and World Bank, it is hard to 
evaluate how much was curtailed in investment for education, health care, public 
transport, or employability improvements on account of debt services. Furthermore, 
it is complicated to measure the consequences of these shifts in investments priorities 
for Brazilian development. Nonetheless, in a UN speech, Cristina Kirchner (2014), 
Argentina’s president, considered how these ideas of liberalisation proposed by IMF 
and World Bank interventions and impositions represent an economic and financial 
terrorism that destabilises national economies through the sin of speculation, causing 
hunger and poverty. She maintained that we cannot only look at the surface of the 
phenomenon but need to penetrate deeply into its roots, as the G8 or G10 countries 
are determining what should be done, or not, in different countries around the world. 
These international interventions have caused the absence of real democracy, as debt 
vultures enslave entire nations and regularly change the definitions of terrorism. 
Therefore, Kirchner concluded that ‘progress’ and ‘development’ optimism without 
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realism is naivety or cynicism, and we need peace and self-determination for all 
nations, since ‘dead people do not pay their debts’. Scholars like Rodrik et al. 
(1999), Gore (2000), Stiglitz (2002) and Harvey (2005) have reinforced those 
arguments.  
The critiques of these universal regulatory statements and risk management models 
are, nonetheless, scattered across disciplines. Scott et al. (1998) suggest that risk’s 
‘thin simplifications’ are inadequate to reproduce domain-specific complexity and 
that ERM is a policy blueprint for seeing ‘like’ an ideal-typical organisation. 
Theorisation in terms of risk and subjective probabilities estimation is, arguably, 
appropriate to normative considerations of optimal ‘rational’ decision-making, but 
utterly inappropriate to accurate descriptions of the real decisions which ordinary 
individuals make (Reddy, 1996: 234; Cancian, 1972; 1980). Modernity, therefore, 
has eliminated genuine indeterminacy, or ‘uncertainty’, by inventing ‘risk’ and 
regulators and risk experts have learnt to transform a radically indeterminate cosmos 
into a manageable one, through the myth of calculability, to reduce ‘uncertainty to 
the same calculable status as that of certainty itself’ (Reddy, 1996: 237; Keynes, 
1936). However, the post-colonial theory could provide a re-reading of the hidden 
politics and power imbalances within this supposed ‘myopia’ within risk 
management conceptualisation (Power, 2009). Here, I argue that the discourse of risk 
was indeed an intentional ‘blindness’ of experts and policy makers, used to obscure 
political struggles and maintain powerful positions anchored in risk interventions. 
In summary, from a post-colonial viewpoint, an abstract universality is not coherent 
with the particularities and heterogeneity of different cultures (Said, 1993; 1995). 
Accordingly, reductionisms limit what is said, thought, and done (Howarth, 2000: 
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68), through colonised and imperialistic systems of representation of an object (Said, 
1993; 1995). Thus, a ‘science of imperialism’, emerged, comprising knowledge, 
practices and institutions’ complicity (Young, 1990: 126-7). It offers a 
misrepresentation of social reality that facilities conquest, restructuration, and 
control around discursive objects, such as ‘progress’ and ‘globalisation’ (Howarth, 
2000: 68; Young, 1990: 126-127). Truth, then, is considered ‘internally connected 
with logics of power and domination’ (Foucault, 1977: 72). Moreover, power is 
complex and mediated by ‘juridico-discursive’ conceptions of the justified and ruled 
(Foucault, 1977: 23) in such a way that other possibilities are excluded from the 
dominant logic of historical development (Howarth, 2000: 73). Social relations are 
organised, ordered and regulated in an illusion of control that produces ‘docile 
bodies’ which fail to detect power’s operationalization, concealed by discourses of 
progress, development, utility, efficiency and productivity (Foucault, 1977; 1979; 
Mitchell, 1991). From this post-colonial perspective, then, the discursive imposition 
of risk management in regulatory and accounting constructions might be further 
scrutinised by the Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe presented in the following 
sections.  
 
4.3. Risk as a Discursive Practice 
Laclau and Mouffe (1987: 84) developed a concept of ‘discourse’ that includes all 
practices and meanings shaping a particular community of social actors. They argued 
that discourses constitute symbolic systems and social orders, and go beyond 
language. Considering Foucault’s (1972; 1981; 1991) claims about the connection 
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between ‘discourse practices and wider sets of ‘non-discursive’ activities and 
institutions, Laclau and Mouffe similarly embraced both linguistic and extra-
linguistic aspects within their discourse analysis. Hence, risk management practices 
must be understood through multiple sources, as their meanings would embrace 
formal and informal, internal and external, written and spoken, verbal and non-verbal 
elements of discourse. Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 108) illustrated the importance of, 
for example, verbal and non-verbal elements, with an analogy of building a wall. In 
this process, there are moments, when the workers ask for a brick (verbal), but also 
there are moments when they just put the brick into place to build the wall (non-
verbal). Similarly, in practice, constructions of risk might involve influences from 
actions and what is said, or even, from what is unsaid, so gestures and facial 
expressions could confirm or contradict prior verbal or non-verbal expressions. 
To understand a social practice, then, DT begins with the assumptions that all objects 
and actions are meaningful, and their meaning is a product of historically specific 
systems of rules (Carter, 2008). DT holds social practices as ‘discourses’ in view of 
how they are used to construct, but also to contest, maintain, and transform reality. 
Using the concept of ‘discursive field’, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) describe a 
theoretical horizon within which the being of objects is constituted. In accordance 
with post-structuralist and post-Marxist perspectives, DT emphasises that the total 
fixity of social structures is impossible because systems of meaning are contingent 
and can never be completely exhausted by a chain of significance (Howarth, 2000). 
From this conceptualisation of discourse, therefore, it is possible to explain why risk 
means different things in different contexts (Woods, 2011). It reveals reasons behind 
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the existence of wide diversity in risk constructions in the financial sector (Mikes, 
2009) and changes in risk regulatory statements over time (BIS, 1988; 2001; 2013).  
DT does not entail scepticism about the existence of the world. A chair indeed exists, 
and no DT theorist will kick it just to prove its existence. However, DT argues that 
we are always immersed in a world of signifying practices and objects, and language 
is what enables us to identify and to engage with the objects that we encountered 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, Heidegger, 1962; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). For example, 
someone can use a chair to sit on, but also to reach higher objects, while children 
might use it to play games. Consequently, all objects are objects of discourse, whose 
meaning depends upon a socially constructed system of rules and significant 
differences (Carter, 2008). To this extent, discourses actively shape the world around 
us by providing conceptual guidance for actions, policy prescriptions, institution 
building, and so on. In sum, Laclau (2001: 108) affirms that:  
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to 
do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the 
realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event 
that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of 
my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 
‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’ depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist 
externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute 
themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence.  
As we are always internal to a world of signifying practices and objects, DT 
investigates the ways in which social practices emerge, are articulated and contested 
(Howarth, 2004). Subjects need to have some kind of stability to develop their 
arguments and conceptualisation of the world and objects. Nevertheless, this 
contingent and temporary structure of objects’ definition establishes boundaries for a 
discourse. From this viewpoint, even if humans seek to close structures of society to 
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maintain their rationality, society itself is an open structure that changes over time 
and in different contexts. The closed nature of structures, or their fixity, is 
impossible, but also necessary, as it helps us to delimit the meaning of the object that 
we have talked about, but also challenges its definition by the elements that are not 
represented as a legitimate discourse. The particularities of each articulation in each 
context represent a political construction that includes and excludes certain elements 
of a signifier. For that reason, ‘risk’, for instance, could represent a potential threat or 
opportunity, and risk management guidelines could intensify the importance of 
financial aspects over human interference for risk evaluations, and even change their 
position and re-articulate it, embracing operational risks or any other category of 
risk. 
Accordingly, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) reject the essentialist and ahistorical 
definition of language of structuralism, and the way subjects are unified by a fixed 
stable identity or system of meaning that is determined by the structure. They 
consequently reject Saussure’s (1993) structuralist claims that within a sign the 
signifier is transparent and there is only one possible ‘signified’ attached to it. 
Saussure considered objects’ existence before subject’s interpretations, and language 
as a system of differences and arbitrary labels constructed by relationships that work 
in opposition to each other. Following these assumptions, there is nothing like the 
word itself, and to understand ‘risk’ we need to comprehend what ‘risk’ is not. This 
perspective is consistent with Knight’s (1971) arguments about risk and uncertainty, 
as while the former is measurable, the latter is not quantifiable, but based on 
judgments. DT, however, challenges this representation of language, exposing that 
meaning is not constructed only by oppositions, but also by the elements excluded, 
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thus, antagonisms and counter-hegemonic discourses. This outline is useful to 
understand and explain, for instance, how the concept of risk has been changed over 
time and acquired different meanings in different contexts, as it needed to mend from 
its contingencies.  
In short, post-structuralism critiques this idea of a closed structure of meaning, 
exposing that there are multiple possible meanings and ‘signifieds’ that could be 
attached to a single or ‘master signifier’ (Lacan, 1989). In this thesis, hence, this 
explains re-articulations of risk that include elements previously excluded, like 
operational risks, and subsequently, reputational and strategic risks, creating a 
broader and more nebulous conception of risk management than the initial reference 
to financial downsides and defaults. Considering the multiple possible signifieds and 
interpretations that could be attached to a single concept, the next section explores 
the differences between ontological and ontic studies, as well as the idea of an ontic 
gap, to further explain how the articulation and meaning-making of risk works. 
 
4.3.1. Multiple Interpretations of Risk 
DT reinforces the difference between ontology (the event, what happened) and the 
ontic (different articulations of meaning that emerge from the event itself). It is 
constituted in the idea of a lacking, or negative ontology, whereas the signifiers 
structures appear closed, but are in fact still open, because total closure is always 
impossible. To this extent, even if the idea of risk is not rejected, there is not a 
singular universal sense of risk, but rather a multiplicity of possible articulations in 
this space. The plurality of definitions for ‘risk’ in different contexts, disciplines and 
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paradigms, as well as the changes in the boundaries of what is allowed to be 
considered ‘risk management’ in financial institutions, exposes the ambiguity, 
incompleteness and contingency of this construction (see Chapter 3). To understand 
better these shifts in risk definition, this section initially moves from an 
epistemological to an ontological study of risk.  
DT asserts that discourses do not neutrally reflect the world but play an active role in 
shaping it. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) argue for the importance of contextualised 
explanations, as language and meaning could be used to deceive and oppress people 
(Fairclough, 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Consequently, the task of 
discourse analysis is to examine the construction of discourses, and the motives 
behind their functions, pondering both historical and political aspects. The 
articulatory processes that construct meanings work by including and excluding 
characteristics of risk that provide qualities to this signifier. The increasing, or 
decreasing of the chain of significations of ‘risk’, therefore, is an arbitrary practice, 
determined by the exercise of power. Spiegelhalter et al. (2011), for example, 
highlight that statistical analysis could easily be used to manipulate people and 
reinforce experts’ claims, so the specific means used to express events are 
constructed to legitimate specific claims and hide particular political interests. These 
discursive strategies are used to persuade an audience about the plausibility of risk 
claims and feasibility of risk management. For that reason, these changes in the 
discourse of risk cannot be analysed just as merely evolutionary processes.  
Gallhofer and Haslam (1991), for instance, illustrated how accounting is a mutable 
phenomenon showing how the element of ‘secrecy’ in accounting rhetoric moved 
from a positive to a negative connotation during the First World War in Germany. In 
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this case, accounting was blamed as a mechanism for hiding immoral profits, which 
created wealth for banks, landowners and armament industry elites to the detriment 
of shareholders and managers. For that reason, they argue that accounting might 
perform a ‘conflict-enhancing’ rather than ‘conflict-resolving’ role in capitalist 
society, disturbing rather than stabilising the prevalent order.  
In this sense, the construction of a discourse is not linear, or predictable, and 
moments of crises could expose contingencies in previous definitions, followed by 
attempts to restructure the definition of the signifier. According to Howarth (2004), 
these shifting moments are ‘radical contingencies’, referring to the process by which 
the contingency of discursive structures is made visible, so the ‘failure’ of the 
structure ‘compels’ subjects to act, to assert its subjectivity anew. Radical 
contingencies do not necessarily represent the collapse of a discourse, but they will 
indeed constitute a ‘moment of dislocation’ when there is a need to re-establish trust. 
In this respect, scandals like Enron and the subprime crisis demonstrated that even 
when disclosing the most sophisticated practices of risk management, corporations 
were subject to managers’ choices and political interests, which interfered with and 
influenced decision-making processes (Damoradan, 2009; Woods et al., 2008). For 
that same reason, the discourse of risk, how to manage it, and what might be 
included in its administration has suffered a radical contingency, which drove 
broader and more inclusive constructions of risk. This radical contingency then 
moved risk management from its initially entirely quantifiable structure comprising 
financial risks to another that accepted more subjective (but still supposedly 
measurable) elements like operational, and after that, strategic risks. New regulations 
also emerged as an attempt to re-establish the confidence of investors by offering 
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assurance that such a situation would not be repeated (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
Basel Accords). Thus, from these radical contingencies and re-articulations about 
what risk is and what constitutes risk management, the discourse of risk and its 
manageability re-established its power.  
The role of politics is irrefutable in this landscape and power has a relevant function 
in the acceptance and adherence to new norms. Melwally et al. (2016) highlight the 
importance of concentrating on the role of actors in shaping accounting and control 
practices. They demonstrated that exogenous imposed risk management practices 
will be contested if the change is not compatible and aligned with pre-existing 
organisational logics, as actors will fell and react to risk differently according to their 
previous experience (Harris, 2014; Soin et al., 2014). In this regard, Melwally et al. 
(2016) demonstrate that directors and manager who perceived the benefits of risk 
regulation support it, while analysts portrayed ERM as an imperialistic imposition, 
which was useless to developed countries, as it has not contained the last financial 
crisis. Thus, despite directors’ tone from the top, analysts played many delaying 
games at the micro level, enhancing the information asymmetry between them and 
consultants as much as possible in order to impede the institutionalisation of ERM 
practices.  
In the battle over what is included in and excluded from a discourse, thus, different 
groups are also marginalised and empowered. These struggles characterise 
discourses as ‘contingent and historical constructions, vulnerable to political forces 
excluded in their production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond their 
control’ (Howarth et al., 2000: 3-4). From the DT perspective, it is reasonable to 
imagine that the implementation of risk in different organisations will not be a 
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neutral and objective process, as described in risk management guidelines like 
COSO, BIS, BCB, IRM. Mouffe (2000) argues that the articulation of discourses 
creates the figures of ‘us and them’; hence, antagonisms characterised excluded 
elements as ‘others’, and this distinction might create allies, but also enemies or 
adversaries. Consequently, it is reasonable to imagine that the implementation of a 
new tool inside an organisation represents a disturbance, caused not only by the 
change itself, but also by the rupture with previous established meanings, practices, 
power relationships and hierarchies, which inevitably causes conflicts. 
According to DT, then, the idea of risk connotes a space where multiple articulations 
and interpretations are possible. The amplitude of possible interpretations exposes 
part of the political side of risk practices, constructed according to different interests 
and choices, reflecting macro-politics, but also micro-politics. Risk could be 
considered a signifier that is mutant. It is not solid, but liquid. Hence, it adopts 
different forms in different sites where it is implemented (Woods, 2011; Mikes, 
2009). In summary, this thesis recognises that risk would be applied differently in 
different contexts, due to the dynamicity and complexity implicit in risk management 
practices that aim not only to predict future outcomes, but also to preserve powerful 
positions that inevitably circumscribe risk’s articulations and claims of control.  
In short, this section argues that ‘risk’ connotes an ontological space where there are 
multiple possible ontic articulations (or understandings) of risk. The ontology, or 
‘space’, is focused on the formal study of ‘Being’ - the nature and meaningful 
structure of existence -, but the interpretation of this structure is provided by the 
ontic, the descriptive characteristics of a particular thing and its existence 
(Heidegger, 1962). Thus, here, I propose a shift from an ontological to an ontic study 
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of risk, acknowledging that multiple meanings could be attached to the same concept 
(object), e.g. ‘risk’, and this empowers risk experts who would endeavour to 
objectify this social space. The next section explores how DT is concerned with 
meaning and the ontic gap between the existence and meanings, therefore, operating 
at the ontic level. 
 
4.3.2. The Ontic Gap within Risk Application 
Given the multiple signifieds that could be attached to the signifier ‘risk’, there 
would be multiple possible interpretations attached to it, and there will always be 
undecidability in any fixation of risk’s definition. According to Derrida (1978: 148), 
‘undecidability is always a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for 
example, of meanings, but also of acts)’. Social practices are naturally destabilised, 
divided and disorganised; however, there are provisional and precarious ways of 
trying to politically ‘naturalise’ or ‘objectivise’ constructed identities (Torfing, 
1999). Thus, risk is conceived as a mark of a ‘naturalised’ Western philosophy 
dominated by metaphysical hierarchies that privilege unity over dispersion, necessity 
over contingency, presence over absence (Torfing, 1999). Derrida (1978) uses the 
notion of deconstruction to challenge those claims of universal truths and highlights 
the effect of choices and assumptions embedded within articulations of meanings by 
interested parties. As a result, this destabilisation of essential identities conceives any 
attempt to determine the essence of something as flawed, because some ambiguities 
and undecidabilities would resist this ultimate fixation. 
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This resistance is caused by an ‘ontic gap’ in the social construction, as every time 
you describe something, for example, ‘risk’, you input a different meaning into it, 
and so reconstruct it (Derrida, 1978). Derrida uses the example of an interpretation 
of a text, when the reader tries to maintain a dialogue with the author, to describe this 
power. Derrida states that when we read a text it can be alive or dead, and this 
decision interferes with the interpretation and analysis provided by the reader. If the 
text is alive, then the reader is in a conversation with the author and engaged in a 
closed interpretation. However, if the text is dead, it means that at the moment that 
the author wrote the text, the author’s intention was lost, and the text is open to 
interpretation (Derrida, 1978).  
A similar process occurs with the interpretation and application of regulatory 
requirements. There is a gap between the general rule and the particular case. Thus, 
Wittgenstein (1953) argues that whenever someone uses a rule, they modify it. 
Therefore, it is not possible to say that the rule is being applied, but rather that it is 
constantly being built and rebuilt. In other words, between the abstract rule and its 
use in a particular context, there is not a relation of application, but a relation of 
articulation (Laclau, 1990) and this opens up a space to understand how the power of 
each actor can influence the legitimation of their claims. To this extent, although 
regulators and experts argued that they have a fixed interpretation of risk 
management’s regulatory requirements, risk is also an instrument for their 
legitimacy. For that reason, considering the multiplicity of actors and their different 
interests, when a rule is interpreted or applied, then, it is plausible to accept that the 
same rule would be applied differently in different contexts.  
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The rules always provide only a starting point, never a destination (Thiele, 2010: 56). 
Derrida (1992: 249) argues that, in applying the law, or the regulation, there is 
‘always an authorised force, a force that is justified or that has its application 
justified’. The law is enforced, or ‘applied by force’, thus, a ‘responsible decision’ is 
the expression of the deconstruction in a particular case, which faces inherent 
‘aporias’
13
. From this landscape, Derrida (1992) stresses the singularity of each case, 
considering the need to follow the law and the indispensability of recreating and 
reinventing the law in conformity with the uniqueness of each instance. To explain 
this, Derrida (1992: 251) cited the decision of a judge:  
To be just, the decision of a judge, for example, must not only follow a rule of 
law or a general law, but must also assume it, approve it, confirm its value, by a 
reinstituting act of interpretation, as if ultimately nothing previously existed of 
the law, as if the judge himself invented the law in every case. No exercise of 
justice as law can be just unless there is a "fresh judgment"....This "fresh 
judgment" can very well - must very well - conform to a preexisting law, but the 
reinstituting, reinventive and freely decisive interpretation, the responsible 
interpretation of the judge requires that his “justice” not just consist in 
conformity, in the conservative and reproductive activity of judgment. 
Similarly, BIS, COSO, and BCB’s requirements presupposed sound ‘best practices’ 
of risk management, sufficiently generic to open interpretation and re-articulations. 
For instance, while specifying that risk management practices must be chosen 
according to banks’ size and the complexity of their operations (BCB, 2004; BIS, 
2003), regulators do not describe which tools are most appropriate for each case (c.f. 
                                                 
 
 
13 An irresolvable internal contradiction or logical disjunction in a text, argument, or theory. 
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Hines, 1991). Considering, hence, the amplitude of Value at Risk (VaR) methods 
(Damoradan, 2007; Woods et al., 2008), then, there is no specific restriction or 
guideline related to which method each organisation must adopt. For that reason, 
Derrida (1992: 257) remind us that ‘if calculation is calculated, the decision to 
calculate is not of the order of the calculable, and must not be’. There is a power 
imbalance between regulators as well as consultancy groups and the regulated (see 
more in Chapter 2.5). Thus, the former have the authority, not only as experts who 
know, but the ones who hold the power to legitimate their own actions and claims 
for the chosen applications.  
Given Derrida’s (1992) arguments about the ‘mystical foundation of authority’, thus, 
it would be naïve to think that the legitimation of any particular knowledge or 
expertise is conquered just by the exercise of gross power. There is always a 
‘necessity to sediment the truth’ and an artificial instrument might be used in this 
process, replacing what is missing. Instead of the real complexity, then, accounting 
numbers embellish themselves with a false and borrowed organised beauty of 
‘science’ (c.f. Baker, 2005; Derrida, 2002). Likewise, risk and the management of 
risk make use of this ‘mystical foundation of authority’ to build a ‘legitimised 
fiction’. There is always a gap between what ‘risk’ should be, and what it is, and 
more, related to what risk does (Mol and Law, 2004). From this gap between the real 
and imaginary, theory and practice, reported and silenced, then, every decision 
remains caught in a ‘ghost’ that represents the undecidability of an open future 
(Derrida, 2002: 46). 
Montaigne (1962 apud Derrida, 2002) suggests that uncovering these ‘ghosts’ 
requires a ‘de-sedimentation of superstructures (e.g. of risk management guidelines 
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and regulations or neoliberal ideologies of governance) that conceal and reflect at the 
same time the economic and political interests of dominant forces in society’. The 
application and institution of regulations as an utterance force do not induce the idea 
that the concept of risk would be in the service of power as a docile instrument, 
subservient and therefore outside of the dominant power, but that risk’s relationship 
with this power is more internal and complex (Derrida, 2002: 24.). Undecidability 
exposes that ‘the incomplete and contingent nature of the totality would spring not 
only from the fact that no hegemonic system can be fully imposed, but also from the 
intrinsic ambiguities of the hegemonic project itself’ (Laclau, 1990: 28). 
Consequently, the assumptions of universality, objectivity, and neutrality in risk 
management practices and decision-making processes are problematic for the 
reasons exposed above and reinforced in this section. 
The uniqueness and undecidability of each case expose that decisions do not only 
consist of applying rules, but articulating them to accommodate or bend decisions. 
Social rules, meanings, or practices cannot be changed merely by arbitrary 
conceptions, but have, at least to a certain extent, to hegemonise the previous 
instances of usage. As such, to alter the rules of the game, pre-existing rules must be 
considered, as new rules must show how they are either compatible, or incompatible, 
with the previous ones. For that reason, hegemonic forces tend to try to stabilise the 
sliding of signifieds under a central signifier, or nodal point, to maintain the 
objectification of a discursive field as a regulative idea of the possibility of an 
entirely transparent society. To understand how the construction of risk as a 
universal concept was possible it is necessary to comprehend, for instance, choices 
of how to portray risk as a universal accounting technology and depict risk experts as 
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in control of future outcomes by prediction models. These hegemonic constructions 
of risk are further examined in the next section. 
 
4.4.The Hegemony of Risk 
As exposed in Chapter 2, there is a problem between risk management regulatory 
requirements and their application as well as between risk theorisation and its 
practices. The hegemonic use of risk in both theory and regulation, hence, can be 
explained by the idea of ‘objectivation’ of a social space through hegemonic 
discourses (Howarth et al., 2000). Laclau (2004) emphasises that hegemony exists 
precisely because all discourses and identities are in a constant search for plenitude, 
even if this completeness is ineffective or not possible. Risk, thus, represents an 
escape from the indeterminacy required by Western society, corporations, and 
individuals (Reddy, 1996: 224). This hegemonic discourse aims to fill this absent 
fullness, in an attempt to create a relation of order. This is because, as Laclau and 
Mouffe (2004: 284) suggested:  
In a situation of disorder, people need that some order is restored and, the more 
generalized disorder is, the more indifferent people will be vis-à-vis the concrete 
forms that the act of restoration will take. It is the actual bringing about order 
that is the source of legitimacy of the acts performing. 
A hegemonic discourse, therefore, presents unity, which aims to systematise and 
unify dispersed groups and interests. Hegemonic practices establish nodal points 
temporarily fixing the sense of the social world (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 179). 
However, considering the impossibility of a complete fixity, hegemony is always a 
precarious and contingent relationship in which a given signifier in a particular 
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historical context takes over the role of a self-embodying feeling of completeness. In 
order to represent multiple identities or actors in a particular way, risk embodied the 
certainty and prediction of future outcomes, which were previously indeterminate 
(Laclau, 2002: 122; Reddy, 1996). This rhetoric of calculable risk provides an 
‘ideological cover’ (Howarth and Griggs, 2006; Carter, 2008) for different actors 
(e.g. policy regulators, experts, consultants) by its supposed characteristics of 
objectivity, neutrality, manageability, and measurability. To this extent, risk could 
provide uniform and replicable sets of performance ratios using this definition (Ortiz, 
1973: 13), but it also leads to distorting the debate over the social and political 
aspects within the management of risks (Reddy, 1996: 230).  
The triumph of ‘risk’ resulted in the hegemony of a certain modality of rationalism 
that marginalised ‘uncertainty’ as ‘other’ (Marglin, 1990: 241). Laclau (1990: 45) 
emphasises that the ‘objectification’ of the social field depends on the establishment 
of a stable hegemony. The process of hegemonic constitution, then, derives from a 
particular discourse that can supplement and represent speeches or identities hitherto 
dispersed. Hegemony occurs from that centralising signifier, or nodal point, that can 
fix its signification and, from it, articulate elements previously disarticulated. Thus, 
the decision to settle upon particular risks as being dangerous or threatening is 
accompanied by a rhetoric that works to hypostasise risks and to develop modes of 
social definition and exclusion. This conceptualisation is a result of a complex 
historical pattern of social changes, as explained by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982: 
9), then:  
People select their awareness of certain danger to conform with a specific way 
of life […] Questions about acceptable levels of risk can never be answered just 
by understanding how nature and technology interact. What needs to be 
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explored is how people agree to ignore most of the potential dangers that 
surround them and interact so as to concentrate only on selected aspects.  
For that reason, an enquiry that remains unanswered is related to how a stable 
hegemony of risk is possible in first place. In this respect, Laclau (2000) argues that, 
if power is actually distributed in an uneven form, the institution of authority in the 
hands of a particular group depends on the skills that this group must have to present 
their goals, initially private, as compatible and representative of ‘other’ groups’ 
aspirations. However, there is not a universal way to institute hegemony, which 
suggests that it is not possible to determine beforehand how a new hegemony will be 
established. Nevertheless, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) use the logics of difference and 
equivalence to explain how it might be constructed.  
The logics of equivalence and difference involve respectively the simplification and 
the expansion or increasing in complexity of a political space (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001: 130). In a discursive field, heterogeneous groups construct discourses, which 
oppose and complement each other in terms of particular interests, given the 
positions that these groups occupy. The logic of equivalence, then, dissolves 
particular identities of individuals within a discursive field. Consequently, the logic 
of equivalence is a simplification, since it articulates dispersed elements in a 
discourse in such a way that the differences cancel each other, highlighting the 
similarities permeating identities and groups through metaphors (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001: 127). On the other hand, the logic of equivalence incorporates diverse 
identities recognised as part of a nodal point, so that it embodies as many social 
elements as possible through articulatory practices, reducing the differences between 
the various groups, such that the interest of a group appears to be the interest of all 
the people. According to Carter (2008: 194), while the logic of equivalence conceals 
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confusion and contestation within the signifier, the logic of difference expands the 
order and dispels opposition. Consequently, both logics will always be present in any 
given discourse, even if, depending on the context, one logic succeeds in dominating 
over the other (Klimecki, 2012: 43; Laclau, 2005: 69-70). 
Thus, hegemonic discourses must necessarily leave their mere particularised initial 
condition to become the locus of universalising effects. Nonetheless, a hegemonic 
discourse does not deny its particular contents, but, to become dominant, it needs to 
expand its specific contents in a way that makes sense to others’ discourses scattered 
in the discursivity field. From this perspective, the idea of a regulation coming with a 
solution from outside as well as the proposition of risk as an accounting technology 
of governance, starts to make more sense. Reddy (1996: 226) illustrates how the idea 
of ‘uncertainty’ is related to the notion of a ‘lack of full knowledge’, which implies a 
lack of ability and control, which was not convenient to claims of expertise. 
Similarly, the fixation of this discourse of a measurable risk represented a tool for 
evaluation of different subjects’ claim of expertise as well as to blame and avoid 
responsibility (Spira and Page, 2003), as to know the future has been a human 
endeavour since ancient times.  
According to Laclau, however, the fixation of a hegemonic discourse is always 
partial, precarious, and contingent. One can never be sure that particular discourses 
or social groups will not overcome political struggles and articulate a new 
hegemonic discourse. Thus, to use hegemony as an analytical category means a 
priori to assume a relentless political struggle between different groups, as counter-
hegemonic discourses will always threaten each established hegemony. 
Consequently, hegemonies would be exposed to periods of ‘organic crisis’ or 
155 | P a g e  
 
‘radical contingency’ which weaken the hegemonic articulations (Laclau, 1990: 45). 
Moreover, when the problematic limits of a discourse are exposed and challenged, 
there is a need to suture them with new articulatory processes. For instance, in the 
case of risk, frauds and financial crises revealed how the idea of an entirely 
quantifiable financial risk management was fragile, so the concept of operational 
risk, formerly explicitly excluded from risk management practices (BIS, 1988), 
incorporated human factors as acceptable (and convenient) influences for risk 
management practices in a new discourse, and silo, of risk management. After that, 
discussion focused solely on threats demonstrated its limitations, which led to the 
notion of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) developed to argue for the importance 
of risk as ‘adding value’ to shareholders and therefore ‘improving performance’. 
Recently, new particular discourses of ‘risk culture’ or ‘risk appetite’ from IRM 
(2011; 2012), as well as liquidity and solvency risk management from Basel III 
(2013), can be considered disputes in the discursivity field of risk for the re-
establishment of a hegemonic discourse about risk regulation and risk management 
practices. Thus, risk is a cultural and political domain, potentially fraught with 
conflict between points of view, which requires cultural and political resolutions 
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Reddy, 1996: 239):  
The practice of calmness and immobility, certainty and security suddenly breaks 
down. New fears and hopes will, without warning, take charge of human 
conduct. All these pretty, polite, techniques, made for a well-panelled board 
room and nicely regulated market, are liable to collapse. At all times, the vague 
panic fears and equally vague and unreasoned hopes are not lulled and lie but a 
little way below the surface. 
The universal is nothing more than relations of equivalence between particularities 
(Laclau, 2004: 283). Universality ‘is simply a concrete historical construction and 
not an aprioristically determined presupposition of the social as such’ (Laclau, 2004: 
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281). Under alternative historical and cultural circumstances, the articulation of 
different and distinct elements or particulars could have been articulated in disparate 
ways. ‘Naturalised’ hegemonies are, thus, described by Barthes (1957) as ‘myths’. 
Consequently, universals are always contingent and incommensurable. Hegemony 
partially constitutes and potentially subverts, constructing insiders and outsiders in a 
discourse (Carter, 2008: 181). Hence, ‘the result of a[n] historical construction is not 
the filling of a transcendentally established place, but the constant production and 
displacement of the place itself’ (Laclau, 2004, 283). He also reinforces this while 
considering the description of universality and pointing out that:  
The constitutive dislocation of the structure are not concentrated in a unique or 
‘natural’ point within it but affect all its constitutive elements […] The 
representation of the chain as a totality […] can only have as means of 
representation particular social demands organized around particular points of 
dislocation […] This process of one demand assuming the representation of 
many others is what I call ‘hegemony’. […] what we have is always a relative 
universality, deriving from equivalential chains constituted around hegemonic 
nodal points. As can be seen, the possibility of universalization depended on 
emptiness as a concrete – not abstract – presence (Laclau, 2004: 280-281).  
Laclau (2000) then suggests that hegemonic discourses must attend to four 
conditions: the constitutive unevenness of power; the effacing of the dichotomy of 
universality/particularity; the production of ‘tendentially’ empty signifiers; and the 
generalisation of a representation as a condition of the formation of a social order. 
Therefore, in light of the previous discussions in this thesis (Chapter 2 and 3), risk 
attends to this dimension as it was constituted in an epistemological violence 
perpetuated by the power imbalances between BIS and Big 4, BCB, and especially, 
BDBs (see earlier in Chapter 2). The idea of risk dissolved the specificities of the 
Brazilian context in a discourse of ‘best practices’ ‘in worldwide use’ which also 
perpetuated the notion that risk-management practices must be applied to all banks 
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of all sizes. In accordance with the changes in the risk discourse and the multiple 
possible interpretations derived, or that could be derived from this signifier, risk 
itself could be regarded as empty of a unique particular signified. Moreover, the 
necessity of a supposed objective, manageable and defined world drives risk 
discourses as the only solution for these controllability claims. Finally, it also 
mandated the need of risk management practices by the BCB in order to maintain 
compliance and trade with the international market.  
One may argue that ambiguity, incompleteness, and contingencies are prejudicial for 
risk and risk management; however, they serve a purpose (Spira and Page, 2003). As 
argued by Butler, Laclau and Zizek (2000: 2), ‘incompleteness is essential to the 
project of hegemony itself’. The ‘conception of uncertainty in terms of ‘risk’ or 
potentially calculable probabilities, diverts attention from the truly radical and 
irreducible nature of our ignorance about the future world, which makes of it in turn 
an irreducibly political space (Reddy, 1996: 242). The fragile initial claims gained 
power and began to demand more space. Risk has passed through many ups and 
downs; therefore, any description of risk management practices is only a snapshot. 
Thus, in order to understand how current practices came about, the next section 
explores in more detail the importance of genealogical analysis within discourse 
construction.  
 
4.4.1. The Genealogy of Risk Hegemony 
To understand the meaning of risk in a particular context, as proposed by the post-
structuralist theoretical framework of Laclau and Mouffe, it is necessary to 
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comprehend how the idea of risk is currently conceptualised in, for instance, a BDB. 
However, the politics implicated in the currently visualised construction of risk as 
currently conceived in this context can only be revealed by its historical 
construction, conflicts, fallacies, and radical contingencies that tried to closure its 
meaning. Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe acknowledge the importance of Foucault’s 
work in archaeology and, especially, in relation to genealogy. 
As discussed above, risk is a multifaceted and multi-layered signifier that cannot be 
properly comprehended by its static current conception alone. The prevailing 
meaning of risk results from many attempts to articulate different elements of risk 
throughout the emergence, contestation, and sedimentation of this signifier. Thus, the 
history of risk discourses is an important element to understand the existing risk 
management practices, because the genealogy of this concept has been marked by 
many shifts and alternatives that have been included and excluded.  
In Foucauldian studies, archaeological analysis embraces the current rules of a 
discourse, but it recognises that the current discourse is dependent on the historical 
crystallisation of norms for its functioning. Although archaeology comprehends the 
meaning of objects, it does not explain where this meaning has come from, nor does 
it explore the constructions, reasons, struggles, politics, and actors involved in its 
construction. As Miller and O’Leary (1987) state, objects do not exist in limbo 
waiting to be discovered, but are formed by complex relations established by 
combining a heterogeneous range of discourses and practices, which share a 
common vocabulary and set of objectives. Therefore, if risk implementation 
struggles (Mikes, 2009), it is important understand not only the current practices and 
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rules of risk management inside each organisation, but also how, why, and by whom 
they were conceptualised.  
Miller (1987: 237) describes genealogy as an enquiry and re-examination of 
contemporarily taken-for-granted objects and their meanings, which demonstrates 
their historical emergence and highlights the conditions throughout their 
sedimentation, ‘tracing the emergence of our frequently unquestioned contemporary 
rationales’. Nonetheless, this is not a search for an origin, a single point in history, 
but rather a recognition that the present must be considered in reference to multiple, 
dispersed and complex events. For that reason, ‘genealogy does not lead us to solid 
foundations; rather, it fragments and disturbs what we might like to see as the basis 
of our current ideas and practices’ (Miller and O’Leary, 1987: 232-233).  
Similar to other calculative accounting technologies, risk represented a new 
invention in this domain, transferred from and to other domains, and receiving in 
accounting new meanings and significances. Accordingly, Miller and O’Leary 
(1987) consider these as ‘constructions’, emphasising the discursive nature of 
calculation, the ideas attached to certain calculative technologies, and how they are 
not separate from the world of ‘practice’ but are constitutive of it. Miller and Napier, 
(1993) similarly stressed how different meanings have been attached to practices at 
different periods, highlighting re-directions, transformations and reversals that time 
installed. Finally, they assert that the genealogy of accounting practices needs:  
[T]o emphasize the historical contingency of contemporary practices, and to 
debunk the apparent permanence of the present. We need to think in terms of 
multiple and dispersed surfaces of emergence of disparate and often humble 
practices (Miller and Napier, 1993: 633). 
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Hence, the discursive nature of accountancy provides a special idiom in which those 
who participate in it can define their actions, a particular way of setting out the 
possibilities and the limitations of certain practices. Therefore, it is important to 
emphasise the new way of seeing and intervening that was brought about through 
utilising the concept of risk. There is, thus, a need to highlight the consequences of 
calculating risk, rather than seeing such consequences as following naturally from 
‘practice’. According to the proposition of emancipation brought by critical 
accounting and management studies, as well as ratified in Laclau’s works, the 
investigation of inclusions and exclusions in these changes of risk, or other 
calculative practices, might provide the basis for transforming the functioning of 
enterprises. Therefore, it is important to comprehend the alternatives ignored in the 
notion of risk in Brazil, and how that notion supersedes the other alternatives 
through its rhetoric of best practices, globally applied, internationally recognised and 
therefore, the universal solution. Consequently, to understand current practices of 
risk, it is also important to understand the rhetorical tools used to persuade an 
audience within hegemonic discourses. 
 
4.5.Rhetorical Articulation of Risk  
The rhetorical tradition in accounting research is represented by studies including 
those by Morgan (1988), Hines (1988; 1991), Craig and Amernic (2004), Arrington 
and Francis (1989) to mention a few. These researchers argue that how accounting is 
a rhetorical device of power, used to maintain professional and capitalist 
perspectives of reality that circumscribe organisations and society. In this sense, 
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Craig and Amernic (2004), analysing the case of the Enron collapse, reveal how 
rhetorical strategies were essential to sustaining the ideology of capitalism and to 
ensuring its resilience and long-term survival. Arrington and Francis (1989) 
deconstructed the rhetoric of Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) to show that this 
perspective is not entitled to the epistemic privilege and authority that it has claimed 
and enjoyed, so it is necessary to uncover alternative and silenced voices about 
accounting research and practices. Morgan (1988) exposes how figures of speech 
like metaphors are used to construct limited reality and provide one-sided views of 
accounting, whilst Hines (1988; 1991) emphasises how accounting constructions 
sustain realities and maintain professionally powerful positions. This section, then, 
provides that rhetorical tools from DT to conduct the analysis of risk management 
discourse.  
 
4.5.1. Analytical Figures of Speech within Risk Discourse 
The construction of risk and determination of risk management practices are 
embedded in complex and dynamic interconnectedness. DT provides a unique way 
of interrogating the levels of politics within risk discourse. In this way, it investigates 
how social practices systematically form the identities of subjects and objects by 
articulating a series of contingent signifying elements available in a discursive field 
(Howarth et al., 2000: 7; Carter, 2008: 188). From a political point of view, closing a 
structure is a rhetorical process of redescription. Rhetoric then examines how people 
are persuaded and structures closed, operating ontologically, deconstructively, and 
constitutively (Carter, 2008). In this respect, the different categories of risk were 
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largely open to interpretation, since regulatory statements provided little guidance to 
their meanings, so interested parties attempted to institute and articulate the meaning 
of risk to support their claims.  
Aristotle (322BC/1947) claimed that rhetoric permeates everything, so each 
particular articulation of risk is an attempt to persuade an audience. The 
epistemological rhetorical tradition of accounting is related to explaining what and 
how things are done, but without exploring ‘why’ people do them (Carter, 2008). In 
order to understand the reasons, it is important to explore genealogical constructions 
and rhetorical techniques that have been used to sustain a hegemonic discourse. 
Consequently, figures of speech like metaphors, metonymies, and catachresis are 
tools of analysis that could be used to explain the construction of risk. 
One of the tools of rhetoric is the metaphor, which makes the unfamiliar familiar 
through comparison of two things. Metaphorical statements transfer qualities 
between signifiers whilst commonly asserting that ‘something is something else’; for 
instance, risk could be ‘useful’, ‘good’, ‘better’, and even ‘under control’. By trying 
to extend the scope of what risk is, more groups, institutions, and countries can be 
incorporated, focusing on their similarities and ignoring their specificities. Therefore, 
metaphors can be used to label and talk about things that are constitutively different, 
whilst constructing them as similar. 
Metaphors substitute a particular name or signifier for the absent unity of the 
demands or identities through the principle of analogy (Laclau, 2005: 19). The idea 
of the judge exemplifies a metaphor, as in adapting the general rule to fit the 
particular case, he or she makes the dissimilar similar (Carter, 2008: 189). Risk is 
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metaphorical as it compares the likelihood of possible scenarios with the prediction 
of future outcomes. In accounting, numbers are familiar, but profit is not, but it could 
be made familiar by ‘numbering’, or measuring it. Equally, processes of rating risk 
and labelling projects accordingly are metaphorical and theoretically segregate 
‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘profitable’ and ‘insolvent’ projects (Young, 2001). These 
processes of numbering also provide risk with attributes such as ‘objectivity’, 
‘neutrality’, ‘controllability’, and ‘manageability’, distancing decision-maker from 
responsibility for failures, but justifying their relevance to successes.  
Metaphors, however, usually operate together with metonyms (Howarth and Griggs, 
2005; Laclau, 2004). Metonyms operate to reduce the complexity within a single 
signifier that names and aims to represent the whole discourse, and multiple 
elements. Laclau exemplifies this figure of speech by considering how ‘Crown’ is 
the representation of a broader concept that includes ‘queen’, ‘parliament’, and 
‘sovereign’. Equally, metonyms are implicit in the idea of ‘Brazilian Culture’ that 
embraces, but also reduces, Brazil’s culture to ‘carnival’, ‘samba’, and ‘football’. 
Metonyms, then, abbreviate the multiple characteristics of an object by taking a 
single characteristic to explain a whole, which is much larger and more complex. For 
example, the definition of risk, in opposition to uncertainty, constrains decision-
making processes as ‘quantifiable’. Similarly, labels of risk such as credit, market, 
operational, enterprise and so on, overshadow the limited role of subjects, as all these 
small concepts have many signifieds, which might be articulated differently in each 
context. Nonetheless, rhetorical redescriptions are not limited by metaphors and 
metonyms. 
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When the boundaries of language seem to be exposed by what cannot be named, 
naming what is lacking in society is obtained by catachresis. This figure of speech 
represents often an improper use of language, applied when a situation is impossible 
to be named, but needs to be, as the gap must be filled; for instance, the ‘leg’ of a 
chair. In this sense, the concept of risk was used to name something lacking: risk is 
the quantifiable part of uncertainty, which conceptually represents what could not be 
measured - the indeterminacy. In addition, the ideas of risk culture and risk appetite 
reflect new attempts to ‘managerialise’ the way people behave and their motivation 
related to risk. In this respect, Power (2009: 851) explains:  
Conceptualising risk appetising as a process might better direct risk 
management attention to where it has likely been lacking, namely to the 
multiplicity of interactions which shape operational and ethical boundaries at 
the level of organisational practice, limiting the concept of risk appetite within a 
capital measurement discourse.  
For that reason, when an organisation, department, or actor makes a decision, the 
idea of risk is ‘overdetermined’ and ‘condensed’. They act with a particular 
interpretation because there will be multiple interpretations about the signifier, and 
one has been chosen and used. When someone acts in the name of risk, one 
particular articulation takes the place of a master signifier. This implies the idea that 
one articulation has been overdetermined as more important than the others. This is 
an exercise of rhetoric, which implies hidden interests and an attempt to persuade an 
audience about the rationale of the hegemonic discourse. Gallhofer, Haslam and 
Yonekura (2015) assert the relevance to conceive accounting as a ‘contextually 
situated practice’ and recognise the complexity of re-constituting its mutable 
universality. Thus, the interplay between accounting and subjects must be taken 
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seriously as a force that constructs, constraining and expanding accounting praxis 
(Hines, 1988; Gallhofer et al., 2015).  
Laclau provides two more concepts to explain how a signifier could be represented, 
containing, or evading, those many signifieds in order to be applied in many contexts 
or weighting different elements of its composition. The following section highlights 
those discursive characteristics of a signifier. 
 
4.5.2. Risk as a Floating or Empty Signifier 
In aiming to have political significance, a hegemonic discourse (e.g. risk 
management) organised around a nodal point (e.g. risk), must be open enough to 
allow multiple particulars to be attached to its signifier (Laclau, 2004: 280). A 
process of representation achieves this when a signifier ‘replaces’ and ‘embodies’ a 
chain of equivalent signifieds. This process of fixing and emptying of meaning is 
achieved by establishing equivalences between competing demands in the policy 
process, and by constructing a common enemy that can subsume the differences 
between the particular demands that constitute it (Howarth and Griggs, 2005: 31). 
For instance, ‘risk’ establishes scientific methods as an objective and neutral 
accounting technology supported by calculative practices and measurements to 
attack the ‘enemy’ - called ‘uncertainty’, ‘indeterminacy’, ‘ambiguity’ or ‘lack of 
knowledge’ - in claims of a controllable future.  
Laclau (1995: 171), then, demonstrates that empty signifiers name the ‘absent 
fullness’ of disparate identities because of their lack of unity and community. The 
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battle over meaning could be infinite, and each representation will necessarily be a 
distortion. For that reason, Laclau (1994) proposed the concept of ‘empty signifier’ 
to describe signifiers that, by aiming to universalise so many demands, become 
impossible to be comprehended exactly, as they end up not matching any possible 
object. An empty signifier can mean everything and nothing at the same time, 
without precisely determining the object. Nevertheless, it still has the potential to 
limit a discourse. In this case, after the incorporation of operational and strategic 
risks, as well as concepts of ‘risk culture’ and ‘risk appetite’, the original claim of 
the full measurability of financial risks was defied, partially exposing the limits of 
risk as a concept and an endeavour to mean everything, whilst meaning nothing. 
Nonetheless, Laclau (1994) emphasises that the empty signifier occurs only 
theoretically, because a chain of equivalences cannot be expanded indefinitely. In a 
situation where heterogeneous elements are only held together by a chain of 
equivalences whose unity itself depends on the exclusion of a designated other, the 
name partly constitutes the meanings of the objects to which it applies, so ‘the name 
becomes the ground of the thing’ (Laclau, 2005: 100). The core set of relationships 
previously established would limit this expansion as certain new relations would be 
simply incompatible with the characteristics of the chain of signification already 
established (Laclau, 2000: 140-141). Consequently, this attempt to become an empty 
signifier would always be a failure, as neither a signifier nor a chain of signifieds 
would have the conditions of a perfect representation (Laclau, 1996: 172): Being 
impossible, the direct representation of a totality is unattainable, though being 
required, empty signifiers must be anything present in a level of representation:  
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Empty signifiers are thus means of representation, which make possible the 
articulation of internal differences, whilst at the same time demonstrating the 
limits of a group’s identity, and its dependence on the opposition to other groups 
(Howarth, 2000: 56). 
This empirical impossibility of empty signifiers is partly solved by the concept of a 
‘floating signifier’. A floating signifier enables interested parties to read the signifier 
according to a complex mix of weights and particular contents put into it at different 
moments and spaces. Considering the potential meanings attached to risk, then, 
different organisations, and departments could apply risk in different ways (Woods, 
2011; Mikes, 2009). Therefore, even if risk is conceptualised as uniform, there are 
differences in its practices. However, to maintain its position, the signifier, ‘risk’, 
must follow the logic of universality that sustains how it has been applied as 
something similar. In short, this allows different actors to develop an argument 
around risk and legitimate their claims.  
The meaning of risk becomes less clear as more elements are included in its chain of 
equivalence. The articulated particular needs to shed its core aim (Laclau, 1994). 
Thus, the movement of the frontier changes the definition of the enemy, and, 
consequently, leads to different actors being incorporated into the hegemonic 
movement (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 127; Carter, 2008). The more extended the 
chain of equivalence, the less pure are particular demands, as each struggle is totally 
enclosed within itself. Thus, any signifier must be contextual and changing, as the 
history of hegemonic struggles between and within groups is the history of the 
negotiation of their identity and the struggle for the articulation of the absent fullness 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 125). In sum, attempts to closure a signifier involve 
relations of power, representation, and politics (Carter, 2008).  




The overall discussion presented in this chapters demonstrates that the discourse of 
risk was ‘naturalised’ in finance and accounting by a neoliberal conception akin to 
science. This construction of risk was not unintentional but deliberatively developed 
to sustain positions of authority and domination. Therefore, the harm caused to 
BDBs could be described as an epistemic violence, which silences and oppresses 
developing countries, like Brazil, through processes of othering. The impact of risk 
management regulatory requirements for BDBs represented a post-colonial and 
imperialist wave of domination under claims of homogenisation and globalisation. 
Eventually, the oppressed internalises the rhetoric that was constructed to dominate, 
and begins to emulate the oppressors, in a desire to be like them. Those ideological 
constructions pervade identities, obliterating the alternatives of emancipation. 
 According to the key concepts of discourse in DT, then, discourses are not neutral 
and these supposedly ahistorical definitions of risk must be examined considering its 
contingent articulations. In a discursive field, the decision about what is risk is 
determined by a judgment about how to articulate the multitude of elements that 
could compose this signifier in a particular case. Thus, general rules and guidelines 
of risk are pondered following the interests of powerful actors, so that each 
construction of risk will be particular and unique. Nonetheless, to maintain its power, 
risk discourse needs to keep sustaining its universality. 
DT provides tools to investigate this taken-for-granted universal conceptualisation of 
risk utilising the concept of hegemony. Although risk is constantly represented as a 
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uniform, objective, neutral, and universal discourse in mainstream accounting 
literature, the hegemony of risk is considered an artificial stabilisation of risk’s 
potential interpretations. The acknowledgement that risk is in the field of 
possibilities implies acceptance that potential dangers or opportunities are reserved 
for the future, and that they cannot be completely managed in the present. 
Consequently, the definition of risk, and each articulation of it, would serve specific 
purposes, including and excluding elements of risk’s multiple potential chains of 
signification. Therefore, there is always arbitrariness in risk constructions. 
The naturalisation of risk is based on different demands, and while risk represents 
nothing and everything, it maintains its political power by balancing different 
interests. The hegemony of risk, therefore, is obtained using its articulations that 
permits risk experts to claim knowledge and control over risk, in different matters 
and different contexts. In this way, risk constitutes and subverts, so each current 
practice of risk must be visualised as transitory, as there is an ongoing dispute among 
groups antagonistic to this hegemony. This perspective then highlights the need to 
search for the power of risk, which in BDBs’ case emerged from outside and was 
perpetuated within Brazil by the interest of various institutions and actors, like 
supranational bodies and consulting firms. 
DT’s analytical tools highlight the rhetorical strategy pursued in risk regulation and 
literature, considering the ontic articulation of signifiers and signifieds. This process 
involves making risk equivalent (metaphorical) to other elements, such as 
probability, controls, and management, which would transfer their properties to risk 
and its claims. This rhetoric represents an attempt to tame the subjectivity implicit in 
any decision-making process through a hegemonic discourse that creates a myth of 
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an objective ‘risk’ antagonistic to the subjective uncertainty. The idea of risk, then, 
has been operationalised by a neoclassical logic, which names a space supposedly 
controllable and measurable, which represents a manageable future. Risk, therefore, 
must be read considering its representative role as part of the accounting 
technologies purposed by an advanced capitalist discourse. It aims to determine what 
would be the right thing to do, and then, what BDBs have to do in order to progress. 
As a result, a variety of rhetorical strategies are used to construct the risk signifier as 
‘good’, ‘better’, ‘the best’, ‘manageable’ and ‘neutral’. However, risk names what is 
lacking in our society; it is proposed as a way to tame the indeterminacy of our 
future. Consequently, although the current practices of risk are relevant, it is 
important to search for the historical contingencies of risk’s emergence, exposing 
choices and hidden politics in its construction.  
Having completed the theoretical conceptualisation of risk, I now move on to 
explore how risk can be understand in practice. Comprehending that this thesis 
requires a more in-depth examination of social practices for its operationalisation, 
the next chapter explore the methodological strategies applied in my data collection 
and analysis.   
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Given the theoretical elements presented by DT in the previous chapter, this chapter 
aims to explain how the elements of DT were operationalised in my data collection 
and empirical analysis. Thus, whilst clarifying the methodological strategies that I 
followed while undertaking my fieldwork, this chapter answers the following 
questions: How do the logics of critical explanation (LOCE) developed by Glynos 
and Howarth (2007) provide a framework for the operationalisation of DT in this 
research? Which methods were used? How were they deployed? Why were they 
appropriated? How can the research analysis utilising dislocation and rhetorical 
redescription support my project to scrutinise the data collected? 
In this chapter, I explain the reasons why the logic of critical explanation provides a 
platform for me to engage with the elements of DT and, how using critical 
ethnography to collect data was the most appropriate approach to develop this 
investigation. First, I explain the analytical approach proposed by Glynos and 
Howarth (2007), and then, the ways and implications of the use of a critical 
ethnography supported by multiple data sources, embracing participant observations, 
document analysis and unstructured interviews. This section begins by 
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demonstrating the steps that I followed to gain access to the Brazilian Development 
Bank and strategies developed to conduct the fieldwork (Section 5.2.1). The 
following section elucidates the research analysis carried out during and after the 
data collection (Section 5.3). Last but not least, I think that an important element in 
this research was my influence, as a researcher, in this investigation (reflexivity) and 
the ethical concerns implicit while I conducted this study, so they are discussed in 
the closing sections of this chapter (Section 5.5). 
 
5.2. Methodology  
5.2.1. Logics of Critical Explanation 
The Logics of Critical Explanation (LOCE) was a specific analytical approach 
proposed by Glynos and Howarth (2007) as a response to the perceived 
methodological limitations of DT in 1985 (Geras, 1987; Lewis, 2005; Torfing, 
2005). Glynos and Howarth established the methodological principles needed to 
utilise a post-structuralist approach in research activities. This conceptual framework 
affords the application of theoretical concepts of DT in the empirical study through 
the process of articulation. Consequently, it is used as the general methodological 
structure for this thesis, consisting of four steps: (1) problematisation; (2) 
retroduction, through social, political and fantasmatic logics; (3) articulation; and (4) 
critique. Each of those stages is examined in more details in the following sections. 
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Problematisation 
Glynos and Howarth (2007) proposed a ‘problem-driven research’ approach, whose 
focus was the problem itself, rather than method or theory. It means that a 
phenomenon has to be constituted as a problem, and the problem must be located at 
an appropriate level of abstraction and complexity (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). This 
thesis has already started this problematisation. The first chapter focused on the post-
colonial problem of risk regulation that have privileged a discourse from outside 
controlled by dominant groups and shifted BDBs’ focus from social projects to 
economic risk management issues. Additionally, the literature review on accounting 
exposed this discourse of risk as akin to science and that it is exclusionary and 
limited, because, under claims of objectivity and rationality, it downplayed the 
subjectivities and political struggles within the constructions of risk hegemonies in 
order to naturalise risk and reduce contestation. For that reason, DT elucidates how 
this claim of apolitical discourse is in itself political. Moreover, the empirical 
analysis will show in more detail the impact of this co-option of a Brazilian 
development bank, hereafter called the ‘BrazBank’, by this language of capital. 
 
Retroduction 
Glynos and Howarth (2007) criticised methods based on both deduction and 
induction and proposed the concept of 'retroduction' for the development of post-
structuralist research instead. They proposed that the evaluation of an empirical 
event must be done through reconstructing and ‘problematising’ it, so the result is 
neither an extreme particularism (inductive) nor an extreme universalism 
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(deductive). Hence, I have already problematised the construction of risk in the 
Brazilian financial sector, particularly as related to development banks; then, the 
retroduction explores further the impacts of risk, and how a discourse of risks has 
been invoked in the BrazBank, pondering how it empowered and disempowered 
internal actors. This retroduction here follows a retroductive circle which 
problematises and pre-theorises the situation in the BrazBank, then, furnishes 
explanations and constructs a theory about it, ending by rendering the problem more 
intelligible while providing a space for intervention and persuasion, encouraging 
another circle (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 34). To accomplish this task, Glynos and 
Howarth (2007) propose the use of social, political and fantasmatic logics. 
 
Social Logic 
The social logic is a starting point both to understand and criticise practices and 
regimes. Social logic characterises practices and regimes in a particular social 
domain, seeking to comprehend the cluster of rules which make some combinations 
and substitutions possible, while excluding others (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). It 
aims to understand norms, rules and perceptions that guide a single practice and 
answers the question, ‘What is risk?’. However, contrary to the approach of 
positivist research, it does not take these guiding elements for granted, but seeks to 
understand the practice’s meanings in a particular context, according to particular 
historical and political circumstances (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 142). 
Consequently, the main focus is on ‘what risk actually does’ (Mol and Law, 2004; 
Frezatti et al., 2014). 
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In this case, my object of study is the concept of risk and risk management practices, 
defined in a certain context and point in time. The social logic involves multiple 
voices and a system of statements that describe and characterise risk and risk 
management practices, passing through the self-representations of different actors, 
departments and hierarchies in the BrazBank. The corresponding cluster of rules 
makes risk both possible and contestable. Thus, this research aims to understand 
what was included and excluded in the discourse of risk and risk management in that 
specific context, along with what is allowed or prohibited within and using the 
current risk hegemonic discourse. Consequently, what was the influence of national 
and international supervisory bodies on the construction of this concept? How have 
‘Big Four’ accountancy firms been involved in the implementation of these practices 
(supposedly) following the regulatory statements of supervisory bodies? What is the 
influence of individual experiences of risk? How have the differences of individual 
and organisational ‘risk appetite’ and ‘risk culture’ been treated in this construction? 
In sum, the aim of the social logics is to comprehend and characterise the risk 
management practices that were effectively in use in the BrazBank at the time of the 
fieldwork. 
 
Political logic  
While the social logic characterises the practice at a given moment of time, the 
political logic focuses on the process, answering how, when and why the social logic 
was employed (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). It comprehends how the concept of 
‘risk’ as well as its management was established or challenged over time (Glynos 
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and Howarth, 2007: 106). The keyword to characterise the political logic is 
changing, or rather ‘dislocation’. This logic explains how risk practices were 
imposed, confronted or contested. It shows the contingency of social structure and its 
disruption, revealing the limits of the social structure (Torfing, 1999). The notion of 
contingency reveals the unpredictability of a social structure and the impossibility of 
identifying the root causes of an event (Torfing, 1999).  
Risk became a hegemonic concept in the Brazilian finance sector as a discourse from 
outside, but without proper contestation as discussed in Chapter 2. Thus, the political 
logic examines how this implementation process was articulated and how the logics 
of equivalence and difference were used to make the concept of risk familiar and 
persuade actors of the BrazBank to promote the new risk management approach. 
Moreover, political logic exposes the radical contingencies of the established 
practice, identifying political struggles over the discourse of implementation, which 
political interests succeeded and which were excluded and marginalised in the 
discussion of potential meanings of risk and risk management. 
 
Fantasmatic logic 
A political reality also depends on fantasies in order to constitute itself (Stavrakakis, 
1999: 81). For that reason, the fantasmatic logic examines why individuals maintain 
social practices, investigating the ideological forces behind those operations (Laclau, 
2005: 101). It explains both the inertia of maintenance practices as well as the 
reasons, directions, speed and resistance to change (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 
145). Fantasies support and give consistency to what we call reality (Zizek, 1989: 
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44). The role of fantasies is ‘implicitly to reinforce the natural character of their 
elements or to actively prevent the emergence of the political dimension’ (Glynos 
and Howarth, 2007: 147).  
In fact, Glynos and Howarth state that ‘the function of many management and 
governance techniques could be seen in this light’ (2007: 146). Images of 
omnipresence or of total control would represent the beatific dimension of fantasy 
that attempts to achieve or maintain closure (Glynos, 2001b, 93-96; Stravrakakis, 
1999: 108-9). Equally, successive risk management guidelines have not challenged 
the concept of risk, but simply perpetuated the importance of its construction. Even 
after crises, guidelines supported arguments claiming that practitioners can manage 
risk better, but did not open a space for questioning whether they were doing it 
correctly.  
The imposition of Basel rules of risk management in Brazilian Development Banks 
revealed numerous inadequacies of risk management regulations in this context 
(Chapter 2), but they are still in use. Ideas of different silos of risk were taken to 
restore the trust of stakeholders and investors after each crisis, so even after many 
fallacies of the concept of risk and its management were made apparent it has still 
been employed in decision-making processes. So, why is it in use? What makes the 
concept of risk so persuasive that it still ‘grips’ subjects, inducing them to act 
according to its rules?  
The following section summarises the logics and explains more about the 
articulatory processes involved in the construction of hegemonic discourses and 
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why, after all the constraints imposed by prudence regulations and risk management 
practices in the financial sector, they are still in use. 
 
Articulation 
The practice of articulation involves the redescription of a discourse in a new 
explanatory framework, which is related to the logics of equivalence and difference 
(see Chapter 4.5). Articulation is related to the identification of ‘nodal points’, which 
are privileged or significant points in a discourse (Carter, 2008). As an example, 
calculative practices, as a proxy for risk management, have become a prime 
reference point for corporate governance. The articulatory process then identifies 
how any singular explanation involves a plurality of contingent theoretical and 
empirical elements. This process of articulation brings together a critical explanation 
that requires ‘practices of judgment’ enacted by a particular subject and is reflective 
rather than determinative (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 183). For that reason, Glynos 
and Howarth argue that it is important to develop a contextualised articulation to 
provide a coherent explanation of the problematic phenomenon.  
These judgments, nevertheless, need to be shared in order to project concepts and 
logics in further contexts (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 186). It is, then, through 
naming that an assemblage of heterogeneous elements is kept together (Laclau, 
2005: 100). As a result, the generalisation from a case is intimately related to the 
comparison of cases and takes place ‘on the basis of shared judgments about 
theoretical terms’, ‘paradigms’, and ‘constitutive cases that converge or diverge from 
paradigm cases’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 189). Thus, the judgment of the 
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researcher represents a singular account and involves a persuasive production of 
narratives that better explain and justify the problematised phenomenon (Glynos and 




The function of logics in social scientific analysis is not only to make social 
processes more intelligible. Indeed, all logics carve out a space for a critical 
conception of explanation because they all presuppose the non-necessary character 
of social relations (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 153). This approach is based on my 
intuition and theoretical expertise and I summarised each chapter by highlighting the 
articulatory processes established in the BrazBank. Hence: 
the researcher needs to be open and attentive to possibilities disclosed by the 
research itself in a mode of critique that combines Derrida and Foucault 
generating a ‘deconstructive genealogy’ of a social practice or regime. (...) The 
task here is to reactivate and make evident options that were foreclosed during 
the emergence of a practice and show how the present configuration of practices 
relies on exclusions that reveal the non-necessary character of the present social 
formation, so he/she must explore the consequences and potential effects of 
such ‘repressions’ and interrogate the conditions under which a particular social 
practice or regime grips its subjects despite its non-necessary character. This 
contributes to a practice of ‘ethico-political interpretation’ (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007: 155). 
The facts do not speak for themselves and even numerical data needs to be 
interpreted. Consequently, explanations start with (hidden) intentions and self-
interpretations. However, a plurality of different kinds of logics and concepts have to 
be linked together to explain a regime critically. As a result, this generates critical 
accounts that are both sensitive to context and explicit about their ontological, 
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ethical, normative, and sociological presuppositions (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 
161). According to Carter (2008), the use of political and fantasmatic logics by itself 
allows the possibility of criticism, especially when a time of dislocation (leading to 
the establishment of new social practices) is penetrated by radical contingency. Thus, 
moments of dislocation make the ‘lack’ visible and identify attempts to cover this 
radical contingency, along with ideological attempts to close the lack within 
subjects; it reveals possibilities that have been excluded or marginalised. Thus, this 
provides the basis for critique and leads DT beyond descriptivism (Carter, 2008). 
The entire analysis of social, political and fantasmatic logics seeks to answer the 
questions: What does risk management do in the specific context of the BrazBank? 
And, how and why was this practice institutionalised? Moreover, what, how and why 
were the alternatives excluded from making this institutionalisation possible?  
According to DT, the struggles and contradictions throughout this process, then, 
provide the basic ingredients for a critical analysis while making evident underlying 
codes governing overt speech contradictions. This thesis, thus, addresses how risk 
and risk management were constructed by actors and reveals failures to close this 
concept as something objective and neutral. This is revealed by an in-depth 
scrutinising of risk management practices in the BrazBank and by the genealogy of 
this concept. The output of this deep understanding and reflection are summarised in 
the conclusion of this thesis (Chapter 9). Therefore, after examining the logic of 
critical explanation, the next section considers the empirical methods used in the 
thesis.  
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5.3. Methods 
Although DT and the Logic of Critical Explanation provide theoretical framing, they 
are also intended to have purchase in the real world and hence empirical studies 
remain hugely important. For the purposes of this research, I chose to undertake a 
critical ethnography using participant observation, document analysis and interviews. 
The utilisation of multiple data-collection techniques was relevant to reinforce 
conclusions, as various methods can be used to challenge and complement each 
other.  
The comprehension of an organisation, or even a process inside it, is very complex 
and varies according to its dynamics as well as internal and external 
interconnectedness and influences. Hence, this research provides a perspective of the 
construction of ‘risk’ and risk management practices at a certain time, constituting 
the period of data collection during six months of immersion in the research. The 
choice of Brazil is related to my nationality, as the comprehension of the Brazilian 
culture and values, formal language (Brazilian Portuguese) and technical banking 
jargon was a fundamental aspect of the development of this investigation (Section 
5.5). Furthermore, the prominence of this developing country in the international 
economic scenario, especially in the last decade (see Chapter 2.2) made this an 
adequate and convenient site for this study. In view of that, the following sections 
shed light on the process of gaining access to the organisation, the methods used and 
their operationalisation, as well as the reasons that justify my choices. 
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5.3.1. Organisation Access 
A critical aspect of this kind of thesis is to gain access to an organisation. Access 
must be obtained through the process of identifying and establishing trust with key 
informants (Gillham, 2008). However, difficulty is commonly generated by cultural 
suspicion related to this kind of research, which is not always understood by 
organisational actors, who are usually worried about organisational secrecy, internal 
policies of non-participation in research, corporate security and even espionage 
related to the leaking of strategic information (Atkinson, 2001). Moreover, the 
researcher’s immersion in the organisation’s environment can cause fears related to 
disturbance of organisational activities, which could reduce employee productivity.  
The issue of access is not restricted to the organisation itself (Ahrens, 2004). The 
following sections present concerns related to access to departments and people in 
power, the conduct of interviews, tracking important concomitant events and access 
to relevant documents. In sum, the number of contingencies and specificities of each 
company and its environment cannot be predicted in books on qualitative research. 
However, these tensions experienced in the field might also generate creative 
insights that enable relevant findings for research, including the deconstruction of 
original perceptions about risk, risk management and the BrazBank, since some 
events showed attitudes contrary to disclosures and guidelines about risk 
management models.  
Overall, this research was only possible because of my previous role as a consultant, 
which created opportunities for the development of this research. Access to this 
BrazBank came after conversations held personally, telephone contacts, a series of 
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queries related to my commitment to the organisation, and assurance of the 
confidentiality of the data collected. Additionally, I must respect the privacy of their 
content, following the Bank Secrecy Act, as provided in the Brazilian Supplementary 
Law Nº 105/2001 and the anonymity of the institution and all participants throughout 
the disclosure or publication of technical or scientific papers resulting from this 
research. 
The whole process of gaining access started one year before my enrolment in the 
doctorate programme and many organisations were approached, but they agreed only 
to provide limited access for the conduct of this research. In the BrazBank, there was 
a stronger interest from both the director and the manager responsible for risk 
management practices. Both director and manager mentioned problems related to the 
‘risk culture’ in the BrazBank. Furthermore, the manager emphasised that the role of 
risk management had changed over time. Therefore, I realised that there were many 
moments of contingency in this Bank, so this site could be a suitable case to 
illustrate the interplaying of contingency and structures and the articulation of 
changes in a particular context (Laclau, 2005). 
However, the access to an organisation and its actors is a continuous process, and 
even after the informal agreement to conduct the research, a few months before the 
beginning of the fieldwork, the legal department issued a myriad queries. These 
requests forced me to travel back to Brazil in order to conduct the negotiation 
personally, as I felt that telephone calls and emails were no longer satisfactory. 
Therefore, after meetings with the director of operations, risk manager and legal 
manager, many concerns were clarified and the agreement was formalised and 
signed. Actually, the immersion came at a very appropriate time, since Brazil was 
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going through a period of unprecedented growth, and a high volume of credit was 
made available on its domestic market to counter the international crisis and drive 
development. The following section gives more details about the methods applied 
during my fieldwork, starting with the critical ethnographic approach. 
  
5.3.2. Critical Ethnography in Action 
Ethnographic methods are particularly useful when researchers need to enter into a 
research field in which the social issues or behaviours are not yet clearly understood. 
They involve a holistic description of a group of people and their way of life, seeking 
to define group values and behaviours (Angrosino, 2007). Those methods have been 
claimed by many researchers in accounting (e.g. Chua, 1995; Jönsson and 
Macintosh, 1997; Ahrens, 1997; Kornberger et al., 2011), but most of them can be 
categorised as in-depth case studies, as there was no attempt by these researchers to 
become insiders. It is acknowledged that ‘in-depth participant observation and 
extensive fieldwork show institutions and organisations as systems of meaningful 
practices that are historically and politically contingent, and socially structured, yet 
open to change’ (Ahrens and Mollona, 2007). Nonetheless, such research cannot 
adopt a conventional ethnographic approach which refers to pure descriptions and 
interpretations of culture and meanings. Consequently, considering the post-
structuralist focus on political influences of this study, I adopted a critical 
perspective of this method (Thomas, 1993).  
According to Thomas (1993: 7), critical ethnography has a political intent of 
challenging hegemonic oppression and tries to expose the taken-for-granted, 
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‘domesticated’, assumptions that perpetuate power imbalances, so ‘cultures, groups 
and individuals being studied are located in contexts of power and interests’ (Cohen 
et al., 2011: 244). This research then shows these oppressive relations, according to 
individual discourses and divergences in multiple voices between hierarchical levels 
and departments in the Brazilian Development Bank towards the definition of risk. 
In summary, this perspective seems apposite to this thesis, whose aim is to study 
how the concept of risk is constructed in a particular organisation as a social and 
political practice rather than an ideal technical process or mere regulatory 
compliance. 
As Dent (1991: 705) said, ‘We know little about the way in which accounting is 
implicated in organizations’ cultures’. Culture is about values, meanings and beliefs 
shared by members of an organisation, which give meaning to an object. 
Consequently, its study must focus on the understanding of organisational units and 
sub-units. The task for social scientists is to enter and grasp the ‘frames of meaning 
involved in the production of social life’, subsequently, ‘reconstituting these within 
the new frames of meaning involved in technical conceptual schemes’ (Giddens, 
1976: 79). Thus, Lyotard (1991: 65) argues that ‘concept or meaning is not exterior 
to Being; rather, Being is immediately concept in itself, and the concept is Being for 
itself’. Meaning is created by symbolic interaction, so it is through the interplay of 
subjects and objects that meaning is born (Crotty, 1998). 
This is a process of understanding the particular contextualised meaning of actions 
and interactions. This understanding requires that we not remain straitjacketed by the 
conventional meanings we have been taught to associate with the object; instead we 
might be open to the potentially new and richer meanings that could be associated 
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with the object (Crotty, 1998: 51). Mead (1994) emphasised that the researcher must 
be able to take the role of others and see him/herself as a social object ‘entering the 
attitudes of the community’ and ‘taking over the institutions of the community’. The 
aim is to get inside the way each group of people sees the world (Hammersley, 1985: 
152). This implies that the sociological observer must exercise sufficient discipline 
on himself to ensure that it is indeed the actors’ meanings that are recorded in his 
notebook and not merely his own (Mitchell, 1977: 115-16). Overall, this is an 
invitation to reinterpretation, which might happen during the process of becoming an 
insider.  
Nonetheless, this process of becoming an insider is not as pragmatic as it seems, and, 
as an ethnographic researcher, I realised that I was labelled by myself, but most 
importantly by the participants. As a stranger, they wanted to know more about me, 
and to be staring from a corner as a statue, or a ‘fly on the wall’, would never allow 
me to fit into their cultural values and practices. Therefore, following my judgement 
and based on my previous experiences, I realised that most of my effort in the field 
would be dedicated to building trust, and part of this process was obtained through 
lunch meals, coffee breaks and reducing the information asymmetry between 
participants and myself. For instance, we started to have lunch together, and then, the 
conversations became more relaxed, disclosing issues that were not commonly 
revealed inside the BrazBank. Additionally, I gradually started to expose my values 
and thoughts, but always trying to show how they were compatible with those of the 
organisation and individuals. Although I did not lose my label as a ‘researcher’, or 
‘Harvard boy’ (as some of them called me), and they kept asking me for the 
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‘solution’ as if I was a consultant, participants started to share their concerns, beliefs 
and secrets with me too. 
During the fieldwork, thus, I did not assume the role of consultant, but of an 
apprentice. Contrary to consultants who seem to know everything, apprentices seem 
to know nothing and always want to know something more, and this position was 
helpful, especially in the beginning. In fact, I adopted different roles with each 
department or individual; sometimes these roles overlapped, but worked to keep my 
access to actors. As explained, my role was not, and could not be determined by 
myself alone, so this position was challenged by the actors in the BrazBank, who 
were anxious to know what I was thinking and receive advice about the quality of 
their risk-management practices.  
There are also other pragmatic elements that made this research possible, for 
example, the comprehension of the formal language (Brazilian Portuguese) and 
technical banking jargon was a fundamental aspect of the development of this 
investigation. Furthermore, methods were blended in order to obtain the most 
reliable and faithful information from the field. For instance, observations in 
conjunction with documents provided me with more of an inside view about the 
BrazBank’s history, which was used to develop better interaction with actors during 
interviews. The following sections, then, explain how the methods were also 
influenced and adapted according to the situation encountered during the fieldwork. 
First, I explain the benefits and reasons for the utilisation of participant observation. 
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5.3.3. Conducting Participant Observations 
Initially, the fieldwork focused on my insertion into the organisational site. I was 
meeting people, building partners and alliances, observing the organisational 
environment, recognising its policies, standards and information systems (formal and 
informal, and intranet and extranet). So, especially, in the first month, I was only 
acclimatising and building trust, to understand the culture, language and cause 
minimal disturbance in the environment studied. That was a period when I learned 
and adapted myself to the routines of the Risk Management Department (RMD), 
which is where I was located as a researcher during the fieldwork.  
Spradley (1980) argues that the first task of an organisational ethnographer in the 
field is to understand which cultural knowledge, behaviour, and artefacts participants 
share and use to interpret their experiences. This process can represent tensions 
between explicit and implicit culture (what is said and what is done), between the 
actor’s voice and the researcher’s voice, and between representations of the local 
cultural world and larger worlds (Schwartsman, 1993). Nonetheless, this preliminary 
tension is important as it reduces the interference and impact of the researcher in the 
field and represents the first steps towards conducting the observations. I admit that 
at the beginning, the ambiguities, contradictions and discrepancies in the reality 
found in the BrazBank caused frustration and anxiety for me, as the first impression 
was that the data would not answer my research questions. However, throughout the 
fieldwork I realised that my data would actually fill many gaps in literature and 
practice of risk management, as can be observed in the empirical part of this thesis 
(see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
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After the first month, I started to analyse the interactions of the RMD with other 
organisational departments, primarily focusing on the vision that actors from the 
RMD have about other departments, and then, trying to understand the reality of this 
department and the influences of risk management practices on its activities. I 
commonly emailed managers asking for a day to follow their practices in order to 
understand more about the ‘risk culture’ in the BrazBank and their connection with 
risk-management practices. Sometimes, managers were interviewed before this 
departmental immersion, sometimes after, and this was determined by our first 
interaction or their requests. Such immersion was a good opportunity to start to do 
informal interviews with other staff, get to know people and be known in the 
BrazBank. In general, this phase was fruitful to observe the interaction of different 
hierarchical levels, particularly at the operational and tactical levels, and be part of 
committees, meetings and decision-making processes about risks understanding the 
influence of the concepts of ‘risk’ and risk management on those activities.  
My participant observations took place in different spaces of the BrazBank. I 
followed the timetable of a normal employee from 8am to 6 pm. This approach 
allowed me to be recognised by the actors in the BrazBank. As time passed, I 
participated in meetings, conversations, interactions during lunch time, gossip, 
complaints about other’s behaviour, personal and organisational history telling, etc. I 
started to observe the posture, tone, facial expressions, and gestures used in each of 
those moments. Also, I came to understand where each kind of interaction usually 
took place in terms of time and space, as well as taboos demonstrated by explicit and 
covert behaviours.  
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While conducting the observations, I was open to all the information available in the 
field. I transcribed the maximum of words using codes to preserve confidentiality 
and making detailed records of events, conversations and other interactions 
(Angrosino, 2007). The fieldnotes were organised chronologically and as literally as 
possible, considering the physical setting, objects and people’s behaviour and 
interaction with other subjects, as well as accounting and risk management tools. 
Silverman (2009) asserts the importance of understanding what, how and why people 
do what they do in order to characterise their aims and assumptions. I was also aware 
of body language and gestures, analysing interactions pre-meeting, post-meeting, and 
clarifying as many points as was possible. Furthermore, it was important to take 
some time to reflect on the content, overall processes and impacts of each 
observation during and after meetings or interviews (Jarzabkowski and Seidi, 2008).  
According to the Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe (2001), observation could 
provide the perception of power imbalance relationships at the organisational level. 
Thus, at the strategic level, this research sought to understand how the idea of risk 
was weighted on issues such as granting credit, planning and budgeting, as well as 
the role of risk management, and how the Board’s perception of this role was 
reflected in the activities of risk management and other departments. This was 
conceived by observing the shared perception of actors in this department about their 
potential role in organisation activities, as well as the interaction of these concepts in 
other departments and at other hierarchical levels.  
After six months working eight hours per day, having lunch with the BrazBank’s 
actors, and using the evenings to code, review and fill the gaps in my transcriptions, 
it was crucial to have some standard in the recordings. I kept a logbook where I 
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commonly described my thoughts and feelings about the interaction in the BrazBank 
and my insertion, which was more like a self-reflexive experience log, sent every 
day to my supervisors and used to monitor changes in my perception. Additionally, 
my fieldnotes were organised, registering the date, place, start and end time, the 
purpose of the meeting as well as how it was opened and finished. The archives were 
organised by month, day and time and segregating the different sources of 
information. At this point, the detailed operationalisation of the document analysis is 
explained below.  
 
5.3.4. Conducting Document Analysis 
The analysis of documents was conducted throughout the fieldwork. Access to the 
archives was gradually obtained according to my requests. In general, I had 
unrestricted access to all the documents in the BrazBank. Initially, however, my 
analyses focused on the documents used by the actors of the RMD, such as 
spreadsheets, heat diagrams, risk matrices, stress tests, databases, reports, training 
materials, norms, policies, etc. In general, these archives provided examples of the 
language used inside the RMD. After that, newsletters, flowcharts, photographs, 
board reports, compliance reports etc. were used to understand the language used in 
the communication between departments. Overall, these archives were relevant to 
clarify connections between previous events related to risk management practices as 
well as providing me with an understanding about important moments in the history 
of the BrazBank. Furthermore, the archives provided an important source for 
inquiring into and confirming assumptions within interviews and observations.  
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Document analyses were concentrated on the genealogy of working versions of the 
present (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), so this is part of the political logic 
(Chapter 7). Documents played a key role in comparative analysis about what people 
should do and what they actually did, or how the organisation wanted to operate or to 
present itself (Chapter 6.2). For those reasons, documents were useful to provide 
information about the BrazBank, its context and key figures and events, showing 
data and details not available from other sources. In conjunction with the previous 
methods, then, document analysis represented a relevant source for corroboration, or 
to challenge the information received from informants, interviewees, and 
observations (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). In summary, it represented a 
valuable and complementary method. 
According to Rapley (2007), the examination of texts must be focused on what is 
said, and how a specific argument, idea or concept is developed, as well as on what 
is not said, i.e. silence, gaps or omissions. This scrutiny emphasised how different 
elements of the text are combined to consolidate (or disrupt) meanings alongside the 
assumptions in the text. In accordance with this perspective, Rapley (2007) argues 
that this process must analyse how specific issues were used to persuade an audience 
about the legitimacy of someone’s claims. It is important to comprehend how 
specific discourses are drawn on (and excluded) alongside specific subject positions, 
which are produced, sustained or negotiated together. For that reason, document 
analyses require the focus on a range of sources of knowledge and evidence.  
In fact, the documents of an organisation represent their history. However, in the 
case of a bank, they also often represent the dissemination of practices of internal 
controls, audit and risk management, which conceptually are intended to formalise 
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all activities in order to maintain audit trails (Power, 2007). The members of the 
BrazBank were engaged in the production and circulation of various kinds of written 
material, including reports on ‘cases’, financial records, rule-books, organisational 
charts, timetables, memoranda, and so on, both in paper and electronic form 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Therefore, these are important sources of 
information about the context under study as documents are also constructions of a 
reality (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004). They construct ‘facts’, ‘records’, ‘diagnoses’, 
‘decisions’, and ‘rules’, which play a central role and are crucially involved in social 
activities that take place (Prior, 2003; 2004). 
In this research, the documents analysed are newsletters; meeting minutes; 
regulations and internal policies, especially those related to audit, risk management 
and internal controls; standards for performance and employee code of ethics; the 
company website; information present in the media; the organisation’s history; 
photographs of events and institutional films; reports and technical papers about 
organisational aspects; billboards; spreadsheets and reports about risk analysis and 
financial statements; management reports used by executives; and external reports 
from government and supervisory bodies related to policies for the financial sector 
and, more specifically, for development banks. Briefly, every form of recording 
available was considered as a potential document to be examined.  
These documents provided important understandings of the decisions that 
contributed to the emergence, establishment, development and the current stage of 
institutionalisation of risk-management practices in the BrazBank; the company and 
its processes; its external image; the form of communication with employees; 
personnel policies; ethical messages in the work environment; standardisation of 
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practices, procedures and standards adopted for the relationship within and between 
departments and hierarchies; and comparison of standards recorded with the 
practices currently adopted. Furthermore, documents showed accounting information 
provided to managers; standards of information disclosure; and a picture of the 
historical economic and financial situation of this development bank.  
In summary, both documents and observations focused on practices and behaviours 
before, during and after decision-making process about risk, usually related to 
funding projects as well as the compliance with Brazilian regulations and internal 
policies related to risk. The role of interviews, then, was to provide a trail of feelings 
about risk and risk management as well as how different practices are interpreted in 
different departments and hierarchies.  
 
5.3.5. Conducting Unstructured Interviews 
After the first two months, formal unstructured interviews were arranged and 
conducted with analysts, managers and directors. Overall, my strategies had to be 
changed many times according to the specific situations found in the setting. There 
were employees’ strikes, restrictions and gaps in the time available to access new 
departments, archives, databases, and actors. The original intention was to hold a 
dialogue firstly on operational levels (3rd month), in order to optimise the time 
available to undertake interviews with managers (4th month) and directors (5th 
month). However, cultural hierarchical barriers in the bank pushed me to invert the 
order and start with the manager in the third month. Furthermore, strikes in the 
BrazBank opened a valuable space in the agenda of the directors in the fourth month. 
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In general, these alterations did not compromise the outcomes of this thesis, but 
reflected the sensibility and flexibility necessary for ethnographic studies and 
researchers. 
In the qualitative research field, the researcher should be mature enough to 
circumvent the ambiguities and difficulties that arise in obtaining the information for 
the research. This research was no exception. For instance, I negotiated access with 
managers who, either due to initial insecurity or the natural demands of their work 
routines, imposed time and access limits to information. Certainly, my previous 
experience and flexibility were essential in enabling me to circumvent these 
difficulties and gain access to information, with the maximum security to me and 
ensuring that a relationship of trust was developed.  
Another important aspect examined in this research is power relationships, referring 
to the interaction of the organisational actors with regulations, such as BCB’s 
statements and supervisory bodies and government requirements. Thus, I used 
informal chats, followed meetings and observations, to monitor the implementation 
of risk management strategies and track discourses developed in decision-making 
processes, making a linkage between the BrazBank and its macro-context according 
to the political influences presented in this context. I also followed meetings in 
committees about risk management, granting credit and strategic investments. 
Therefore, this research sought to understand how these internal and external 
demands generated changes in the organisation’s routines and strategies and how 
actors in this development bank adapted themselves to these changes and 
rationalised their decisions utilising discourses related to risk. Even more, I sought to 
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highlight the specific role of accounting tools and risk management analysis in these 
situations. 
The formal interviews took place in the Brazilian Development Bank during 
business hours. In total, I conducted 54 interviews, with a duration between 30 
minutes and 2 hours, with directors, managers and analysts, selected for convenience 
and availability. Before each interview, I introduced myself, talking about who I am 
and the nature of my research; explained the purpose of the interview; checked if the 
interviewee had any question about those things; explained the confidentiality of 
both the interviewee and organisation’s identity; and confirmed that this research and 
interview was solely for academic purposes (Gillham, 2008: 26-27). I started the 
interviews using open questions focusing on feelings and meanings of risk and risk 
management practices, like ‘What does risk mean to you?’ and ‘How is risk related 
to your work?’. Then, following their reply construction, I asked for some 
explanations about feelings and perceptions related to risk culture and appetite in 
different departments. During the interview, I tried to offer the time and space 
necessary to the interviewee to respond to the question explaining their point of 
view, trying not to over talk or finish off what the interviewee was saying; to be alert 
to non-verbal signals, mood and uncertainty presented by the interviewee and to 
avoid joined questions. Additionally, at the end of each interview, I summarised it to 
the interviewee to check if my comprehension about what had been said was correct 
(Gillham, 2008: 26-27). Moreover, other informal interviews or quick chats during 
the lunch hour or coffee breaks were used as an additional source of information. 
For Howarth (2004), an interview is an approach that emphasises the importance of 
subjectivity in the explanation of social reality and seeks to provide ‘thick 
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descriptions’ of events and processes, which provide depth to a qualitative study. 
Unstructured interviews attempt to understand the complex behaviour of a member 
of society without imposing any a priori categorisation that may limit the field of 
inquiry (Fontana, 2007). They are developed through a human-to-human relationship 
with the respondent and seek to understand rather than to explain their point of view; 
what Spradley (1979) called ‘learning from the native’.  
The main focus of unstructured interviews is on how a story is told (Gubrium and 
Holstein, 1998), so I was constantly aware of the substance, structure, plot of the 
story and the context where the interviewee inserted his/her story. Moreover, 
following the imperatives of post-structuralism, I focused on what was told and what 
was omitted. Consequently, this research used unstructured interviews to focus on 
how the concept of ‘risk’ differs from person to person, from situation to situation, 
from time to time (Scheurich, 1997: 62), highlighting contradictions between 
individual, hierarchical and departmental conceptions of risk, and how these are 
influenced by regulatory statements, consultants’ recommendations, and internal 
norms. From this perspective, the using of multiple methods was a fundamental 
approach to this research. 
 
5.3.6. Benefits from Multiple Data Sources 
As I said before, the traditional ethnographic approach tries to obtain a complete 
comprehension about organisational environments. However, according to the post-
structuralist perspective, this completeness is always problematic. Although I 
acknowledge that each method would have limitations for presenting a whole view 
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of an organisational context, I also recognise that a platform of multiple methods 
would reduce these limitations by the complementarity between methods. This 
approach is useful to post-structuralist purposes, as it seeks to hear multiple voices 
and uncover multi-layers of reality, looking at the historical, philosophical and 
cultural construction of frames considering patterns of belief and habit as temporary 
in each organisational period (Emerson et al., 2001: 479). The post-structuralist 
paradigm understands structures as historically contingent and reciprocally affected 
by practices present in particular conditions of time, which define how they are 
conceptualised as disciplinary knowledge (Lather, 2001; Prado, 1995). For instance:  
In contemporary regimes of disciplinary truth-telling, authenticity and voice are 
at the heart of claims to the ‘real’ in ethnography. Indeed, in the ‘new’ 
ethnography, that which comes after the loss of faith in received stories and 
predictable scripts, the authority of voice is often privileged over other analyses. 
Confessional tales, authorial self-revelation, ‘multivoicedness’ and personal 
narrative, all are contemporary practices of representation designed to move 
ethnography away from scientificity and the appropriation to others (Emerson et 
al., 2001: 483).  
For that reason, during my fieldwork, I privileged my informal conversations with 
the participants and my involvement in their more ordinary practices, such as lunch 
and friendly chats during coffee hour. These more informal events gave me the 
opportunity to grasp the interaction between subjects and power hierarchies, for 
instance. They contradicted formal archives and showed a lived picture of the 
organisation. Consequently, the operationalisation of the multiple sources of data 
collection was done considering, for example, that observations must be confronted 
with documents, then clarified by personal narratives. I recognise that ethnography is 
a cyclical approach, as these major tasks like asking questions, recording 
observations, and analysing data were repeated over and over again until saturation 
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was reached in order to give confidence that the analysis is as unbiased as possible 
(Schwartsman, 1993).  
The last month was used to monitor the planning for the following year in the area of 
risk management and related areas and to clarify any doubts or perceived conflicts 
during interviews, observations and documentary analysis. Throughout this data 
collection, I worked as a passive scribe, documenting the organisational worlds and 
meaning systems of particular groups, but also reflecting upon and criticising 
organisational, social and economic systems within which meanings were a part, 
while seeking for relationships that would corroborate or contradict the literature, 
theory and paradigm used. Thus, in line with my commitment to an open and 
accountable research practice, I also presented to the organisation a preliminary 
report about this study and listened to their feedback and their reactions to the 
findings.  
It is worth highlighting that at the end of my fieldwork, the RMD was conceived as a 
key area in the bank and passed through a new reformulation conducted by a 
consulting group. Although the new shift was not the focus of this research, the live 
observed interaction between members of the bank and consultant was an important 
element to confirm some perceptions obtained previously from document analysis 
and other records. Nonetheless, it also reinforced that risk management practices 
were in constant movement. In order to understand those elements, the next section 
focuses on the analyses carried in this research. 
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5.4. Research Analysis 
The main focus of this thesis is to address how the concept of risk was constructed in 
the Brazilian financial sector, in this case, pondering the influence of possible 
demands of certain powerful organisational actors and silenced voices in a 
development bank. Nonetheless, as shown before, the conceptualisation of risk and 
its regulation was problematic, involving different levels of power imbalances as 
well as arbitrary regulatory and disciplinary conceptualisations of risk (Chapter 2 
and 3). For that reason, it would be naïve to conceive this as a consensual and 
smooth implementation process. Similarly, it is questionable whether risk 
management practices are still uncontested, especially after so many explicit and 
current failures of its claims. Thus, this section highlights the tools used to analyse 
disputes intertwined in the emergence, conflicts, contradictions and closures of risk 
management as a hegemonic discourse for development and as a source of good 
corporate governance structures. The analytical strategy employed was concentrated 
on the analysis of dislocation, comprehending radical contingencies around risk 
constructions and the rhetorical redescription of risk as a nodal point, explained 
below. 
The analysis of dislocation focuses on shifts within a discourse. During my 
fieldwork, it was possible to identify shifts in and contestations about the hegemonic 
constructions of ‘risk’, as a nodal point. This was already theoretically confirmed by 
the struggles surrounding risk’s discursive formation and implementation within 
regulatory statements (Chapter 2) and epistemological boundaries set by the 
accounting discipline (Chapter 3). Hence, my empirical analysis focused on actors 
within the BrazBank that formed this discursive field. In general, dislocations 
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resulted from counter-hegemonic struggles when actors attempted to construct a 
‘new’ discourse of risk, including and excluding certain elements within this 
discursive field, or attempted to cover the limitation of this discursive structure in 
order to sediment a new social practice (Howarth et al, 2000: 9). These new claims 
are related to maintaining powerful position and power imbalances. 
In the BIS’s regulatory statements of risk management, for example, these shifts 
were clear in the redefinitions of what constitute risk-management practices. In this 
case, the inclusion of operational risks in risk management frameworks expanded its 
frontiers, incorporating more subjective measures into them. However, this was done 
to contain a radical contingency caused by financial scandals, such as Enron, that 
exposed the influence of subjects in this previously immaculate fully quantitative 
model. Therefore, dislocations are usually a response to crises and can demonstrate 
the limitations of risk’s constructions.  
Identifying these radical contingencies and dislocations can be challenging in 
fieldwork. The subjectivity of actors, their difficulties in recognising such events, 
different self-representation in different groups, and the problem that not all these 
contingencies necessarily lead to change, are aspects that must be considered (Carter, 
2008: 220). In general, then, this thesis examines how interested actors, formulating 
the discourse around ‘risk’, succeeded in, and were challenged about, the 
sedimenting practices of risk management and new hegemonic regimes of risk in the 
BrazBank.  
As the literature review of this thesis has shown, the political use of risk as a concept 
is contingent and controversial. Laclau and Mouffe, then, considered that 
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redescriptions play a significant role in the creation, maintenance, destabilising, and 
disruption of hegemonies. For that reason, ‘rhetorical redescriptions’ were used to 
understand how actors articulate metaphorical elements of risk, in the 
implementation, application and maintenance of risk management practices. This 
commonly involves changing this concept to alternative variants to increase its 
‘acceptability’ (Carter, 2008). Carter (2008: 220) states that:  
In rhetorical and linguistic terms, a ‘redescription’ names moves that change a 
concept in alternative respects, and includes several variants: 
reconceptualisation (a revision of meaning), renaming (a change of the name), 
re-weighting (a shift in significance) and re-evaluation (an alteration of the 
normative implication). 
Following the requirements of my analytical approach, the ethnographic field notes 
including documents, interviews and observations were subject to an analysis of 
rhetorical redescriptions, focusing on the role that DT’s elements, like metonyms and 
metaphors (see Chapter 4.5.1), had on the employment of ‘risk’ in risk management 
practices. Furthermore, I focused on the incentives that each player had to define risk 
for their own advantage, uncovering interests and power imbalances in risk 
hegemonic constructions. The analysis of the contestation over interpreting and 
implementing risk management practices illustrates that dislocations of this signifier 
might result from confusion and disappointment in relation to the aims of new 
regimes of risk, which empower some actors and disempower others (Carter, 2008: 
220-222). All these analyses were framed according to LOCE’s framework and 
logics proposed by Glynos and Howarth.  
Overall, I conducted preliminary analyses during the fieldwork, after each day and 
considering my learning curve about the organisational culture of risk, recorded in 
my self-reflections summarised every day in a logbook about my experiences in the 
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field and my perceptions of them. Each month another review was conducted, 
pondering the outcomes obtained. At the beginning of the sixth month, an overall 
examination was done in order to fill some gaps and provide feedback about my data 
collection to the actors in the BrazBank. After I finished the fieldwork, all logbooks 
were re-read and the fieldnotes analysed, firstly, to familiarise myself with the whole 
data, then, highlighting important quotations, and finally, identifying some themes. 
After the first draft, in line with the structure of LOCE, the fieldnotes passed again 
through this analysis whilst they were re-read in order to ensure that the main topics 
of influence to risk management practices conceptualisation were embraced by this 
research. Finally, after the final version of the empirics, the fieldnotes were analysed 
following the same process, bringing even more quotations and details which 
confirmed the outcomes of this study. Overall, I conducted the analyses following an 
iterative process grounded in empirical data and theoretical support. 
It is important to clarify that this research was a product of the situation found in the 
field. In the first stage, Chapter 2, 3 and 4 provided just a generic overview of the 
Brazilian financial system and regulatory context and paradigmatic positions adopted 
in the research of risk that could have an influence on risk management practices. 
Henceforth, after the data collection and first round of analysis, the theoretical part 
of this thesis was revised completely. The empirical analysis was again re-examined 
and the uncovering of new gaps drove further reviews in the conceptualisation of the 
theory, literature about risk management and the impacts of the imposition of risk 
management regulations in Brazil. At the end, I tidied up chapters and sections in 
order to provide a framework that could properly demonstrate the problems faced in 
practice and theoretically about the conceptualisation of risk and risk management 
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culture. Ultimately, this thesis is a result of my fieldwork, previous experiences and 
readings about risk and risk management practices. The next section explains my 
awareness, role and potential influence during the fieldwork. 
 
5.5. Reflexivity  
Firstly, it is worth recognising that my relations in the field under study constantly 
and directly influenced this research, and thus, that the idea of reflexivity is 
important to comprehend this investigation. According to Riach (2009), reflexivity 
tends to emphasise and give greater awareness to and acknowledge the role of the 
researcher in the construction of knowledge. It puts the researcher at the epicentre of 
discussion, as social phenomena are produced through social interactions involving 
social actors and the research itself (Riach, 2009). For that reason, I adopted an 
active voice while writing this thesis, understanding that I was an active part of the 
study, and the results presented here would not be separate from my life story, 
choices and participation in the field.  
In regard to the validity of my findings, reflexivity is one of the characteristics that 
give coherence to qualitative research. Following Gibbs’ (2008) suggestions, I 
critically acknowledged my role in all phases of the research; described previous 
experience; evaluated the data critically, included issues related to the interaction 
with respondents; and focused on the story that different voices tell, and not just 
those who hold higher power or support my way of seeing the world. Consequently, 
I was constantly aware of these aspects, and this multitude of perspectives is further 
presented not only in this section, but throughout the development of this research. 
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It is important to mention that this is only one of many possible ways of rendering 
the social reality encountered in the BrazBank. My research, then, ‘offers ‘readings’ 
not ‘observations’, ‘interpretations’ not ‘findings’ (Rosenau, 1992: 8) about risk 
construction and risk management practices in the BrazBank studied. Even though I 
recognise that this leaves us with an acute sense of uncertainty, however, I think it is 
important to represent the fluid flow and relativity of explanations. Thus, this 
research provides a plausible representation of risk construction. Nonetheless, 
considering the dynamic of our modern world, I accept that, as Heraclitus said, it is 
impossible to step into the same river twice, because tools, practices, institutions, 
organisations and actors are in constant movement and changing. 
Problematising and questioning the permanent characteristics of anything, I critique 
‘realist tales’ as there is no objective reality out there waiting to be revealed to and 
uncovered by social scientists (Van Maanen, 1988, Crotty, 1998). Similarly, Denzin 
(1994: 296) has problematised the authority to explain reality, arguing that 
descriptions ‘can never be a final, accurate representation of what was meant or said, 
but only different textual representations of different experiences’. Thus, throughout 
this research, the mantra was:  
not one ‘voice’, but polyvocality; not one history, but many tales, dramas, 
pieces of fiction, fables, memories, histories, autobiographies, poems, and other 
texts to inform our sense of life ways, to extend our understanding of the Other 
(Lincoln and Denzin, 1994: 584). 
This is coherent with post-structuralism, as it focuses on marginal voices suppressed 
by political power and interests. This ‘requires a fundamental re-questioning of what 
is knowable in a given context’ and taken-for-granted beliefs (Riach, 2009: 359). 
Hence, reflexivity is exercised during, as well as after research. This entails 
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sensitivity to cultural, political and social context and reflection about my identity in 
time and space. 
For that reason, writing predominantly in the first person, I seek to reveal my 
identity through the text in order to emphasise the point that the ethnographic text is 
constructed through my stance assumed in relation to the observed and explaining 
my experiential writing strategies, seeking to achieve post-structuralist reflexivity 
(Kondon, 1990). I was constantly aware of my position as an observer-author and 
reflecting on the implications of the methods, values, bias, and decisions chosen to 
study the social world and how my personal experience and implicit assumptions, 
affect this investigation. That is the reason for reflecting about my background. 
 
5.5.1. Positioning myself as a researcher 
It is worth mentioning that my professional experiences probably had great relevance 
on the development of this research. Since 2006, I have been working with risk 
management, mainly as a consultant. I have participated in consulting projects for 
financial and non-financial companies, working in the public and private sector for-
profit and not-for-profit organisations and in themes related to areas, such as 
organisational performance improvement focus, particularly, on the improvement in 
managerial accounting, internal controls, information systems and governance 
corporate. I have also worked with issues related to risk management and its 
interaction with comptrollership, audit, corporate governance, environmental 
management, business planning, financial literacy and cognitive biases. During the 
course of these activities, I intuitively developed skills related to the conduct of 
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interviews, observation of organisational activities and interactions between 
organisational actors as well as analysis of documents related to the improvement of 
organisational process and reduction of operational risks. 
These experiences also enable my faster adaptation in different organisational 
settings, as I have been regularly working with different hierarchical levels and with 
people with different responsibilities, from strategic to operational issues. All 
feedback obtained from directors and managers over these periods of consultancy 
highlighted how my friendliness is helpful to obtain quick adaptation to 
organisational sites and cause minimal disturbance in the activities of employees, 
respecting their work routines. Accordingly, while conducting this ethnographic 
study, I followed the norms of the community in the BrazBank and was aware of 
local preconceptions about factors over which I have no control (e.g. gender, race 
and age preconceptions) (Angronino, 2007).  
Throughout those years, my focus in this consultancy work was on improving 
organisational performance, concentrating on the interaction between people and 
accounting management tools, but in this research, I recognise that I need to 
maintain my critical awareness in order to identify political interests in the context 
under study. Here, again, I believe that my personal characteristics were 
indispensable and a key element in this fieldwork, as I have always appreciated the 
importance of personal motivation and how people interacted with accounting 
management tools that were available in their work rather than only technical aspects 
related to these techniques.  
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Furthermore, as a Brazilian, it is also a huge responsibility to risk exposing an image 
that could undermine the reputation of Brazilian institutions. For that reason, and 
respecting the Bank Secrecy Act promulgated by Brazilian Complementary Law 
105/2001, which states the duty and obligation of financial institutions to safeguard 
the data of their customers, I preserved the anonymity and confidentiality of all 
participants, as well as the institution and its customers. I acknowledge that, on this 
site, there was also a risk of improper use of financial resources and corruption; 
however, it is not the aim of this research to investigate this kind of problem. 
Therefore, if any vestige of these practices was noticed during this research, they 
were ignored, as their disclosure could cause harm to me as a researcher and the 
participants involved. According to Brazilian law, any disclosure about such matters 
could represent a legal obligation of the researcher to prove in Court the existence of 
such misconduct. Thus, if even during the interviews, participants might have started 
to talk about it, I stopped them and advised them of the legal implications of this 
kind of information. In sum, ethical concerns were crucial in this research, as the 
following section expounds. 
 
5.5.2. Ethical Concerns about this Research 
Whilst working with people and organisations I continually considered aspects 
related to the safety of participants and the organisation as a whole, since the 
information reported in research can harm people’s lives and the reputation of 
organisations. Thus, although my intention as a researcher is to bring practical and 
theoretical contributions, I have always respected the ethical boundaries of this 
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quest. Consequently, researchers cannot, under any circumstances, harm participants 
and the main attention of this investigation was directed to this.  
Prior to beginning my fieldwork, I signed a memorandum of commitment with the 
BrazBank in which I assured the ethical and confidentiality considerations of this 
research. Moreover, before any interview, I announced to the participants that they 
were involved in academic research, so that there was no connection with any kind 
of consulting or the researcher’s intention to join the organisation, as they often 
asked that. 
Furthermore, before all the interviews, I requested permission from the interviewee 
to record the conversation. However, following recommendations from my 
informant and in accordance with the organisational culture, I observed that the 
interviewees usually did not feel comfortable with the recording and this was 
creating a bias in the answers provided. The interviewees usually revealed conflicts 
and politics only after the interview had finished and the recording stopped. Some of 
them also expressed that they would not confirm this kind of information afterwards, 
but allowed me to use it in the research. For that reason, I decided to take brief notes 
during the sessions and fill them out with other comments at the end of the 
interview. This proved to be a better approach, enalbling me to receive more reliable 
information. It is worth mentioning that I was constantly aware of the necessity to 
pay attention to the respondent during each interview, especially, because many 
notes during the interview could also cause embarrassment to the respondent and 
affect the flow of this procedure and the information obtained. Therefore, I sought 
always to maintain eye contact with the interviewees in order to keep them more 
comfortable and confident in our relationship. At the end of each interview, I 
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recapitulated some points and after I had transcribed the interviews, the respondents 
had the opportunity to review some statements and correct any misinterpretations.  
Complementarily, at the end of each interview, I emphasised that participants had the 
option to delete the recording or notes and not take part in the research, but there was 
no case of withdrawal. Furthermore, the respondents were also given one month to 
communicate any concerns about the transcriptions. Thus, after that period had 
expired, I assumed that the respondent agreed with the information provided and 
with the interview.  
Related to the confidentiality of the records made in the field, no other member of 
the organisation had access to the information discussed during the interviews. 
Throughout this research, only I had access to interviews records and field notes. In 
all my field notes, I did not use names or nicknames, but only code letters and 
numbers. Regularly, after the working hours in the bank, I typed the field notes into 
the computer. Once a week, I stored all the data into my computer with a password 
and destroyed all my paper records. The data was always kept transcribed with 
codes, whilst the codes were kept separate from the data and stored in another 
document with a different password. Moreover, the recordings and field notes from 
this thesis used for working papers will be archived (without identification) for five 
years in a secure place to ensure the accuracy of this research if it is needed, while 
other records and field notes will be destroyed after one year from project 
completion. 




In this chapter, I showed how this research was conducted and the implications of 
the paradigm, methodology and methods chosen. As a result, I showed that:  
a) Methodology: the Logic of Critical Explanation of Glynos and Howarth 
(2007) permits the use of the Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe (2001) 
in empirical studies through the use of problematisation, retroduction 
embracing social, politic, and fantasmatic logics, articulation, and critical 
analysis. This allows the study of ‘risk’ as a current problem and the 
comprehension of what those practices are and how and why they emerged 
and were contested and maintained in this particular case. 
b) Methods: the critical ethnographic approach permits a profound 
understanding of the organisational culture of risk management through in-
depth immersion in the BrazBank activities. Here, this method was supported 
by participant observations and interviews which allowed the exploration of a 
large amount of information about risk management practices, but also 
comparing what actors said and what they did. Furthermore, document 
analysis enabled the historical analysis of sedimented practices and how they 
had arisen, presenting concerns about what people do and what they should 
do. In sum, this sheds light on how controls work in practice. 
c) Analysis: the analyses were conducted considering dislocation and rhetorical 
redescription. These analytical tools focused on contradictions and radical 
contingencies which made explicit the limitations of risk management 
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discourse and how powerful actors rhetorically cover over these limitations in 
sedimenting practices and during contestations respectively.  
This chapter also elucidated the steps taken while conducting the work in the field, 
and how this involved changes from the original plan. This whole explanation was 
helpful to understand the execution of critical ethnographic approaches in 
organisational fieldwork and develop a comprehension of the advantages and 
limitations of each method. I pointed out the importance of the reflexivity and the 
influence that I, as a researcher, have in this kind of investigation. Finally, the last 
section shows the ethical implications of this research and the actions employed to 
minimise any undesirable impact from it. The next chapter focuses on the empirical 
analysis of this research and shows the results of this examination.  
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– CHAPTER SIX – 
 




This is the first of my three empirical chapters presented to analyse the construction 
of risk in practice. Given the rationale developed thus far, this chapter explores the 
regimes of practices that characterise risk management in the BrazBank according to 
internal and external perspectives. Therefore, considering elements proposed by DT 
and the LOCE, in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, this chapter examines the 
discourses that made possible the reproduction of the discourse of ‘risk’ and ‘risk 
management’ in the BrazBank. This allows the description of the BrazBank’s actual 
practices of risk management, responding to the following questions: What is the 
influence and impact of international regulations of risk management in the 
BrazBank? How has this international conceptualisation of risk influenced macro-, 
meso- and micro-articulation of risk and risk management practices? What does risk 
do in the BrazBank? What are the politics involved in its sedimented practices? 
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In Chapter 2, risk management was considered as an imperialist discourse that has 
been inadequate and harmful to BDBs. Thus, here, it is important to show the 
influence of international regulation (Basel Accord, COSO, governance structures, 
etc.) on the BrazBank. This picture provides a rubric to understand how the practices 
of risk emerged in this particular site and where risk came from, highlighting 
influences on how risk was understood and implemented at this site.  
Chapter 3 exposed disputes around risk and risk-management discourse, which from 
a positivist perspective is considered as a universal, objective and neutral concept, 
but in reality, represents a social, with multi-layered practice. This chapter, then, 
confirms relations of power and politics in the proposition and construction of 
accounting techniques which set boundaries to risk and the definition of risk 
management. For that reason, the social logics presented here consider the genuine 
BrazBank’s internal practices of risk at meso- and micro-level, answering Borraz’s 
(2012) comment on the current obscurity in the understanding of risk management 
practices and its actual meaning.  
This chapter acknowledges the importance of risk’s frames and structures, but also 
the immense complexity and dynamics of risk-management practices, characterised 
by the mobile and flexible paths of our liquid modern world (Bauman, 2013). Thus, 
considering the DT perspective embraced in Chapter 4, this chapter aims to 
comprehend how the contradictions between the normative and functional side of 
risk, i.e. ‘what risk should do’ and ‘what risk actually does’, were translated into 
BrazBank’s risk-management practices. Consequently, narrowing my analysis to the 
BrazBank, this chapter examines ‘what risk is’, ‘what risk does’ and ‘how risk 
management practices were used’ in this context. This chapter makes claims about a 
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rhetorical construction of risk in decision-making practices and the existence of 
power imbalances in risk constructions.  
In short, this chapter contextualises risk-management practices in the BrazBank, 
exposing the differences between external disclosures and internal conflicts around 
risk management. After that, it explores the heterogeneity in risk discourse, 
considering risk as contextual, articulated differently by different groups. 
Additionally, it exposes divergences in cross-departmental and hierarchical 
perspectives about risk, and how they were used to maintain, but also to challenge 
actors’ dominant positions. Finally, it exposes how international regulatory 
frameworks provide an ideological cover for risk management practices and experts 
in the BrazBank, so that risk actual management constructions and practices were 
kept secret, to sustain claims of expertise and power imbalances.  
 
6.2. BrazBank Risk Practices to Outsiders 
My first contact with the BrazBank’s risk-management practices started three 
months before the fieldwork. Consequently, in the first stage of the research, I 
pondered upon the external disclosures related to risk management and examined the 
BrazBank’s accounting reports, website, academic materials, corporate videos, etc. 
These disclosures were analysed as archives, which provided me with an 
understanding of not only of practices of risk management in the BrazBank, but also 
and most importantly, about how the BrazBank wants to portray itself and its risk-
management practices.  
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6.2.1. Introducing the BrazBank 
The BrazBank represents an important institution in Brazilian history. It has 
contributed to macro-governmental goals as well as guidelines for public policy, 
representing a complementary mechanism to tax incentives offered by the state. It 
has a particular focus on projects located outside metropolitan areas to promote 
integrated and sustainable economic and social development. It therefore supports 
government development projects through funding to private companies and 
government agents operating in several areas such: education, infrastructure, 
hospitals, agriculture, industry, and machinery. Its funding covers a range of projects 
that could vary in value from hundreds (microcredit) to billions (World Cup 
Stadiums) of Brazilian Reais.  
The BrazBank supplies credit to working capital, fixed assets, and joint investments. 
For instance, the working capital is directed to company’s operations, such as 
purchasing goods, raw materials, training and inventory replenishment, 
administrative expenses, etc. The bank also delivers funding for fixed assets, such as 
the purchase of machinery and equipment, construction, facilities and installations, 
vehicles, furniture and fixtures and other items required to run a company. Joint 
investments finance both permanent assets and working capital. Finally, government 
institutions have access to special credit lines to facilitate infrastructure construction, 
acquisition of heavy machinery, trucks, ambulances and other equipment.  
Throughout its history, this bank has applied public savings and promoted the 
development, modernisation, and expansion of infrastructure, agribusiness, tourism, 
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services, education, transport, trade and restoration of the historical heritage site, 
opening new avenues of development. For instance, it helped to establish and 
decentralise industrial centres in several towns and modify the urban and economic 
landscape, with the construction of dams, roads, and airports. It also supported 
irrigation projects, flood prevention and water treatment networks and distribution. 
Beyond this, the bank works on projects aimed at providing funding and support for 
small and micro entrepreneurs, something expensive and scarce in Brazil. The 
following section analyses the BrazBank’s risk-management structure. 
 
6.2.2. Risk Management in the BrazBank 
Risk Management in the BrazBank complies with the regulations of the National 
Monetary Council (CMN) and Brazilian Central Bank (BCB), following the 
structure suggested by the BIS and COSO, which supported the definition of its 
internal policies, structure and procedures. Financial scandals around the world 
heightened the importance of risk management, which assumed a prominent position 
in the BrazBank. Considering the influences of the Basel Accords and consecutive 
training from three of the Big 4 consultancy firms, the BrazBank followed a global 
trend toward efficiency and transparency, directing its focus on continuous 
improvement in the measurement of risks, complemented by internal controls and 
criteria for allocation of capital.  
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Risk-Management Structure 
Following BIS’s sound practices for risk management, the BCB’s risk management 
regulation states that ‘the structure [including models and control procedures] of risk 
management must be compatible with the nature of operations and complexity of 
products and services offered’ (BCB, 2006a: Art. 2). This statement means that 
Brazilian banks with complex operations must present more extensive risk-
management structures and robust controls. Banks with simple operations, or 
operations less relevant for the institution, on the other hand, can dispense with these 
more complex models. In short, this guideline has to do with the premise of the 
relationship between the cost and benefit of frameworks of control. The intricate but 
barely challenged problem is related to the way of determining which risk structure 
would be the most appropriate to the complexity and size of each institution. Is there 
a list of risk management procedures that are more sophisticated, for instance ‘X’, to 
be applied to an organisation ‘Y’ size with ‘Z’ complexity? If not, how is the proper 
structure determined? Given these questions, I interviewed two BCB managers to see 
how the regulatory body balances these practices. One of them could not explain to 
me how the process works in practice because he did not work in this particular 
sector, but the other answered that:  
There are no objective criteria for such assessment. It fits into what we call 
‘professional judgment’. In theory, it is a value judgment, common sense. It 
depends on each situation. The orientation is only a guideline that can be used 
by the regulator to require an increase in risk and control management structure 
(BCB Manager, 2013). 
This subjectivity implicit in these ‘professional judgments’ was never clear to me, 
and certainly not to those outside BCB. Indeed, this vagueness in the regulation 
allows flexibility in its application and requirements without compromising BCB’s 
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power. Following the pre-requisites of the recognisable Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM) approach, thus, the BrazBank opted to have a single department responsible 
for risk management, but with segregated units working with credit and market risks 
and another one with operational risks. Inside the risk management department, the 
structure was composed of one senior manager, two managers, four analysts and two 
interns. However, the bank claimed to have integrated risk-management practices, 
reinforced by the subordination of these risk management units to a single manager 
and department, as its disclosures showed:  
The BrazBank opted for a single body responsible for risk management, 
segregating, however, the credit risk activities and market operational risk 
activities, though both are subject to the same hierarchy. This format evidenced 
a commitment to the best corporate governance practices and compliance with 
the rules of segregation of duties that clearly define responsibilities between the 
decision activities, execution, and control throughout the organization (emphasis 
added).  
In this disclosure, therefore, the bank reinforced its commitment to the ‘best 
practices’ of corporate governance, compliance, transparency, and integration. This 
rhetoric is also used to explain the development of a culture of controls and periodic 
risk assessments. The adoption of these practices has less to do with actual dangers 
and more to do with the prestige and legitimacy of this organisation (Power, 2007). 
The disclosure frequently emphasises that this structure supposedly provides this 
bank with a secure means of addressing risks, setting continuous procedures for 
monitoring ‘adherence’ to internal norms, policies and regulations, ‘minimising 
incidents’ and ‘optimising resources’ to support these unforeseen events. The 
rhetoric suggests that risk management practices ensure the ‘safety’ and 
‘transparency’ of operations by ‘continuously monitoring’ the risks and controls in 
order to reduce the likelihood that risks would materialise, or mitigate their impacts. 
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The focus on critical activities portrays risk management as a ‘competitive advantage 
tool’, which increases the ‘productivity’ of the audit and the ‘security’ of 
documentation, reducing management failures and operational incidents as well as 
frauds and operational losses.  
To summarise, from outside, the practices in the BrazBank seem to follow a 
structure applicable to any financial institution. Disclosures explicitly refer to the 
international frameworks of COSO and BIS. The structure emphasises acceptable 
limits defined by senior managers, continual review of risks and associated internal 
controls with a cost-benefit focus and minimisation of potential conflicts of interest 
through segregation of duties. From outside, the bank emphasises that managers 
have a clear understanding of their role in risk management processes and objectives, 
which ensure that recommendations are properly implemented aligned with the risk 
culture and appetite grand-narratives, and receiving support from the Board. The 
following sections, however, will demonstrate the fallacies in this structure. First, 
however, it is necessary to provide more details about how risk-management 




According to BrazBank’s disclosures, the Credit and Market Risk Unit (CMRU) 
monitors, calculates, and analyses the market risk, providing information to decision-
making regarding capital allocation. These practices are associated with asset 
volatility. The bank adopted the VaR parametric as its methodology applied to all 
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operations sensitive to changes in interest rates. The impact of economic changes 
was measured by stress testing and analysis of portfolio behaviour in scenarios of 
crisis or adverse changes. These measurements also provided inputs to review of 
procedures and criteria for capital adequacy.  
These risk-management practices within BrazBank have historically been driven by 
changes in BCB’s regulations, followed by Big 4 consultancy and training. For 
instance, the analysis of credit grants follows the principle of diversification 
proposed by Markowitz (1991) of an acceptable risk level and optimal portfolio to 
maximise returns. For that reason, risk is conceptualised as a standard deviation of 
probability distribution and analysis of credit risk focuses on the likelihood of 
undesirable events (i.e., default or payment delays) through the “six C’s” of credit 
analysis
14
. Thus, many statistical tests such as Monte Carlo analysis, stress tests and 
scenarios designed by Delphi methodology or VaR analysis complement each other 
and are used to examine portfolio and market risks. Although all these procedures 
supposedly follow a highly technical and rational model, a missing point might be 
that the scenarios are adjusted according to suggestions from members of the group 
responsible for its implementation.  
                                                 
 
 
14 Character, capability of management, capital, collateral issues, conditions and conglomerate.  
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During this fieldwork, the bank was also searching for benchmarks to implement 
new Basel III requirements. However, it was important to focus on more sedimented 
practices, such as how the operational risk management was organised.  
 
Operational Risks 
The BCB’s Resolution N. 3.380/06 recommended the management of operational 
risk as a regulatory requirement to BDBs. It also includes the legal risk associated 
with inadequacy or deficiency in contracts signed by the institution, as well as 
statutory provisions and compensation for damages to third parties. Following 
process flow-charts, the risk management of BrazBank includes all activities of the 
BrazBank under this heading according to the similarity of risks associated with 
strategic, operational, reporting, information and compliance categories suggested by 
the COSO. This structure ensures the security and transparency of operations, with 
risks and controls monitored continuously in order to mitigate risk’s impact or 
reduce the likelihood that risks will materialise. Furthermore, disclosure emphasises 
how risk management represents a competitive advantage tool, which provides 
information to executives, but also integrates the areas of reducing failures, 
operational losses and frauds and increases the productivity of auditing activities. In 
short, in the BrazBank, risk management is described as continuous, following ‘best 
practices’ and involving quantitative and qualitative assessments.  
According to BrazBank reports, risk management is also one of the components of 
BrazBank’s transparency along with performance, social responsibility, PPP’s 
Accountability, Code of Conduct and Ethics, and Disclosures. The risk management 
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inside BrazBank comprises ‘best practices’ methodologies and structures of proper 
internal controls and operational, market and credit risk management which again 
received the support from international acknowledged Big 4 consultancies.  
Overall, therefore, the structured disclosure by the BrazBank seems perfectly 
coherent with international standards and best practices of risk management. Its 
continuous improvements also reinforce that BrazBank is committed to keeping its 
practices close to the ‘state of the art’. However, what is the real impact of the 
rationality of risk discourse for BrazBank practices? The following section sheds 
light on one of the impacts observed during my fieldwork. 
 
6.2.3. Risky Macro-Impacts: Constraining the Social Logic of Development 
Moving into inside practices, the first aspect of BrazBank’s risk management 
practices that drew my attention at the beginning of the fieldwork was the 
abandonment of a tool used to measure the social development potential of projects 
funded by the BrazBank. The ‘Social Index’ considered the Fiscal Responsibility 
Law and the Tax Reform started in 2000 in Brazil and proposed the encouragement 
of a shifting decentralisation that would develop rural areas in the Brazilian 
economy. This index encouraged projects that increase jobs, environmental 
awareness and economic development outside the capital. However, whilst I was 
analysing previous norms of risk management in this bank, I observed that this 
instrument was mentioned in internal standards at one point in time, but suddenly it 
was abandoned without any justification. Searching for explanations from members 
of the bank, I found a manager who told me that:  
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The [Social Index] is no longer used because throughout the implementation 
process, it was observed that projects that had a good ability to pay back [the 
funding] might not be accepted because of their adherence rate [to the Social 
Index]. So there is still this discussion on the social and economic role of credit, 
but we should not approve funding for a client that has no capability to pay, 
because if we only grant [credit] to the customer what is most interesting from a 
social point of view, the institution could not [financially] sustain itself. Thus, 
[credit grant] goes missing exactly for who will need. Unfortunately, the best 
projects are in places that are not the best from a social point of view, so close to 
the capital or in regions already developed. However, those are projects that pass 
on the credit rating [of risk analyses], which actually have the capability to 
payback. So, there is no point in using this index that will cut precisely these 
projects in the framing, even before the payment analysis be carried out. 
[Manager S, emphasis added] 
The quotation above confirmed the clash between the social aim of BDBs and the 
economic logic of risk. It highlighted that the decision about what might be included 
or excluded from risk assessments in the BrazBank was determined by the economic 
logic proposed by international regulations. To this extent, this proposition opposes 
the social role of development banks (see Section 2.3.2), with incommensurable 
impacts on inclusive social development for the Brazilian population. Consequently, 
international risk regulation works to confine acceptable or prohibited risk 
constructions in the BrazBank. Ultimately, the logic of development is constrained 
by the logic of risk, which is driven by a purely economic logic. Therefore, the rules 
about what risk should be are crucial to the construction of risk in the BrazBank and 
influence how risk is understood and implemented in this context.  
In sum, although the bank acknowledges the importance of a holistic view and other 
metrics beyond financial ones, it is still driven by this economic logic of risk. For 
instance, it has adopted a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) – legitimated as ‘the 
methodology used by most companies today’ – in its strategic planning and focus on 
enhancing professionalism, human capital, transparency, customer service, 
commitment to development. Indeed, this reinforces a broader view of BrazBank 
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practices and confirms its mission of ‘offering financial and technical solutions to 
improve the lives of the population’, whereas the diagram used to represent each 
BSC perspective shows that the financial aspect should be only a small fraction of 
BrazBank’s attention. Nonetheless, BrazBank’s performance index reveals the 
contradictory measures of performance, as all metrics use the increment in credit 
grant volume as a target, instead of other criteria, such as the quality of credit and 
services provided. Consequently, this economic shifting proposed by the prudence 
regulation, which drives BrazBank’s practices, had internal implications that will be 
further understood in the following sections.  
 
6.3. Risk Management inside Practices 
Although risk-management practices in the BrazBank could be considered 
standardised from outside, following the same ‘best practices’ promoted by COSO 
and BIS in their guidelines, which were further disseminated by consultancy groups 
worldwide, a deeper understanding of these practices shows that they were not 
homogeneous as was initially supposed. In external disclosures, risk-management 
practices were disseminated following some logics, ratified by signifieds which 
reinforced their universality, using terms like ‘efficient’, ‘objective’, ‘best practices’ 
and ‘worldwide use’. However, at the beginning of my fieldwork, I observed that the 
BrazBank was passing through a period of organisational crisis in relation to its risk 
management practices, and there were many contestations taking place, showing 
contingencies in the hegemony of these ‘universal’ risk management practices that 
had previously been taken for granted. It is noteworthy that this crisis was not 
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evident to external users. Thus, the following sections contextualise the social logics 
used to maintain risk management practices while exposing the internal battle around 
risk management hegemony. Instead of a normalised discourse, this section reveals 
how the hegemonic discourse of risk management was both supported and contested 
in practice. However, first, I need to contextualise this battle by illustrating the 
hierarchical structure of power in the BrazBank. 
 
6.3.1. Into the ‘Battle’-Field: Contextualising the Battle 
The BrazBank is a hierarchal organisation with a clear segregation between the work 
and the space of analysts, managers, and directors. Analysts typically occupy stalls, 
arranged in a certain way, such that they have their backs to each other, and face the 
computer, usually in a way that they can observe who is coming in or out, as they 
commonly explained. This instrument of control has harassed analysts even if it is 
used to reduce inefficiency and keep their focus on work
15
.  




 Foucault (1991) proposed the idea that the power of controlling mechanisms was not in their physical or nature 
or the efficiency of their practices, but in the ideological constraining that they impose on the minds of the 
oppressed individuals. As a Panopticon where the prisoner cannot know when the vigilant/guard is observing its 
movements or not, the control is obtained by the sneaky feeling that mystifies control, while gives ideological 
and omnipresence characteristics to controlling mechanisms. Therefore, the disposition of the stalls in the 
BrazBank followed the same logic of as Panopticon, as the analysts never know when a manager or director will 
come through the door and observe that they are doing something unrelated to their work, even if for just a few 
minutes. 
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Nevertheless, after a few weeks
16
, I started to see differences between the idealised 
control and the actual one, as even if most of the time each analyst was in hers or his 
stalls facing the computer, they were not always working. Phones were on hand and 
in use. Other websites were on display. However, if someone looked from outside 
the work seemed to be incessant. As analysts could see each other’s screens, thus, 
turned back in their stalls, they made a tacit agreement to resist this supervisory 
control. On the other hand, managers’ work cannot be questioned so easily, as they 
sit facing the door and with their backs to their windows. 
Room space, as well as the quality and comfort of seats, were elements of 
hierarchical distinction. Directors had closed rooms with two tables, one for them 
and another larger one with six chairs for small meetings. Managers have particular 
rooms with large tables, usually featuring two chairs to enable them to discuss the 
work of analysts, but also to meet (friends) managers from other departments who 
seek information. Analysts have their stalls, as exposed above. Therefore, space and 
privacy were also elements that represent status and power in the BrazBank. 
Opened doors, moreover, do not mean free access, or an informal hierarchy. The 
hierarchical process of communication followed a specific route. To speak with an 
analyst, firstly, it was necessary to inform the manager and ask for his permission. 




 Perhaps because the analysts were more comfortable with my presence and forgot that they were being 
observed. 
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He would indicate the hour and date most appropriate in the schedule. To talk with 
managers, it was necessary to inform the director. I observed this in my first weeks, 
as even if conversations at the same hierarchical levels, as among analysts and their 
managers, were held informally, in many cases, an email or a quick phone call was a 
prerequisite before any conversation.  
This scheme seems to be a controversial legacy of new public management (NPM) 
approaches which would promote the professionalisation of BrazBank’s activities 
(see Chapter 2). According to older employees, however, this current organisational 
environment generated nostalgia for the ‘days when people freely circulated in the 
bank and could enter without asking for permission to talk with friends’. The 
meaning ascribed to these practices was not homogenous, as following this NPM 
logic, other analysts and managers considered this an important feature to promote a 
‘professional environment’, reporting cases of abuse of freedom that reinforced the 
necessity of more rigorous internal controls. Overall, the general feeling among 
analysts about the intensity of current monitoring mechanisms could be summarised 
in the following statement:  
You used to be able to make your own personal schedule. There were people 
who came at eight [a.m. and official time for bank operation], and people who 
arrived at nine, ten […] Nonetheless, there were some individuals who "crossed 
the line". Now everything has changed, and we live in this prison with ‘the 
turnstile’ and timesheet. You cannot be one minute late; you have to justify any 
absence, even if you go to the doctor, you need to bring a medical certificate. 
(Analyst1, 2013) 
The turnstile and timesheet reflected initial attempts towards more control in the 
BrazBank. What is interesting is the movement towards the naturalisation of these 
internal controls in BrazBank. Internal controls were initially implemented in such a 
way that they would fit into the pre-existing cultural beliefs (Ruef, 2000; Suddaby 
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and Greenwood, 2005). For instance, the first change in the control configuration 
was the implementation of ‘the turnstile’. Older employees argued that in the 
beginning ‘the turnstile’ was just an ‘instrument of measurement’, but later became 
an ‘instrument of control and imposition’. ‘The turnstile’ gave managers a tool to 
monitor employees’ work time and verify if employees were following their time-
schedule. Nonetheless, it quickly became a mandatory control for all analysts. 
Ultimately, this flexibility in time ended up representing another hierarchical 
distinction between analysts, managers and directors, while managers have greater 
flexibility in the time-schedule, analysts no longer benefit from this flexibility, and 
this commonly frustrated the latter.  
After several years, nevertheless, the BrazBank went through an unprecedented 
institutional crisis, which generated ‘dissatisfaction’ among employees, 
demonstrations and annual strikes
17
 that gained more adherents each year. During 
debates about a strike, the previous director compared BrazBank’s employees with 
Neymar, a Brazilian footballer considered one of the best in the world, and implying 
someone demanding special treatment. An analyst said:  
According to him [director], there was no space for ‘Neymars’ here, and anyone 
[who didn’t like it] could look for a better place. This Board’s speech has 
resonated repeatedly since then. 
                                                 
 
 
17 Banks’ Strikes in Brazil are common and happened every year. However, development banks for a long time 
did not take part into these demonstrations. 
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 This analogy caused demotivation among staff, and the BrazBank lost many of its 
most capable employees to both private and public institutions. There was an attempt 
by the current Board of Directors to reverse this situation and regain the trust of 
analysts and managers. They developed programmes of ‘Capital Appreciation’ and 
‘Coffee with the Directors’ (meetings when analysts could talk with directors, which 
in my view in itself demonstrated a barrier between these levels)
18
. However, these 
initiatives were regarded as ‘empty speeches’, as ‘there is a lot of chat and few 
changes’ and ‘no concrete improvement is made to meet employees’ requests’ 
(Analyst B). This quotation highlights the struggles and contestations around the 
new controls and risk management mechanisms. 
In this context, during my fieldwork, the situation of risk management did not seem 
to be much better. There was a loss of credibility in this discourse and risk 
committee meetings resembled a war. In fact, the discussion about risk was so 
named within the bank. In some cases, other managers expressly decried the 
importance of risk management, causing frustration among members of the risk 
department, who need cooperation to develop their operational risk analysis (Mikes, 
2014).  
                                                 
 
 
18 The‘Coffee with the Directors’ was a response to the lack of communication channels between 
management and workforce verified by the Organisational Climate Survey (OCS) held in the second half of 
2012. The OCS exposed that ‘The employees did not feel heard, and there was little room to participate in 
decisions, which created a climate of dissatisfaction’. 
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The risk management inside BrazBank moved from a comfort zone in which it was 
depicted as ‘important’, ‘necessary’ and a ‘good’ gatekeeper to determine projects 
that must be accepted or rejected, to become merely regulatory compliance, jumbled 
with re-auditing. Nonetheless, asserting risk management’s importance to 
compliance and security, risk experts emphasised the objectivity, while they 
obscured the subjectivity, in their analyses and kept risk management practices 
almost a ‘secret’
19
. Hence, to understand risk construction and how different 
discourses and conflicts marked the formation of risk management practices in 
BrazBank, it is important to analyse current practices and the interaction between 
actors and risk management practices. 
The following sections show different elements used in the maintenance and 
articulation of risk-management discourse. The discussion highlights, initially, the 
hegemonic discourse of risk according to the internal viewpoint in the RMD, but 
also shows divergences and contestations from other departments. Although the 
Social Logic usually portrays homogenous, sedimented and naturalised practices of 
risk management, the ambience inside the bank was full of contrast and disputes, so 
it is hard to show risk as a fully closed and consensual process. Thus, this chapter 
focuses more on the actual risk management practices within BrazBank rather than 
                                                 
 
 
19 This secret was selectively revealed by some members in credit grants departments as a way to have projects 
accepted.  
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on risk’s theoretical and ideal conventionalisation. It shows how regulatory 
statements, consultants’ suggestions and international guidelines or benchmarks 
must be adapted to fit in different contexts. Therefore, it confirms the contradictions 
between formal discourses of ‘what risk is’ and its practices, which express ‘what 
risk does’. The following sections represent some of those elements that were 
identified in actors’ discourse. 
 
6.3.2. Social Logics of Risk in the BrazBank 
The Social Logic of Solution from ‘Best practices’ 
The idea of risk management was conveyed as the solution to the BrazBank’s 
organisational problems. Risk management practices were implemented with the 
support of Big 4 consulting groups, which reinforced the internalisation of an idea 
that universal solutions coming from outside can be bought to solve all problems. 
The rhetoric of these large transnational consultancies – Deloitte, PwC, KPMG, 
EandY – is supported by a self-claimed supposedly
20
 worldwide experience 
associated with these companies’ names. Thus, they introduced risk management as 
                                                 
 
 
20 I use ‘supposedly’ in this case, because the majority of employees in the Big 4 are inexperienced and underpaid 
junior consultants who are supervised by more mature managers, but that usually receive better opportunities in 
other companies after some years of experience and use the Big 4 as a springboard.  
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‘best practices’ which were ‘used worldwide’ and that must be developed targeting a 
‘state of the art’. In sum, risk models were sold as ‘magic formulas’ with which to 
think about and manage organisations, as if there was a ‘fit-all’ answer to every 
problem faced.  
During this ethnography, I was constantly asked about the ‘solution’ and the ‘right 
path’ to follow, by actors in the BrazBank. I observed that even if I was trying to 
interact with BrazBank’s actors as a learner, my previous experiences as a consultant 
and also as a Ph.D. student from London, had a substantial impact on my 
relationships, especially in the beginning. I was regularly questioned about the 
appropriateness of practices currently adopted by the BrazBank. These were requests 
from risk experts, but also non-experts who wanted to be sure that they were doing 
what they were supposed to do. Even if I did not know much about their practices in 
the first stages of this research, in the course of interviews and informal 
conversations, while individuals were explaining their practices to me, they often 
asked if they were right and if what they were doing was correct. I had avoided 
answering those questions, explaining that the purpose of this research was to learn 
about their practices, but they frequently asked me, ‘At least, tell me if it is the best 
way to do it’ (Manager I, 2013).  
This searching for a ‘universal solution’ reflects positivist propositions of 
predictability, and hence, controllability in organisational practices. The idea of a 
‘solution’ as the right path to follow or the only right thing to do is problematic, as it 
leads people to maintain, and not challenge, self-referential practices that reinforce 
the status quo. The naturalisation of these practices, then, was commonly described 
by members of the BrazBank with the established rhetoric of, ‘this has been always 
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like that’. They excluded alternatives and did not ‘think out of the box’, did not 
believe that something different was possible or even rejected and combatted the 
‘Other’, which seemed different.  
This logic also reinforces the necessity of maintaining a logic of compliance which 
creates a dependence on external validation that could be interpreted in various 
ways. For instance, if an actor had done something wrong or did not deliver an 
expected result, they were, at least, following the rules and policies. Consequently, 
risk management practices provide a feeling of security:  
I think it is useful. [...] There are people who see the risk as an opponent, but I 
believe that the risk is a partner because you are also more secure about your 
work. [...] They stress scenarios, based on debt and other variables, in a way that 
you often cannot and there they can see if something can go wrong. I think it’s 
good, I know the several people do not like it, but for me it is positive. [Manager 
T, 03/12/2013] 
Risk reduces actors’ responsibility for mistakes and possible blame for faults (Spira 
and Page, 2003). Nonetheless, this also represents violence to individuals, who could 
not perceive themselves as agents of change. Manager Y explained, for example, 
how the bank’s operations were constrained by a limited budget for consultancy, 
while requesting to start a public bidding
21
. She frequently argued that she had little 
influence to change BrazBank’s practices, but trusted in the Big 4 to facilitate this.  
                                                 
 
 
21 According to Brazilian Law 8.666/93, governmental purchases must be supported by public biddings.  
235 | P a g e  
 
These findings corroborated Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews’s (2013) critiques of 
countries around the world that are ‘transplanting preconceived and packaged “best 
practice” solutions’; the same is true of organisations. For instance, Rodrik (2008: 
100) notes that best practices ‘presumes it is possible to determine a unique set of 
appropriate institutional arrangements ex-ante and views convergence toward those 
arrangements as inherently desirable’. However, the previous authors argued that this 
facilitates the ‘perpetuation of dysfunctions’ (e.g. the inadequacy of prudence 
regulations to development banks described in Chapter 2.5). Thus, although models 
bring benefits of standardised processes which seem to maintain coherence, they also 
bureaucratise, or ‘burro-cratisa’
22
, administrations. They limit individuals’ power to 
think about alternatives, look outside the box and reinvent, modernise and adapt 
contextual changes to their particular management problems. This construction of 
risk can be considered a new colonisation, or imperialism, and an attempt to 
maintain the hegemony of the Big 4, which alienates and causes a progressive lack 
of reflection within organisational space. The variety of discursive elements used by 
internal risk experts to support this rhetoric in the bank is, thus, the target of the 
following sections.  
                                                 
 
 
22 This is a metaphor used in Portuguese joining donkey (‘burro’, in Portuguese) and bureaucracy (‘burocracia’, 
in Portuguese). This comparison is used to explain the problem with an increasing bureaucracy that transforms 
people and processes in donkeys, considered a blind and silly animal that follows instructions with no 
independent thought. 
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The Social Logic of Independent Practices 
One of the elements that sustained risk management practices in the bank was the 
idea of independent checking practices. Public inefficiencies were cited to support 
the proposition of new public management (NPM) frameworks into government 
institutions and that they must follow the same economic imperative that has driven 
private companies forward. Hence, public institutions were pushed to frame their 
practices according to a proposed marketization of economy. The way to do it was 
reducing the political influences in credit grant analyses, which was to be achieved 
by utilizing an independent critical observer, an expert. According to a manager:  
The risk management ends up being the critical commentator of your work, as in 
a theatre, you present your piece, and then, the risk [management department] 
comes to criticise your work. [...] I think it increases the security of your job. The 
risk ends up giving the assurance that everything is going well. [03/03/2013]  
This independence demonstrates that risk experts were considered masters 
responsible for the quality of the masterpiece. The idea of an outsider viewpoint was, 
then, embraced as something of benefit to the BrazBank. Risk experts were 
perceived to represent someone with a broader knowledge who would come from 
outside to show the pitfalls of the BrazBank’s current practices. This 
conceptualisation of professionalism and expertise sustains the idea of risk as a 
packaged solution, and hence the rhetoric of Big 4 consulting groups and their 
intervention in the BrazBank. Furthermore, internal members of the RMD used this 
rhetoric to reinforce their influence over other departments. In this sense, the idea of 
risk management transmits security to actors, as similarly to Spira and Page’s (2002) 
findings, risk is an instrument of blame, but also a way of avoiding responsibility. In 
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this case, risk experts sustain the idea that employees were doing well; even if they 
received critiques about the inadequacy of their work, they treated other managers as 
children who needed guidance. For that reason, an analyst mentioned that:  
Let them complain. This is good for them. It is like a child who wants ice cream 
all day. You cannot nurture their will. It’s good for him. If you just give them 
ice-cream, will it be good? No. But often they do not know it. [...] The important 
thing is that we are doing the best for them. [05/12/2013] 
Risk experts, as well as other managers and analysts, could not understood the 
harmfulness of risk-management propositions in the BrazBank. For that reason, risk 
experts maintained that they were doing good. The resistance to risk management 
practices was conceived as a sign of misunderstanding and lack of knowledge. 
Indeed, this was a heritage perpetuated by consulting training, as the analyst 
explained how she needed to ‘open her mind in order to absorb the new methodology 
of risk management’. Thus, she mentioned:  
I think there is still a greater lack of acculturation about risk in the institution as a 
whole. I feel that the vision of risks is very rooted in Risk Management 
[Department], but other managers still do not understand very well how this is 
important for their activities and the risk ends up just not been part of their day-
to-day lives. 
This conceptualisation transmits an element of neutrality and objectivity to risk 
discourse, a perspective that reinforces the paradigmatic positivist separation 
between subjects and the object within risk practices. This rhetoric, then, supports 
the feeling that risk would bring more security to the BrazBank’s practices while 
also avoiding possible blame arising from lack of compliance or inadequacies of risk 
management practices in the BrazBank. Consequently, this is a self-referential 
construction that supports the status quo and the imposition of risk in the Brazilian 
context, instead of challenging it. Two elements were essential in this construction: 
the objectivation and systematisation of risk discourse, as follows.  
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The Social Logic of Objectification 
During interviews, risk managers claimed the objectivity of BrazBank’s risk 
management practices. They often affirmed that risk management and their analysis 
must be based on ‘models’, ‘systems’ and ‘measures’. Using this idea of an objective 
decision-making process which supported the ‘right’ or ‘best’ way to do things, 
many norms were implanted to ‘formalise’ ‘good governance practices’. This 
conceptualisation reflects BCB’s guidelines and recommendations from consultancy 
firms used to create new forms, procedures, processes, and systems that seek to 
‘standardise’ and ‘formalise’ risk management practices. These elements were 
constantly implicit in the conceptualisation of new practices and products. For 
instance, an internal report about the development of a new software product 
explained that:  
The model will be applied to operations during categorisation and analysis in an 
automated manner through systematic tools, hence, the need to construct 
[financial] indicators considering, together with its relevance in credit grants 
[analysis], the possibility of objective measurement with parameterised indexes, 
thereby eliminating analysis’s subjectivity.[emphasis added] 
The objectivity was associated with having and using numbers to support decisions, 
but also with an attempt to exorcise judgment and apparently any subjectivity. For 
that reason, categorisations, accumulation, measurements, percentages, values, 
counts, stratification in tables, charts, figures and constant checklists for conformities 
and non-conformities, gains and losses, were used to explain the controllability, and 
hence, ‘objectivity’ presented in risk management practices. The idea of ‘security’ 
was also constructed as a control panel using these instruments. Directors and 
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managers used audit reports as red flags or alarms to indicate dangers, divergences, 
and variations. 
Not only did numbers reinforce this ‘objectivity’, but also procedures were translated 
and ‘formalised’ into flowcharts, norms and guidelines which ‘point to the right 
direction’, showing how processes and activities must be carried out. For example, 
there were flowcharts about ‘providing customer service’, ‘customer analysis of 
categorisation compliance’, ‘technical analysis’, ‘risk analysis’, ‘analysis of 
warranties’, ‘engineering analysis’, ‘deliberation’, ‘grant’, ‘authorise release of 
resources’, ‘releasing resources’, but also support flowcharts for post-grant 
procedures, such as ‘tracking portfolio and monitoring risk’, ‘proactive performance’ 
and ‘monitoring internal controls and risks’. These tools were used to guide 
activities, providing audit trails to further analysis of performance, and so ensure the 
controllability within risk management practices.  
Also, organisational charts were used to assure functional segregation and 
responsibilities. Norms explained about required documentation and systems. Forms 
carried the registers of ‘events of risk or loss’ and ‘atypical situation 
communications’. According to checklists and forms, procedures were followed in 
other departments. Cash-flow statements supported Monte Carlos analysis to 
quantify the risk rating of each project. Thus, everything was in place to predict, 
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mitigate, reduce, avoid and control ‘risks’ (or, at least, to circumvent the feeling of 
not being able to do this) (c.f. Bauman, 2006)
23
. Each model was supported by its 
methodological description about how it was calibrated and validated with matrix, 
tests and results as well as the criteria for its application. 
Power (1997), however, emphasised that although the description of procedures is 
never complete, the work cannot stop. Thus, in this case, what would happen if 
something did not fit in the guidelines? My fieldwork confirmed the fluidity in the 
workplace and showed that unpredicted elements led analysts to find other and new 
alternative paths. Nevertheless, for the RMD, that would represent a failure of its 
own statement of objectivity and controllability. For that reason, they characterised 
these shifts as a deficiency in internal controls, which led them to blame constantly 
outdated flowcharts that failed to describe internal processes. To support their 
claims, the RMD used ‘what-if’ propositions to show the worst scenarios and how 
this simple failure could cause major problems for the BrazBank, for example, after 
the resignation of experienced managers or to train new employees.  
I observed, nonetheless, that usually, explanation of the origins of the numbers used 
in risk analysis was weak and it was assumed that numbers speak for themselves. An 
analyst asserted during the preparation of a risk report that ‘the numbers of graphs 
                                                 
 
 
23 Bauman (2012) ‘Liquid Fear’, Polity Press.  
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and charts do not need to be repeated’ (Analyst A, 2013). Conversely, after months, I 
observed that this justification was further used to hide analysts’ and managers’ own 
doubts raised during analysis and constant questions about the real meaning of the 
data presented.  
To summarise, risk management operations were driven by frameworks and focused 
on a static ‘manufactured risk’ (Beck, 1992), which were sold by consultancy firms 
considering predetermined ‘cause and effects’ maps, that cannot account for the 
dynamics of organisational practices and culture. In the short term, the authority of 
the messenger hid the failures of the model. However, in the long term, this forced 
‘objectification’ caused conflicts about the information provided in risk reports and 
the actual impersonality exposed in their writing. Due to the lack of materialisation 
of risk and losses, these activities started to lose their credibility and trust inside the 
BrazBank. Nevertheless, before digging deeper into the contradictions and 
contestations of this logic, the next section presents the role of the logic of 
‘systematisation’ in this discourse. 
 
The Social Logic of Systematisation 
In the BrazBank, the idea of systematisation was derived from an attempt to reduce 
human influence in decision-makings involving risks. Therefore, considering the 
history of corruption in Brazil and the rejection of bureaucratic procedures brought 
by the NPM, the mechanisation of processes arose from the incorporation of certain 
repetitive routines that could be studied and outlined. Risk management practices 
usually follow a cycle: financial information, forms, calculus, analysis, and reports. 
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Consequently, the idea of a ‘solution’ coming from automatisation using IT systems 
was presented in the BrazBank. For example, as an analyst explained:  
If the control is not systemic, you cannot guarantee that there will not be a fraud, 
or that someone will not get on the worksheet and change some parameter, and 
all this will only be solved with controls within a system. (Analyst B, 
12/06/2013) 
The valorisation of both formalised and mechanised processes was evident in 
discourses about norms and procedures. IT tools seemed to carry the idea of ‘best 
practices’, as if they did not suffer from the interference of human errors – which 
does not mean that they could not suffer from ‘other’ ones – and were driven by a 
constant search for processes that would ‘bring more efficiency’. This characteristic 
was explicit in internal reports, for example, during a software development:  
[This] new [software] platform for applications in web environments, aims at 
the modernity of BrazBank [...]. It is used to represent an increase in 
productivity and quality, associated with reducing risks and costs’ (Newsletter, 
2013, emphasis added). 
The systematisation of risk-management practice, then, represented a more 
fashionable and up-to-date practice, which would enhance productivity and quality. 
What was silenced in this discourse was that, in practice, the use of IT ‘solutions’ 
does not necessarily reduce errors, but could sometimes even cause consecutive 
errors, on an industrial scale. For instance, in the definition of new funding 
parameters, the system was set in such a way that even borrowers with overdue loans 
could be granted further funding. This problem was detected only after six months of 
development and one week before the expected schedule for the product’s launch. If 
it had not been corrected in a timely fashion, this could have generated many 
problems, which may not have been evidenced until future auditing. Nonetheless, not 
all failure could be predicted or imagined in advance and, even after many 
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brainstorming sessions and meetings, many problems were diagnosed only after 
launch.  
Even if regarded as a solution to avoid operational risks by risk standards, the 
accuracy and reliability of information in the systems were regularly discussed as a 
problem in the BrazBank. Complaints were related to systems that did not provide 
the necessary information or loss of information caused by the overlapping of 
historical data of customer profiles in a way that prejudiced risk analysis. 
Nonetheless, there were also disagreements about what caused dubious information 
and what could be done to correct this or have more accurate data. An Analyst 
explained that:  
[In the BrazBank] the big hurdle now is the lack of a database with reliable 
information, since most of the time customers’ information are overlap with 
new grants and updates on the system. Thus often the process becomes slow and 
tiring with the necessity to return the client’s folder, immense [hands wide 
opened], to obtain the required information (Analyst B, 2013). 
Since the creation of risk management, the existence of databases with up-to-date 
and accurate risk information was reported to be a necessity and solution to risk 
management problems (BIS, 2003), but its operationalisation has always been 
problematic (Taleb, 2007; Brown et al., 2008; Power, 2009). The feasibility of such 
a database became even more problematic after the insertion of operational risk 
management into this analysis and the complexity involved in the registration of 
operational losses (Cummins et al., 2006; Mikes, 2011). The creation of a historical 
database statistically significant to work as a risk indicator and comply with capital 
requirements is a privilege of large banks, which have its financial benefit justified 
by decreases in the required minimum allocated capital (Beasley et al., 2005). 
However, the internal conflicts related to the operationalisation and feasibility of this 
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database were scarcely discussed. For instance, in the BrazBank, there was a limited 
registration of losses. This was not caused by lack of knowledge of the importance of 
these records, nor systems limitations. Indeed, this record represented a conflict of 
interest between actors who used the asymmetry of information existing between 
them to keep their position of power and avoid blame. The registration of losses also 
meant acknowledgement of failures, and BrazBank’s managers expressed personal 
awareness that such an instrument could be used against them.  
Accordingly, another option to reduce this problem and create a database could have 
been the utilisation of available external databases. Nonetheless, the information of 
external databases did not follow a singular standard and could be disorganised and 
confused, with distributions that had been already questioned in BrazBank’s risk 
assessments. In this regard, an example about a historical agricultural time-series 
could be useful to illustrate this issue, as explained by a manager:  
There was a divergence in communication and consequently the understanding 
of what has been analysed. For example, our analysis of [agricultural 
production] has found that there was a database for flood period. And the time-
series is for dry-land. But analysts did their evaluations thinking exactly the 
opposite. So there was a discussion to determine which positions would now be 
used for analysis. It was considered that the irrigated has a higher cost of 
production, but has less variation, so it was decided that the [credit risk] analysis 
would be done with lower variations, even without historical data proving this 
trend.  
The lack of reliable data, the impossibility of recording everything, the complexity 
and dynamic nature of our reality, etc. reinforce the importance of cooperation and 
humility of CFO (Mikes, 2014). In the BrazBank, risk management practices have 
passed through a period of stabilisation and relative cooperation with credit grant 
departments. However, this interaction between them was no longer valorised after 
claims of independence (see more in Chapter 7). Consequently, some decisions were 
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made using the information that was available and also considering the expected 
final result. Commonly, according to Analyst A, if the credit grant department was 
inclined to approve a project, the acceptance would come anyway, after feedbacks 
and pressures focusing on how risk assessments were done superficially and how 
they had ignored some aspects of this customer’s business. Thus, it earlier approval 
was conceived as a way to ‘avoid the re-work’ and ‘more conflicts that not change 
anything’. 
The pictures presented here showed that even in an age when systems and 
integration are almost synonymous with good results (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003, 
Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011), sometimes the supposed ‘solution’ could also be the 
source of problems (Pritchettand Woolcock, 2004). Thus, inevitably, the dependence 
and lack of interconnectedness of internal managerial systems caused problems 
inside the BrazBank. Nonetheless, these problems with systematisation could not be 
considered as particular to the BrazBank, but as a chain of system failures, as 
exposed during one interview while the manager was explaining to his client that:  
The process was held up by an improper operation from a credit card company 
that generated the registration of unpaid debts of one of the partners, and, even 
after the judicial decision favourable to you, nothing was solved in the BCB’s 
database, which caused the impossibility of releasing funding in the BrazBank. 
[Manager X in telephone call during interview] 
The lack of reliability is often ignored while working with systems. The information 
available in information systems was not generated by physical practices but 
commonly inputted from them. While assembling new reports and charts doubt 
among analysts was clear; the information in systems is inconsistent, not integrated 
and outdated. In this situation of inability to predict the future, risk becomes a bridge 
from past to future decision-making. Therefore, risk analyses are used to support 
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decisions. What is intriguing about risk discourses is how subjectivity is downplayed 
in favour of objectivity and systematisation. One of the elements that explain this 
behaviour is the security brought by numeracy, as the following social logic 
demonstrates. 
 
The Social Logic of Security 
The objectivation and systematisation within risk discourse created a sense of 
security among actors. As they were in compliance with the national regulation, and 
following the international best practices of risk, so they were doing right. The myth 
of objectivity was sustained in the BrazBank, as it brought a sense of certainty, or at 
least, some kind of confidence conveyed by numbers, tests, and evidence. In this 
regard, a manager argued that:  
At least it’s less abstract when you talk about one thing and put a number [on it], 
it is easier to work. At least I like to work with numbers ... They give me more 
security, don’t they? 
Accordingly Nocera (2009) ratified that the utilisation of instruments like the VaR is 
related to the human desire to have something concrete, because ‘people like to have 
one number they can believe in’. Consequently, the objectification of risk recognised 
that there was subjectivity from judgments and choices made in the process of 
decision-making. However, actors considered this as the price of achieving an 
idealised ‘state of art’ in risk management practices. Ultimately, the concept of risk 
has never been challenged in the BrazBank, even if its constructs have changed. This 
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whole discourse sustained the claims of expertise and the professionalisation of risk 
discourse, as demonstrated in the following section. 
 
The Professionalisation of Risk Discourse 
The elements used in BrazBank’s current construction of risk management practices 
created a space for risk analysts and managers to portray themselves as experts. The 
idea that the Big 4 consulting groups shaped risk management practices created a 
halo around risk experts. They received training from Big 4 experts, and were then 
allowed to transmit the ‘worldwide used’ ‘best practices’ risk management inside the 
BrazBank. These professionals repeatedly reinforced this discourse. As already 
mentioned, actors in the bank used the metaphors of a parent guiding his children or 
a master guiding an apprentice to create a masterpiece. Furthermore, the rationalism 
sustained by the objectification of risk discourse and within its rhetoric of ‘best 
practices’, ‘in worldwide use’, ‘efficient’, ‘integrated’ that will ‘add value’ supports 
the position of experts, allowing them to dictate changes while identifying errors or 
deficiencies in other managers’ activities.  
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the practices of risk were challenged by other 
managers. Therefore, in the second month of the fieldwork, I started to observe that 
the elements presented so far were under contestation by other managers and 
analysts. Part of this problem was described in the RMD as a ‘weak culture of risk’. 
However, from the multiple – and sometimes silenced – voices in the field, it was 
possible to expose politics and power imbalances in the hegemonic discourse of risk. 
Consequently, the following section digs deeper in the micro-level of the risk 
P a g e  | 248 
 
construct, depicting the contradictions between ‘what risk should do’ and ‘what risk 
actually does’.  
 
6.3.3. Risk as Secret: Different Projects, Different Risks  
My first impressions as an outsider reading BrazBank’s risk reports was that risk-
management practices were rightly organised, supported by three Big 4 
consultancies during the implementation period, the BrazBank disclosures ‘best 
practices’ and the aim was to develop ‘state of the art’ in its risk management 
practices. Nonetheless, on closer inspection, I understood that there were gaps 
between disclosures, or theorisations, and current practices. Inside the BrazBank, I 
realised that risk discourse was shifted from ‘what we do’ to ‘what we should say’. 
Obviously, this was not explicit, but rather kept as a secret, the impression 
maintained was that risk was pondered more or less objectively according to the size 
of each project.  
 
The Appreciation of Objectivity over Subjectivity 
In the BrazBank, small projects for micro-economies were blocked by hundreds of 
IT parameters, subjected to restrictive norms and policies and suffered from the lack 
of capital. In these departments, managers were constantly trying to show the 
importance of their operations by sharing and using the same accounting tools as the 
RMD, like accounting reports and statistical analysis of the sector, area, client 
profile, etc. Consequently, although numbers were the source of litigation, they were 
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also considered a source of legitimation and accounting technologies used as 
suppliers of these numbers (Rose, 1991), wihch was not always reasonable. 
Credit grant managers, on the other hand, argued that ‘the acceptance of big projects 
passes through a different gate’. In these cases, the risk was no longer a matter of 
blocking, parameters or formalisation, but ‘justification’. It was necessary to find 
gaps in legislation to justify some projects. Consequently, the supposedly objective 
risk management tools were in these cases indeed used under an oppressive 
supervision to ensure that ‘all parameters have been fullfilled in the right way’ to 
guarantee acceptance. For instance, as an analyst underlined:  
For this project to be approved there were more than fifty meetings. When I 
went to do the analysis, there were [managers and analysts] here behind me, 
telling me just: ‘do it, do it, [and] do something else’. I was just following what 
was prescribed because it had to be approved. Some projects are like this. You 
do not even ask, and we can no longer question almost anything... but there are 
some those, if they were not approved or return with some unpleasant report, the 
head of the [risk] manager rolls immediately (Analyst F, 2013). 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that actors disregard the objectiveness of risk-
management practices; on the contrary, they argued that sometimes these models 
clearly present incoherencies to their analysis in such a way that they must be shifted 
to the particular case (Derrida, 2002). This labouring quest for objectivity drives risk 
constructions inside departments. Credit grant departments that operate with large 
projects understand risk as a more subjective technique, driven by financial analysis, 
but also complemented by the analyst’s perception and trust relationships developed 
with upcoming clients. However, for departments that operate with smaller projects, 
there were perceptions about these rules as more restricted, so that systematic blocks 
and parameters could reduce human interference. Risk management practices were 
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used to reinforce the objectivity within these decisions, but choices and judgment 
were present in both cases, as a manager said:  
It is different when you visit and see the enterprise operating, sometimes the 
client does not speak very well, but when you get there, you see that he has been 
in love with that job, and everything is organised, and he knows what he is 
doing, then, it changes your view of the funding. I try to consider these things 
when I am going to fill the credit matrix, because the same way you have clients 
who hire a professional credit designer who knows how everything has to be 
done and sends everything right, but you know this is a politician who is there 
just wanting funding to pocket it and you have to try to consider this in the 
credit matrix also in a way that this funding will not be accepted (Credit Analyst 
B, 03/12/2013). 
The myth of ‘objectivity’ was also used to legitimate decisions, and to replace or 
reaffirm the importance and coherence of actors’ actions with BrazBank’ norms and 
procedures. This appreciation of objectivity was previously presented in survey 
studies as dissonances which highlight that although managers did not use 
sophisticated models, they had confidence in these instruments (Collier, Beery and 
Burke, 2007; Souza, 2011). Nevertheless, the disparity between groups presented on 
the research site demonstrates that this behaviour could represent a more mature 
understanding of risk-management politics. For instance, elder managers or actors 
who were in higher positions in the hierarchy argued more freely about their 
influence on the conception of the risk customised in each project, and how risk was 
necessary to justify decisions made. Thus, the true understanding of actual risk 
management practices can be analysed as a process of personal and professional 
maturity that reduces the blindness of the idealised practices as well as its rhetoric 
and myth of objectivity.  
Nevertheless, on lower hierarchical levels, declarations like this one were given, 
expressing the secret of these conceptualisations. For instance, during my first 
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interviews I observed differences between how individuals exposed these human 
interferences in recorded and non-recorded interviews, and how these revelations 
were made more often in the former ones. Thus, in non-recorded interviews, even 
when these points were not directly targeted during the interviews, actors often 
uncovered how subjectivity was an important element in decision-making. However, 
in the recorded ones, they usually mentioned these aspects only after I stopped 
recording, at the end of the interview
24
. Even though actors revealed these politics in 
non-recorded interviews, they also asked not to be identified; otherwise they would 
deny that they had made such affirmations. 
Therefore, using this idea of the objective decision-making process and the ‘right’ or 
‘best’ way to do things, many norms of risk management were implanted to 
‘formalise’ ‘good practices’. Despite this rhetoric of objectivity, what happens on the 
ground seems to be secret; literally, it is a ‘closed doors conversation’. During the 
investigation of a controversial project case, a manager explained to me that I would 
not be allowed to stay in this ‘hot meeting’; however, she gave me some 
information
25
. According to her:  
                                                 
 
 
24 For that reason, I also stopped recording interviews and started to take notes, as I understood that this was a 
better way to obtain more faithful representations of the actual risk-management practices.  
25 During the period that I spent in the BrazBank, I realised that more important than the formal information, was 
the informal. The real revelations about risk came from informal chats that looked like ‘gossip’ and ‘whispers’, 
usually preceded by questions like: ‘This will not be part of your research, will it? But just to let you know…’. 
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The issues around risk go far beyond the technical side, do you know? There is 
politics, especially in a public institution, that are part of this decision. We also 
are not Puritan here, you know? The process is not as Cartesian as it seems to 
be. […] [However] if there is anything [wrong] here we are held to account for 
administrative improbity. They [directors] also respond, but then you know 
how... They will say that they made the decision based on a technical opinion, 
and the responsibility will fall on us. So it’s a very complicated situation, 
because we know you have pressure from the top, but we also respond 
[legally]... Then we get into a difficult situation. 
During this revelation, the manager looked sideways to see if she was being 
observed, passed her hand through her hair and looked up and down in a clear 
demonstration of discomfort. Thus, the idea of risk seems to be clouded by this 
objectivity that hides its real characteristics, even if, following some trends the 
decisions about risk are based on judgments and perceptions. This influence could be 
related to high-profile cases such as Enron and the CDO problems with rating 
agencies that confirmed that those ratings’ meanings are just a ‘personal opinion’
26
. 
Nevertheless, in no case was this space for manoeuvre revealed before the bubble 
burst. 
Even if probability is contingent, based on many assumptions (Spiegelhalter, 2013), 
immersed in this discourse of ‘objectivity’, managers seem to ignore the assumptions 
made by them while talking about risk in meetings and debates, using expressions 
                                                                                                                                          
 
 
However, after chats with many managers, I realised that this did not mean that they did not want to have this 
information in this research, but that they would never confirm it elsewhere, so it meant that they did not wish to 
have their identity revealed. 
26 See more details about these framed ‘opinions’ in the film ‘Inside Job’ (2010). 
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such as ‘I think…’, I believe…’, ‘it seems to me that…’, and the acknowledgeable 
conditional and arbitrary adjustments of parameters previously made in credit 
conditions norms
27
. Therefore, even if risk management is a cyclical process, it is not 
neutral, as the act of setting parameters is related to power and politics, as ‘the ability 
to decide the direction and purpose of actions’ (Bauman, 2007: 2). In this sense, the 
following section sheds light on the moment when risk decisions are made. 
 
Risk as an instrument support to ipso-facto decisions 
During the last mandate in the BrazBank, for instance, a massive project involving 
two different public banks was rejected by the Credit Grant Committee and by the 
Executive Board of Directors. There was a political interest in this project, and it 
should have been accepted. However, due to concerns about the validity and 
evaluation of the guarantees presented and the possible civil and criminal 
responsibility that managers would bear if a project like this was accepted with 
apparent financial deficiencies, it was rejected. The pressures that happened behind 
closed doors were not publicly revealed. However, the president had extensively 
                                                 
 
 
27 The conditionality and arbitrariness of criteria were also exposed in a discussion about current changes in 
clients’ profile according to their credit grants. In this case, according to the new SB’s risk appetite, there was a 
shift in this classification between small firms (from revenue under R$ 2,4millions/year to R$ 3,6 millions/year). 
This change represented Board’s and government’s intentions to expand these credit grants, making them 
automatised and online, which has modified the default of SB, increasing loss in these operations that become 
more ‘flexible’.  
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argued that ‘it was a project with a huge social benefit and it was viable, so must be 
approved’. These problems generated a tension inside the bank regarding political 
pressures in technical assessments. A manager was fired, and a director resigned 
from his job. After a while, even the president was reallocated to another public 
institution. Even after demonstrations from managers and analysts, the project was 
accepted, but at that time, following another credit grant line.  
Risk management is an important instrument to fill information gaps and support 
decision-making processes, even if it will not necessarily indicate which is the best 
decision to be made, since there are always problems with limited data and 
asymmetric information. Consequently, even following the same flowchart, there are 
differences between small and big projects. For instance, larger projects could also 
pass through a pre-analysis of risks to reveal possible deficiencies in their funding 
projects, and then, again pass through another pre-analysis or follow the ‘standard’ 
credit grant flowchart. Analysts did not consider this as inconsistency within risk 
management practices but emphasised that the pre-analysis is an instrument to 
guarantee more accurate decisions, which should also reflect their experience and 
judgment considering firms’ history, brand, and political power. Also, a manager 
said:  
Though all the planning is done on an idea of risk, which is the most likely, and 
using all methodology proposed in proceedings that present the greatest risk, 
there are many things that escape from what was planned, unexpected things, 
changes, new demands, which require that you review your plan and consider 
other elements, which adapt yourself. Therefore, although the risk is important, 
there are numerous uncertainties in day-to-day that impact decisions and 
planning (Manager D, 2013). 
However, under an argument of objectivity and neutrality of models, risk hides its 
power. Similarly to Hines’s (1988) arguments about financial accounting, ‘[risk] 
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power is a hidden power because people only think of you as communicating reality, 
but in communicating reality, you construct reality’. Recently, for instance, 
considering the current strategy of the BrazBank to expand its portfolio, the analyses 
of risk were made to accept and nor reject projects. For example, reviewing the 
bank’s assessments an analyst said:  
Our model was wrong. We were rejecting large and approving small [projects]. 
Now this is right. Now the model is less conservative. Finally, I adjusted it. I 
changed this and this. You can then save and run [the model] with these 
parameters so that it will work [be approved] (Analyst A, 2013) 
The main issue with these adjustments is that they commonly targeted large projects. 
They were used to reinforce the status quo and to reflect an economic logic in risk 
construction. Therefore, more than inform, risk supports decision-making processes 
and legitimates actors’ perceptions and decisions. Thus, risk conception grips actors 
by its power to transform what was potential into something real. Even if the 
conceptualisation of risks in decision-making could be contested, then, if someday it 
should prove wrong, it will not represent the present anymore, but the past, which 
could be justified. Always in the future, risk articulation includes and excludes many 
elements that compose risk reality, identities, and contexts. Therefore, the act of 
setting parameters to make decisions is related to power and politics (Derrida, 2002), 
as well as the ability to decide the direction and purpose of actions (Bauman, 2007: 
2). Again, what is intriguing about risk discourses is how subjectivity is downplayed 
in favour of systematisation; even if subjectivity is a recognised aspect of risk-
management practices. Thus, the following section exposes that actors recognise the 
role of subjectivity in risk-management practices and the importance of previous 
errors and experiences, in decisions about risk. 
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Risk management as a social practice 
Throughout BrazBank history, several activities and processes were ‘optimised’ in 
trial and error learning practices. This allowed the implementation of new internal 
controls and risk-management practices, as long as actors perceived new problems, 
as well as when new demands for information were incorporated. The 
communication and shared experiences among analysts facilitated this diffusion. 
According to some actors, it is important to learn from mistakes (Analyst J, Manager 
E, 2013). Thus, risk could be understood as the desire to avoid errors. Slovic (1999), 
for instance, emphasised how personal intuition is complementary to risk analysis, 
especially as a supplement to disperse information that could not be measured, but 
that could enhance good decisions. The ignorance about the complex 
interconnectedness involved in the decision-making process represented one of the 
main concerns for Manager Y (2013), when he described risks implicit in a new 
systematised product:  
There are several issues that need to be considered and several details that often 
get lost in this new vision [systematisation], we do not know yet what will 
happen. [However] there is a range of feelings that influences the analyst in a 
grant, and that is important as the experience of this guy could ‘see’ if the client 
is deceiving you or actually having some difficulty getting financing (Manager 
Y). 
Personal history and experience are important elements in decisions involving risk. 
Indeed, the importance of experience in risk decisions was demonstrated by Adams 
(1995), who argued that people usually use their experiences, risk appetites and 
personal history to form individual risk filters and weigh risks implicit in their 
decisions. In the BrazBank, the personal narratives exposed nostalgic feelings about 
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a golden period – usually articulated at the end of interviews as the real risk for 
BrazBank’s activities – when non-measurable risks, such as employees’ 
dissatisfaction, were considered important to the bank.  
These personal histories and experiences also permeated discussions in decision-
making processes. They were the source of comparison between credit grants, 
clients, business environments and their dynamics and complexity. Also, exposing 
similar cases and experiences, actors made their arguments more plausible and 
coherent, so analogies were used to justify personal conceptions. These experiences 
were used for training purposes and to keep the memory of the BrazBank, so 
represent a tool for knowledge management, as shared experiences show how 
problems have been solved previously and the reasons for current practices or norms. 
Of course, the hegemonic discourse of risk tries to diminish the relevance of these 
subjective elements and contest the validation of each story in the current context, as 
according to one manager:  
The histories of use are not updated, as the Brazilian legal system usually takes 
a lot of time to have a verdict about prosecutions. However, they are presented 
on a daily basis in some departments in BrazBank, and these arguments are used 
to make decisions about funding, or not, some projects. We need to have more 
systematic information from the market not to incur in this kind of errors.  
Undeniably, this assertion highlights that this perspective can bring biases into 
decision-making processes. The main argument in this respect was how historical 
problems once again became current issues inside some departments, creating 
barriers to change and development that kept the BrazBank stuck in the past. This 
reflects that, for risk management purposes, stories have mainly two different 
aspects: they are important to comprehend past errors and also as organisational 
memories that keep the idea of progress through comparison. Consequently, this 
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section does not suggest that subjectivity is the panacea, but the opposite; it seeks to 
offer a space for reflection about risk management practices. 
 
Could risk be objective? 
According to the current theoretical discourse about risk, it seems that there has been 
a huge change in risk-management practices in recent decades. Those changes were 
supported by the idea that human factors are biased and should be removed from 
these models. Inside the BrazBank, for instance, the Risk Manager explained the 
evolution of risk management practices, emphasising this idea:  
Until mid-1994, credit granting and management in Brazil were not as well 
developed as are the ones based on current policies, as inflationary correction 
compensated any losses of credit through the financial maelstrom and 
markdown prices. Thus, the credit decision was made solely by judgments based 
on the experience of credit analysts (Internal Journal 426, 2007: 1) 
The utilisation of quantitative tools was made available after the controlled 
hyperinflation, but also provided an instrument to handle the new economic 
imperatives that would not allow easy money from compensation. Furthermore, risk 
presupposes a political tool of legitimacy for managers to avoid possible future 
accusations. This idea justifies, for example, the results of Souza (2011), as although 
managers do not have accurate quantitative tools for risk management, they argue 
that those are the ones that they trust most. Therefore, risk management tools are 
considered a relevant source of legitimation, even if there are incongruencies. The 
constant quest for objectivity pursued in guidelines and reaffirmed by consultancies 
supports decision makers. Furthermore, a manager asserted:  
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Even with developments in models, posteriors analysis demonstrates that they 
are flawed and do not necessarily indicate the best risk to be incurred (Manager 
D, 2013). 
Therefore, managers recognise the limitations in current models but continue to 
justify the need for them. For example, during the discussion about a new product, 
after reading the BCB standards, managers found that there was a way to justify 
customers’ different ratings classification, following the guidelines of Article 2, 
Section II and also to explain why the BrazBank adopted a different risk ranking. 
Manager A explained that there was no strict position from BCB that they needed to 
classify these operations with the worst risk rating, and that would affect BrazBank’s 
loss provisions. Manager B stated that the most important thing was to explain the 
reasons and detailed that following the BCB’s Article 2, and BrazBank’s models, 
this was a more conservative criterion. Then, she emphasised:  
Even if I did not agree…but erase that. Use the data you have and properly 
explain that we made that decision based on the test conducted and a profile of 
transactions that represent a lower risk to the BrazBank, because it has a smaller 
portfolio… which presents a lower [risk of] default… and show the points 
[evidence] that will help you to justify that this is a good option (Manager F, 
2013). 
In practice, I observed that there was a lot of subjectivity in the risk management 
decisions related to different projects and individuals. This subjectivity could be 
characterised mainly by judgments and perceptions, used to fill some gaps in 
information, but also related to other interests of funding, or a response to time 
constraints and pressures which needed to be justified. For instance, during a 
conversation after a meeting, two managers exposed that:  
Manager H: The directors want to release it soon, and we’re running, running, 
and then, it’s all for yesterday. 
Manager C: The only way out is to launch the product this way, as the board 
wants, justify on the norms, the criteria adopted and explain that as it is a new 
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product change, even there would be some changes and monitoring in order to 
better understand this process and keep up with this new funding.  
Therefore, constant and unexpected variations in the environmental conditions, plus 
pressures and unexpected requests, might also push things, as reported by another 
manager:  
Though all the planning is done on an idea of risk, which is the most likely, and 
using all methodology proposed in proceedings that present the greatest risk, 
there are many things that escape from what was planned, unexpected things, 
changes, new demands, which require that you review your plan and consider 
other elements, which adapt yourself. Therefore, although the risk is important, 
there are numerous uncertainties in day-to-day that impact decisions and 
planning (Manager D, 2013). 
Therefore, even knowing the limitations of risk management practices, different 
actors seem to articulate it in different ways to support their decisions and practices. 
The next section then exposes how counter-hegemonic discourses of risk have used 
the idea of risk management as a floating signifier to support different purposes in 
BrazBank’s departments and hierarchical level. 
 
6.3.4. Risk as Contextual: Different Groups, Different Risks 
Considering the battle between the RMD and ‘other’ departments, summed up in the 
current discourse from risk managers stressing a ‘weak risk culture’ inside the bank, 
this section seeks to explore the primary sources of these contradictions in risk 
discourse. The homogeneity reinforced by theoretical ‘risk culture’ guidelines (e.g. 
IRM, 2011, 2012) has demonstrated its ‘intellectual failure’ (Power, 2009) in the 
BrazBank. After many years of using and passing through a few Big 4 consultancies, 
the ‘risk culture’ in the bank seems to be weak for risk experts and oversized 
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according to other managers. But, what were the reasons for this disparity? This 
section exposes contradictions in discourses about risk in literature and the conflicts 
between unfulfilled promises, i.e. ‘what risk should do’ and ‘what risk actually does’ 
(Mol and Law, 2004). This gap sheds light on the reasons for the obscurity of risk 
management practices (Borraz, 2012). Thus, I offer a series of different perspectives 
on risk and risk management practices among the BrazBank’s groups, characterising 
risk as a floating signifier, in the following sections. 
  
Cross-Departmental Discourse of Risk 
The articulation of risk as a signifier and nodal point in the BrazBank differed across 
departments. Concisely, there were mainly three different groups’ views about risk 
in the BrazBank. First, for risk experts, risk management meant the ‘solution’ for all 
the bank’s problems, legitimated by the idea of ‘best practices’ ‘used worldwide’ in 
the market. These arguments were also supported by the necessity to comply with 
external actors considering the training obtained from Big 4 consultancies and the 
requirements of BCB. Second, credit grant managers presented the opposite view, as 
risk analyses were seen as a ‘barrier’ to the acceptance of more loans, and thus, to 
activement of organisational – as well as departmental, and personal – goals. 
Therefore, risk was considered a threat to BrazBank’s performance and (financial) 
sustainability. Third, the administrative managers recognised risk as an important 
supporting tool, but saw it as out of BrazBank’s reality. This last argument was 
presented to avoid ‘overweight’ action plans from the RMD, which, according to the 
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administrative managers, represented a ‘re-auditing’ activity that would not fit into 
BrazBank’s reality, and so would end up just ‘bothering’ them.  
Overall, the risk descriptions of the two latter groups were confusedly blended with 
audit practices, perhaps as an influence from the ‘Golden times of Auditing with a 
Risk Management Focus’ period (See Political Logic section 7.2.1.). This argument 
was also contrary to the supposed ‘opportunities for improvement’ role and benefits 
requested by the current risk management practices. Therefore, this struggle around 
the definition of risk’s function shifted the previous ruling position of risk experts 
and their ability to interfere and set standards of ‘best practices’ for other 
departments. 
This battle for expertise was present between ‘other’ managers and risk managers, 
respectively, considered ‘non-experts’ and ‘experts’ of risk. Inside the bank, the 
crucial question raised was: who is the ‘expert’ to interfere in my work? Clearly, this 
polarity was prejudicial to risk-management practices, as risk experts suffered from a 
lack of collaboration from ‘non-experts’. In this context, the claim of independence 
was detrimental to developing an image of the humble CRO, proposed by Mikes 
(2015), an important aspect of becoming influential whilst creating a toolkit shared 
at different hierarchical levels and among other managers (Hall et al., 2014). From a 
DT perspective, the current hegemonic risk construct radically challenged dominant 
positions and pre-existing practices in the BrazBank. For that reason, tensions 
erupted, and antagonist identities tried to regain the space they had lost. 
In the BrazBank, risk managers used their training to ratify their knowledge and 
ability to set the ‘right path to follow’, considering the ‘best practices’, ‘state of the 
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art’ and the ‘new’ and ‘better’ methodology of risk management. However, 
administrative managers did not accept that these recommendations fitted well in the 
BrazBank’s context, as they considered risk-management practices as ‘re-auditing’ 
and ‘overweighed’ in relation to the size, goal and particular characteristics of 
BrazBank’s operations as well as its limited resources. In addition to this, credit 
grant managers presented an even more fatalistic view; sharing the view of 
administrative managers, they went further and considered risk as a threat to 
BrazBank’s financial sustainability, arguing that BrazBank’s aim was to increase 
revenue and not manage risks. 
When confronted with this latter point of view, risk experts considered it an ‘unsafe’ 
standpoint, claiming that the BrazBank could make better decisions and reduce 
losses using risk management practices. However, these struggles were mediated by 
the evidence provided by each group and, although the BrazBank conforms to BSC’s 
approach to achieving its goals, its leading indicators of performance were the 
volume of credit grants awarded. In this way, credit grant managers could quickly 
provide evidence to support the benefits of their practices to BrazBank performance. 
On the other hand, the absence of risk materialisation of losses in recent years put 
risk managers in an inferior position. For that reason, there were even concealed 
desires from risk experts that something should go wrong, in order vindicate their 
perspective. Even so, these actors were also suspicious of the consequences of such 
an outcome to their position, i.e. whether losses would bolster, or weaken their 
importance in the BrazBank. Ultimately, these divergences were influenced by 
BrazBank’s current emphasis towards financial performance, which did not benefit 
risk experts.  
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Cross-Hierarchical Discourse of Risk 
Drawing on current risk guidelines, risk experts called for the necessity to develop a 
common language of risk, but the views about risk management were even more 
heterogeneous concerning hierarchical levels. There was a dissonance between what 
decision-makers required and what the RMD delivered as crucial information on 
BrazBank’s daily basis. Part of the problem was related to a huge volume of 
information provided each semester by the risk-management department. Risk 
reports were ‘hard to digest’ and generally provided outdated information about the 
current practices in each department. The gaps, though, were considered again a 
symptom of the ‘weak culture of risk’, and hence as the consequence of the lack of 
participation and collaboration from other departments. The commitment to ‘best 
practices’ was another self-referential element used to reinforce the appropriateness 
of the current methodology, which reflected the training from Big 4 consultancies, 
and hence, ‘in worldwide use’ practices of risk management. In short, managers 
were stuck in their Big 4 training, but other actors were no longer persuaded by this 
argument anymore. 
For instance, considering that risk reports certain more than 100 pages, directors 
argued for more ‘synthetic’, ‘objective’ and ‘simple’ risk management practices, that 
could help them to make better decisions and not just to comply with BCB’s 
requirements. On the other hand, other managers were usually concerned about the 
timing and updating of numerous risk action plans, suggesting the incompatibility of 
risk management practices that were ‘too sophisticated’, ‘highly bureaucratic’ and 
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‘time-consuming’ with BrazBank’s necessities. Conversely, in this battle, risk 
managers felt lost and discouraged by their ‘lost relevance’ and requested more 
support from the Board to improve their practices, explaining how the tone from the 
top would drive the behaviour of managers. They also demanded more resources for 
consultancy training that could update risk management practices. Therefore, they 
remained fixed in the idea that the solution would come from outside. 
Risk experts were indeed cornered by a lack of participation of other managers and 
analysts, as their claim for ‘independence’ had conveyed almost an image of 
‘arrogant self-sufficiency’ according to credit grant and administrative managers. 
The authority lost can be described as a lack of interest of the ‘non-humble’ risk 
expert in creating coalitions with (perceived) less powerful actors, like analysts in 
other departments (Mikes, 2014). Risk-management practices were historically 
driven by a ‘tone from the top’, so analysts felt that they were ignored by the ‘state-
of-art’ of ‘snobbish risk experts’ who did not include their point of view on possible 
threats and improvement opportunities to BrazBank practices. In the long term, 
however, this detachment resulted in the inapplicability of risk management 
recommendations, which had lost their practical connection with BrazBank’s 
practices and capacities. Therefore, the integration purposed by risk experts in the 
ERM period was considered utopian in comparison to the actual practices in risk 
department. In this battle for power, characterised by claims of expertise, risk-
management practices in the bank could be understood as ‘a ship full of small boats 
where each oarsman is rowing in a different direction’, as a manager argued.  
Additionally, despite the fact that the importance of disseminating a common 
language of risk was regularly emphasised in new consultancies, the training about it 
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during new risk management requirements was mainly concentrated on the members 
of the department responsible for risk management practices in each period of risk 
management evolution. Perhaps this is the reason for the disparity in the 
conceptualisations of risk promulgated during interviews with different departments 
and level of hierarchy. 
When asked about the meaning of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ to their practices, 
managers and analysts usually replied with inquiries about ‘which risk’? They 
commonly considered only the risks that were present in their daily activities or the 
most important for them and developed their arguments emphasised elements that 
made the idea of risk more concrete in their practices. For instance, credit grant 
managers and analysts paid more attention to credit risks, as they were decisive in 
accepting or rejecting a project, and this was used as a performance measure and to 
set their goals. On the other hand, administrative managers and analysts had more 
concerns about operational risk analysis, which would interfere more in their 
activities, even though the degree of importance of risk management practices was 
also directly related to the time since the last operational risk evaluation. 
The multiple layers and social constructions of risk were confirmed here, 
demonstrating that the lack of training was not the only reason for dissimilarities. 
Among administrative departments, the concept of risk also differed according to the 
experience of analysts and managers. Thus, previous errors and experiences were 
considered as important sources of information for working properly with possible 
risks. Even if norms and policies were considered a guide, analysts emphasised that 
‘each operation, and also each analyst, have their own way to conduct their activities 
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and their dynamic can change, for instance, according to time and hierarchical 
pressures or their experience’ (Analyst X).  
In short, the complexity and dynamics of risk discourse were articulated differently 
by different actors to reinforce their own interests and maintain their power. Risk is 
contextual and could be characterised as a ‘floating signifier’, as various particular 
contents could be read into the signifier, and different actors will articulate different 
element of it according to their particular interests (Laclau, 2004). Thus, risk could 
be understood as a legitimate instrument that subjugates actors while excluding their 
proposed meaning from the hegemonic discourse of risk. However, considering the 
antagonistic position of these excluded actors, any failure in the hegemonic discourse 
also represents an opportunity to regain power. For that reason, risk management 
practices could be characterised more like a battle rather than a homogenous and 
naturalised discourse, as was presented within the external disclosures. A request for 
‘objectivity’, ‘neutrality’, and ‘independence’ hides subjective elements in an 




Risk guidelines and consultancies’ reports have focused on the importance of 
integration (BIS, 2003, COSO, 2004, Deloitte, 2009) and created a common 
language of risk (AIRMIC, Alarm and IRM, 2010, IRM, 2012). This chapter has 
examined the viability of this attempt to standardise and homogenise risk 
management’s heterogeneous realities, whereby complexity in human interaction 
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and individual conceptions is hidden in the construction of ‘risk’. Moreover, it 
provides an empirical critique of the positivist distance from subjects, which is 
implicit in any discourse of objectivity and universalisation. According to Arena et 
al. (2010: 673):  
Organisational translations diverge as they encounter pre-existing centres of 
control and practices. This heterogeneity is explained at the highest level by 
differing risk rationalities and their potential to challenge the conceptualisation 
of uncertainty. A shift in the decisional mindset and context is shown to be 
dependent on whether risks are represented as ‘real’ problems for managers, 
instilling urgency in the form of a new moral vocabulary, and by visualising 
impacts in a manner close to their actions and responsibilities. 
In this chapter, then, I explained how risk operates in practice and different meanings 
are attached to risk and risk management as a signifier used by both external and 
internal actors. Although the discursive political power of risk is not commonly 
addressed by the mainstream literature of accounting and finance, I showed here that 
chains of signification were important to risk’s current political power (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001).  
This chapter illustrates how, the subprime macro-crisis echoed inside the BrazBank, 
reflected in a micro-institutional crisis regarding risk practices and tools, but how, 
despite previous crises, risk management instruments were still in use. The way that 
those practices were articulated at macro-, meso- and micro-levels in the BrazBank 
seems to be an essential factor for understanding the meaning and rules of risk 
management practices. Here, I showed how the structure of risk management in 
BrazBank reflected international regulatory imperatives. Furthermore, I 
demonstrated that risk management was condensed and naturalised by risk experts in 
a rhetoric that reinforced elements like ‘best practices’, ‘solutions’, ‘in worldwide 
use’, ‘security’ and ‘systematisation’. From outside, thus, BrazBank’s risk 
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management structure could be compared with that of any bank in Brazil, or abroad, 
and with discussions in mainstream accounting and finance literature.  
Nevertheless, to expose the multiple layers of risk, I considered differences between 
disclosures and internal practices of risk management. This methodology confirmed 
the characteristics of risk as a floating signifier, which was articulated differently 
according to different interests. Covered over by a ‘normative discourse’ of 
‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’, external disclosures and risk experts emphasised their 
compliance with ‘best practices’. However, there was a lot of divergence between 
risk experts and cross-departmental and cross-hierarchical interpretations of risk. 
Risk was also characterised by personal judgments, perceptions, and decisions made 
according to previous ‘errors’, ‘own experience’ and ‘organisational history’. 
Therefore, there were always contradictions between ‘what risk is’, ‘what risk does’ 
and ‘what actors should be told about risk’.  
The source of these divergences is further scrutinised in the genealogy of risk 
management practices presented in the next chapter.  
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– CHAPTER SEVEN – 
 
FROM A COLLABORATIVE ‘CULTURE OF CONTROL’ TO A 
BLAMING ‘RISK CULTURE’ 
 
7.1. Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 6, the macro-discourse of risk was reflected in BrazBank’s risk 
management practices. However, there were hidden conflicts and heterogeneity in 
external and internal discourses as well as between experts and non-experts. At the 
micro-level of analysis, it was clearer that non-experts’ antagonistic positions opened 
up space for contestations about risk management practices in BrazBank. A quick look 
at this bank, focused on the current practices of risk management, could support 
interpretations that the BrazBank presents an incoherent ‘risk culture’ and a failure in 
the implementation of ‘best practices’ or to achieve the ‘state of the art’. Nevertheless, 
this chapter demonstrates that the dynamics and continuity of risk in the BrazBank also 
reflected continuous translations from international macro-discourses of sound risk 
management practices in attempts to legitimate risk experts’ interests. Thus, the battle 
and contestations around the concept of risk, as a nodal point, have been driven by 
departments throughout BrazBank’s history, but only gained momentum recently with 
its international failure and lack of support from BrazBank’s Board of Directors. 
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The political logic of risk management practices presented in this chapter, then, shows 
rhetorical strategies and dislocatory moments from risk management’s emergence until 
it achieved its golden period. It also depicts how, after that prestigious period, risk 
experienced an unprecedented crisis. This critical analysis of the political logics of 
risk management in the BrazBank exposes risk’s conflicts with pre-existing social 
logics (Arena et al., 2010) and consequent shifts in its social representation 
throughout its history following modifications in international and national 
regulations, as well as accommodating struggles among different actors and their 
interests. Thus, while Chapter 6 exposed the current picture of risk management 
rules and practices, Chapter 7 reveals a historical picture organised here to show how 
these practices emerged, were contested and sedimented. This link with the 
ideological cover provided by international regulations expands the understanding of 
risk-management practices beyond its technical aspects. In fact, it embraces the 
social and political relevance of risk as an instrument to legitimate and create a space 
for risk experts (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) and to translate neo-colonial 
international accounting requirements (Neu et al., 2006). 
For me, the current discourse about a ‘weak risk culture’ inside the bank represents 
an attempt to re-establish trust between actors and the bank, and also the bank and 
regulators and consultancy groups. The genealogy of risk management practices, 
then, represents a way to comprehend the relationship between the micro and macro 
contexts, something lacking in the institutional approach, which focuses primarily on 
the micro in isolation from the historical macro-context (Lounsburry, 2008). 
The following sections demonstrate how hegemonic international discourses of risk 
management were translated and articulated around new normative propositions 
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about ‘what risk should be’, which benefited some groups at the expense of others, 
who lost their power. These dislocations demonstrate the contingent nature of 
discursive structures built to sustain idealistic risk-management practices. Howarth et 
al. (2000: 13) affirm that dislocations ‘create a lack at the level of meaning that 
simulates new discursive constructions, which attempt to suture the dislocated 
structure’. Thus, in this chapter, I demonstrate the gap between theoretical and 
practical risk-management efforts. I analyse the rhetorical constructions and 
dislocatory moments of risk as vectors of change, seeking to understand 
transformations in departmental and organisational micro-contexts.  
The analysis presented here sheds light on the historical processes of the emergence, 
adaptation, and implementation of risk management, which have suffered from a 
lack of empirical data and in-depth empirical studies linking the mobilisation and 
meaning of risk with distinct social contexts (Borraz, 2012). Thus, the following 
section starts this journey by tracing the emergence of the concept of risk in the 
BrazBank and the initial attempt towards normalisation. 
 
7.2.The Political Logics of Risk: from Controls to Culture 
Inside the BrazBank, it seems that the discourse about risk has shifted over the last 
14 years. The proposition of NPM to public institutions became more prominent as a 
driver towards progress after Brazil controlled its hyperinflation using the Real Plan 
(see Chapter 2.3: 45). The primary focus was to guarantee the efficiency and 
transparency of these institutions, which suffered from political interference 
throughout their history. The compliance with best practices adopted by developed 
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countries and the market was considered an answer to these developmental 
pretensions. Thus, retrospectively, the relevance of risk management was connected 
to the international recognition of best practices (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011). 
Initially, in the BrazBank, a discourse centred on the value of risk-management 
practices that highlighted the necessity to adopt more robust internal controls. The 
elements of this discourse constructed risk management as the solution, emphasising 
aspects that portray risk as a new and better managerial instrument that would bring 
efficiency and professionalism to BrazBank’s practices while providing compliance 
with best practices in the market and in worldwide use. The ‘enemy’, in this case, 
was state inefficiency not driven by an economic imperative. The dictatorship of the 
logic of marketization portrayed that efficient and robust internal control 
mechanisms could avoid human errors and subjectivities increasing productivity and 
growth. Overall, this initial attempt avoided conflicts and invited people to 
participate and collaborate with these new practices.  
Between 2003 and 2004, risk management practices were more settled, but did not 
appear in the spotlight, as they were much less emphasised in new directors’ 
speeches. This diminished importance was opposed by risk experts, who stressed 
that other managers should engage with and embed risk management in their 
practices in order to obtain the ‘state of the art’ of risk management. Systematisation 
was the answer to BrazBank’s problems, as this would supposedly avoid human 
errors and subjectivities in BrazBank’s practices. Nonetheless, even when systems 
were in place, errors continued to occur.  
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Scandals and crises, like Enron and World.com, fortified the promulgation of the 
SOX, and then, new BCB’s regulations, which again increased the interest in 
compliance with those international requirements, which presupposed transparency 
on the part of boards of directors’ actions and also their civil and criminal 
accountability for misconduct and fraud (SOX, 2002; CMN, 2004). Thus, directors 
supported by Big 4 training, proposed the restructuring of the Department of Internal 
Auditing, to what was henceforth called ‘Auditing with a Risk Management Focus’. 
Risk gained momentum and status in the BrazBank, and auditors claimed 
independence for risk-management practices in order to provide the total neutrality 
of such practices. For a second time, best practices and compliance were supporting 
this new endeavour of risk management practices. However, auditors also worked as 
a watchdog for the Board, so the element of punishment was perceived by other 
managers during this period.  
The power of auditors was shaken by new regulations claiming a transition to a 
worldwide and more integrated risk management approach, named the Enterprise 
Risk Management framework (ERM). The ERM was in the spotlight internationally, 
and these current sound practices reinforced the exploration of opportunities and the 
necessity to add value for shareholders (even through the BrazBank has no 
shareholders), instead of focusing only on threats. In this period, the risk-
management department was receiving relatively strong support from the Board and 
new risk experts claimed that risk was not auditing, so they should be, and were, 
moved to a new office. This new division asserted the reestablishment of cooperation 
between departments to achieve a holistic view of potential risks in the BrazBank. 
Contradictorily, it was asserted that the integration must be obtained without losing 
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the independence of risk-management recommendations. Therefore, the element of 
neutrality was again restated.  
After this golden period, the subprime crisis triggered a loss of credibility regarding 
the management practices of risk around the world, especially the most sophisticated 
and obscure ones. Risk-management practices were in the spotlight again; however, 
now they were blamed as the cause of the most recent world financial crisis. In the 
new directors’ political mandate, risk management practices no longer received 
much support. Inside the BrazBank, a new moment of dislocation focusing on the 
‘risk culture’ tried to re-establish the power of risk experts. However, that was also a 
period when international discourses about which path should risk management 
practices follow were divergent. While propositions from Basel III asserted the need 
to adopt more comprehensive and sophisticated models of quantification, the IRM, 
for example, focused attention more on soft elements like ‘risk culture’ and ‘risk 
appetite’ (BIS, 2013; IRM, 2011; IRM 2012). Therefore, risk started to lose its 
power and influence over BrazBank’s decisions, and other managers, perceiving this 
lack of power, also used this is an opportunity to reinforce their importance in 
steering BrazBank’s incomes, considered a priority in the discourse of BrazBank’s 
(financial) sustainability and, hence, progress. As a result, risk managers who had 
been experts in a position of prestige for the past decade saw their empire failing in 
front of their eyes. In short, the trajectory of risk could be summarised in the 
following diagram:  
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Figure 2 - Hegemonic Discourses around 'Risk' and Risk Management' nodal points. 
In summary, from the risk experts’ viewpoint, this nodal point of ‘risk’ has moved 
from the discourse arguing about improving internal controls collectively to a 
blaming, ‘weak risk culture’ not supported by non-experts. Firstly, the 
standardisation of BrazBank’s operations has sought ‘better’ and ‘more accurate’ 
models and in turn, ‘efficient’ analysis of credit grants. Ultimately, the question 
focused on managers’ capacity to manage risks and the ‘necessity’ to develop a ‘risk 
culture’ inside BrazBank. The central element emphasised by this discourse was the 
idea that risk-management practice would ‘add value’ to BrazBank’s operations. 
Conversely, there was extensive resistance from other departments to risk 
management practices, as ‘risk’ went against many interests whilst serving to 
uncover potential threats, like individuals’ failures and errors, denoting that risk was 
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a punishment instrument. The core conflict happened in the articulation of risk 
between 2003 and 2005 when operational risk management was associated with 
audit practices, and even though after 2006, a new discourse regarding risk 
properties to improve performance was constructed, this last dislocatory movement 
has not fully succeeded. Therefore, the last attempt from the RMD was developed 
through a discourse about a ‘weak risk culture’ and problems with an attitude of non-
cooperation from ‘non-experts’ that impeded risk management practices in achieving 
their aims: ‘improving performance’ and ‘adding value’. Overall, among many 
international and external macro-determinants, these shifts were also influenced by 
changes in political mandates in the Brazilian government, which were reflected in 
changes in the Board of Directors of the BrazBank, who needed to legitimate the 
contribution of their terms of office. These elements are fully described in the next 
subsections and summarised in Appendix 1.  
7.2.1. Risk and Political Mandates: Different Political Mandates, Different Risks 
BrazBank’s history presented various hegemonic discourses, and subsequent crises 
and dislocations related to the concept of risk management. Brazilian public 
institutions passed through a reframing after changes in the government that implied 
shifts in political positions, like those of the president, directors and some managers, 
at least every four years. In the BrazBank, however, these changes have also altered 
the discourse of risk, articulated differently in each new political mandate. These 
dislocations reflect not only internal processes, but also variations in the perceived 
power of macro-discourses of risk management around the world. Therefore, risk 
was used to legitimate new actors’ power, but also to support their decisions, 
reinforcing their contribution in the BrazBank, while the value perceived in risk 
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management tools passed through redescriptions, as exposed in the following 
sections.  
 
2000 – 2002: Transformation Logic of Control and Professionalisation
28
 
At the beginning of 2000, after the economic stabilisation brought by Brazil’s 
eradication of hyperinflation, the BrazBank passed through many changes. This was 
a period of privatisation in Brazil and the idealisation of a new public management 
framework for public institutions. This phase was characterised by market concerns 
related to controls and effectiveness as a way to discipline managers, maximise 
firms’ value, re-order organisational life and ensure compliance (see more in Chapter 
2). In brief, it was a desire to replace the presumed inefficiency of hierarchical public 
bureaucracy with the alleged efficiency of markets (Power, 1997: 43).  
Significant uncertainties faced the BrazBank, as people were unsure of the future of 
this institution, and hence, their future. The BrazBank had a new president whose 
                                                 
 
 
28 It is important to mention that although the proposition of prudent regulation was reinforced to BDBs after a 
period of hyperinflation, when a new public management (NPM) framework and an agenda of privatisation was 
also imposed on Brazilian public institutions, the main discourse inside the SB reflected concerns regarding 
professionalism and efficiency. These concerns marked a period of uncertainty about the future of this bank 
haunted by privatisations in other public financial institutions. Thus, perhaps, this rhetoric represented the way in 
which actors in this bank structured SB’s role in accordance with the NPM’s framework to avoid privatisation. 
Indeed, the internal journal used to inform this political logic analysis started to be published only at the end of 
1999. For that reason, there were limited connections documented between the emergence of risk in this site and 
the controlled hyperinflation in the macro-context.  
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slogan was ‘Transformation in Progress’ and who argued that the BrazBank should 
be driven by ‘Simplicity, De-bureaucratisation, Pursuing Objectivity’ (Internal 
Journal, 2001). It was a discourse of collectivism, to ‘resolve issues in order to 
facilitate the work of everybody, and above all, the care for our customers’ (Internal 
Journal, 2001). Concepts like ‘Social Responsibility’ and ‘Organisational Climate’ 
(Internal Journal, 2001) gained momentum, and norms of security (Internal Journal, 
2002), as well as programmes of goals, were created in a joint initiative (Internal 
Journal, 2002).  
The idea was to ‘create an entirely new organisation’, seeking ‘change of culture, 
change of attitudes, people’s posture and animus’ (Internal Journal, 2000). It is 
noteworthy that this was a period marked by the predominance of political 
interference in Brazilian public institutions, which were exposed to favouritisms in 
the form of appointments to key positions based on cronyism and nepotism. 
Consequently, the formal discourse pointed out that these proposed changes would 
be achieved ‘through professional and human enhancement of the organisation’s 
people’. Emphasis was placed on the ‘expansion and renewal’ of the technical body 
through public competitive examinations. Furthermore, under a discourse of 




, the idea of ‘continuous education’, translated into training 
and qualifications, illustrated BrazBank’s impetus. 
Between 2001 and 2002, the BrazBank was supported by consultancies that started 
the implementation of risk-management practices. This process was marked by a 
desire for compliance with the Brazilian Central Bank’s (BCB) and National 
Monetary Council’s (in Portuguese Conselho Monetário Nacional, CMN) 
regulations (BCB, 1994; CMN, 2001). These Brazilian national laws, however, 
reflected international requirements from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS, 1988; 1994; 2000), COSO (1992) and pressures from the Big 4 accounting and 
consultancy firms. For that reason, the structure and history of the BrazBank, as of 
many other banks, are closely linked to risk management enquiries and requests from 
national regulators which emerged reflecting international requirements and ‘best 
practices’, for instance, from BIS and COSO. Hence, considering the aim of this 
bank, the former president had said:  
The intention is that the bank really acts looking more to development than to 
credit. The credit itself is nothing. And in this context become even more 
important new tools that have been developed by BrazBank, such as the area of 
credit risk, which seeks to reduce the maximum possible loss on the wrong 
loans, and especially the Matrix of Compliance, which seeks to ensure that 
operations are perfectly attuned to the strategic interests of the State (Internal 
Journal, 2001). 
                                                 
 
 
29 Professionalisation here is not conceived as an affiliation to or creation of a professional body, but as the 
construction of expertise in relation to a domain of knowledge that created a dominant space for risk experts. 
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Initially, therefore, the focus of risk management practices was directed towards the 
financial risks, mainly defaults that represented credit risks, but also internal controls 
(BIS 1998, BCB, 2000). However, each actor articulated risk requirements in a 
different manner. For instance, according to BCB’s reports, risk management was 
necessary for the bank’s ‘safety’ and the ‘reliability’ of internal information, while 
the Big 4 consultancies emphasised its importance to ‘improve organisational 
performance’ and ‘fulfil international market requirements’. The idea of internal 
controls was presented in a seminar involving the whole organisation and reinforcing 
the participatory nature of this enterprise, invoking the ‘reliability’, ‘effectiveness’, 
‘efficiency’, ‘safety’ characteristics of this tool. According to the consultant 
responsible for this implementation:  
This is a dynamic process driven by the Board, management and staff and 
provides effectiveness and efficiency of operations, the reliability of financial 
reporting and fulfillment of rules and regulations (compliance). […] Thus, we 
are creating a strategic vision of safety management and risk management 
(Internal Journal, 2002 – emphasis added).  
Furthermore:  
The objectives of the internal control structure are to ensure the effective 
management of internal and external risks to the BrazBank and to ensure the 
efficiency and effectiveness of operations and to ensure the quality and integrity 
in recording transactions, and provide reliability in the preparation of financial 
statements (BrazBank’s Internal Control Norm). 
In summary, this articulation associated risk with safety and this was important to 
explain and normalise the necessity of surveillance and more internal controls, which 
would reduce failures and human errors through the incorporation of IT solutions 
and the mechanisation of processes. Furthermore, this discourse also maintained the 
necessity for formalisation and structuration through new guidelines, norms, 
flowcharts, etc. Surveillance processes emphasised their contribution to ‘improve 
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management’; and, hence, performance. Internal controls were perceived as 
something ‘new’ and ‘good’ that would ‘add value’, and as an imperative ‘to 
preserve the institution’s survival’ (Internal Journal, 2000). In short, the ‘necessity’ 
to improve internal controls was articulated as something essential to any company, 
as a consultant concluded:  
Internal controls are primary to management any business. Whether it’s a 
grocery store or a big bank, it is necessary that a company tries to decrease risks 
of financial and reputation losses (Big 4 consultant, Internal Journal, 2000). 
The normalisation of the rhetoric of surveillance as an imperative for efficiency was 
consistent with concerns about budget constraints and questions about the 
BrazBank’s survival, called ‘financial sustainability’, and which would supposedly 
be obtained with the adoption of drastic cost reduction measures aiming to itemise 
incomes and expenses (Internal Journal, 2000). These ideas were translated into 
propositions to cut costs, in a campaign of ‘save to balance’, which would only be 
achieved through more control mechanisms. In that period, risk was understood as an 
instrument to reduce failures and errors occasioned by lack of controls. 
Consequently, as reported in the Internal Journal, ‘BrazBank improves internal 
controls to operate more safely’ (Internal Journal, 2000: 1).  
Risk managers also addressed the importance of Information Technology 
Governance in the implementation of an efficient and effective system of internal 
controls (Internal Journal, 2002). During its implementation, the Director of 
Finances asserted:  
The System of Internal Control covers the recognition and reduction of risks, 
performance improvement and compliance with regulations and laws. ‘It’s the 
end of surprises’, he concluded (Internal Journal, 2002: 2 – emphasis added). 
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Risk thus provided a feeling of stability and order necessary to BrazBank’s 
continuous changes. At that time, the focus of risk-management practices was on 
departmental activities and the ‘concern with processes’ acceleration’ characterised 
by the valorisation of an ‘organisational reorientation and, above all, of the 
information technology... essential tool... updating, accelerating and de-
bureaucratising all processes’ (Internal Journal, 2000). Internal controls gained 
prominence and support from staff with a directed focus on re-establishing the 
recommendation of CMN’s Law N.2554/98 inside the BrazBank. This proposition 
seemed to offer a complete solution to BrazBank’s apprehensions, as a manager 
reported, at that time, ‘[Internal controls] track all your actions and at all levels, so 
you can achieve the planned objectives’ (Internal Journal 27, 2000, emphasis added). 
Ultimately, this analogy normalised the new mechanisms of surveillance and control 
as positive to BrazBank’s operations. 
It was also during this period that a department of risk management was created. 
Initially, it was configured in two different units: the ‘Risk Department’ was the one 
responsible for credit risks, measured by cash flow analysis and credit matrix; while 
the ‘Processes Department’ was responsible for internal controls. As exposed in 
accounting and finance literature, the development of discourses of risk resulted in a 
proliferation of the assumption that risk was controllable (Knight, 1971; Jorion, 
2006). Models, based on ‘big data’, seeking statistical inferences tried to predict the 
future (Gujarati, 2003). Therefore, risk analyses were focused on ‘preventing’ 
problems, and gathering information found useful in folders, and wihch started to be 
required from risk experts as part of official forms, spreadsheets, and systems of 
credit grant analysis. This initiative aimed to create a database to manage risks. 
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Additionally, new models were developed in process reviews and maintained the 
valorised ‘strictness in granting loans’. In that period, operational norms reinforced 
that the main ‘innovation’ was:  
The adoption of a matrix that enables classify projects according to their degree 
of risk and ‘Social Index’, an indicator that seeks to capture the extent to which 
candidates for funding projects contribute to State’s economic and social 
development. In case, the industry and field of activity, employment generation, 
and the integration of production chains, the spatial concentration, technological 
development and environmental impact are considered. The elaborated matrix, 
besides being an instrument for pre-qualification of projects and confirmation, 
after more accurate assessments, enables the flexibility in the spread with which 
the bank starts working (Internal Journal, 2001). 
The implementation of risk management practices, then, was associated with 
BrazBank’s social and economic goals. However, this was also a strategy developed 
to accommodate initial challenges. Although national consultancy groups supported 
this process, they considered it as something experimental. For that reason, the 
success of risk management depended on the acceptance of other managers, as that 
was a period of more interaction between departments. Of course, this was not a 
neutral game, and an analyst additionally reported that there were conflicts with 
practices previously established:  
No one knew what to do, and a consultancy was hired to implement this ‘risk 
analysis’ [using his fingers to indicate quotation marks in this last concept]. The 
process was initially manual and related with searching for information in 
folders in an attempt to better comprehend the characteristics of each operation, 
of each customer, for granting credit. Before that, the analysis was made based 
on the perception and experience of analysts responsible for credit grants, so, in 
the beginning, there were many conflicts with them who said the activity of risk 
analysis department represented a rework. This consultancy lasted a year, 
analysing how this process was developed and exchanging information based on 
the results. (Analyst A) 
Given the indications of the analyst, the idea of risk analysis was used to name these 
new practices, previously unnamed. This represents a catachrestical moment in risk 
discourse. Naming the unnameable, risk was indeed creating a space for its practices, 
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which needed to be legitimated in the BrazBank. There were attempts to contest that 
expansionary discourse of risk, as could be evidenced by the allegations of ‘rework’ 
from credit grant managers. Indeed, clients’ profiles had been analysed before, but 
the formalisation and numeracy involved in risk management practices started to 
provide power to risk experts. The experiment, therefore, was labelled risk analysis 
and incorporated into the BrazBank’s practices.  
In that period, risk-management practices were similarly prominent worldwide. 
Thus, while reflecting benchmarks from other banks, workshops were conducted ‘in 
order to start the process of disseminating information about the system being 
implemented, as well as emphasising the role and importance of each of us in the 
management of internal controls process’ (Internal Journal, 2002: 1). The Board of 
Directors also supported these changes and emphasised that ‘Internal Control 
Systems will require the commitment of everybody’. As a Director at that point 
highlighted: ‘[we] need to install in the conscience of us all the culture of internal 
control’, and also that it was a ‘[instrument of] great value for the performance of the 
bank and each of its employees’ (Internal Journal, 2002). Thus, risk proposed a 
change in mind-set marked by its internal acceptance, which supported its 
universality, and international recognition and applicability. The conversation at this 
point started to condense the meaning of risk around the idea of ‘best practices’, in 
metonymical rhetoric strategies that ignored the particularities of BrazBank’s social 
role (see section 2.3.2) while asserting that internal controls would guarantee 
‘transparency, clarity, security’, as highlighted in BrazBank’s Internal Journal:  
The primary objective of the Internal Control System is set parameters that 
should delimit the actions of the agency in the conduction of its business, in 
order to reduce the possibilities of operating errors, exposure of risk, fraud and 
P a g e  | 286 
 
malfeasance, in accordance with CMN Resolution 2.554 and international 
standards and principles of the Basel Committee. 
Although it meets a legal device, a system of well-designed internal controls 
brings many advantages to the operation of the institution. Among many, we 
could mention: greater employee’s involvement with BrazBank’s strategies; 
mapping of all activities performed by the various units; formalisation of all 
internal procedures, monitoring of the main risks affecting the BrazBank; 
transparency in the implementation of activities; clarity in determination of 
responsibility, greater ability to audit etc. It is for this reason that the 
implementation of the Internal Control System in BBD should be seen as a 
unique opportunity for the planning of their activities, much to the pursuit of 
efficiency, but also to ensure better security in conducting their business 
(Internal Journal, 2002, emphasis added). 
Again, safety and efficiency were nodal points in the discourse of risk. However, 
initially, the universality of risk as something better implied a continuous evolution 
in BrazBank’s practices to accommodate interests and avoid clashes with pre-
existing practices which could represent a radical rupture of protagonists’ dominant 
position (Sudddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Therefore, consultancy groups focused 
on creating a sense of order while proposing the ‘formalisation and structuration’ of 
existing practices (Internal Journal, 2000). The analyses were based on statistical 
models, but training and workshops were used as a way to share experiences, and 
create a sense of grouping. Also, the normalisation of risk discourse reinforced 
attempts to maintain benchmarks with international development banks, for example, 
the Development Bank of Japan and the Latin American Association of 
Development Financing Institutions (ALIDE) (Internal Journal, 2000). As reported 
by a consultant during a collective training:  
We will be much more convincing in the sense of showing local and 
international investors that the future will be different from the past, if, year 
after year, we can show where a statistical line of debt/GDP ratio is declining 
albeit gradually (Consultant, Internal Journal 45, 2000).  
Actors in the bank also supported this initiative: 
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I think the event was paramount, especially at this time that the BrazBank has 
been experiencing: new tools, new model, the matrix of compliance. It was an 
exchange of experience (Manager, Internal Journal 49, 2000)  
The consultants, however, ignored the fact that the BrazBank did not have 
international investors and imposed the same rhetoric based on the market logic of 
risk from multinational banks in the context of a development bank. Indeed, the 
opinions of managers demonstrated that the exchange of experiences and the use of 
(de-contextualised) benchmarks was perceived as useful for BrazBank’s operations 
and actors. This openness to learning from outsiders was considered a relevant 
aspect in BrazBank’s culture. Therefore, concisely, risk was perceived in this phase 
as ‘new’, ‘better’, more ‘safe’ and an ‘efficient’ instrument that would bring 
‘professionalism’ to BrazBank’s operations and maintain its ‘compliance’ with BCB 
requirements, but which also followed international standards that would ‘reduce 
cost’ and ‘improve performance’. Thus, risk was considered the ‘solution’ for 
BrazBank’s previous problems related to inefficiencies caused by political 
interference and human error caused by the subjectivity implicit in decisions in this 
new stabilised economic period after hyperinflation. Nonetheless, the fulfilment of 
these promises did not materialise, and contestations about these standards started to 
crystalize.  
 
2003 – 2004: Contestations and New Expertise - From Controls to Audited 
Risks 
At the end of the previous phase, between 2003 and 2004, problems and faults had 
not yet been completely solved. The BrazBank was in compliance with BCB’s 
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Resolution N. 2554/98. However, risk experts reinforced the importance of 
embedding risk management considerations in all activities in order to achieve a 
‘state of the art’ in risk management practices, described as:  
The internalisation by each about the importance of Internal Controls’ subject 
for the BrazBank; assumption by each of incumbent responsibilities on risk’s 
monitoring and mitigation process; implementation of improvements and 
corrections of deviations from the monitoring activities carried out by internal 
audit; the conscience that is much safer if everyone knows the way we do or not 
do something. This way we will be transparent with our colleagues and partners 
and contribute to the transparency of the institution, as best practices in 
corporate governance, suggested. (Internal Journal, 2004, emphasis added). 
The problem then was constructed to highlight an incoherence, not in the concept of 
risk, but in its constructs and operationalization, which required the commitment of 
each actor in the BrazBank. The involvement of everyone was linked with a sense of 
transparency and reliability among BrazBank’s colleagues. It again reinforced an 
idea of friendship in risk management propositions smoothly shifting the 
responsibility for failures from experts to non-experts. However, the promulgation of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 compelled the BCB to announce Resolution N. 
3.081/03 to meet international requirements of external audit and internal audit 
committees. Thus, perceiving the fragilities in the risk discourse in that time, the 
audit department started to articulate a new space for its practices, using the rhetoric 
of ‘continuous updating’. Given SOX’s requirements translated in BCB 3.081/03, 
after a crowded training event, the official BrazBank’s discourse considered that:  
The bank’s involvement in this type of [training] event is positive and 
necessary, given that, in the [BrazBank], it is applicable in relation to internal 
controls, particularly concerning risk management. This view is increasingly 
important for the company to continue updated in discussions and improvement 
of management mechanisms used by institutions with similar characteristics 
(Internal Journal, 2003, emphasis added)  
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The proposition of a risk focus, then, was considered a continuous updating of 
previous internal control practices (Arena et al., 2010) used to maintain the 
benchmark with other institutions. During this period, internal audits were an 
instrument to evaluate BrazBank’s internal controls and the current Director of 
Finance was titled ‘Director of Finance, Controls and Audit’. This director bought 
the idea proposed by the internal auditing department and claimed a ‘culture of risk 
management’, asserting that ‘there must be a permanent work for improvement so 
that quality can be ensured’ (Internal Journal 200, 2003: 1). Suddenly, reflecting the 
emergence of the Enron case, the element of ‘fraud’ was incorporated in BrazBank’s 
discourse of risk, which was no longer only characterised solely by an exorcism of 
the subjectivity implicated in human judgments, not compatible with the current 
moment of BrazBank’s practices dominated by ‘IT solutions’. The Enron fraud 
triggered concerns about human interference even in sophisticated quantitative 
decision-making processes and the prevalence of human interests. Therefore, it 
reinforced the necessity of independent and neutral actors conducting the 
management of threats. Formalisation and mechanisation were still considered the 
best way to reduce these adverse influences. The mantra was that ‘there are no 
arguments against facts’ and ‘in God we trust, everything else we test’. 
Consequently, activities were monitored, formalised, blocked, limited, 
parameterised, and audited more strictly as a way to maintain control and 
organisational sustainability.  
BrazBank is now dedicated to the implementation of Internal Controls Systems, 
not in order to fit the standards of the BCB, but worried about their routines 
provide efficiency and safety, as long as an account with the participation of all 
collaborators. […] Systems’ goal is to define parameters that should mark out 
bank’s actions in conducting its business, reducing the chances of operational 
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errors, malfeasance and fraud, according to international standards and the 
principles of the Basel Committee (Internal Journal, 211, 2004: 1). 
The quotation above, then, illustrates an aim to follow international risk-management 
standards, instead of national ones, which were considered inferior. This tense 
climate was used to sustain claims for audit committees and even more surveillance, 
in a ‘risk of everything’ (Power, 2004). A discourse of professionalisation
30
 started 
to take shape, while experts’ programmes shifted risk-management practices 
previously embraced by ‘disconnected’ departments as an ‘experimental’ process to 
an independent supposedly neutral and trained one. All this change was again 
supported by Big 4 consultancies, putting risk management in the spotlight and 
disseminating this ‘new tendency’ to the Internal Audit department (IAD). The IAD 
was, then, the new body responsible for risk-management practices and had its 
importance reinforced among directors and in the Boards. This incorporation of 
internal controls in auditing and risk management practices was considered ‘modern’ 
and ‘critical to provide greater transparency to financial institutions, avoiding 
accounting scandals of Americans like Enron and World.com’ (Internal Journal, 
2003: 1) as emphasised in audit plans for 2004:  
                                                 
 
 
30 The idea of professionalisation here is embraced as a continuous process of becoming an expert. This is related 
to attempts to legitimate experts’ practices (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), accommodate previous existing 
practices (Arena et al., 2010) and avoid or engage in disputes in order to preserve their authority (Mikes, 2011). 
This represents a political construction of an identity that segregates non-experts as biased and untrained 
individuals who need to use their (inferior) experience and judgement to make decisions. On the other hand, risk 
management calculative practices cover over the influence of experts in principles that hide their interests while 
claiming the measurability, controllability and predictability of future outcomes.  
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As a result of the experience gained in 2003, and based on the knowledge 
acquired during training in the period in which we participate, is being 
introduced gradually to form a methodology that has been adopted in modern 
audit work, which turns with emphasis on focused examinations the risks. 
(Auditing Plan, 2004, emphasis added) 
During this period, the auditing department started to evaluate internal controls and 
report its conclusions with some recommendations, while other managers were 
responsible for presenting possible ‘solutions’ for ‘deficiencies’ found (Internal 
Journal 201, 2003). These ‘deficiencies’ were also called ‘fragilities’ in Audit 
reports. These elements were used to confirm the claimed authority and supremacy 
of auditors to spot errors and recommend improvements through action plans. 
In summary, this was also a period of consolidation of BrazBank’s purposes, which 
changed the discourse of “Transformation in progress” to “BrazBank in Action” 
(Internal Journal 209, 2003: 4). This ‘action’ was supported by the new focus on risk 
management, which had changed too. Consequently, the focus on Internal Controls 
and Risk Management was directed to the programme of goals, strategic plans, and 
internal performance evaluation. The IAD embraced this work, incorporating 
internal controls and potential risks, as complementary instruments in its analysis. 
Therefore, more recent scandals and crisis brought the importance of risk back and 
gave momentum to its expansion. 
 
2005 – 2006: Golden Times of Auditing with a Risk Management Focus 
The golden time of risk management became apparent in 2005 with the renaming of 
the auditing practices to ‘Auditing with a Risk Management Focus’. It was a period 
of the enormous relevance of risk-management practices, which received much 
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support from BrazBank’s Board of Directors. New requirements for operational risk 
management were applied, and the development of the auditing department focusing 
on operational risks marked another ‘dislocatory moment’ for risk management 
practices, which changed the focus of auditing from a backward to a forward view, 
to support previous internal control attempts. The BrazBank considered that:  
The establishment of internal controls is critical to the efficient management of 
operational risk. An effective internal control system reduces the likelihood of 
human errors and irregularities in processes and systems (Internal Journal, 
2006). 
This conceptualisation denied human interference to sustain the supposed objectivity 
and neutrality of risk assessments, claimed by an assumed ‘systematicity’ of risk 
management practices. These ‘new’ audit practices re-wrote the discourse about risk 
considering it the ‘most modern technique’, associated again with the idea of ‘best 
practices’ and ‘state of the art’ (Audit Report, 2006). Given the supremacy of 
auditing surveillance, risk became an instrument that exposed ‘fragilities’ and 
‘deficiencies’, and trained auditors were the ‘experts’ who could point to the right 
direction using no more ‘recommendations’, but ‘actions plans’.  
As a result of the adoption of Auditing’s most modern techniques of internal 
audit and risk assessment, […] [auditing reports] evaluated: the efficiency of 
each of the identified controls, using the audit’s technique of walkthrough, the 
impact and likelihood of risk according to Matrix Criteria for Risk Assessment. 
[…] Due to the update level to be elevating the newly formed team of internal 
auditors was hired on a [Big 4] consultancy in 2006 for theoretical and practical 
training of the Audit team, based on Risk Management Methodology (Audit 
Report, 2006, our emphasis). 
Given the metaphorical connection caused by the reference to internal controls in 
operational risk-management practices, risk became recognised as the lack of 
controls and the focus changed from activities to processes and to fragilities that 
could give rise to financial and operational problems. Furthermore, the association 
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with the Big 4 training was an essential element in the legitimacy bought to re-
articulate internal audit practices, as exposed in training slides and auditing norms:  
 [Audit with a Risk Management Focus] is an independent activity, of objective 
assurance and consulting, designed to aggregate value to an organisation’s 
operations. A systematic and disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the 
efficiency of the processes of risk management, control and governance to help 
an organisation achieve its goals (Institute of Internal Auditors (USA) and 
Audibra - Institute of Internal Auditors of Brazil) - Training Internal Audit 
(Slides from Big 4 Training, 2006) 
The role of the IAD was modified to assess risks, provide risk coverage, confirm 
information, analyse operations, check compliance, make recommendations, 
evaluate the security of assets, and track action plans’ implementation. This process 
of evaluating risk was described as ‘a systematic process for assessing and 
integrating professional judgments about probable adverse conditions or events; 
identifying risks, examining them, investigating the sources and assigning a relative 
value to each of them, anticipating problems and helping the organisation to protect 
against disaster or loss of opportunity, aligned with the hedging needs of 
stakeholders’ (Internal Audit Report, 2006).  
To guarantee the consistency of this discourse, during this period, the process of 
identifying and categorising risks changed its parameters too. While attached to 
internal controls, risks could have multiple categories, and, hence, causes; however, 
consultants during the training imposed the importance, and even necessity, of 
identifying a ‘major or primary cause of each risk’ as a way to avoid contradictions 
and have more accurate information. Contradictorily, while this methodology 
reduced complexity, it also decreased the information available in risk reports. 
Stirling (2011) ratified the importance of keeping risk complexity, as one failure 
could be caused by many errors or a sequence of them. Similarly, in the BrazBank, 
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an analyst confirmed that these changes brought incongruences because ‘an event 
could be caused by a conjunction of legal, operational or system failures’. However, 
she also endorsed that this was the orientation proposed (or imposed) by consultants 
to maintain the (arbitrary and illusory) consistency in the claims of controllability of 
risk management practices. Therefore, according to the new methodology, all these 
elements were implicit in a singular accident represented by the most impactful one. 
This condensed meaning of risk represented a metonymical moment of its 
construction. This metonymy reinforced risk’s supposedly quantifiable 
characteristics. While excluding risk’s multiple layers and interconnected cause-
consequence relationships, this rhetoric sustained the myth of objectivity of risk 
while supporting unilateral decisions that simplified the complexity and dynamics of 
departmental activities in single risk categories. To this extent, the proposition of a 
sole and most impactful risk reduced the contestation using a methodology supported 
by international practices and transmitted by the legitimated Big 4 experts. 
Consequently, risk became a self-referential practice. 
In summary, during this period, trained auditors were the experts who could point 
the right direction, and have the domain of ‘best practices’, as universal solutions 
brought with action plans. Nonetheless, this dominant position and power imbalance 
also introduced conflict in discourses about risk management practices by the 
frontiers drawn between experts and non-experts’ identities. Whereas in the 
transformation period, there was an experimental process where everybody was 
uncomfortable as learners of a new methodology, during auditing’s golden period, 
risk management was perceived as a concentrated power, supported by the Board 
and the training received by Big 4 consultancy. As previous investments had to be 
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justified, the knowledge and competence of a ‘risk expert’ were the answer. The 
spotlight was on the auditing department; however, another shift in national 
regulatory parameters would change its position. 
 
2007- 2008: ERM’s Integration in a Holistic and (or) Independent Risk 
Approach 
Following new demands and global tendencies about risk management (COSO, 
2004; Deloitte, 2008; EandY, 2011; KPMG, 2011), in 2006, the BCB promulgated 
the Resolution N. 3.380/2006, which autonomous risk management department to 
financial institutions. Additionally, Big 4 companies visualised this as an opportunity 
to sell a new product (Power, 2007) that promised the integration of risk 
management practices and a shift from a focus on threats to opportunities, which was 
worldwide called Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). Thus, inside the BrazBank, 
these shifts in the macro-discourse of risk management represented a rupture with 
the former ‘Auditing with a Risk Management Focus’ through this rhetoric that 
emphasised the ‘new’: department, methodology and training. The announcement of 
these changes and ‘investments’ was published in BrazBank’s Internal Journals, 
then:  
BrazBank has gained a new department: with the purpose of improving the 
internal and operational controls of BrazBank, adding the tools in a single 
management and complying with the view of Central Bank Resolution n. 
3.380/06, the Risk Management Department was established, a body linked to 
the Director of Finance. The new department will absorb the old Unit of Risk 
Management, which changes its name to the Credit and Market Risk Unit. 
Subordinated to the Risk Management Department, the Operational Risk Unit 
has also been created, encompassing the activities of operational risk 
management, internal controls and information security. In order to properly 
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structure the Operational Risk Unit, the new management team is participating 
in presentations of proposals for service of the most respected consultancies in 
risk management in Brazil, such as Big 4A, Big 4B and the University Lab Y. 
(Internal Journal, April 2007) 
The conceptualisation of ERM implemented in the BrazBank emphasised risk 
management’s ‘new’ character. After creating the ‘new’ department of risk 
management, a ‘new’ methodology brought by a ‘new’ (and different) Big 4 
consultancy group stressed its ‘added value’ component for shareholders (even 
though the bank has no shareholders). Risk was now measured and pondered 
considering the financial impacts caused by its potential monetary materialisation. In 
addition, more than the action plans, different indicators were proposed to ‘follow’, 
‘monitor’ and ‘signal’ some risks, described as ‘more timely metrics’. 
On the other hand, this movement also caused conflicts between the risk 
management and auditing departments, constant especially in the beginning of this 
transition. According to Manager B, risk management practices only started in the 
bank in 2007, and before this, there was ‘a different thing’. The new methodology 
was questioned many times, but the risk management actors protected their authority 
considering the more up-to-date training received from the Big 4 consultancy group 
who proposed the current approach. The annual meeting records in 2007 reflect this 
situation of rupture after the exclusion of previous statistics from auditing analysis 
and illustrate these battles for power:  
- [Risk Manager], as coordinator of the Risk Committee, explained to everyone 
involved that the statistical effectiveness of the controls in the current report was 
suppressed for two reasons:  
a) the risk categorisation, the type and grade, as well as the controls are not 
compatible with the new methodology; 
b) based solely on the compliments of [Action Plans] reported by managers 
without testing and reviewing processes, which often have undergone 
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significant changes, the results would be presented, particularly in regard to 
the efficiency of the controls would not be valid, contrasting including the 
notes of audit tests. For these reasons, we support the position of the previous 
tracked [Action Plans], but not use statistics to indicate the effectiveness of 
process controls, understanding that wrong information is worse than 
outdated by the lack of information. (Emphasis added) 
In short, the discourse of ERM was developed to reinforce that ‘risk management is 
not auditing’. This rupture was necessary for two reasons. First, it would supposedly 
reduce the resistance from other departments that associated risk management 
practices with auditing, and therefore, punishment. Second, the emphasis on the 
difference between current risk-management practices and previous ones was used to 
open space for these new claims of expertise. However, this new methodology 
continued to carry a vestige from the past auditing practices, as the idea of 
independence was conceived as an essential element of risk management’s power 
and the focus was on what could go wrong in departmental activities. This rhetoric 
was flawed because this independence of risk-management experts was mixed with a 
secret, and risk management was associated with threats instead of opportunities. For 
instance, Administrative Manager C affirmed that:  
Perhaps part of the conception that risk management is equal to audit departs 
from the way the process is developed. The risk management [department] was 
created as an integration of auditing and process management [department]. 
Moreover, with a risk management department that was considered a re-work, 
including analysts were kept the same. Therefore, the structure has changed, but 
the concept remained the same.  
During the period of ‘Auditing with a Risk Management Focus’, the debate about 
risk-management practices was concentrated around internal auditors, managers and 
the Board to maintain its independence. However, after a period without much 
disclosure of its practices, risk management began to feature again in Internal 
Journal headlines. A weekly advertisement in BrazBank’s Internal Journal tried to 
explain new concepts, and processes and to reinforce the importance of risk 
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management to BrazBank’s operations. Prearrangements and explanations about the 
new methodology and the new risk management department were exposed in 
BrazBank’s Internal Journal, for instance:  
[Structuration of Risk Management - April/2007] during the last five years the 
BrazBank has sought ways to measure, mitigate and control their risks more 
efficiently. However, this practice has happened in disaggregated mode, with 
individual actions in different departments in the bank failing to take advantage 
of the longer established knowledge in specific areas of the institution. 
The market has shown that the risk management of financial institutions has 
been structured in the most aggregated way since the concept of risk does not 
bring many differences in their types. Thus, it is also possible to consolidate the 
risks so that you can measure and/or estimate the overall risk level of the 
institution. Based on this premise, the Risk Management department was 
created on 11/12/2006, subject to the Director of Finance, as the sole body 
responsible for managing the inherent business risks of BrazBank, translated as 
managing credit risk and market risk and operational risk, the latter to meet the 
provisions of [BCB’s] Resolution 3380. 
The discourse of ‘best practices’ was again reinforced by internal communications. 
However, the primary driver of risk management expansion was its relevance to 
work both maximising gains and reducing losses in order to improve performance. 
Its focus thus was shifted to expose what was called the ‘real’ risk and not only lack 
of controls. The ‘new’ department was articulated as a ‘gain’ extended by the idea of 
integration, which reinforced its meaning as something ‘good’. The new 
methodology supposedly represented a more ‘complete’’ and ‘sophisticated’ 
approach to ensure the safety and reliability of the international financial system.  
The idea of necessity was also embodied in this view, which proclaimed that this 
change was not only considered as the ‘state of the art’, but a ‘non-negotiable 
imposition’. This self-referential rhetoric reinforced BCB and Basel’s minimum 
capital requirements as ‘the most significant pillar in terms of impact on institutions’ 
activities and that affects the process of review and disclosure to the market’ 
299 | P a g e  
 
(Consultant, Internal Journal, 2008). While ignoring that the BrazBank had no 
market or international investors and was accorded a high and positive Basel index, 
the Big 4 consultancy firm affirmed in an event to the whole bank that the benefits 
from the new risk management framework were:  
[Increase] shareholder value: competitiveness, efficiency improvement, 
effective and efficient use of capital, reduction of capital allocation 
requirements, change the market perception, influence the "rating" assigned to 
banks and the value of their shares, improvement in decision making. 
Adaptation of Basel II is a non-negotiable requirement.  
Of course, contradictions were presented in many aspects of this discourse; 
consequently, this was also a turbulent period. Even if the new discourse was about 
integration, this was not the reality even inside the RMD, as the two units – credit 
and market as well as operational risk management – continued to develop 
segregated work, but now structured in a single department. Internally, conflicts 
were present, and shifts in the location of the audit department exposed how this 
department had lost its privileges of being an area to ‘predict the future’ that worked 
literally near the director and became again as ‘backwards looking in the rear-view 
mirror’. The new risk-management department, then, ‘expands the technical and 
managerial capacity of the bank’ and became the responsible ‘to prevent large errors 
with an integrated structure which will establish a culture based on risks’ 
(BrazBank’s President’s speech, 2007). Conversely, this harmonised culture was 
never achieved. 
In summary, recognising the authority of risk in the BrazBank, actors took advantage 
of the general proposition of ERM and new requirements from the BCB to claim 
their power in a new department of risk management. To reduce the contestations 
from other departments, this latest construction of risk utilised a logic of difference 
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to reinforce that risk was not auditing. It also tried to create a commonality while 
shifting the focus of risk management practices from threats to opportunities. 
Therefore, risk management practices were constructed as a component of the 
BrazBank’s impetus to improve performance. The core element of this rhetoric, in 
this case, was the idea the risk added value to BrazBank’s operations. Nonetheless, 
after some time, it became apparent that even the ‘new’ risk management practices 
could not fulfil their promises. As a result, the next section explains the current crisis 
in risk management practices and the current rhetoric that blame non-experts who do 
not cooperate with the enhancing of the ‘risk culture’ in the BrazBank. 
 
2009 – 2013: The Crisis of Experts and Blaming ‘Risk Culture’ 
The crisis of risk-management practices in this BrazBank was related to questions 
about risk management’s supremacy and capacity to dictate the ‘best practices’ for 
the whole bank. The idea that risk management adds value and improves 
performance was challenged by administrative and credit grant managers, 
considering that BrazBank’s incomes were obtained through new loans and not by 
risk-management practices. The accumulation of ‘action plans’ and risks, which have 
never been materialised, raised questions about the plausibility and even the ‘real’ 
existence of the risks proposed by the RMD. 
Although the discourse in the integration period was that risk management and audit 
were two different things, the perception of managers and analysts did not converge 
on this point. During interviews, risk-management practices were commonly 
described as conflated with internal audit practices, so managers felt they were being 
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inspected twice. Additionally, changes in the mandate of the Board of Directors, 
together with the international relevance lost after the subprime crisis (Stulz, 2009; 
Taleb, 2009), generated the loss of the Board’s support internally.  
For that reason, the idea of ‘risk culture’ implicit in risk international norms and 
guidelines since the institution of internal controls (BIS, 1994; COSO, 1998) started 
to be explored more deeply in a rhetoric constructed to re-establish the power of risk 
experts. In a period when there was a divergence between guidelines and regulations 
(BIS, 2013; IRM, 2011; 2012), this element of culture was translated inside the 
BrazBank into a discourse on a ‘weak culture of risk’, and ‘lack of risk 
comprehension’, which was used to blame other managers.  
This rhetoric completely ignored the historical construction of this problem within 
previous attempts of risk construction. The discourse of ‘best practices’ ignored the 
epistemic violence that subjugated existing practices and control mechanisms in the 
BrazBank, claiming the supremacy of risk-management practices as the solution (see 
Chapter 2 and 4). Looking closer, each new articulation of risk represented a 
response to a contingency exposed in international discourses of risk management 
after crises. These dislocations, however, did not challenge the concept of risk, but 
its constructs. Therefore, they engendered the awareness that the previous 
understanding of risks had been incomplete, so needed to be improved, not 
contested. This self-referential practice of re-conceptualisation empowered, but also 
caused harm to BrazBank analysts, who misrecognised their power and the necessity 
of particular endogenous solutions for BrazBank’s problems, as said by Analyst E 
(2013):  
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I needed to open my mind and understand the difference of this new approach. 
In the beginning, it didn’t make sense to me, as it was in conflict with my 
previous models of risk management, but after some time, I started to 
comprehend this new model.  
The analyst was referring to internal conflicts about the inadequacy of the 
condensation of risk to a single category. However, the focus on the methodology 
purchased and imported from the Big 4 seemed to be unaltered (or even 
untouchable). I perceived that, psychologically, the methodology appeared to be 
treated as the source of power to risk experts, who ignored problems in its 
application and blamed other managers who had not receive the same training as 
they did, so were considered not skilled enough to perceive the risks or understand 
and work with risk management. While risk-management practices received support 
from the Board, this was not conceived as a problem. However, when it lost this 
sustenance, the risk empire was ruined. 
Following international discussions about risk through specialised publications, the 
idea of a ‘risk culture’ was explored as an instrument to re-establish the power of 
risk-management experts and blame those who refuse to accept it. As the power of 
risk practices was obtained from outside, thus, risk experts restricted their actions to 
requesting another worldwide recognised consulting group, who could update risk-
management practices and bring the solution and the right (new) path to be followed. 
Even under contestations which highlighted the inadequacy or even absence of the 
risk proposed, risk experts did not challenge this imported methodology internally, 
as it represented an external validation and legitimation of their power. Therefore, 
this discourse was developed to support their position and, as a new ideology, 
discussions about culture followed the idea of ‘massification’, as Analyst D said:  
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We need to have the support from the Board for the ‘massification’ of this idea 
of risk inside the bank. Workshops, training, seminars must be used to do this. 
That was what happened in my previous company when they tried to implement 
the importance of security.  
In the implementation of new management technologies in organisations, the 
component of massification is used to convince different actors about the importance 
and necessity of these new practices, reducing contestation. Blame is commonly also 
disseminated to segregate those who accepted and rejected the new technology, and 
so who was right or wrong. For instance, the resistance of senior employees to the 
new methodology was characterised as a problem which undermined risk 
management practices. Manager F (2013) argued that the problem was in the 
BrazBank culture, and not solved even with training:  
[T]he main problem has a cultural nature! The BrazBank has most of its staff 
trained in ancient ages. [...] It is a common practice in several areas, spend time, 
energy and intelligence idealising shortcuts, or even preventing, the normal 
process, instead of adopting the simple mechanisms that the legislator has 
demanded. This situation was not even mitigated with training.  
Although many reasons could be invoked to explain the crisis of risk-management 
practices, in the BrazBank, this seems to be closely related to the internal 
questioning of risk management’s supremacy and capacity to dictate the best practice 
for the whole bank. For instance, the process of defining which risks are appropriate 
to the BrazBank is described as follows:  
(1) after the cyclic process of risk analysis is finished, the results, called 
‘improvement opportunities’, are discussed with managers in meeting involving 
the committee of risk management and security and the individual responsible for 
the department [usually the manager]. (2) the discussion is developed focusing on 
points which generate disagreements between the risk department and the 
manager to set an action plan. (3) after exposing the risk and evaluate the actual 
controls in use supported by evidence, the debate is on the plausibility, or not, of 
action plans.  
For a long time, each group defended its interests and any attempt to see the ‘other’ 
(analysed) side viewpoint was considered a betrayal. Managers under analysis can 
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express their justification for disagreeing with an action plan purposed by the risk 
department; however, they have no vote in the Risk Committee’s decision. Thus, 
requesting the expertise of training and arguing about the ‘best practices’, Risk 
Committee members are persuaded to agree with the risk management standpoint. 
However, recently, it seems that this alliance has broken down. Precisely, with the 
new Board of Directors and after a new risk manager, who has come from the credit 
grant department, these agreements, which focused on ‘best practices’ were 
contested by a more organisational view. Given the accumulation of action plans for 
years, their timing and actual validity were further challenged by the Board, who 
questioned the capacity to evaluate the performance of other departments and risk 
management itself.  
During these last changes in the articulation of risk-management practices, therefore, 
there was a shift in risk’s importance and in the value attributed to it inside 
BrazBank. The position of risk experts moved from a status of privilege to one of 
awkwardness, as risk-management activities became synonymous with resistance 
and troubling colleagues in their work. It lost the support of the directors and became 
just a formalisation, in the sense that it was ‘used to fill a form’ and merely to 
‘comply with external requirements that do not necessarily have some internal 
importance until something bad happens’ (Manager K, 2013). According to informal 
chats in the RMD, these ‘unfortunate events’ were considered both as a threat and as 
an opportunity to risk management practices. Thus, there were mixed feelings about 
what would bring risk values back. To some extent, there was a desire for something 
bad happen, as a way (or last hope) to re-establish the power of risk management. 
However, this possible ‘opportunity’, also carried concerns about the possibility of 
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being blamed, labelled as ‘irresponsible’ and plagued by ‘do not develop good 
work’, in such a way that ‘it could be just another punishment for Risk Management 
practices that would push it into the hole’, and perhaps the manager would be held 
accountable for it.  
 
7.2.2. Discussion: from Collaborative ‘Culture of Control’ to Blaming ‘Risk 
Culture’ 
Inside the BrazBank, risk-management practices have suffered tremendous 
resistance and passed through many conflicts between hierarchies and departments 
throughout its history. Each actor developed his or her own view about risk, mainly, 
according to their experiences, errors, behaviours and interests. The idea of ‘risk’, 
‘risk management’ and ‘risk culture’ was intrinsically and historically 
departmentalised in a top-down imposition from the Board, following national and 
international regulations and the advice of Big 4 consultancies. As a result, risk-
management practices collided with previous existing mechanisms of control and a 
constant dispute between the risk management department and other managers 
marked the implementation of risk management, which was considered in many 
situations a threat to personal and departmental interests.  
Initially, conversely, the construction of risk and its discourse emerged in the 
BrazBank as an attempt to accommodate pre-existing control processes and interests. 
The Board played a major role determining a powerful hegemonic articulation about 
the importance and necessity of strength internal controls, used along with risk-
management implementation. Nonetheless, the directors and managers were 
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influenced by the hegemony of risk discourse internationally and pressure from 
national and international regulations as well as Big 4 companies. The Big 4 firms 
found in the construction of risk an opportunity to expand their domains while 
selling a supposedly transferable universal knowledge to BrazBank’s actors who 
wanted to become experts. In this progression, there was an overdetermination of 
elements like ‘objectivity’, ‘neutrality’, ‘independence’ and ‘best practices’, which 
downplayed the importance of ‘subjectivity’ and human interference in risk 
management practices.  
After radical contingencies which exposed the difference between what ‘risk 
management should do’ and ‘what risk management actually does’, in each new 
articulation, the risk-management discourse attached and allowed signifieds that 
were more subjective to draw its frontiers. In this sense, the propositions of new 
interpretations, or silos, for risk management, like ‘operational’ and ‘strategic’ risk 
organised in an ‘integrated’ framework which, in turn, emphasised the importance of 
‘culture’ and ‘appetite’, represented re-articulations of the risk construct, but did not 
challenge the concept. Each new articulation expanded and limited the concept of 
risk, so brought new advantages and difficulties to the risk discourse of ‘importance’ 
and necessity’. Risk became all and none of those signifiers that compound it, as an 
‘empty signifier’, but was differently articulated in each context, as a floating 
signifier (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Nevertheless, although ‘empty signifiers’ seem 
to be powerful elements of political discourses in previous literature (Howarth and 
Griggs, 2005), in this empirical site, the lack of coherence in concrete results opened 
space for contestations, which led to an institutional crisis.  
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From an internal perspective, directors have used risk to show their contribution and 
highlight ‘what they did better’, ‘what they brought new’, but also ‘problems in 
previous mandates’. New political mandates and changes in the board of directors, 
which are political indications from the government, pretended continuity, even 
though a new government might arrive with new objectives. Therefore, while risk 
was an authoritative discourse internationally, it received support from the Board, 
but when it lost its international power, it also came under threat internally. A 
manager reported that the importance offered to risk management is related to each 
director’s perspective, for instance:  
In the beginning, during the mandate of President [X], we discussed 
improvement opportunities and how it would be operationalised. He gave much 
attention to [risk management]. In the case of President [Y], he read the whole 
report and made pertinent questions, but more to see how those things work. 
This last one came and has already made it clear that for him what mattered was 
that income over expenditure should be greater than one. We had a whole 
training and work preparing the strategic planning, but he just wanted to know if 
the bank could [financially] hold itself. Now I think it is worse, as they do not 
even read. The reports are transferred from one meeting to another until they 
have time on the agenda to ‘accept’ it. They do not want to discuss or know 
what is happening (Manager H, 2013). 
The violence caused by consultancies was driven by claims of ‘new’ and ‘better’ 
risk-management frameworks without a focus on the understanding of BrazBank’s 
internal environment. This inadequacy was supported by a discourse that reinforced 
that consultants were ‘not specialists in development banks, but in the methodology 
of risk management’. Nonetheless, using the idea of risk management as a universal 
instrument of control, they decontextualised the particularities of its practices, 
arguing that they had ‘worldwide experience’ and ‘world-market reputation’ to 
legitimate their power and domain of technical elements of these ‘new’ (and 
unknown) tools, which could be fitted for all kind of organisations. In sum, this 
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discourse brought the ideas of ‘in worldwide use’ and ‘best practices’ to risk 
discussions.  
Organisations are complex and dynamic, so it is important to explore their genealogy 
and how changes are articulated. Consequently, risk-management practices cannot 
be conceived as fixed or immutable, so their history and subjects must be properly 
understood and reflected upon. In the recent period, risk practices were, then, 
progressively kept more as ‘secret’, supposedly to maintain their ‘independence’. 
However, the increased contestations and suspicious about it enhanced pressures for 
‘real’ results. Incongruencies in previous promises and lack of power to support 
concrete outcomes and benefits opened a space for contestations questioning the 
‘creative process’ of risk practices (Manager G), the existence of ‘real risks’ 
(Manager I) and the incompatibility of these supposedly ‘best practices’ with 
BrazBank’s context (Manager H). Nonetheless, these contestations were rebutted 
using arguments which blamed managers for a weak culture of risk. 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
The political logic demonstrates the genealogy of risk discourse. Risk was a ‘nodal 
point’ and a ‘hegemonic discourse’ inside BrazBank. However, its ‘articulation’ is 
contingent on excluded elements and marginalised groups. Shifts in power and 
interests have driven risk management practices. During risk management 
implementation, for instance, there were attempts to both expand and limit risk’s 
meaning. For example, through logics of equivalence, the idea of risk was portrayed 
as a ‘new’, ‘better’, more ‘safe’ and ‘effective’ control mechanism. Additionally, 
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through logics of difference, previously disconnected elements condensed the 
purposes of risk management practices, reinforcing their communality, aiming to 
‘improve performance’, ‘aggregate value’ and reduce threats. 
This chapter demonstrates how risk’s discursive articulations accommodated 
interests, avoiding or confronting opposition. Initially, as an experimental process, 
collective and beneficial for all, risk created a space for its expertise supported by the 
Board and international claims diffused by Big 4 consultancy firms. After being 
partially established, risk started to assert its uniqueness in claims of independence, 
which differentiated risk practices from other ones, creating frontiers between 
experts’ and non-experts’ identity through references to the training and knowledge 
received from Big 4 consultancy firms. Subsequently, shifts in regulatory 
requirements and the proposition of the ERM framework dislocated risk 
management practices to a new department that expanded its meaning as embracing 
both threats and opportunities. Nonetheless, the failure of threats or opportunities to 
materialise in the BrazBank, together with risk’s international failure after the 
subprime crisis, provided a chance for antagonist positions to challenge ‘risk’s 
empire’ also using its loss of relevance to the current Board’s political mandate.  
This landscape exposes how this organisation translated and adapted regulatory 
statements in its risk-management practices. Furthermore, it shows external and 
internal interests and power imbalances in the perpetuation of risk discourse. At 
different times, ‘risk’ was used to empower consultants, supervisory bodies, new 
Boards and risk experts. The claimed control of risk meant to control the 
organisation and had the authority to determine what was right or wrong, and in turn, 
set the correct path to follow. Nonetheless, the international failure of risk opened a 
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space for ‘other managers’ to reclaim their power. The dynamics and continuity of 
risk discourse, then, portray its construction as an ongoing process of becoming 
(Foucault, 1981). Thus, each new external regulatory requirement for risk 
management practices was used internally in attempts to re-establish the power of 
risk experts. 
In this sense, the current recognition and the inclusion of culture and appetite in the 
hegemonic discourse of risk, thus, it is not a mere coincidence, but another re-
articulation of risk-management practices constructed to empower its experts. This 
chapter revealed hidden interests in the dislocation from a participatory ‘culture of 
control’ to a blaming ‘risk culture’ inside the BrazBank. The political logic thus 
confirms that the implementation of risk management is dynamic, complex and 
struggles in practice (Woods, 2011; Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 2009). Likewise, it 
demonstrates that there are political processes and power imbalances underpinning 
these different conceptions, perceptions, and developments of risk and risk 
management.  
In this chapter, I also questioned whether the concept of risk employed allows for the 
distinction of ‘risk’ specialists to appear as experts, and consequently the 
construction of risk as a way of maintaining the power imbalance and the illusion of 
control over default, losses, and financial cycles. Thus, acknowledging that the 
discourse of risk allows for the creation of experts, I stressed the importance of 
human influences, as a counterpoint to a focus merely on technical tools. I exposed 
how, in this construction of risk, interested political actors take advantage of 
definitions and boundaries set for ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ according to their 
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own interests. Consequently, the definition of risk subordinated to quantification 
seems to be limited (Adams, 1995; Collier et al., 2007; Damoradan, 2009).  
This research confirms that the definition of ‘what risk is’ permeates psychological, 
social and cultural perspectives. For that reason, I advocated the importance of 
understanding historical constructions of risk and the political nature of risk 
discourse, considering contradictions between ‘what risk should be’ and ‘what risk 
does’ in practice (Mol and Law, 2004). Ultimately, I demonstrated that risk models 
do not run by themselves, but they are constructed, and, as in accounting, the 
numbers are only the final product (Hines, 1988).  
Ultimately, I showed that risk experts did not conceive changes to this imported 
methodology, because this was the source of their power and external legitimacy of 
their work. Consequently, they restricted their actions to blaming non-experts and 
claiming support from another consultant’s training, which could update their 
practices and massify a risk culture among non-experts. This perspective 
demonstrates the dependence of BrazBank’s risk management practices and experts 
on external validation. Thus, in the next chapter, embracing the fantasmatic logic of 
the LOCE, I propose an in-depth focus on the role of ideology and subjects (Zizek, 
1999; Glynos and Howarth, 2007) to understand the fantasies that support the 
hegemonic position of the risk concept.  
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– CHAPTER EIGHT – 
 
THE IDEOLOGY OF RISK AS BEST PRACTICES 
 
8.1. Introduction 
Given the overall discussion presented thus far, it seems intriguing that the concept 
of risk has so fully grasped the imagination of many actors. The Social Logic 
exposes that the objectivity and controllability of risk are contradictory, or an 
illusion kept as a secret, which could be highlighted by divergences between risk 
disclosures and practices, considering what has been said about ‘what risk is’, or 
‘should be’, and ‘what risk actually does’. The Political Logic demonstrates that this 
gap between risk aspirations and practices was constructed reflecting international 
contingencies, and then, dislocations imposed a rationale from international 
regulatory bodies and consulting firms, which actors used to legitimate their power 
in different moments of BrazBank’s history. Nonetheless, it is so far unclear why, 
even with the current discourse of risk inside the BrazBank replicating conflicts and 
contradictions at both national and international levels, risk was still in use and 
supported by most actors.  
This section, thus, explains some psychoanalytical and discursive elements that 
could be taken into account to explain the reasons why risk-management practices 
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are perpetuated. This analysis is developed considering the fantasmatic logic 
described by Glynos and Howarth (2007) and propositions from Zizek (1990), 
drawing on Lacan and Althusser, about how and why subjects construct discourses 
that misrecognise contingencies to ‘enjoy a good life’. In this respect, while in the 
BrazBank, I observed ideologies that covered over contingencies exposed in the 
social and political logics. These ideologies maintained the status quo and a 
comfortable sensation of control. Ultimately, fantasies avoided the possible pain and 
guilt of the responsibility for failures in risk constructions. 
Actors in the BrazBank and worldwide seem to believe in this rhetoric of risk’s 
controllability and predictability, and even after each new failure, they have been 
prone to invest in yet further risk-management practices as the assumed remedy for 
all previous problems. For that reason, the ideal of a complete model or framework 
of risk management is an impossible fantasy, but one that is nevertheless generally 
shared. The fantasmactic logic in this sense must be understood as a powerful 
element for the maintenance of social and political logics. Actors construct the 
incompleteness and impossibility in the ‘Other’, while looking for the promised 
‘fullness-to-come’, and enabling new practices and regimes of risk management to 
emerge.  
The fantasmatic logic in Lacanian terms is also related to enjoyment, in the sense 
that it ends the pain of the lacking. The enjoyment in the case of risk constructions is 
linked to the desire for objectivity, measurability, controllability and predictability. It 
fights the indeterminacy of future outcomes. Thus, given the resistance to challenge 
to the inappropriateness of the concept of risk coming from international regulations, 
and then, in allowing the rearticulating of risk management in new frameworks and 
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guidelines of sound best practices, enjoyment lies in the sense of some utopian 
paradise that might be achieved. The achievement of a ‘state of the art’, as a 
representation of the completeness in risk-management practices, then, drove new 
modes of risk management in an intricate pathway of supposed continuous 
improvement. 
Here, I examine how and why subjects articulate risk to support their activities. 
Moreover, how did risk experts cover over contingencies to claim expertise and 
power? The following sections represent examples of fantasies perpetuated inside the 
BrazBank. 
 
8.2. The Fantasies of Importance and Necessity 
Firstly, although many contradictions and conflicts originate from the risk-
management conceptualisations of ‘best practices’ and ‘the right
31
 path to follow’, 
risk has continued to be treated as something ‘important’ and ‘necessary’ in 
interviews with different actors. Thus, it is worth enquiring: why are these risk 
practices ‘important’ and ‘necessary’? And for whom are they ‘important’ and 




 ‘Right’ here is not adopted with the normative sense of ‘correct’, but as a desire, belief or even feeling that 
actors sustain to support that they are doing what they are supposed to do; thus, something acceptable and 
justifiable. 
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‘necessary’? In the subsequent sub-sections, I consider how statements about the 
importance and necessity of risk were often overdetermined as they were frequently 
further overlapped by a conditional ‘but’ that followed by many explanations.  
The focus on ‘importance’ was frequently related with ‘doing the right thing’ and 
then the ‘necessity’ of ‘standardised’ and ‘formalised’ decisions. The importance of 
risk sustains the identity of experts, but also the lack of contestation from non-
experts, since risk management regulations and guidelines were settled 
internationally; thus, in a supposely superior space and by superior actors. In this 
sense, it allowed blaming and repelled the responsibility for failures. Nonetheless, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, the necessity of risk is related to its myth of objectivity (see 
Section 3.2), which sustained unilateral economic decisions by its rhetoric of ‘best 
practices’ and solutions coming from outside to drive Brazil’s forward development. 
Finally, this discourse reduced the contestation of the neoliberal as well as 
international regulatory interventions.  
Further details about the fantasmatic elements of this importance and necessity are 
described in the following subsection. 
 
8.2.1. The Fantasy of Compliance with Best Practices 
The first fantasy sustaining risk management practices was the fantasy of compliance 
with ‘best practices’. This fantasy ignores that the best practices were in continuous 
transformation, caused by the empirical limits of this discourse, which presented 
failures in its operationalisation. Indeed, the phase of blaming ‘risk culture’ 
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portrayed frauds and a lack of cooperation and understanding from non-experts as 
the ‘Other’, which impeded the realisation of full compliance, and hence, the 
achievement of a ‘state of the art’ in risk management practices. Thus, they were 
obstacles preventing the realisation of the promised fullness. 
Even if the last stage of risk-management practices, reflecting the ERM’s 
framework, claimed a focus on performance improvement, BrazBank’s managers 
agreed that the primary driver of these practices was complying with BCB’s 
regulatory requirements. Actors in different hierarchical positions perceived 
inadequacies in these supervisory requests, but they did not recognise their power in 
arguing with the BCB about the incongruences of the risk management framework 
proposed for the BrazBank. This lack of contestation presented traces of a subaltern 
identity, which portrays regulators in a superior position, representing the world 
knowledge of international experts. Furthermore, it reinforces claims of universality 
in risk construction misrecognising an imperialist attempt to undermine the 
particularities of the micro in order to strengthen the macro. 
Practices such as the Value at Risk (VaR) used to assess market volatility, for 
instance, were kept just to meet normative requirements. Since BDBs could not use 
external funding (see more in Chapter 2), the total market risk exposition of this 
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bank represented only 0.01% of its PRE
32
. For that reason, analysts habitually 
compare the importance of these measures and information with directors’ salaries, 
as one director’s monthly wage would cover all the BrazBank’s market risk. 
Consequently, an intern made these assessments once a month, then an analyst 
revised them every three months before releasing the report. An analyst even argued 
that:  
This procedure refers to just a “tick-box” in which the information is filled in 
according to pre-established models […] [These] are requirements from the 
Central Bank, and the models had been defined by the previous management, so 
we just followed what had already been established. 
This affirmation confirmed the lack of contestations actors, who recognised part of 
the inappropriateness of BCB’s regulations, but did not take action to change their 
risk management practices. Similarly, the inappropriateness of the regulation at the 
international level was not challenged, while risk management international sound 
practices continue to the taken-for-granted. Also, this position can be partly 
explained by the next fantasy, which sustains the necessity of objective measures as 
a way to control future outcomes. This fantasy is maintained by the inaccessibility of 
regulators and supposed incapability of the regulated persons to challenge the 
system.  
 




 Required Reference Equity (in Portuguese, Patrimônio de Referência Exigido – PRE). 
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8.2.2. The Fantasy of Objectivity 
The desire for objectivity, or concreteness, was present in many instances, for 
example, when a risk expert argued during the decline of the risk empire: ‘I want to 
cap bottles; at least, I will feel that I am contributing and doing something’. In my 
view, the duality of risk objectivity and subjectivity create confusion among risk 
experts, who want to be perceived as neutral and objective contributors and not only 
as an irritation to others managers or the work of their departments. This 
incompleteness in subjects’ identity was partially fulfilled by a desire for objectivity 
brought by accounting technical methods and numbers. In this respect, actors 
claimed objectivity and the subjectivity implicit in making decisions was 
downplayed and considered as a ‘toll fee’ to achieve an imaginary fullness of an 
entirely objective risk management process in the future. Therefore, even if these 
claims of objectivity have a political intent to legitimatise risk-management 
practices, they also have a psychoanalytical correspondence with actors’ wish for 
wholeness and desire to enjoy a predictable and controllable good life (Reddy, 
1996).  
This supposed objectivity has been barely challenged, even after the worst crisis of 
risk. Even with the current opportunities to challenge the claimed neutrality and 
universality of risk discourse of objectivity, little has actually changed (Zizek, 2012; 
Glynos, Klimecki and Willmott, 2012). In the BrazBank, the inappropriateness of 
risk discourse was covered over by ‘Others’, who purportedly impeded the 
concretisation of risk management’s ‘state of the art’. The impediments, then, were 
materialised by the ‘lack of collaboration of managers to create a robust database of 
losses’ (Analyst E); ‘lack of understanding from non-experts (at all hierarchical 
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levels) about the relevance of risk management practices’ (Analyst D); and ‘lack of 
investments in new consultancy training to update risk management practices and to 
massify the risk culture’ (Manager A), to cite a few. Therefore, the maintaining of 
this practice also explain how management control could be used to legitimate rather 
than improve performance, as reported by other researchers in accounting and risk 
literature (Millo and MacKenzie, 2009). 
The objectivity of risk was kept at a second level of secrecy that concealed its 
limitations while arguing for more independence. As a regulator, the BCB tried to 
maintain the fictitious ‘inaccessibility’, creating barriers to communication about its 
own objectivity. The BrazBank’s risk manager reported that ‘the BCB always 
answers with generic comments and without giving a clear explanation of how risk 
management methods must be applied’. This seems to be a common problem inside 
the BrazBank, as other managers and analysts reported similar problems in relation 
to different issues concerning the BCB (Meeting G, 2014). As they mentioned, then, 
‘BCB seems to sit at the top of a “Tower of Babel”. 
In order to understand how the regulatory idea of ‘[choosing] models of risk 
management according to the complexity and size of business’ (BCB, 2006a) works 
in practice, I contacted and questioned two BCB’s managers. They stated that BCB’s 
regulations seem to be broad, to some extent intentionally, in order to support 
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regulators powerful positions and discretion, especially in the case of risk 
management, as there are indeterminacies related to the translation of universal 
frameworks and practices (BCB’s Manager, 2013). According to one BCB 
Manager
33
, in relation to this idea of compatibility between complexity and size:  
There are no objective criteria for this evaluation. It fits into what we call 
‘professional judgment’. In theory, it is a value judgment, common sense. It 
depends on each situation. The orientation is only a guideline that can be used 
by the regulator to require strengthening the structure of risk management and 
control. (Emphasis added) 
Thus, although the evaluation does not follow an objective criterion, it does 
empower the regulation and the regulator to, for example, require even the 
development of advanced risk assessment frameworks inside Brazilian institutions. 
As Derrida (2002) asserted, the regulatory vagueness left it open to interpretation, 
while maintaining power imbalances. Nonetheless, this situation caused anxiety 
inside the BrazBank, as employees never knew if they were in the ‘right direction’ or 
not. Meanwhile, actors felt more comfortable replicating international sound 
practices and guidelines disseminated by Big 4 consultancy firms, which again 
supported the claim that risk management practices represent a universal tool to add 
value to organisational activities, as exposed in the following subsection.  
                                                 
 
 
33 Another BCB manager explained that BCB was segregated into departments responsible for different banks. 
Huge corporations, for example, have their own department, because their operation involves complex financial 
instruments that only expert specialists could understand. Nonetheless, ‘in the case of development banks there 
are other political aspects could be involved too’, this, he argued that he could not explain to me this in details. 
Therefore, I believe that there is the same illusion of objectivity even inside regulatory structures, but it must be 
explored in future research.  
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8.2.3. The Fantasy of ‘Adding Value’  
As a way to cope with this uncertainty and anxiety created by the inaccessibility of 
regulators and the necessity to maintain compliance and try to tame future outcomes, 
managers and directors found support in consultancy groups, which sold their 
‘worldwide recognition’ and marketed ‘best practices’ as universal solutions for 
BrazBank’s problems. Training materials and newsletters exposed how consultants 
commonly reinforced this element of ‘adding value’ during discussions about risk 
management implementation. Thus, asserting the reasons for this theme be important 
for banks, the consulting firm affirmed that: 
An effective risk management enables financial institutions to maximize 
revenue, reduce costs, allocate capital more efficiently, resulting in value 
creation to shareholders. (Big 4's training slides, 2008) 
This proposition of risk management adding value was also emphasised in the 
consulting training, in 2013, and observed during Risk and Security Committees. 
The main focus of this discourse was on economic measures, such as increased 
revenue, optimisation of operating costs, asset efficiency, and customer expectations, 
which form ‘the map of shareholder’s value’. However, I observed that the supposed 
value was directed to shareholders, ignoring that the BrazBank has no shareholders. 
During my fieldwork, I frenquently questioned this decontextualised assumption. 
The answer to my enquiries came from the understanding that the Big 4 rhetoric 
provides BrazBank’s actors with an ideological cover (Howarth and Griggs, 2006; 
Carter, 2008), which avoids blame (Spira and Page, 2003) and legitimates their 
practices (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). This element influences the identity of 
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the BrazBank and its actors, reinforcing the epistemic violence characterised by the 
symptomatic feeling of ‘lack of power’ among different groups. It also explains the 
lack of contestation about the inadequacy of BrazBank’s compliance with BCB’s 
regulation. Finally, this necessity of external validition explains BrazBank’s 
dependency on consultancies and how training had been used previously to reduce 
resistance to changes and reinforce the identity of ‘risk experts’ (The influence of 
consulting firms was addressed in Chapter 2 and further explained by the Political 
Logics in the previous chapter. These firms created a dependence between 
BrazBank’s risk experts, as can be perceived in the affirmation of Manager A on 
page 280). The idea of ‘best practices’ and the isomorphic legitimacy provided by 
the rhetoric of ‘in worldwide use’ reinforced that the BrazBank and its actors were 
doing their best and going in the right direction. For that reason, it perpetuated a 
fantasy of the superiority of risk experts towards non-experts, like a parent who is 
taking care of a naïve child, as illustrated below. 
 
8.2.4. The Fantasy of ‘Mothering’  
Of course, the incongruences in risk discourse caused tensions between risk experts 
and others managers. While experts had their power, they seemed not to be troubled 
by what was described as a ‘lack of understanding’ from non-experts about the 
importance of risk-management practices. Conversely, after risk-management 
practices had lost their power, these tensions became more evident. Nonetheless, 
even when risk moved from a heavenly place to a shameful one, as described in 
Chapter 7, the main discourse that risk experts ‘keep us on track’ did not change. 
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Even if best practices had not been reached yet, based on a benchmarking standard 
with large private bank, experts claimed to be the ‘aiming for’ them, which was the 
most important goal for the BrazBank. Thus, under pressure from different levels, 
the figure of the risk expert was compared with that of a careful mother. For 
instance, during a discussion, an analyst stated:  
A2: You [risk expert] want to be the mother of the managers! Let them 
complain! That’s good for them! It is like a child who wants ice cream every 
day. You cannot grant this wish. It’s what is good for him. If you only give him 
ice cream, will it be good? No! But often they do not know it. [...] The important 
thing is that we are doing the best for them. (Debate between Analyst E and 
Manager B) 
As illustrated above, risk experts nurtured a feeling of doing good, making the right 
decision. This also alluded to previous fantasies as a way to suture the inadequacies 
noticeable in risk management’s results. The desires for compliance, objectivity, and 
hence, neutral decisions, as well as an idea that this work would add value to the 
BrazBank’s activities, supported this fantasy of doing the best, even if the ‘child’ could 
not recognise this. The epistemic violence of this rhetoric portrays the mother, who 
knows more, and the child, who knows nothing. The mother has a broader knowledge 
and view, while the child is limited by its narrow understanding of the world. 
Therefore, this fantasy of the mother taking care of a naïve child was used to portray 
the superiority of risk experts, to impose their knowledge to set the right path to be 
followed and the importance and necessity of being strict sometimes, even under 
criticism. This comportment is also related to a chain of epistemic violence perpetuated 
from Big 4 firms to risk experts in the BrazBank that ends up reflecting in their 
relationship with non-experts. 
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Even an analogy with an ‘art critic’ was used to reinforce this position. Thus, ‘if 
persons in a portrait cannot see themselves, then, an art critic is needed in order to spot 
mistakes’ (Analyst E). Again, this replicates the discourse from Big 4 consulting firms, 
whereby the outsider view was considered more important than that of insiders one. 
Ultimately, this fantasy sustains the imperialist ideology of a solution coming from 
outside, while preserving a false feeling of security, as described in the next subsection.  
 
8.2.5. The Fantasy of Security  
The idea of risk management provides a false sense of being safety in conjunction 
with all the previous fantasies of compliance, objectivity, best practices and adding 
value. Also, the training conveyed by consulting firms created a sensation of security 
among risk experts who could not be blamed, as they were just following what they 
had been trained for. Furthermore, as a response to the previous failures, risk 
reinforced its position as the solution, which came from outside in international 
agreements about ‘best practices’, which created an ideological cover and a space to 
blame and not be blamed (Spira and Page, 2003; Carter, 2008). In this case, the idea 
of ‘best practices’ came not as an answer to all the problems and questions, but as a 
safe place where specialists could stay and blame the other actors as non-experts 
who did not follow the international framework or did not support their point of 
view. 
This security also legitimated risk specialists’ practices, using risk as well as auditing 
reports to show that they are acting according to the policies established, in 
worldwide use and recognised as ‘best practices’. This powerful ideology of ‘best 
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practices’ could explain, for example, why there were so many ‘action plans’ 
reprogrammed and postponed by other managers, even if the former knew these 
requirements were incoherent and not consistent with to BDB’s context. Thus, even 
after attempts from the RMD to reduce the number of actions plans, as claimed by 
other managers, the decision was to keep most of them. In my view, the explanation 
is that by accepting and postponing action plans managers perpetuated the idea of a 
continuous development, while by rejecting these recommendations they would shift 
the responsibility from risk experts to themselves, and could, then, be blamed if 
something wrong happened. Uncompleted action plans could be justified by time or 
budget constraints, as well as the project-dependency of other departments, which 
impeded their implementation. Again, this behaviour reinforces the fake security 
brought by risk-management practices, as it does not avoid risk, but shows that it has 
been “managed” (no matter how).  
 
8.3. Discussion  
8.3.1. Ideologies of ‘New’, then, ‘Good’, and then, ‘the Solution’ 
Given the shifts in risk discourse (as described in Chapter 7), each period of risk in 
the BrazBank was driven by ‘radical contingencies’, and then, ‘new’ guidelines 
coming from BIS or BCB’s regulatory statements and frameworks as well as advice 
from Big 4 consultancy firms. This signifier ‘new’, through logics of equivalence, 
was expanded and represented as ‘anew’ and ‘renew’, which aimed to invigorate the 
power of risk discourse, and hence, risk experts. The new discourses were: new (and 
more) internal controls, thus, efficiency; new operational risk management, and so a 
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complete view of processes; new ERM, and then, the BrazBank would be up-to-date 
with world fashions; finally, new (previously ignored) risk culture and risk appetite, 
which then would repair past errors. Accordingly, even the Basel III framework 
approaches carried this element of ‘new’, ‘anew’ or ‘renew’ while proposing the 
inclusion of liquidity and capital risk management to improve risk management 
accuracy and provide good and better overview of BrazBank’s exposition to risks, 
and in turn, the solution for the subprime crisis (Hall, 2004; Delahaye, 2011). This 
has been the rhetoric of risk and its purported solutions, which perpetuated an 
illusion of control as a panacea to avoid previous problems without any evidence that 
it would not create worse ones. 
Hence, the most important element for this rhetoric was the analogy of ‘new’ with 
‘good’. More than just ‘good’, each attempt to close radical contingencies of the 
(impossible) risk management completeness carried the connotation of ‘better’. The 
‘new’ discourses of risk repeatedly promised more benefits. These were endorsed by 
the ‘knowledge’ of international bodies, the ‘experience’ of Big 4 consultancy firms, 
and new models in worldwide use, which had supposedly been tested and certified 
by multinational corporations. Thus, ‘knowledgeable’, ‘savvy’ and ‘proven’ new 
risk-management frameworks or guidelines should fulfil the promises that previous 
attempts could not accomplish. The fantasy (and desire) was that they would 
certainly provide solutions to problems or, at least, to the most current ones.  
This constant search for solutions, or fetishism of calculation as described by 
Bloomfield (1991) and Willmott (2011), carried the idea of comparability as a good 
and better driver to accounting and management research, but it also changed 
organisational practices and sites. This assumption is propagated in the mainstream 
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positivist research literature, both in accounting, just as it is in other fields. The idea 
of a solution out there (waiting to be discovered) carries ideologies of neutrality and 
objectivity both in research, and in practice. Nonetheless, what is intriguing about 
risk discourses is how subjectivity is downplayed in favour of systematisation.  
Thus, even if the probability is contingent and based on many assumptions 
(Spiegelhalter, 2013), immersed in this discourse of ‘objectivity’, managers seemed 
to ignore the assumptions they themselves were making. They regularly made 
decisions about risk in meetings and debates based on their own subjective views 
and judgments; they constantly argued, ‘I think’, ‘I believe’ and ‘it seems to me 
that’, while making decisions. Furthermore, many of them have acknowledged the 
conditionality and arbitrariness of adjustments made to previous parameter 
conditions in BrazBank’s credit grant norms, which have changed over time 
(according to BrazBank’s Risk Management Policies 1 to 9). Therefore, deep down 
they recognised that even if risk management is a cyclical process, it is not neutral, 
as the act of setting parameters is related to power and politics (Derrida, 2002), as 
well as the ability to decide the direction and purpose of actions’ (Bauman, 2007: 2). 
Nonetheless, they seemed to be incapable of changing these underlying assumptions. 
In my view, one of the problems is that these assumptions provided power to risk 
experts. For that reason, is it important to understand further the ideology of the 
solution coming from outside, as exposed in the following section. 
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8.3.2. Ideology of the Solution Coming from Outside 
During my fieldwork, I was repeatedly asked by BrazBank’s actors about the ‘right 
path to follow’ in relation to risk management practices and international 
frameworks. Although I tried to create an identity of apprentice, as exposed in the 
methodology chapter, I perceived that my identity was constructed not only by me 
but also by my interaction with BrazBank’s actors. Therefore, considering my 
previous experience as a risk management consultant and my current Ph.D. studies 
embracing risk management practices, I was also portrayed as an external expert in 
risk, almost as a consultant.  
Nonetheless, I observed in these inquiries that the faith in recommendations and 
solutions from outside was not only restricted to myself. Actors were continuously 
exposed to consulting firms, to the extent that this image was normalised in the 
BrazBank and considered as a sign of investments in performance improvement and 
updating of BrazBank’s practices. For me, this relationship created some kind of 
dependence, as many BrazBank’s actors did not trust in themselves and considered it 
unsafe to make decisions on their own (see again the affirmation of Manager A in 
page 280). Therefore, they substituted their ruling with another person’s judgment to 
support their decision and seemed to misrecognise the subjectivity in that person’s 
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opinion. This behaviour reflected a desire to follow the ‘best practices’, which would 
supposedly provide the universal solution for actors’ and BrazBank’s problems.  
Nevertheless, as I illustrated in Chapters 1 and 4, there were also traces of a post-
colonial ideology of subalternity
34
 (Spivak, 1988) in this case. Actors preferred 
compliance with international regulations rather than endogenous solutions. 
Consequently, they regularly searched for Big 4 consultancy firms to confirm 
positions already available in this site. Therefore, Big 4 consultants worked as 
communication facilitators, encouraging internal debate, uncovering silenced voices, 
and then, providing a summary report with their brand, which certificated internal 
risk experts’ claims. In sum, the discourse of ‘worldwide recognition’ of ‘best 
practices’ and ‘Big 4 training’ that could be outstretched to a ‘state of the art’ 
supported BrazBank’s fantasies, which ignored the limitations of risk management 
international guidelines in BrazBank’s context.  
 
                                                 
 
 
34 As discussed in Chapter 4, this subalternity represents someone who cannot recognise its situation of being 
oppressed, and wants to be similar to its oppressor. In this case, even after the structural violence caused by the 
negations of its own rationality and intellectual capacity to determinate the priorities, solutions and then right 
path to follow, the actor wants to be considered an expert and uses the training from Big 4 to reinforce his or her 
position.  
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8.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I exposed a web of fantasies, which complement each other in order 
to sustain the fantasmatic character of risk as ‘best practice’. On the beatific side of 
these fantasies, actors argued about the importance and necessity of maintaining 
compliance with national and international regulations. They also emphasised the 
objectivity of risk calculation while subjugating subjectivities as mere ‘toll fees’ for 
continuous improvement until achieve a ‘state of the art’ was achieved in risk 
management practices. In this regard, they claimed that risk management practices 
added value and guaranteed the security of BrazBank’s activities, so, as caring 
parents, risk experts must push non-experts towards the right direction, even if they 
cannot recognise the benefits of this work. 
These fantasies made the idea of risk management possible and intelligible, while 
transforming its impossibility into a mere difficulty in achieving a ‘state of the art’, 
an idealised scenario that would represent the imaginary fullness of risk discourse. 
This impediment was mainly attributed to non-experts, the Other, who failed to 
cooperate and understand risk management. Therefore, while keeping the impression 
that the realisation of complete control was at least potentially possible, threats from 
the Other, such as incomplete databases, were also part of the barriers to achieving 
the ‘state of the art’. However, they were portrayed as only temporary, because they 
would supposedly be overcome in the future with more and more sophisticated 
methods of risk assessment. 
This search for ‘totality’ has driven the discourse of risk and many elements are 
intertwined in this quest. Moreover, fantasies sustained by a subaltern identity reduce 
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BrazBank’s actors to a powerless position that impedes them from contesting the 
inadequacies of national and international risk management frameworks in the 
BrazBank’s context. Regulators also maintained a second level of secrecy about their 
own practices, leaving vagueness in regulations and creating barriers to access that 
sustained their authority to judge risk management practices. Yet these ambiguities 
and uncertainties about what the BrazBank would need to face if regulations were 
contested avoided the emancipation of these actors, reinforcing the status quo.  
In short, the fantasies presented in the BrazBank represented simultaneously an ideal 
and impediments to the realisation of this ultimate suture in the discourse of risk. 
They portrayed each re-articulation of risk as something new and better, while 
reinforcing its position of best practices that would bring the solution to BrazBank 
and Brazil’s wish to develop. Thus, even while replicating impositions from outside 
and perpetuating relations of domination and exploitation, the discourse of risk was 
misrecognised as beneficial for the BrazBank, as if the solutions for all problems 
could simply be imported from abroad, or bought from a consulting firm.  
 
  




– CHAPTER NINE – 
CONCLUSION - RISK AS AN ADVANCED CAPITALIST 
ACCOUNTING TECHNOLOGY OF MISCOMMUNICATION 
 
8.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I aim to bring together the findings of this research and to 
demonstrate how they relate to the three logics of risk outlined in Chapter 6, 7 and 8. 
In this thesis, I have attempted to provide a tri-dimensional picture of risk 
construction, with each of the logics of risk providing one perspective on its practice, 
implementation and perpetuation. These logics complement each other. To 
understand how risk operates in the BrazBank, it was essential to comprehend the 
interconnectedness of complementary heterogeneous logics and the problematisation 
presented in this thesis. Thus, here, I analyse the implications both for theory and 
practice of the contestability of risk construction and its covert contingencies. In this 
way, I shed light on the reasons why the construction of risk might be problematic 
while showing that the current discourse of risk in the BrazBank enhanced struggles 
and created polarities while attempting to maintain powerful positions. As a result, I 
argue that the confronting interpretations and constructions of risk encountered in the 
BrazBank and characterised by a blaming ‘risk culture’, actually represented a new 
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attempt to re-establish truth and power in this accounting technology of governance 
and its experts.  
This research comprehends the influence of gaps between risk theory and practice, 
while considering the prominence of risk worldwide and in different fields, but also 
the contradictions between this discourse in accounting and the inadequacies of the 
regulation imposed upon BDBs. My whole argumentation in this thesis revolves 
around the construction of risk in the Brazilian financial sector. In short, the thesis 
aimed to answer the following research questions:  
RQ1. How is the concept of risk constructed to meet the demands of certain 
powerful organisational actors (including internal and external stakeholders 
such as employees, experts, governments, and other corporations)? 
RQ2. What is the importance of subjectivity in the construction of risk, and the 
practical implementation and development of risk management?  
RQ3. How do individual conceptions about ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ 
influence the implementation of a risk management framework and 
conceptions of ‘risk appetite’ and ‘risk culture’ at the organisational level? 
Considering the complexity implicit in these questions and their possible answers, I 
employed many other questions to drive this research. For instance, what is ‘risk’ 
according to different organisational actors?; how is the concept of risk mobilised to 
legitimate actors’ political interests?; how have these different views of ‘risk’ 
impacted upon, been received, contested and spread within the organisational 
context? Finally, acknowledging the long-standing dispute concerning the objective 
and subjective nature of risk, this research comprehended and criticised power 
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imbalances that privilege some aspects of risk while ignoring others that do not fit 
with the hegemony of modern financial risk and neo-liberal rationality.  
In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of my argument, as developed throughout 
the preceding chapters, to make it contributes to the discussion of risk-management 
practices and its regulation. I also demonstrate how I have addressed my research 
questions and summarise the contributions to knowledge make by each chapter. 
Towards the end, I discuss the opportunities for future research opened up by this 
thesis, while acknowledging limitations implicit in the choices made throughout this 
study. The following section summarises the argument of this thesis as a whole. 
 
8.2. Joining the Dots of Risk Construction 
This research began with a problematisation of the expansion of risk discourses. Risk 
has moved from a construction based wholly on claims of controllability implicit in 
the proposition of models for the quantification of financial defaults, volatility and 
losses, to the inclusion of more and more subjective elements. In this way, risk has 
moved from the framework of credit and market risks to incorporate elements like 
operational, reputational and enterprise risks, claiming the capability to encompass 
even ‘risk culture’ and ‘risk appetite’ in organisational spaces. This whole expansion 
was supported by a human desire to tame and predict the future, which has created 
‘experts’ since the medieval era. In this thesis, I argue that the domain of risk still 
confers power on actors, who call themselves experts. Nevertheless, crises have 
frequently occurred even with the most sophisticated measurement instruments. 
Interestingly, although the panacea proposed by risk measures seems to be far from 
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being achieved, these instruments still maintain their influence in organisational 
sites. From this perspective, I suggested that it is important to understand the 
underpinnings of risk constructions. In Chapter 2, I set the scene by introducing the 
Brazilian context and its financial sector, opening a space to analyse paths chosen to 
achieve the ‘order and progress’ targeted by Brazil. Initially, I contextualised this 
space by describing some of the vicissitudes of Brazilian history, which was 
previously marked by Portuguese colonisation and after that by an endeavour to 
become a developed country, akin to the USA or Europe, overcoming a period of 
hyperinflation. Finally, I exposed that the solution proposed for these problems was 
based on adherence to the BIS’s prudential regulations, which have risk management 
practices as the fundamental tool to strengthen the Brazilian financial system and to 
carry its development projects forward. 
The imposition of risk management regulation from outside, nevertheless, sustained 
a claimed segregation between the regulatory bodies that proposed it, and the object 
of this regulation, risks in the Brazilian financial system. This discourse was 
articulated to reinforce the technicality and neutrality of the regulation while 
imposing risk management practices and policies. Therefore, it downplayed the role 
of subjects in risk constructions. Nonetheless, in this research, I showed that what 
happened in practice was just a myth of objectivity, supported by the positivist 
rhetoric inherent in accounting literature and practice. The proposition of risk as a 
neutral calculative practice worked to create an accounting tool of governmentality 
that aimed to exercise control over a determinate group of financial systems and 
institutions around the world. In the case of Brazil, and its financial system, 
specifically development banks, the construction of risk was proposed as a solution 
P a g e  | 336 
 
to control hyperinflation and reduce the supposed inefficiencies of public 
institutions, thereby sustaining economic growth and development. In Chapter 2, 
however, I demonstrated the incompatibility of these international risk management 
requirements with the core objectives of development banks, whose capital structure 
and social role adversely affected by these regulations. Finally, I stressed that the 
construction of risk as a solution coming from outside subjugated the capacity of the 
country to find its own route, whilst shifting the focus of these public banks from a 
social to an economic emphasis in relation to the credit grants provided.  
In Chapter 2, I also proposed that this acquiescence to international imperialistic 
regulations was legitimated by their claims of universal ‘solutions’, propagated as 
‘best practices’ for management, accountability, development, progress, efficiency 
and so forth. In Brazil, these imported solutions also perpetuated risk and control 
logics that opened space for the entry of foreign banks in the Brazilian market 
through new discourses that proposed ‘the right way’ to manage and reduce financial 
and systemic risks. I pointed out that, although it is clear that these regulations might 
be applicable to multinational banks, in the Brazilian case, when applied to 
development banks, they damaged their ability to carry out their key social 
objectives and tasks. This provided clear evidence that these regulatory statements 
were potentially destructive and unsuitable for BDBs. Given the dissemination of 
risk regulations in the BFS, it was unclear whether the emergence and 
implementation of risk management regulatory requirements had been contested 
even after their inadequacies for development banks’ functions became clear. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I have assumed that claims of neutrality and universality 
covered over the contingencies within this discourse, creating a myth of objectivity 
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that reduced its contestability, so risk management practices were disseminated 
among these public institutions too.  
In order to demystify this risk construction, in the literature review, I shed light on 
the similarity between accounting and risk constructions in Chapter 3. Accounting 
has also been imposed as a technology of government and instrument of 
governmentality and many critical researchers have exposed the limits and 
shortcomings of this discourse. Here, arguing that risk is akin to accounting, I 
demonstrated that this rhetoric constructed a myth of objectivity that is in reality a 
fragmented perspective fashioned to sustain unilateral decisions. For that reason, risk 
and accounting, as instruments of communication, exercise an active role in 
constructing and translating realities, rather than merely representing a reliable and 
faithful social space. Those tools are not simply instruments to portray social 
practices, but technologies used to sustain claims of controllability, manageability 
and expertise, which ultimately reduce the space for contestation over the limits and 
shortcomings pointed out above. In summary, I showed that the construction of risk, 
as a technology of governance, is used to maintain powerful positions and power 
imbalances, while downplaying the multi-layered nature of risk and potential 
alternatives ways of predicting the future and its outcomes.  
This literature review drove my queries about the hegemony of a positivist 
perspective in accounting and possible contributions from multiple paradigmatic 
positions in the construction of risk. In accounting and finance, risk is conceived as 
something neutral, objective, ahistorical and apolitical. In opposition to uncertainty, 
risk is, hence, conceived as almost completely exempt from subjectivity and 
judgement. This rhetoric portrays risk as the way to control and measure future 
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outcomes, but this aspiration is confined by the pragmatic operationalisation of these 
attempts. The segregation between subjects and risk is only theoretical. For instance, 
the limited database of operational losses available currently fails to provide the 
information necessary to enhance the accuracy of risk assessments and predictions. 
Therefore, judgement and choices are inherent elements in these decision-making 
processes. However, in the mainstream literature of accounting and finance, the 
focus is diverted from the role of subjects, and the central claim is to create improved 
models to increase the size of databases and overcome these deficiencies. I argue that 
in order to properly understand the current problems of risk management practices, 
researchers and practitioners must redirect their focus to social practices that enable 
or confine the meaning of risk management.  
In order to understand the articulatory process and reasons behind the proposition of 
these calculative constructions of risk, in Chapter 4 Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory was used as a theoretical basis that allowed me to re-examine the construction 
of the concept of risk in practice. Firstly, the imposition of risk in regulatory 
statements was reinterpreted through the lens of Spivak's post-colonial theory and 
her ideas of a 'subaltern identity' and epistemic violence meted out by developed 
countries. Therefore, the international best practices of risk management from a 
regulatory point of view are an ideological artefact that constrains and confines the 
capacity of developing countries to seek and define local solutions. The universality 
of this regulatory proposition and the hegemonic nature of its discourse in 
accounting was then analysed through the post-structural lens of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s Discourse Theory (DT).  
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In order to understand how hegemonies are created and maintained, Laclau and 
Mouffe proposed an understanding of their articulatory practices. Thus, I mobilised 
elements of DT to explain the undecidability implicit in a social space and the 
multiple potential meanings (signifieds) that were, and could be, attached to the 
signifier: risk. Calling for an understanding of risk as a discursive practice, this 
theory offers tools to comprehend articulations that naturalise the construction of risk 
as a quantifiable element of the future. It reinforces the necessity to comprehend the 
genealogy of risk’s construction and the radical contingencies implicit in changes 
that produced enemies and allies within this discourse. DT shed light on the political 
aspects of risk management practices whilst allowing me to develop a practical and 
theoretical analysis of risk construction that was missing in accounting literature. 
DT stresses that the amplitude of meanings and representations are contextual, 
relational and contingent. Hence, constructions are made by constitutive and 
subjugated elements of a discourse, which means that objects and practices are 
discursively constructed. The undecidability of social structure is enclosed by 
impermanent hegemonic discourses, which would propose a naturalised or 
normalised myth of risk for example, as viewed in at the positivist paradigm. DT 
emphasises that the understanding of social relations must comprise the contingency, 
historicity, power and primacy of politics of hegemonic representations. From this 
perspective, in Chapter 4, I noted that, according to DT, risk must be classified a 
‘floating signifier’, which could have multiple meanings in different situations. 
Additionally, the amplitude of meanings attached to risk also characterise it as 
‘empty signifier’, which means everything and nothing at the same time. This 
landscape opened a space to re-read the emergence of risk in the Brazilian financial 
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context. It illustrated the importance of the genealogy of risk in each context and 
provided some analytical tools to trace risk constructions and the influence of 
individual conceptions about ‘risk’. 
Departing from the perspective in Chapter 4, I recognised that DT might well prove 
to be too abstract and difficult to operationalise in a research project. Therefore, this 
research would not have been possible without the framework proposed in the Logic 
of Critical Explanation (LOCE) by Glynos and Howarth (2007) and the critical 
ethnographic method which were applied, respectively, to structure and collect my 
data as outlined in Chapter 5. The LOCE provides a framework to the theoretical 
elements coming from DT. Initially, the LOCE was used to problematise a current 
and concrete empirical situation, the misrecognition of ‘risk’ in the establishment of 
a risk quantification approach in the Brazilian regulatory statements. Thereafter, 
through the retroduction of risk mangement’s emergence, contestation and 
sedimentation, it is enabled current practices of risk management to be understood in 
a particular context, as well as how they came about and why they are maintained by 
subjects. These frameworks allowed me to demonstrate how hegemonic 
constructions and practices of risk management in fact represented inclusions and 
exclusions of signifieds and social groups in attempts to acquire more power and to 
maintain powerful positions. In conclusion, they created a space for critique and to 
scrutinise the alternatives that have been neglected, rejected or hidden within the 
hegemonic discourse of risk management. Nonetheless, although the LOCE 
acknowledges the primacy of politics, it also recognises that for the most part, 
politics and power imbalances are hidden in traditional and mainstream research 
approaches. Thus, the application of LOCE would not be possible without access to 
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an appropriate source of data. As a result, the use of a critical ethnography approach 
was indispensable. 
In employing critical ethnography to conduct this research, I acknowledged that the 
political elements exposed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 would not be explicit and might 
not be consciously distinguished, even by actors within the BrazBank. As a result, 
this thesis required a coherent method for data collection, which would shed light on 
the elements included in, but also excluded from hegemonic risk discourses. I 
explored deeply the methods I was planning to use, how they would be helpful to 
this thesis and why they were the most appropriate. Under this scrutiny, and as 
explained in more detail in Chapter 5, I selected open and semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis and participant free observations, which were blended 
to complement each other and show the gaps and contradictions present in what was 
said, done and recorded about risk. This section also presented a detailed account of 
my gaining access to the BrazBank, how each method was used and the sources of 
data considered in this research. In order to align the elements from DT, the 
methodology of LOCE and the data collected, I analysed my data searching for 
moments of dislocation after contingencies and how the idea of risk, as a nodal point, 
was articulated in each moment; in other words, rhetorical redescriptions of risk. 
Moreover, I presented a reflexive self-analysis of my role as a researcher, pondering 
my previous experiences as a risk manager and consultant. After this personal 
consideration, I scrutinized the potential for my behaviour to cause harm to the 
institution and its actors, always careful to cause harm to them, and to respect ethical 
limits and assurances of anonymity and confidentiality.  
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After all this theoretical preparation and contextualisation, I moved to the empirical 
analysis of this research. I acknowledged that even with all this preparation, initially 
my experience in the field was surprising and frustrating. I had not expected that 
there would be a battlefield in the bank and that risk-management practices would be 
at its epicentre. Intuitively, I initially read the divergences of external disclosures and 
internal practices as incongruences in the discourse of risk and its practices. 
However, recognising my role as a researcher, I challenged my consultant 
impetuousness and did not try to find solutions, but to understand the reasons behind 
current risk management practices. Thus, after a while, the dots started to connect, 
the roots of the current discourse of risk became clearer, and I could understand and 
explain them better
35
. Indeed, I realised how this moment could be important to 
expose the contradictions between risk disclosures and theoretical conventions, and 
how risk works and struggles in practice. This opened a space to de-homogenise my 
own view about risk and reflect on my own theoretical knowledge and thoughts 
about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ risk cultures and practices. 
In my first empirical analysis, in Chapter 6, utilising the Social Logic, I exposed that 
the contradictions that I faced were partially caused by the positivist regulatory 
perspective of risk in the BrazBank. There was a detachment between risk 
                                                 
 
 
35Here, again, I recognise that this is only one of the multiple possible readings which events in this site might 
generate.  
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management practices to outsiders and insiders, disclosure and practices, theoretical 
conceptualisations and pragmatic uses. There was also a declared wish to deal with 
risk objectively, even if in its operationalisation, risk was considered based on the 
subjectivity implicit in interpretations and perceptions of actors’ experience, and 
their powerful position. Consequently, as a secret, risk was weighted differently in 
different projects, while its meaning was reproduced in and influenced by different 
hierarchical levels as well as in the administrative and credit grant departments. The 
solution proposed by risk caused divergences and conflicts between ‘best practices’ 
perpetuated by experts and their constructions of others’ identities, as ‘non-experts’. 
In short, the results of my ethnographic analysis interpreted through the Social Logic 
perspective, as reported in Chapter 6, ratified the diversity in risk discourse, showing 
contradictions between risk’s normative functions and its practices, and hence, the 
arbitrariness of risk enclosures, as well as power imbalances and politics in these 
constructions.  
As I reported in Chapter 7, based on the Political Logic, I explored the genealogy of 
risk-management implementation in the BrazBank to highlight radical contingencies, 
exposing part of the history of risk in this site and some long-standing struggles over 
the naturalisation of this signifier. From this perspective, it became clearer that risk 
management was not always in crisis, or under contestation, and its current 
sedimented perspective, encountered during my fieldwork, was considered a 
consequence of this battle for control of its meaning within the organisation. Risk 
emerged in the BrazBank according to the logic of efficiency, anti-bureaucracy and 
anti-corruption, initially illustrated in Chapter 2, and under propositions of more 
internal controls to manage and reduce potential risks. This characterised a particular 
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period in Brazil and at the BrazBank, when the role of public institutions was 
undermined by NPM’s propositions and the concept of risk acquired an enhanced 
importance and spread to different departments of the bank. The growing power of 
risk worldwide sharpened the interest of other actors in taking some responsibility 
for the practice of risk management and ultimately influenced the whole 
organisation. 
Following the introduction of new regulatory reforms, auditors proposed a logic of 
‘Auditing with a Risk Management Focus’ contemplating the newest international 
proposition to manage operational risks, which increased this department's power 
and ability to control managerial activities across the whole BrazBank. In this period, 
risk was passing through a golden time globally, as well as in the BrazBank. 
However, newer regulatory requirements for independence and the proposition of an 
Enterprise Risk Management framework brought about a change in the structure of 
BrazBank and a shift in power among actors within the organisation. A new 
department of risk was created, proposing an integrated but independent segment to 
drive risk management practices; nonetheless, this new articulation was not widely 
supported by BrazBank’s Board. This was a reflection of the loss of power in risk 
management discourses internationally, consequent upon their failure to prevent (or 
perhaps even enhancing the consequences of) the subprime housing market and its 
precipitation of a global financial crisis. This link explained the organisational crisis 
of risk management practices observed during my fieldwork, but also posed the need 
for a further reflection on the current propositions of new measures for ‘risk culture’ 
and ‘risk appetite’ internationally and within the BrazBank. Therefore, these more 
recent elements articulated within risk discourse were considered not only as new 
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attempts to delimit a risk signifier, but also to maintain the power imbalance between 
risk experts and ‘others’.  
In the BrazBank, then, the shifting from a collaborative culture of control to a risk 
culture based around blame represented an internal attempt by BrazBank’s actors to 
re-establish their power. Drawing on the international conceptualisation of best 
practices, they utilised guidelines and reports, from professional supervisory bodies 
and Big 4 consultancy firms respectively, to re-legitimate their supremacy. However, 
the most interesting element of this scrutiny was the understanding that the concept 
of risk has never been under threat, only its constructs. 
The fantasies nourished by experts and non-experts did not challenge the concept of 
risk but re-described its practices. The Fantasmatic Logic, presented in Chapter 7, is 
the most subjective part of my analysis and focused on the role of subjects, instead of 
only on the object, risk. In spite of all the contradictions exposed here and in other 
research about risk-management practices, inside the BrazBank there was a desire to 
support risk as something important and necessary. In this eagerness to find the 
‘right path to follow’, risk was constantly articulated by actors as a re-new and better 
‘solution’ to solve existing problems. Focusing on the underpinnings of these 
attempts, there was a desire to achieve compliance that complemented actors’ 
fantasies and feelings of not be strong enough to contest the BCB’s regulations, 
which replicate international regulatory requirements. Actors in the BrazBank 
replicated generic assumptions from Big 4 consultancy firms and believed they 
should behave like parents and point the right direction to their naïve and untrained 
fellows, non-experts. Finally, the fantasy of a more objectified future (even if 
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inaccessible) was nurtured with many other fantasies of ‘adding value’ or ‘doing the 
best’, even if contradictions were evident in these elements.  
The hegemonic discourses of risk might have been beneficial for BrazBank’s actors 
in maintaining this reassuring sense of a continuously refined mechanism to obtain 
full control. Nonetheless, the trust in these frameworks and training provided by Big 
4 consulting firms ultimately also constrained possible attempts to re-establish their 
organisational power. In this way, the illusion of control presented in risk 
management practices might be detrimental to developing countries, because it 
obfuscates imperialist interests in the imposition of accounting techniques and 
regulations under claims of objectivity, neutrality and universality. Consequently, it 
is important to understand further the implications of this conceptualisation of risk. 
In sum, the contradictions and complementarities exposed by this research opened a 
space to generate many critiques about risk-management practices, regulations, 
ideologies, changes, paradigmatic positions, methodological approaches and designs, 
which are reported throughout this study. Consequently, it is important to understand 
further the implications of this conceptualisation of risk. Thus, comprehending that 
in this thesis I have attempted to provide a tri-dimensional picture of risk 
construction, the following section brings these three perspectives together to 
provide an over-arching analysis of the construction of risk in the BrazBank.  
 
347 | P a g e  
 
8.3.3. The Problematic Conceptualisation of Risk 
The analyses presented in my theoretical and empirical chapters highlighted the 
limitations of risk discourse. Risk was exposed as a technology of 
miscommunication, which covers over the contingencies of the impossible full 
control of future outcomes. Thus, acknowledging the necessity of some sense of 
control, risk is both a necessary and an impossible discourse. In this sense, the 
concept of risk represents what has always been lacking and desired in society 
throughout human history: the ability to predict and control upcoming events.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the problem with the mainstream conceptualisation of 
risk in the Brazilian regulations was its provocation of a shift in the BrazBank’s 
focus from a social to an economic imperative. The political logic demonstrated that 
the initial attempt at risk management implementation was to accommodate 
contestations while developing the rhetoric of collaboration, which claimed benefits 
for all. In this way, the economic logic of risk embraced the social aim of this bank 
early on by creating a ‘Social Index’ that would distinguish bad projects from good 
ones without losing the bank's focus on community development. However, as soon 
as this discourse of risk was accepted and normalised, the economic logic prevailed 
and the Social Index was abandoned. For that reason, the BrazBank privileged large 
corporations and established companies over small social enterprises. 
Inside the BrazBank, the idea of risk was associated with efficiency, control and 
security, thereby naturalising surveillance instruments and the identity of risk 
experts. These actors gained power and influence in BrazBank’s decisions and risk 
management practices were conceived as a relevant managerial tool between 
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different political mandates of the Board of Directors. Nonetheless, these practices 
were legitimated by utilising a discourse from outside. Thus, after the sub-prime 
crisis and the divergences in the international articulation of risk-management best 
practices, the discourse of risk was fiercely contested in an attempt to shift the power 
back to non-experts. This battle for power was precisely what I experienced during 
my fieldwork. 
My empirical analysis demonstrated that for an extended period, the concept of risk 
was used as an attempt to re-establish trust in the market and its experts. Accounting 
and managerial tools were used to accomplish this objective, concealing the 
contingencies of this discourse using myths of objectivity (Chapter 3). Policies and 
regulations endeavoured to set the right tone in this quest, while also claiming the 
power to understand the best practices of risk management (Chapter 2). Ultimately, 
different organisational actors used this discourse to perpetuate their power or create 
a space for their authority, crafting what were considered, for example, hybrid 
accounting technologies (Miller et al., 2008). The obscure power relationships 
presented in different fields characterised this attempt to tame the future as an 
‘intellectual failure’ (Power, 2009). Indeed, the frustrating confusion experienced in 
my fieldwork made clearer the ongoing battle for power in the BrazBank, at that 
time, provoked by the impairment of risk discourse after the sub-prime crisis.  
I observed the method and reasons behind risk concealment and, after a while, 
understood the reasons for the shift from a collaborative culture of control to a risk 
culture revolving around blame. Moreover, focusing on subjects’ fantasies, it was 
possible to comprehend why risk management practices were still in use and barely 
challenged. Thus, I understood that BrazBank’s actors were indeed psychologically 
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confined by their construction of risk. Experts took for granted and did not contest 
the methodology proposed by Big 4 consultancy firms, even after recognising the 
incongruences of its operationalization in the BrazBank. In this regard, the 
challenging of the international regulations and guidelines of risk management or 
orientations and frameworks would represent a rejection of their own identity, as it 
was these regulations have enabled them to be called experts.  
As 'subalterns'
36
 (Spivak, 1988), BrazBank’s actors compared their practices with 
benchmarks from large private banks. They did not recognise the inappropriateness 
and harmfulness of the adoption of what were proposed as ‘best practices’, or of 
aiming to achieve a decontextualized ‘state of the art’ in risk management practices. 
Indeed, this quest sustained their identity. Thus, as an advanced capitalist accounting 
technology of miscommunication, risk maintains its power while preserving in 
individuals the idea that this is the right path to be followed, the solution to their 
problems. Through ignoring that it is actually part of the problem, the idea of risk 
perpetuated an ideology of self-referential closed loops in a deterministic world. 
The following sections attempt to summarise the contribution to knowledge offered 
by this research. I then highlight further paths to follow and acknowledge the 
partiality of these readings, pondering some limitations recognised in this research.  
                                                 
 
 
36 Spivak (1988) argued that subalterns are immersed in deeper ideologies, which impede the understanding of 
their oppressed condition, while enacting a desire to be like the oppressor. 
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8.3. The Nuts and Bolts of Risk Construction 
First, for me, it is important to underline that the questions in this research 
complement each other and their answers were constructed throughout the 
problematisation presented in my research. Nonetheless, here, I provide more 
straightforward insights about how my study has helped in the understanding of the 
role performed by risk constructions in practice. In this way, my first research 
question was directed to comprehend: 
[RQ1] How is the concept of risk constructed to meet the demands of 
certain powerful organisational actors (including internal and external 
stakeholders such as employees, experts, governments, and other 
corporations)? 
Guided by this research question, this thesis highlighted that the concept of risk is 
constructed to serve many different interests, externally and internally to each 
organisation. Pondering upon the international regulatory framework of sound 
practices for risk management, like BIS and COSO, I demonstrated that the 
universality implicit in these norms must not be taken for granted, but challenged 
and scrutinised in accordance with each particular context of their implementation. 
In the case of BDBs, for instance, I revealed that universal propositions of risk 
management practices could be dysfunctional and detract from the main objectives 
of developing countries and their financial institutions. To this extent, risk regulatory 
statements might be considered representations of neo-colonial manoeuvres vis- à -
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vis these countries, which sought to overwhelm endogenous solutions and freedom 
of thought.  
In the specific case of the development bank under study, the empirical analysis 
demonstrated how normalised external disclosures were used to deceive external 
actors and portrayed an image of compliance of this institution with international 
best practices of risk management. This dissonance was clearer especially after my 
immersion in this site, as my fieldwork experiences revealed different levels of 
understanding about risk management practices and conflicts over risk’s 
conceptualisation. The contradictions between external reports and internal practices, 
however, could not be considered merely as a failure in the development of a 
‘common language of risk’ or homogenous ‘risk culture’. Indeed, the heterogeneity 
encountered in practices revealed the hidden politics in the construction of risk.  
The genealogical analysis presented by the political logic, in Chapter 7, endorsed the 
previous understandings explained above. The idea of risk in the BrazBank has 
always reflected international conceptualisations of ‘best practices’ transmitted by 
international bodies, such as COSO and BIS, but also further disseminated by Big 4 
consultancy firms. Actors have used an externally powerful discourse of risk to 
reinforce their power and expertise inside the BrazBank. In this sense, in each period 
when this construct has changed worldwide, it also changed in the BrazBank. Those 
who had supposed control of risk also gained enhanced influence over organisational 
practices. Consequently, the domain of risk knowledge and expertise was used to 
reaffirm the power of new directors and risk experts for an extended period of time. 
In each hegemonic moment of this discourse, different actors were empowered and 
disempowered, while different elements were included in and excluded from this 
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discourse. However, after the sub-prime crisis and divergences about which was the 
right path to follow in relation to risk-management practices, the hegemony of risk 
was contested, while proponents and opponents, respectively, portrayed risk 
management as both the solution to and cause of the catastrophic failure.  
In summary, the construction of risk in this research confirmed that, as with other 
accounting concepts, risk is contextually specific (Gallhofer et al., 2015) and 
represents a technical, methodological, social and political instrument of power 
(Carter, 2008). Different actors in different periods have tried to construct the idea of 
risk in accordance with their own interest. These constructions, however, are not 
explicitly political, but presented as principles or ‘best practice’. The ideological 
cover provided by international legislation and reaffirmed by recognisable Big 4 
consultancy groups obscured the interests underlying the construction of risk to 
appear as objective, neutral and universal. Nonetheless, the understanding of 
contingencies and shifts in this discourse over time revealed the underlying politics 
within these supposedly fixed and hegemonic practices. Therefore, it is also 
important to understand: 
[RQ2] What is the importance of subjectivity in the construction of risk, 
and the practical implementation and development of risk management?  
In order to answer the second research question, I endeavoured to understand risk as 
a broad social concept. Breaking the boundaries traditionally established in the 
accounting research field, I explored the idea of risk from an ontological perspective. 
As a broad concept, risk is used in many fields from sociology to engineering and 
philosophy to medicine. In other disciplines, risk is recognised as a social and 
353 | P a g e  
 
political practice. To this extent, the role of subjectivity is not downplayed but, 
sometimes, even celebrated in these areas. Nonetheless, in accounting and finance, 
the concept of risk is still intertwined with calculative practices and used to support 
claims of objectivity and neutrality. Thus, in Chapter 3, I tried to uncover part of the 
constrained complexity implicit in risk constructions and the multiple layers of this 
concept.  
In this research, therefore, I comprehended the idea of risk as an instrument that 
operationalised governance rationality. As a tool for governmentality, the rhetoric of 
risk claimed objectivity and neutrality. However, this is a self-referential discourse 
used to supress contestation. The supposed domain of risk creates the identity of risk 
experts and gives power to their interventions inside organisations. This particular 
construction of risk neglects the subjectivity implicit in choices made before the 
proposition of risk models in order to establish a unilateral understanding of future 
outcomes. This viewpoint privileged economic logics over the social ones (as 
exposed in Chapter 2 and demonstrated by the desertion of the ‘Social Index’ in 
Chapter 6). For that reason, it supported the neo-colonial attempts of foreign banks 
in the Brazilian financial sector (BFS) previously controlled by public banks. Thus, 
the construction of risk, as an advanced capitalist instrument of governance 
worldwide in use and representing the ‘best practices’ for the banking sector, 
downplayed the relevance of endogenous solutions. External players, neglecting 
subjectivities in the construction, legitimated their interventions in the BFS and 
empowered themselves, while portraying prudence regulations as totally 
advantageous for Brazil’s aim of achieving ‘order and progress’.  
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Inside the BrazBank, risk experts also used this construction to empower themselves 
and expand their influence over organisational activities. The conceptualisation of 
risk has never been neutral and objective. Different chains of power have been 
implicated in each singular hegemonic definition of risk. Initially, risk experts 
crafted their space by accommodating pre-existing managerial practices and showing 
how the proposition of risk management was aligned with attempts to maintain 
control and efficiency in BrazBank’s operations after the period of hyperinflation. As 
risk gained more relevance worldwide, its domain was also expanded inside the 
BrazBank. Different actors started to claim that they had the most current knowledge 
of and expertise in the ‘best practices’ of risk management, in order to demand more 
power for themselves. At their peak of influence, the independence of risk experts 
was conceived as a crucial element to maintain the neutrality of their practices. After 
that, the same independence was used to assert the necessity of some confidentiality 
within risk management activities. Nevertheless, during the overt failure of risk to 
perform as the panacea it had portrayed itself to be, the shift from a culture of control 
to a culture of blame depicted a battle between BrazBank’s actors to dethrone the 
experts and re-establish the trust in risk management practices. Thus, subjectivity in 
risk construction was presented clearly between the dislocations of this discourse, 
which arbitrarily defined what must be included and excluded from its hegemonic 
practices.  
In sum, the downplaying of subjectivity was an important element in the 
implementation and development of risk-management practices. Nevertheless, it also 
represented its most evident drawback. The devaluing of subjectivity created a 
terrain for experts, but also constrained them by their own claims. Before risk’s final 
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expansion, the recognition of subjectivity would challenge the self-identity of 
experts, which was confined by the idea of universal ‘best practices’. Without the 
capacity to challenge the source of their power, experts then confined themselves to 
blaming others, which became the representation of the impossibility of risk 
management ‘state of the art’. Ultimately, this whole censorious discourse was 
detrimental to the continuity of risk practices and the power of risk experts. Thus, 
moving to my last research question: 
[RQ3] How do individual conceptions about ‘risk’ and ‘risk 
management’ influence the implementation of a risk management 
framework and in conceptions of ‘risk appetite’ and ‘risk culture’ at the 
organisational level? 
From all my argumentation, but especially from my empirics, it has become clearer 
that individual conceptions of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ would influence the 
implementation of risk management frameworks and the definition of ‘risk appetite’ 
and ‘risk culture’ at the organisational level. Indeed, the definition of each of those 
concepts is embedded in power relations and imbalances so that constructions of this 
signifier are not neutral or even merely natural projections of organisational 
behaviour. Although I recognise that through the study of normalised cases it must 
be difficult to identify the politics implicit in the construction of risk, moments of 
radical contingency or crisis might shed light on the underestimated unilaterality of 
these constructions. Furthermore, in response to the lack of evidence of this 
characteristic in previous surveys and mainstream research, my study demonstrated 
that these internal politics are not explicit to outsiders, but concealed as a secret that 
P a g e  | 356 
 
must be kept in order to maintain the power of risk management and its experts 
(Chapter 6 and 7).  
The uncovering of fantasies used to support the existing risk management practices 
represented another response for the influence of individuals. The focus on subjects 
presented in Chapter 8 illustrated how both experts and non-experts disguise the 
contingencies of risk management discourse. Justifications are created to support the 
role of risk management, but also of its actors. Equally, order, or a good appearance 
from outside, is a prerequisite to the maintenance of both object and subject. 
Accordingly, the understanding of failures might represent a good route to the 
comprehension of what risk actually means.  
Considering the complexity and dynamic of risk depicted in this research, I argue 
that the conceptualisation of risk should consider it as a particular, not universal, 
signifier. The idea of control risk would be mobilised differently in different sites 
and by different actors. Indeed, indications of this variation have been shown in 
previous studies, but are commonly characterised as hybrid (Millers et al., 2008) or 
representations of singular and fixed risk cultures (Mikes, 2009). For me, the 
translation of risk will always be particular and claims of homogeneity in this 
discourse are used to mislead an audience which in fact wants to believe that the 
future can be controlled. This research, then, shows that while the music is playing it 
is easier just to keep dancing; however, when the music stops, attempts to maintain 
power imbalance will create different arguments to disseminate and avoid blame in 
all quarters.  
 
357 | P a g e  
 
8.4. New Insights about Risk Hegemonic Constructions 
Considering the overview presented above, some contributions of this thesis can be 
highlighted. First, this thesis portrayed the global standard view of risk as a 
regulatory control technology, which was developed externally and imposed as a 
compulsory legal requirement from IMF and World Bank, but that created also a 
space for experts inside Brazil. Considering the scenario of international influences 
in the Brazilian banking regulatory bank system, my research took a critical 
approach to this view, highlighting the influence of international actors who have 
imposed the international rhetoric of 'best practices' on this developing country, 
which, for them, is merely a new market.  
My first contribution to knowledge is thus a theoretical one. I have illustrated that 
changes in Brazilian Banking regulations, which allowed the entrance of 
multinational foreign financial institutions in Brazil and the adoption of requirements 
incompatible with BDB’s functions, make clear this hegemonic imposition of an 
external and damaging conceptualisation of risk. The empirical chapters provide 
evidence to support this claim in the form of the dissection of the practices of Big 4 
consultancy groups in this new market and the application of their rhetoric of ‘best 
practices’ and ‘state of the art’ to BrazBank’s functions and operations. I claim that 
this indirect influence by global corporations constitutes a post-colonial structural 
intervention which I portray as a form of institutionalised violence, an imposition of 
a destructive discourse from outside, and which was not indigenous to Brazil which 
went on to create conflict and struggles and to subjugate the Brazilian identity.  
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In Chapters 2 and 3, I asserted claims that accounting and finance mainstream 
literature reinforces the status quo in risk discourse, following a positivistic 
comprehension of its practice. This construction exists to support the discourse rather 
than to critique, challenge or influence it. Thus, this simplifying or reductionist logic 
of risk is dangerous, because risk can represent a reification of control. 
Consequently, Chapter 3 exposed the contingencies and arbitrariness implicit in each 
new articulation of risk-management frameworks. Risk is all about discourse, and 
hence what is included in and excluded from each rhetoric or constructions becomes 
a matter of power. Therefore, each discipline develops its own ontic to interpret the 
multiple meanings attached to risk. Similarly, the empirical findings illustrated that 
each organisation, department or actor would engage in a similar process, 
interpreting risk according to their own interests over time, which reinforced risk’s 
political construction. These cross-purpose interests clarified that actors could use 
the same language, but with different particularities (Carter, 2008). Rather than an 
ontological conversation (centred on meaning), risk was shown to be an ontic 
conversation (centred on interpretations) and this judgemental process involves, for 
instance, claims of expertise and the creation of antagonistic identities of ‘risk 
experts’ and ‘non-expert’. Ultimately, it is not risk itself but only its construction that 
is challenged. 
Methodologically, the mobilisation of the DT and LOCE in a critical ethnographic 
post-structuralist study is innovative in many ways. Primarily, this is the first 
ethnographic study conducted in accounting and in Brazil, written in English. Thus, 
even if there were some incipient initiatives in this path in Portuguese (e.g. 
Nascimento, 2011; Barroso, 2014), I have built on, extended, and deepened their 
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analysis. Thus, I have made a novel contribution in terms of linking discourse theory 
to the realities of a country which, while having emerged from a colonial past, is 
none the less still subject to powerful global forces in its economic development. 
Moreover, this is the first post-structuralist study of risk management in accounting, 
which mobilised DT and LOCE to its analysis. This methodological perspective 
allowed me to expose risk as a floating signifier. The Social Logic, for example, 
illustrated multiple meanings and articulations of risk, suggesting that it must be 
understood in each context. Thus, even though BrazBank’s actors did not completely 
identify these politics implicit in risk constructions, risk has led to articulatory and 
antagonistic processes inside organisations. This represents a novel and, I believe, 
important contribution to the analysis of risk in financial institutions. Risk 
management is an instrument to maintain power imbalances and create the identity 
of risk experts in opposition to other managers. In this regard, risk is a self-serving 
discourse: it is self-interested, constructed and used by experts to claim power. Thus, 
the examination of the subjugation of social measures under supposed and illusory 
objectivity and neutrality residing in risk management guidelines and used by 
different actors highlights the contradictions between ‘what is said’ about risk and 
‘what risk management actually does’.  
This is also the first time that Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory has been used to 
analyse power relations and the development of the concept of risk within a bank. 
Internationally and locally, risk is an instrument of domination, if not power itself. 
This power is perpetuated by this ability to claim what is right or wrong, and is 
obtained by some particular representations of risk that create a space for individuals 
and institutions to subjugate others. In my research, I show how internal politics and 
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dynamics inside organisations refer to risk as a nodal point in shifting discourses that 
are permeated by claims of power.  
This thesis also sheds light on the actions of subjects to maintain risk discourses and 
conceal their radical contingency. When you make a decision about the future, you 
actually do not know what tomorrow is going to be like, but we hide this reality. 
This is like a closure that provides a temporary closure and concretises future 
outcomes according to boundaries that exclude and include some elements of this 
complex and dynamic process of decision-making. Experts usually portray risk as 
objective, because measurement is the language of certainty; thus, we pretend that 
measurement is certainty. As a result, experts use risk as a bridge that provides a 
universal sense of reassurance. Risk constructs the power and certainty, which, 
although artificial, permits us to know (or claim to know) what tomorrow is going to 
be like. Consequently, risk itself is an ideological discourse. A subject acts through 
ideology, and ideology is used to cover over the structural limits of our discourses. 
Risk is actually an illumination, not of all, but only of part; it sheds light on what one 
wants to show. It is a glimpse, a brief image, of the fundamental contingencies. In 
this sense, risk is similar to uncertainty and every decision is contingent. Thus, risk is 
an attempt to say that tomorrow is going to be fine. This is catachrestical rhetoric, 
because risk is naming the unnameable. It names what the risk of tomorrow is, but it 
cannot really determine it, so risk is always failure.  
Finally, my research shows that risk has created a problem of communication. The 
technology of risk proposes the ability to simplify and enable, but, in fact, it creates 
miscommunication in organisations. This is because risk is empty of actual 
signification, so its construction represents an act of politics that tries to claim 
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universality in a hegemonic sense. For that reason, this research exposed multiple 
interpretations within the organisation and among its actors, who tried to expand or 
constrain risk’s articulation throughout BrazBank’s history and Board of Director’s 
political mandates. This whole logic of risk, then, was connected with the 
maintenance of power imbalances. 
My third contribution to knowledge is to provide evidence of the way in which 
specific actors in a specific financial context used the concept of risk and its 
variability in their ongoing battles for supremacy within their organisation. In this 
research, I demonstrated how the conceptualisation of risk created antagonist 
positions in the BrazBank. In doing so, it segregated experts and non-experts in order 
to sustain power imbalances, rather than aggregating actors into its 
operationalisation. This characteristic faced in the BrazBank imitated Big 4 
consultants’ position, which also creates a disparity between their ‘superior’ 
knowledge and that of BrazBank’s risk experts. Ultimately, the latter replicated this 
behaviour and rhetoric, while claiming the necessity of developing a ‘state of the art’ 
in risk management practise. Of course, this situation brought problems to both 
sides.  
This research contributes to the study of risk from more critical paradigms in 
accounting and finance, and investigates it from sociological, political, and historical 
perspectives (Miller, 2001; Carter, 2008), based on linguistic, social, political, and 
psychoanalytical analysis. Consequently, it challenges the neo-classical economic 
and positivist perspective that permeates research in accounting and finance and 
recognises broader sociological and political dimensions. This research enables the 
study of specific risk-management practices, responding to the need for more 
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organisational studies on this topic (Gephar et al., 2009; Power, 2009). Further, it 
answers calls for more holistic approaches in the analysis of practices of risk 
management that pay more attention to a wide range of cultural paradigms 
(Lounsbury, 2008), enabling a greater understanding of the role and limitations of 
management accounting and the implications of broader conceptions of risk for the 
management of organisations (Collier and Berry, 2002). Therefore, in exploring the 
discursive (constructed) nature of the concept of risk, my research begins to fill the 
gaps identified. 
Furthermore, this discussion contributes to our current understanding of risk, in the 
wake of the ongoing global financial crisis. My research concentrates on the 
influence of subjectivity on corporate risk management and the failures of 
quantitative models of risk management. It is also practically oriented, which 
supports organisations in the implementation of risk management by highlighting the 
importance of subjectivity, culture and complexity in this process. Much research 
argues that the implementation of risk management is complex and difficult (Mikes, 
2009; Arena et al., 2010; Woods, 2011). My study, then, suggests that these 
complexities cannot be resolved through traditional positivist research, for it 
abstracts the subject, holding a subject-object duality, it generalizes and takes a 
superficial view of organisational reality (Crotty, 1998; Chua, 1986). Furthermore, 
there are few critical contributions exploring how risk management works in 
practice, and even fewer, addressing how the organisation develops its own 
conception of risk and how it contributes to a style of risk management (Gephart et 
al., 2009; Power, 2009).  
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My thesis, hence, examines different hierarchies, departments and individuals 
working within the framework of risk, demonstrating that the concept of risk has 
different meanings and purposes, even within a single organisation. Post-
structuralism argues for an ontological and multi-faceted conceptualisation of reality, 
and advocates the importance of listening to different voices and recognising power 
relationships and imbalance. Post-structuralism focuses on how subjects mobilise 
objects and meanings, and considers the historical context related to power, politics 
and conflict (see Chapter 4). Through this perspective, it is possible to understand 
more fully that social artefacts, like risk, are not neutral, but political. This insight 
lend weight to my analysis of the importance of concepts such as ‘risk appetite’ and 
‘risk culture’, proposing a deep understanding of the social process of defining risk, 
the complexities of the social and political processes that underlie that definition, and 
the sophistication required in the implementation of risk management in BDBs. 
‘Risk management’ has become a prime reference (nodal point) for corporate 
governance in firms. However, this research is not merely focused on technical 
artefacts and frameworks of risk management, but on the way that subjects (actors) 
interact with them, and thus, construct the idea of ‘risk’ and risk management in this 
particular organisational context. As a result, my research gives ‘readings’ and 
‘interpretations’ and invites readers to choose which discursive construction they are 
more persuaded by. The next section exposes how this research might also provide 
contributions beyond academia. 
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8.3.4. Contributions beyond the fieldwork and academia 
Because of its practical focus, this thesis is able to offer a contribution that goes 
beyond theoretical insight. My many meetings with managers and other staff at the 
BrazBank led to an interaction based on a relationship of trust that included the 
organisation deeply in this thesis. As a result of such deep collaboration, it became 
clear that my research could contribute to improving the BrazBank’s operation and 
resolving their conflicts. Although all this interaction was done in an informal way 
and on my own initiative, its outputs were important to ratify points of view that 
could be limited by my research lens and were reduced after the iterations with those 
participants. Moreover, this perspective was worthwhile to comprehend the 
expectations of this organisation and its actors. Therefore, practical contributions 
could be highlighted here, exposing potential implications of this research to 
practitioners.  
This research shed light on the complexity and dynamicity of human relations, and 
then, its influence on risk management practices. This might highlight the role of the 
subjects and the methodological, social and political aspects of risk constructions. 
Thus, it might shift the focus of risk management practices, considered by many as 
only technical artefacts; 
This research challenges the incongruence within the rhetoric that claims the 
possibility of a universal ‘state of the art’ within practices of risk management. 
Considering the case of the BrazBank studied here, it is clear that the idea of risk 
will face different constraints and contestations in each singular organisation. 
Consequently, solutions must be contextualised and adapted to each site. 
365 | P a g e  
 
Considering how the current hegemonic logic of risk in the BrazBank was 
constructed reinforcing the contribution of credit grant departments and not the risk 
management department to the (financial) sustainability of this bank, this research 
shed light on the limitations in incentives and performance evaluations at Brazilian 
public institutions. Perhaps actors involved in the construction of risk and 
contestations around its hegemonic discourse may utilise the accounting mechanisms 
in place to sustain antagonistic positions. Therefore, pondering upon the managerial 
accounting policies and norms in place might help Boards to understand the 
hegemonic discourse of risk and the potential impacts of such a conceptulisation. In 
this regard, this study demonstrated the necessity of constant re-evaluation and 
experimentation in this process of risk management implementation, as well as an 
analysis of the kind of behaviours which these practices are encouraging; 
In the specific case of Brazilian public institutions, I highlighted that the influence of 
changes in political mandates and the necessity of developing strategies to cope with 
them and reduce their impact. Although other organisations around the world may 
not face this kind of political change, shifts in the tone from the top and actors who 
are involved in the risk construct might present tension and contestation around 
sedimented practices. For that reason, these changes must be conducted carefully. 
The hegemony or success of risk management practices and risk culture in 
organisations might involve, then, a constant process of renegotiation, judgement 
and conflict management to bring cooperation and support to risk management 
activities. In this regard, Mikes (2015) and Mikes et al. (2013) have highlighted the 
importance of risk experts gaining influence, for example through a collaborative 
profile that emphasises the characteristics of humble CROs.  
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In general, this research does not provide a recipe for how to keep employees’ 
engagement, motivation and acculturation towards risk management practices. 
Nevertheless, it sheds light on many methodological, social and political aspects that 
might be considered by institutions and Boards in the implementation and 
maintenance of these practices. Ultimately, as in any research, this thesis also offers 
scope for future investigations, despite its limitations. 
 
8.5. Glimpsing the Future: Limitations and Opportunities 
Reflecting upon my investigation, I believe that my choice to study a single 
organisation in depth could leave my research open to the charge that it lacks 
representativeness. However, considering the post-structuralist theory in which this 
thesis is grounded, there is no aim here to provide generalisable results. For that 
reason, as I made clear before, this is just one of the readings available at the 
BrazBank, which was constructed considering my period of fieldwork as well as my 
particular paradigmatic, theoretical and disciplinary lenses. Therefore, each site 
would provide multiple readings as they are formed by a complex and dynamic 
blend of interactions between institutions, agents, interests, experiences, social laws, 
cultures, risk appetites, and so forth. As a result, each case must be analysed in 
particular, even if insights from one of them could be expanded to and validated in 
others.  
Furthermore, my previous professional experience forms part of these analyses and 
cannot be separated from the considerations that I have made in this research. As I 
made clear earlier, the main motivation for this research came from my practical 
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experience, and the feeling that the mainstream literature did not adequately reflect 
the practices of risk management on the ground. Of course, the contradictions and 
inadequacies of risk exposed here might leave some kind of insecurity to the reader 
who is not familiar with the multi-layered nature of post-structuralist research. 
Conversely, however, much of the real complexity faced during my field work 
needed to be simplified here in order to provide an easier understanding to the 
readers.  
In this regard, this research represents a political intervention and is not intended to 
uncover the causality between discursive elements of risk construction, but to 
provide a critical explanation of them. Obviously, I cannot deny the theoretical lens 
provided by the DT. However, its combination with post-colonial theory clarifies 
that this research was not driven just by this theory either. Therefore, there are many 
other theoretical readings which were available to aid understanding of this site, but 
surely the DT provided the most reasonable explanation for the reality encountered 
in the BrazBank.  
The validity of this research is provided by the richness of details and range of data 
sources used in order to complement the gaps found in literature, but experienced in 
practice. To this extent, this research was both insightful and challenging. As already 
outlined, the radical contingencies faced in BrazBank’s risk discourse were 
frustrating even for me, but have made clearer the politics and power imbalances 
within risk’s construction. These social and political sides of risk have driven my 
interest in understanding the construction of risk at other sites. And, although this 
was not part of this research, interviews carried out as well as conferences attended 
after the data collection confirmed the social and political discursive elements of risk 
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construction that were presented here. Nonetheless, recognising the particularity of 
each context, these constructions must be further investigated and better 
comprehended in the future. 
The most significant contribution of my thesis is to establish a potential new 
direction for accounting research in the area of risk, as it illustrates how the 
utilisation of a political approach in accounting is important to both academics and 
practitioners. Furthermore, students with this kind of understanding might have a 
more active influence in challenging the arbitrary nature of the construction of risk 
or other accounting tools in their practices. Although I recognised the difficulties in 
developing this kind of study, especially, considering the access to this kind of 
practices that could be restricted to senior positions, or kept as a secret, there are 
some paths available to further research in this area.  
Additionally, even though most of the mainstream research is triggered by the 
exposition of cases of success, we can learn also from mistakes or practices that are 
not fully normalised. The emergence and consolidation of managerial practices must 
also consider their contingent aspects as well as contestation stage. The struggles 
existing before the implementation of a new accounting practice cannot be simply 
ignored or obscured in an accounting research that is passing through many changes, 
such as the IFRS process of harmonisation, attempts to improve governance and 
controls, claims for more transparency through integrated reports, requests from 
different actors about accountability, and many others. In sum, more than just 
demonstrating institutions that are ‘successful’, researchers might search for cases of 
failure as a way to intervene and improve these contexts. 
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These struggles might be examined using both the LOCE as well as the DT, as there 
are few studies in accounting following this methodology and theory. The expansion 
of these tools could highlight elements previously obscured in accounting research, 
as they shed light on angles rarely examined before. This in itself would be a 
contribution, but both LOCE and DT encourage the inclusion of other theories and 
methods to improve the understanding of complex and dynamic realities in our 
modern world. Therefore, the coalition with other centres of research and specialists 
from other subjects might improve the quality of the researches developed in this 
field, as our knowledge will be always limited by and contingent upon our own 
background and perspective. That said, these suggestions might favour more 
interdisciplinary political research in accounting.  
The limited access to internal practices could not be used as an excuse to avoid 
developing more politically focused research in accounting, as we have many 
different sources of information and disclosure. The contradictions between those 
different discourses and the relevance of excluded elements must be scrutinised from 
more critical research perspectives, which focus not only on what is said, but also 
unsaid, shedding light on alternatives and possibilities that were not pondered, or 
were deliberatively excluded. In this regard, two current cases stand out as 
particularly worthy of attention. First, the discourses to improve governance and 
controls in the scandal of the Brazilian Oil Company, Petrobras, that dislocated the 
politically complex causes of this problem as a way to propose a technical contingent 
solution. Secondly, the different perspectives and mechanisms utilised by 
representatives in Scotland and England respectively to support and discourage the 
former’s claims for independence through the construction of completely different 
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projections of future outcomes and, therefore, risks. Consequently, public debates 
and disagreements might be the source of academic interventions.  
Additionally, the construction of accounting discourses and supposed solutions 
might be further examined. The politics and interests implicit in each particular 
construction of accounting’s “solutions” might be scrutinised considering their 
emergence and created hegemonies. Thus, gaps between theory and practices as well 
as principles and interests might expose the politics, bias and subjectivity in 
accounting discourse, as well as the alternatives that these hegemonies are excluding.  
In this regard, perhaps the main difference between the current discourse of risk and 
previous articulations of these practices was the absence of a converging hegemonic 
perspective for the conceptualisation of best practices, which would provide a safe 
terrain for risk experts to claim or maintain their authority in the BrazBank. After the 
sub-prime crisis, the divergences in risk constructions were presented both in 
international and national statements of risk regulations and guidelines, as well as 
externally and internally to the BrazBank. This available space was then taken over 
by non-experts, who perceived the waning of risk hegemonic discourse as an 
opportunity to re-establish their power. During my fieldwork, this was an ongoing 
dispute. 
Glynos et al. (2015), nevertheless, demonstrate that it might be naïve to think that the 
contestations after current risk fallacies would generate a revolution in this concept. 
Indeed, what has been observed during the last decades is the reinvention of risk. 
Thus, the current era seems to have found a way to re-establish trust in the concept 
of risk while renaming its practices as ‘resilience management’ (Huberand Scheytt, 
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2013) and portraying it as a ‘clumsy solution’ to ‘wicked problems’ (Linsley 
andKewell, 2015) or the ‘revealing hand’ of strategic management (Mikes, 2016). Of 
course, there is still a lot of divergence between regulators and professional bodies 
about the future path for this discourse (e.g. BIS, 2013, IRM, 2011, 2012), but each 
of them will try to accommodate their interests in the most beneficial hegemonic 
route of this discourse. 
I present this thesis as a contribution to the knowledge of risk management. As a 
practitioner in this field, I am aware of the spectacular failures of risk and loss of 
confidence in its measures. Hence, I humbly offer these insights as a deeper way of 
understanding the complexity and dynamics of the construction of risk in practice. 
As a Brazilian, I hope to play a role in supporting my country in challenging the 
imposition of risk-management international regulations and finding a way to 
develop an authentic and self-defining approach to manage risk in banking and 
accounting. I believe that the approach presented here might be used to empower 
individuals, organisations and countries in adopting a self-reflexive perspective, to 
challenge the taken-for-granted, isomorphic and imported ‘solutions’, commonly 
called ‘best practices’.   
APPENDIX 1 – The Articulation of Risk in Different Periods 
Period Macro-Discourse BrazBank’s 
Practices 
Rhetoric Hierarchy Involved 
2000-2002 ‐ Brazil: controlled hyperinflation and NPM’s 
imperatives. 
 
‐ World: Credit and Market Risk Management 
associated with Internal Controls mechanisms and 





Practices in a 
Learning 
Approach 
‐ BrazBank operations must become more Professional 
and Market Driven.  
 
‐ Logic of Equivalence expanding the meaning of risk 
through ideas of 'new', 'better', 'objective', 'efficient', 
'professional', and 'compliance' (necessary). 
 
‐ Catachrestical moment name the lack (risk analysis 
instead of actor’s experience and judgements). 
‐ Analysts and 
Managers working to 
development risk 
management practices 
with support from 
consulting firms and 
the Board of 
Directors. 
2003-2004 ‐ Brazil: mimetic risk management development 
process reflecting world trends (BCB's regulation 
about the necessity of an auditing committee for 
financial institutions in 2003); 
 
‐ World: Credit and Market Risk Management. 
Tremendous focus on Operational Risk 
Management (instead of only Internal Controls) 





‐ Combat initial contestations against risk management 
practices; 
 
‐ Risk Management to avoid Frauds (reinforcing the 
necessity to be independent, so a neutral and trained 
expert); 
 
‐ More than just compliance with national regulations 
from BCB, but follow international best practices from 
BIS, COSO and SOX. 
‐ Auditors claimed a 
space to replicate best 




receiving the support 
from the Board of 
Directors. 
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2005 - 2006 ‐ Brazil: mimetic risk management development 
process reflecting world trends; 
 
‐ World: Credit and Market Risk Management. 
Tremendous focus on Operational Risk 
Management (instead of only Internal Controls) 





‐ Risk management practices represent the 'most 
modern technique', 'worldwide in use' and 'best 
practices'; 
 
‐ Risk experts argue for 'independence', 'compliance' 
and 'IT standardisation to avoid human errors, thus, 
threats; 
 
- Metonymical condensation of risk in one most 
impactful category. 
‐ Auditors replicate 





from the Board of 
Directors. 
Period Macro-Discourse BrazBank's 
Practices 
Rhetoric Hierarchy Involved 
2007-2008 ‐ Brazil: Mimetic Risk Management Development 
Process reflecting world trends (BCB's regulation 
about an independent operational risk management 
department for financial institutions in 2006); 
 
‐ World: Enterprise Risk Management (Integrated 









‐ Risk management practices must be integrated and 
holistic in order to aggregate value to BrazBank's 
operations; 
 
‐ Risk management is not Auditing; 
 
‐ Risk experts argue for 'independence' and 
'compliance' with 'best practices'; 
 
‐ Logic of Difference claiming that we are all working 
to aggregate value to BrazBank; 
‐ Risk Experts 
disseminate the best 





from the Board of 
Directors. 
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2009-2013 ‐ Brazil: Mimetic Risk Management Development 
Process reflecting world trends (BCB regulation 
about capital, leverage and liquidity risk 
management framework in 2011) ; 
 
‐ World: Subprime Crisis and divergence between 
regulations and guidelines that claimed more 
sophisticated quantitative models for capital and 
liquidity risk management (Basel lll) and a focus on 








‐ Stronger contestation about the inadequacy of risk 
management practices to BrazBank's operation and 
financial sustainability; 
 
‐ Risk Experts blame other managers by a weak 'Risk 
Culture' at the BrazBank;  
 
‐ Risk Experts reinforce the necessity to achieve an 
'State of the Art' and have cooperation from other 
managers; 
‐ Risk Experts blame 
other Managers 
without the support 
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